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The objective of this dissertation is to understand the functioning of 
nationwide low-income health insurance scheme - Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) - in India and explain variations in its performance across states. It 
demonstrates that inter-organizational relations (IOR) play a critical role in shaping 
the variations in performance of the scheme across jurisdictions. 
The performance of the RSBY scheme, a public–private partnerships, varies 
widely across jurisdictions, despite similar incentive structure, contract design, 
administrative structure and management capacity. The theories traditionally used to 
explain variation in performance of a public-private partnership -- Contract Theory, 
Relational Theory, Social Capital Theory, theories in policy Implementation, 
Network Analysis/ Management -- fail to explain the variation in performance. 
Existing theories have not elucidated the role inter-organizational relations play in 
determining performance. The inter-organizational relations consist of two parts –the 
way relationship between agencies is structured also known as implementation 
structure and the approach used to manage the relationship, also known as 
compliance mechanism.  Implementation structure and compliance mechanism 
together constitute inter-organizational relations among organizations.  
Most of the existing theories and frameworks have either examined role of 
implementation structure or role of compliance mechanisms in determining 
performance. Some theoretical frameworks have considered both- implementation 
structure and compliance mechanism,-but they treat them as single variable without 
considering relationship between them. There is very little conceptualization on how 
the congruence or incongruence between implementation structure and compliance 
mechanism affects performance and the extent to which it has impact on 
performance. This dissertation suggests that relationship between structure and 
compliance mechanism is a significant determinant of implementation and explains 
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variations in performance across jurisdictions. Congruence between structure and 
compliance mechanism leads to appropriate inter-organizational relations conducive 
to implementation performance.  
To assess the role of inter-organizational relations on implementation 
performance, the dissertation conducts two sequential inquiries using two different 
methods.  
First, it qualitatively traces the influence of inter-organizational relations on 
implementation performance by mapping variations in congruence between 
implementation structure and compliance mechanism during different stages of policy 
implementation and traces their effect on performance. This also illuminates the 
process of evolution of inter-organizational relations; trace their effectiveness in 
managing opportunities and threats that arise during implementation and thus 
assessing the appropriateness of inter-organizational relations in managing 
implementation process.  
 Second, after understanding the effect of inter-organizational relations on 
implementation performance, the study assess the impact of inter-organizational 
relations on implementation performance. To achieve this, first a measure inter-
organizational relations in the context of the case used in this thesis is created. After 
measuring inter-organizational relations, its impact on performance is assessed in the 
second step.  For creating a measure of inter-organizational relations, a review of the 
existing approaches to measuring inter-organizational relationships is done and   
inter-organizational relations in the context of case is measured using primary survey.  
In the second step,  the study   assess the extent to which inter-organizational 
relationship among agencies explain variation in implementation performance across 
jurisdictions using regression analysis.  
Thus the first study traces the effect of inter-organizational relation on 
implementation performance, and the second assesses the extent to which inter-
organizational relations impact implementation performance. Facts and findings from 
xi 
 
the two inquiries open the black-box of inter-organizational relations during policy 
implementation and explain their effect on policy performance, generating 
implications for both theory and practice in policy implementation.  
Findings from the study confirm that inter-organizational relations are an 
important determinant of variation in implementation performance. Policy 
implementation by default is an inter-organizational activity and successful policy 
implementation, requires an inter-organizational relations that is appropriate and 
conducive to the implementation process. Appropriate IORs are those where there is 
congruence between structure and compliance mechanism. This congruence 
effectively manages the opportunities and threats that arise during the implementation 
process leading to higher implementation performance.  
Secondly, there is a direct relationship between the extent of congruence 
between implementation structure and compliance mechanism with implementation 
performance. Higher the alignment between implementation structure and compliance 
mechanism, higher is the implementation performance. Thus performance of a policy 
is crucially determined by the design and management of inter –organizational 
relations during implementation.  
This dissertation highlights the role of inter-organizational relations in policy 
performance, a role which has been largely ignored by scholars in public policy. 
Policies get implemented without due consideration of management of inter-
organizational relationship. This thesis suggests that the use of congruent inter –
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1 CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Structure of Thesis  
 
The health system of India has been performing poorly, as health outcomes 
are lower than spending on health
1
. Some health indicators like infant mortality rate 
and malnutrition are not only lower than those of other countries in South Asia, but 
even worse than those of Sub-Saharan Africa (Dreze and Sen, 2013; Human 
Development Report 2010). In India, if the healthcare reforms of the last decade 
(2005–2014) are ignored, the public sector can be viewed as failing to provide even 
basic healthcare services. Institutional failures and low public health spending had led 
to a gradual deterioration of the public health system over the years, and by the end of 
the century, public facilities were in a pathetic state, healthcare providers were absent, 
drug supplies and consumables were unavailable, and facilities were closed most of 
the time (Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2005; Peters 
et al., 2002; Banerjee et al., 2004). Subsequently, most of the population sought 
services from private providers
2
, which varied extensively in terms of quality of care, 
and which were paid for out of pocket in the absence of health insurance coverage
3
, 
leading to financial vulnerability
4
 and poor access to care.   
To address the failings of both the public and private healthcare systems, a 
number of healthcare reforms were initiated in last decade in an attempt to revive the 
dysfunctional public health system
5
 and increase financial access to high-cost care
6
. 
                                                          
1
 Total health Expenditure in 2012 was  4.1% of the GDP according to the World Bank 
database.   
2
 At present 70% of hospitals, 38.2% of hospital beds, 60 to 79% of doctors, 80% of outpatient 
care and 57 % of inpatient care are in private sector. (Bhat, 1996; Ramani and Dileep, 2006; 
and WHO, 2006; Decosta and Diwan, 2007; World Bank, 2001).  
3
 By 2005 only 5% of the population was covered under some of insurance ( PHFI India report 
2010). 
4
 According to Peters et al (2004) 35% of Indians fall below poverty line because of 
hospitalization every year. 
5
 A series of programs -National Rural Health Mission, Urban Health Mission and now 
National Health Mission- by increasing funding and improve management strategies, are 
trying to revive dysfunctional public health system.  
3 
 
The healthcare reform program, the National Health Insurance Scheme (Rashtriya 
Swasthya Bima Yojana, or RSBY), launched in 2007, is one of the largest and most 
prominent government-sponsored social health insurance schemes, covering 37 
million families in 436 districts across 29 states by 2013. This program is 
implemented through a public-private partnership (PPP) mode, in which a state 
government agency contracts with an insurance company to provide defined health 
insurance coverage to a defined population in a district. The government funds the 
insurance premium, provides oversight of the program, and facilitates 
implementation. Health insurance companies (public as well as private) and their 
intermediaries enroll beneficiaries in the program, provide risk pooling, and deliver 
healthcare services through a network of providers empanelled from the public and 
private sectors. 
1.1 The Puzzle: Motivation for This Thesis  
 
The RSBY scheme is implemented through a uniform scheme design and 
implementation process that varies very little across states; however, performance of 
the scheme varies widely, not only across states
7
 but also within a state, across 





 and institutional environments
10
 but extensive variation in 
the implementation performance. What factors lead to this variation in the 
implementation performance?  
                                                                                                                                                        
6
  Number of government sponsored health insurance schemes, were initiated by central and 
state governments, increasing health insurance coverage of population from 5% in  2005 to 
around 25% by 2010 (Reddy et al., 2011). 
7
 State here refers to provinces. India is a federal union of twenty nine states and seven union 
territories.   
8
 All districts have the same contract design and similar contract management structure, 
suggesting same incentive structures. 
9
 In all the districts, same healthcare services are being purchased, and same organizations are 
working, therefore the role of market, context and capacity as factors attributing to variation is 
also limited 
10
 The role of institutional environment is also expected to be limited, as RSBY scheme does 
not depend on the formal institutional system for addressing conflict, and has its own private 
order institutional arrangement for grievance redressal. 
4 
 
Theoretical frameworks in the contract performance, public-private 
partnership (specifically in health and social services), and policy implementation has 
mainly focused on scheme design/contract design
11
 , context, and institutional 
environment
12
, characteristics of the agencies involved (mainly capacity)
13
 and 
Implementation structure and process
14
.  In the  case of RSBY these factors are 
similar across the jurisdictions and do not play a significant role in explaining 
variation in implementation performance. As implementation design is the same 
across jurisdictions, it is the management of implementation that can be expected to 
determine the variations. A number of studies suggest implementation management / 
Contract management / Inter-Organisational Relations as an important factor in 
determining performance but there is very limited understanding of the role they play.   
The literature on PPP in social services, policy implementation, and inter-
organizational relations has identified implementation management and the resulting 
relationship between implementing agencies
15
 as an important determinant of the 
performance but there is limited research on the role of scheme implementation or 
contract management in determining performance in public contracting and public–
private partnerships. In the existing literature is limited and fragmented, and offers 
contradictory findings on the role of implementation management in the performance 
of policy. 
                                                          
11
 Please see Venkataraman, 2009; Iossa, E., G. Spagnolo, and M. Vellez, 2007; Prekar, 2007; 
Prekar and Langenbrunner, 2005; Liu et.al., 2004, Loevinsohn and Harding, 2004, Mills, 1998 
 
12
 For details refer to Mackay B, Azariah S., 2005; Fernandez, S., 2007; Bazolli et al., 2003; 
Pongsiri, 2002; Baker, 2003; Jamali, 2004, Zouggari, 2003; Grimsey and Lewis, 2004 
13
 See Mills (1998); Fernandez 2007 ; Bhat et al., 2007; Venkataraman 2009, Siddiqui 2006; 
Zaidi et al 2011. 
14
 For Example see Wiladavasky (1973) Lipsky (1980) Goggin (1980) , Winter (2006), Proven 
and Kenis (2005). 
 
15
 For details refer to Dehoog, 1990; Brown and Potoski, 2007; Davis, 2007 ; Van Slyke, 
2007; Gazely, 2008; Brown, Potoski and Van slyke, 2007; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; 
Palmer, 2000; Lonnoroth, 2007 
5 
 
This thesis therefore synthesizes literature from various disciplines, 
identifying gaps in linkage between implementation management and performance, 
and assessing the impact of implementation management on performance.  
Management of implementation in a multi-organizational context includes 
the way in which implementation is structured or designed (Implementation 
structure/mode of organisation) and approach used to manage implementation 
(Compliance mechanism). The three modes of organisation in which implementation 
could be structured are hierarchy, market and network, but generally in practice it is a 
combination of these three pure forms. Similarly the three modes of compliance used 
for managing implementation are authority /rules, incentives and persuasion but in 
practice it is generally a combination of these three modes of compliance.  Taken 
together (Implementation structure and compliance mechanism) both leads to steering 
of relationships between and among organizations, commonly referred as inter-
organizational relations /service delivery regime /mode of governance.  More 
discussion on this is provided in Chapter Two.  
The literature on the public service delivery regime (Osborn 2010; Parsons 1995), 
governance design (Considine and Lewis, 1999; Howlett and Ramesh, 2013), and 
policy implementation (Peters, 2014) defines the IORs/ implementation regime/ mode 
of governance/ service delivery regime – Hierarchy, Market, and Network – as a 
unique combination of implementation structure (mode of organization) and 
compliance mechanism   also known as mode of compliance. For example, hierarchy 
is a combination of bureaucratic organizational structures, and ensures compliance by 
authority and rules. 
 The literature in general treats these service delivery regimes as a single variable 
during analysis, making an assumption of congruence-that agents in a bureaucratic 
organizational structure will mainly use authority and rules to ensure compliance.  
But the incongruence is more common than expected specially in public 
contracting, where contracts are designed in one approach because of transparency 
6 
 
and accountability reasons but managed in a completely different approach
16
. 
Recently, Hill and Hupe (2014, pg. 191) have suggested that incongruence between 
the implementation structure and compliance mechanism will affect performance, but 
there is no conceptualization of how it influences performance. 
The theories most commonly used to explain variation in the performance of a 
public-private partnership  either assume congruence between structure and 
compliance mechanism (Contract Theory, Relational Theory, Theories in Policy 
Implementation ) or  they only consider structure ( Network Analysis ) or Compliance 
mechanism ( Network Management, Compliance Mechanism , Social Capital) but not 
both,  in their analysis of  implementation performance. This thesis will, challenge the 
conventional thinking that assumes congruence between implementation structure 
(mode of organization) and compliance mechanism (mode of compliance) and will 
provide the first empiricalization of this argument. 
The thesis argues that the alignment between compliance mechanism and the 
implementation structure determines appropriateness of IORs which is a significant 
determinant of implementation, and explains variation in performance across 
jurisdictions.   
Secondly the thesis argues that congruence between implementation structure 
and compliance mechanism is a continuum. The level of congruence ranges from 
non-congruence to high level of congruence.  Depending upon the level of alignment 
between implementation structure and compliance mechanism, the intensity of 
congruency will vary and therefore higher alignment is expected to lead to higher 
performance.  Congruency leads to appropriate management of opportunities and 
threats that arise during opportunism and therefore higher level of congruence 
suggests better management and thus higher performance.  
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 A number of studies have suggested that in public contracting contracts may be designed in 
formal manner because of the accountability and transparency requirement in public 
sector but they are managed in a relational style
16
 (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Goo and 
Huang, 2008; Van Slyke, 2006, 2007; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; 
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 To assess the role of inter-organizational relations (congruence between 
implementation structure and compliance mechanism) on implementation 
performance, this study involves two sequential inquiries using different methods.  
First, the study qualitatively traces the influence of inter-organizational 
relations on implementation performance by mapping variations in congruence 
between implementation structure and compliance mechanism, during different stages 
of policy implementation. This variation in congruency between implementation 
structure and compliance mechanism is then linked to their effectiveness in 
preventing and controlling partner opportunism. The comparative case analysis 
illuminates the variations in congruence between implementation structure and 
compliance mechanism across cases, linking with their effectiveness in preventing 
and controlling opportunism. The cross case analysis also identifies factors that led to 
creation of appropriate inter-organizational relations effective in preventing and 
controlling opportunism.  
Second, after understanding the effect of IOR on implementation 
performance, the study measures congruency between implementation structure and 
compliance mechanism across implementation units. A review of the existing 
approaches to measuring inter-organizational relationships suggests that collaboration 
among agencies is a congruent compliance mechanism in a network mode of 
implementation structure. The review develops a measurement model appropriate for 
the RSBY scheme and applies it using primary survey data collected for the thesis.  
Finally, the study measures the impact of congruent inter-organizational 
relations on performance. Collaboration as a congruent IOR is linked to the 
implementation performance. Regression analysis is used to assess the impact of 
congruency on implementation performance. In other words, analysis aims to answer 
the question- does higher congruency leads to higher performance?  
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Thus the first study traces the effect of inter-organizational relations on 
implementation performance; the second assesses the extent to which congruent inter-
organizational relations impact implementation performance.  
The facts and findings from the two inquiries will open the black box of 
inter-organizational relations during policy implementation, and explain their 
influence on implementation performance, generating implications for both the theory 
and practice of policy implementation.  
1.2 Research Questions and Objectives  
 
As this thesis focuses on the inter-organizational relationships (IORs) in 
public-private partnerships in healthcare and works within the realm of policy 
implementation studies, the research questions guiding the thesis are as follows: 
Research Question:  
What is the role of inter-organizational relationships in determining the 
performance of the scheme? 
 
Here, ‗inter-organizational relationship‘ refers to the structure, management 
and steering of relationships between organizations. Cropper et al., (2008) describes 
the field of Inter-organizational relations (or IORs) as the field of study of Inter-
organizational Entities (IOE) where the organizations can be from public, business or 
non-profit, from just two organizations to huge networks of organizations, and from 
non-contractual relationships to long term contracts. The IOR consists of 
implementation structure, that is how implementation is designed and compliance 
mechanism used by the agency to manage the implementation process. The role of 
IORs in policy implementation performance, has been stressed by most 
implementation scholars, but ignored by researchers until very recently. IOR is now 
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considered one of the most critical variables contributing to theorization in policy 
implementation (Hill and Hupe, 2014; Winter, 2012; Peters, 2014). 
Here ‗performance‘ refers to policy implementation performance, which 
implies the achievement of the objectives of the scheme in terms of output, but not 
outcome or impact of the scheme. Perfect policy implementation is possible even in 
the case of policy failure, and therefore studies explaining policy impact and 
outcomes contribute little to the understanding of policy implementation (May, 1999; 
Winter, 2012; Hill and Hupe, 2014; Peters, 2014). Therefore this thesis explains 
variation in the policy outputs and implementation outputs, which is considered 
critical to improve theorization in policy implementation.  
 To answer the above question, the thesis traces the link between IORs 
among agencies implementing the RSBY scheme and implementation performance 
during the different stages of policy implementation, and assesses the impact of 
congruent IORs on implementation performance. Therefore, the sub-questions that 
the thesis aims to answer are as follows:    
Sub-question 1:  
How do inter-organizational relationships affect implementation performance?  
Objective 1: Use multi-case multi-level analysis (qualitative) to understand the 
dynamics of inter-organizational relations in controlling opportunism between 
stakeholders in the RSBY scheme. Control of opportunism is considered as one of the 
most important components of implementation performance.   The variation in 
compliance mechanism for preventing and controlling opportunism is explored along 
with its relationship with implementation context in prevention and control of 
opportunism.  
This study will demarcate the policy implementation structure, identify the 
opportunities and constraints that implementation structures impose on agents, and 
map the compliance mechanism used by agents, thus linking the interaction between 
implementation structure and compliance mechanism to policy implementation 
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performance.  This will untangle some of the dynamics between implementation 
structure and compliance mechanism, and linking the interaction between them with 
performance at various stages of policy implementation. This will reveal the 
effectiveness of the IOR at that stage of policy implementation, suggesting the degree 
of alignment between the compliance mechanism and implementation structure. Thus 
this thesis will also identify factors that contribute to an effective compliance 
mechanism that is in alignment with implementation structure, effective in controlling 
and preventing opportunism. 
Sub-question 2:   
What is the impact of IOR on implementation performance?  
As there is always a mix of modes of IOR in practice, I use dominant IOR to assess 
its impact on the performance. Dominant IOR refers to the mode of IOR that 
dominates in the given case as there will be a dominant IOR and other subsidiary 
modes. So I assess the impact of dominant IOR on performance.  If the dominant IOR 
used is congruent the performance is expected to be high. 
For assessing the impact of IOR on implementation performance, first a suitable 
measures needs to be developed that can capture the dominant IOR  in the case used 
for this study and then assess the extent to which the dominant IOR impacts 
implementation performance.  Thus for achieving this following two objectives are 
discussed.  
Objective 2.1: Measuring dominant inter-organizational relations in the context of 
the RSBY scheme.   
First a literature review is done to identify a suitable approach to measure dominant 
IOR in the case used for this thesis. Then a measurement index of dominant IOR is 
created using confirmatory factor analysis using primary survey data.  
  
Objective 2.2: Assess the extent to which a dominant IOR explains variation in the 
implementation performance of the RSBY scheme.  
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For achieving this regression analysis is used to measure the extent to which 
congruent inter-organizational relations (congruency between implementation context 
and implementation performance), influence the implementation performance of the 
RSBY scheme.  
Thus the above two questions and respective objectives will trace the effect 
of IORs on implementation performance, measure congruent IORs, and assess the 
impact of congruent IORs on implementation performance, thereby determining the 
role of IORs in policy implementation performance.  
1.3 Significance of the Questions  
 
First, this study promises to advance research into public policy in general 
and policy implementation in particular by taking a number of critical steps as 
suggested by Hill (2014), Hill and Hupe (2014), and Winter (2012). This thesis 
explains variation in the policy outputs and implementation outputs, which is 
considered critical to improve theorization in policy implementation. This thesis 
explores the role of IORs in policy implementation performance, which has been 
stressed by most implementation scholars, but ignored by researchers until very 
recently. The IOR is now considered one of the most critical variables contributing to 
theorization in policy implementation (Hill and Hupe, 2014; Winter, 2012; Peters, 
2014). To explore the role of IORs in policy implementation performance, this thesis 
will demarcate the policy implementation structure, identify the opportunities and 
constraints that implementation structures impose on agents, and map the compliance 
mechanism used by agents, thus linking the interaction between the structure agent 
and compliance mechanism  to policy implementation performance. Categorizing 
variables into structure, agency, and compliance mechanism allows the generation of 
a testable hypothesis leading to theoretical conceptualization in addressing the 
pressing need for advancing theorization in the field (Winter, 2012; Hupe, 2014; Hill 
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and Hupe, 2014). This thesis also measures IORs and quantitatively assesses the 
impact of IORs on policy outputs, a process identified as an important causal analysis 
that has received little attention in policy implementation (Hill and Hupe, 2014, pg. 
148) and public sector contracting (Thomson, 2009; Aamirkhanyan, 2012). This 
study abides by the benchmarks set for advancing the field of policy implementation 
by Hill and Hupe (2014)
17
, and is thus poised to advance theorization in policy 
implementation. 
 Second, this thesis aims to untangle some of the dynamics between structure, 
agents, compliance mechanism, and the interaction between them by linking them 
with performance at various stages of policy implementation.  
Third, this analysis will also contribute to the theorization in the policy 
implementation process (Meier and Toole, 2007; Lynn et al., 2001; Winter, 2012; 
Peters, 2014), identifying critical factors that lead to the creation of an effective IORs 
in different contexts.  This will also identify the critical variables related to 
implementation structure, the characteristics of agents, and how organizations can 
take these factors into account while deploying an compliance mechanism.    
Fourth, this thesis will also identify factors that contribute to an effective 
compliance mechanism that is in alignment with implementation structure, effective 
in controlling and preventing opportunism.  
Fifth, agencies use of the governance mechanism to control opportunism will 
also reveal the composition and evolution of more effective governance strategies to 
prevent and control partner opportunism. This will contribute to theorization in the 
field of contract governance, further improving understanding of the interplay 
between governance mechanisms to effectively control partner opportunism. Both 
practitioners and academics will benefit from the findings, which will illuminate the 
                                                          
17
  A number of criteria have been identified to advance the field of policy 
implementation.These are explaining the pressing issues like role of IOR in implementation 
performance, using a case that clearly separates implementation from policy formulation, 
dealing with multiple layers, specifying IOR, separating agency responses, recognizing the 
macro factors, and using quantitative and qualitative approaches appropriately. 
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factors that contribute to the identification of governance strategies, and help 
effectively manage the opportunism of partners in public–private partnerships , 
further advancing the work in contract governance on these themes (Olsen, 2005; 
Caniels and Gelderman, 2012).   
These findings will also help identify the process of evolution of IORs and 
the social, economic, and contextual factors that lead to variations in IORs, 
contributing  to the field of IORs in policy implementation (O Toole, 2003 & 2012; 
Winter, 2006 & 2012; Peters, 2014). The findings will also suggest how governments 
can design and deploy an effective compliance mechanismIOR to guide policy design 
literature (Xun and Ramesh, 2014). More specifically, the findings will be of direct 
relevance to further theorization in public contracting, on the use of contract 
governance strategies with the private sector, and vice versa  (Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Goo and Huang, 2008; Van Slyke, 2007 & 2009; Lamothe and Lamothe, 
2012).  
Fifth, this thesis will measure the impact of congruent IORs. In this study 
collaboration is the congruent compliance mechanism. This study will identify the 
extent to which performance increases with one unit of increase in collaboration, 
thereby serving as a guide for managers to invest in congruent IOR. As this is one of 
the first studies to use an objective measure of performance to assess the impact of 
IORs, the comparison of its findings with those of perception-based studies might 
provide new insights into the relationship between collaboration and perception of 
performance. 
Sixth, the case of the RSBY scheme will allow the teasing out of the impact 
of IORs on performance by keeping the implementation context constant across 
jurisdictions, as the scheme has the same implementation design across jurisdictions. 
This will be the first ever empirical test linking the IOR and performance in public 
contracting, where all sample units have the same contracted service characteristics 
and contract design, and similar implementation and institutional arrangements 
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(circumstances that are rare in other studies), increasing the causality and validity of 
the findings. This will provide guidance to managers on investing in IORs, and in 
specific components of the IOR that are critical to performance. These findings will 
also advance the theorization in performance of PPP in social services (Romzek and 
Johnston, 2005; Guinness, 2011; Davis, 2007) and contracting in social services 
(Chen, 2010; Aamirkhanyan, 2012; Selden, Sowa and Sandfort, 2006; Thomson, 
2001; Myhr and Sperkman, 2002; Chuang and Lucio, 2011).  
Seventh, this is one of the first studies on inter-organizational relations and its 
relationship with performance in a developing-country context. Most of the studies on 
IOR have been conducted in a Western context, and there has been very limited 
evidence of the testing of this approach in a developing-country context, especially in 
public contracting, using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This study will 
allow for a comparison of the findings about public contracting in a Western context 
(Chen, 2010; Aamirkhanyan, 2010; Selden, Sowa and Sandfort, 2006; Thomson, 
2001; Myhr and Sperkman, 2002; Chuang and Lucio, 2011) with the findings from a 
developing-country context.   
The findings of this study will probably address one of the pressing questions 
in the field of public administration for the developing-country context: is 
collaboration work in the context of a developing country like India? Collaboration 
requires a new set of skills which the managers in the public system in India are not 
expected to have, and thus it is expected that public sector managers will have lower 
levels of collaboration, even if the scheme is designed from a collaboration 
perspective. The governance design theory suggests that if the required IOR is 
collaboration, it needs to be adopted for that implementation context. Therefore, if 
public managers do not use the required mode of IOR, the incongruence between 
implementation design and IOR will hamper performance, especially in contexts 
where public sector managers play a central or crucial role in implementation, and 
therefore in the evolution of the IOR.   
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Finally, this thesis emphasizes the use of a multi-theoretical lens to review 
theoretical developments in various fields like contract governance, network 
governance, collaborative governance, policy implementation, contracting, supply 
chain, social capital, and trust studies. Drawing from various theories, the thesis will 
move beyond silos of theoretical disciplines and aggregate divergent findings beyond 
existing dichotomies. It will use confirmatory factor analysis to develop a 
measurement model suitable for the case of the RSBY scheme. This will provide a 
measure of the IORs developed in a developing-country context, as most of the 
measures of IORs have generally been developed in a Western context. This will also 
illuminate the variations in the measuring of IORs in these two different contexts, and 
contribute to the measurement of IORs in various disciplines.  
1.4 Structure of Thesis  
 
This thesis is organized as follows. After this introductory chapter, Chapter 
Two provides the theoretical background of the two research objectives – 
understanding the role of inter-organizational relations in the prevention and 
management of opportunism, measuring inter-organizational relations among 
agencies, and linking inter-organizational relations to performance. 
Chapter Three provides the background of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY) and the context of the case – the evolution of policy on public-private 
partnerships in healthcare in India.    
Chapter Four presents the methodology used for the two research objectives. 
For the first objective, a qualitative approach is used to conduct a multi-case, multi-
level analysis, which is discussed. For the second objective – linking inter-
organizational relations with performance – a quantitative approach used to link inter-
organizational relations with performance is discussed. 
Chapter Five presents an analysis of the first objective – tracing the influence 
of inter-organizational relations on implementation performance. The chapter traces 
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the evolution of governance dynamics at dyadic, network, and state levels, and its 
influence on opportunism. The findings are presented first as three individual case 
analyses, followed by a cross-case analysis. Three cases are analyzed, mapping 
variations in implementation structure, agents and compliance mechanism linking 
them with partner opportunism, during different stages of policy implementation. The 
comparative case analysis illuminates the relationship between implementation 
structure and compliance mechanism across cases, and identify factors that contribute 
to an effective IOR prevent and control opportunism of partner agencies.  
Chapter Six presents an analysis of the second objective, linking inter-
organizational relationships (measured as a relationship index in the previous chapter) 
with performance measures.  A series of confirmatory factor analyses is done to 
generate a measure of IOR and based on that an index of IOR is generated. Using 
performance data from the program database, a series of regression analyses is 
conducted for three performance objectives – enrolment ratio, hospitalization ratio, 
and quality of implementation. 
Chapter Seven concludes by integrating the findings and observations 
generated on inter-organizational relationships, and summarizing how they influence 
implementation performance.    
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The information and arguments presented in this chapter clearly suggest that 
the variation in performance in the case of RSBY cannot be explained by commonly 
used theoretical approaches. The compliance mechanism used in the scheme and the 
relationship between agencies is expected to be the driving factor, and this is 
expected to vary significantly across jurisdictions.  
A lack of explanation of the variation in performance of RSBY and limited 
theorization in IORs in policy implementation has been the motivating factors for this 
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thesis. The exploration of the compliance mechanism will untangle the dynamics 
between agencies, and provide suggestions for the altering of these dynamics to 
improve the performance of the program. The findings will not only be applicable to 
the RSBY alone, as the results have wider implications for India and other developing 
nations, giving them the potential to better tune and formulate policy and policy 




















2 CHAPTER TWO: Inter-Organizational Relations (IOR) 
Perspective in Policy Implementation Performance: 
Theoretical Background 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to understand the connection between inter-
organizational relations (IOR) and implementation performance. The thesis tries to 
achieve this by uncovering and analyzing the effect of IOR on implementation 
performance and assessing the extent of its impact. The main body of the thesis is 
organized into three parts, based on the research objectives outlined in the first 
chapter. 
1. In the first part, a qualitative analysis of the effect of IOR on preventing and 
controlling partner opportunism, one of the key components of 
implementation performance, is provided. 
2. In the second part, a measurement index to measure IOR is developed. 
3. In the third part, a regression analysis approach is used to assess the impact of 
IOR on implementation performance. 
This chapter provides the theoretical background of the research presented in 
this thesis. In the subsequent chapters, the general explanatory variable used is IOR 
operationalized as contract governance at the dyadic level, collaboration at the 
network level, and modes of governance at the state level. The dependent variable – 
the implementation performance of the scheme – is operationalized as program 
objectives achieved and control of opportunism. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 defines the term 
―implementation performance‖, specifically in the context of public–private 
partnerships. Section 2.2 identifies the determinants of implementation performance. 
Section 2.3 discusses the role of IOR as a determinant of implementation 
performance. Section 2.4 unpacks the IOR into two components – implementation 
structure and compliance mechanisms – and discusses the relationship between them.  
It also presents a review of the key theoretical concepts. Sections 2.5 to 2.7 provide 
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the specific relevant theoretical foundations of the two empirical chapters which 
address the objectives of the thesis previously outlined. 
Section 2.5 reviews the literature on the dynamics of IOR for the prevention 
and control of opportunism. Section 2.6 reviews the literature on mapping IOR in a 
network context and identifies a suitable measure (subsection 2.6.1); following this, it 
examines the literature on the specific relationships between IOR and implementation 
performance (subsection 2.6.2). 
2.1 Policy Implementation Performance 
 
How a policy gets implemented determines the performance of the policy, 
but most of the literature related to policy performance has primarily focused on 
policy design rather than policy implementation (Winter, 2012). 
According to Hill and Hupe (2014), policy implementation research has lost 
its charm because of poor theorization in the field. It has been argued that policy 
implementation research suffers from too many variables and has very little 
conceptual development (Goggin, 1981; Hupe, 2014). Researchers of implementation 
have identified more than 300 variables but very little structure and theorization (Hill 
and Hupe, 2014). Therefore, improving research in the field requires specifying the 
conditions under which these variables are important (Matland, 1995:53). 
One of the reasons for poor theorization is the wrong focus of the policy 
implementation studies, which use policy outputs/outcomes as a dependent variable 
rather than policy outputs. Policy outcomes depend not only on the implementation 
but also on a host of other factors, including policy design and context. Perfect policy 
implementation is possible even in the case of policy failure, and so studies 
explaining policy impact and outcomes contribute little to the understanding of policy 
implementation (May, 1999; Winter, 2012; Hill and Hupe, 2014; Peters, 2014). Hupe 
(2014) suggests that it is the ―empirical variation in the performance (horizontally) 
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that needs explanation, rather than goal achievement (vertically)‖ (p. 173). Analyzing 
variation in implementation performance is expected to explain the role of local 
factors, the implementation process, organizational design, and inter-organizational 
collaboration, thereby enriching the theoretical development of the field (Winter, 
2012; Hupe, 2014; Hupe and Hill, 2014). 
2.1.1 Policy Implementation Performance in PPP Context 
 
In the context of public–private partnerships (PPPs), in service contracting, 
performance has been mainly defined as contract performance in terms of cost
18
, 
quality (Savas, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2007), responsiveness, timeliness, and legal 
compliance (Fernandez, 2007, 2009) of the contracted-out private service delivery, 
compared with government service delivery. However, these approaches are fraught 
with methodological obstacles, such as the absence of relevant control variables 
(Savas, 1987; Boyne, 1998), lack of pretests (Blasi, 2002), selection bias (Hirsch, 
1995), and poor measures of outcome (Hirsch, 1995). Another approach used to 
assess performance involves measuring the extent to which contracted service 
delivery achieves the goals of contracting in terms of quantity and quality 
(Aamirkhanyan, 2007). In general, policy implementation performance is defined in 
terms of ―compliance with the statues directives, compliance with statutes goals, 
achievement of specific success indicators, achievement of locally specified goals, 
and improvement of the private climate around a specific programme‖ (Matland, 
1990). This is more relevant when a comparison is made between contracting out the 
same service in two different geographic locations. The quantity dimension measures 
the extent to which the contracted service delivery achieves the program objectives. 
The quality dimension of contracting performance is assessed in terms of the 
compliance of the implementation with the expected specifications detailed in the 
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 This measures contract performance in terms of the cost effectiveness of contracting. 
21 
 
contract, in terms of structure, process, and outcome, using the Donabedians 
framework of quality (Aamirkhanyan, 2007; Martin, 2003). 
The main quality component of implementation performance is control of 
partner opportunism. The risk of opportunism is one of the most critical components 
in a transaction, and therefore controlling opportunism has been considered a central 
goal of governance mechanism. Some scholars, like Williamson (1985), consider 
controlling opportunism the sole reason for the existence of the governance 
mechanism, although other scholars disagree (Ghoshal and Moran, 1994). However, 
controlling opportunism, even if it is not the sole reason for the existence of the 
governance mechanism, is still one of the most important goals of the governance 
system. The purpose of governance is to mitigate conflict, realize mutual gain, and 
induce order. (Williamson, 2000). 
2.2 Determinants of Implementation Performance  
 
Most of the studies (Goggin, 1986; Sabatier; Lynn et al., 2001; Meier and 
O‘Toole Jr, 2007; Lipsky, 1980) identify a number of factors as determinants of 
implementation performance. These factors are: environmental factors, clientele 
characteristics, contents of the policy, characteristics of the organizations involved in 
policy implementation, resources and time allocated for the implementation process, 
management of the implementation process and the discretion available to those 
responsible for management.    
Though the process of policy implementation is an inherently inter-
organizational activity, there has been very limited research on the management of 
the implementation process and the resulting inter-organizational relations. Peter 
(2014) writes, ―much of the initial spate of literature on implementation recognized 
the role of multiple public sector organizations in implementation but continued to 
assume a more top-down logic for the process‖ (pg. 131). The importance of IOR in 
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implementation has been stressed by almost all generations of scholars in policy 
implementation – the Top Down theorists19, Bottom Up theorists20 as well as Third-
generation researchers
21
. However, very little research on this topic has been 
discussed in the policy implementation literature. 
Similarly, in the literature on Social Services contracting, a number of qualitative 
studies have stressed the important roles played by the implementation 
management/inter-organizational relationship in determining contract performance 
(Fernandez, 2009; Perrot, 2006; Palmer and Mills, 2003; Lonnoroth et al., 2006). 
Contract management and the resulting inter-organizational relationship moderates 
the impact of both contextual factors and contract design (Guinness, 2011
22
; Zaidi, 
2011; Lonnoroth et al., 2006; Brown et. al., 2007; Van Slyke, 2007; Palmer and 
Mills, 2003; Lonnoroth et al., 2006), shapes contract monitoring and evaluation, and 
accounts for the incomplete aspects of the contract (Zaidi, 2011; Van Slyke, 2009; 
Girth, 2011).  Though the importance of implementation management and the 
resulting relationship between agencies has been identified as an important variable, 
there is very limited conceptualization on how, and the extent to which, IOR affects 
performance.  
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 Top-down theorists Pressman and Wildavasky (1973) suggest that successful 
implementation requires collaboration, as it depends upon the linkages between different 
organizations and departments at the local level. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) also identify 
Inter-organizational collaboration as one of the critical factors determining implementation 
performance. 
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 Bottom-up theorists strongly challenge the hierarchical perspective, and suggest   
interactions between organizations and the resulting negotiations and compromises determine 
the policy implementation, as policy undergoes interpretation modification and in some cases 
subversion (Hjern, 1982; Berret and Fudge, 1981). 
21
 Third generation researchers, especially network researchers, largely brought the issue of 
IOR in the implementation performance to the forefront.  While Goggin et al., (1990) stressed 
the importance of vertical layers, Scharf (1978) highlighted that effective implementation is 
dependent on the development of collaborative networks, and that this can plug the ‗gap‘ in 
the implementation deficit identified by Pressman and Wildavasky (1973). The networks 
approach views implementation as embedded in a wider policy process, negotiated through 
networks (Hill and Hupe, 2014; pg. 71).  
22
 In the study of contracting of HIV services in two different states, the author finds that the 
contracting model which used a more relational approach to contracting, and using a 
management agency to manage the contracting relationship, was more successful that use of a 
hierarchical approach to manage contracts. 
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2.3 Role of IOR in Policy Implementation: Drawing from the IOR 
Literature   
 
Cropper et al. (2008) describe the field of Inter-Organizational Relations (or 
IORs) as the field of study of Inter-Organizational Entities (IOE), in which the 
organizations can be public, business or non-profit sectors, and range from just two 
organizations to huge networks of organizations, and the relations can range from 
non-contractual relationships to long term contracts.  The research in the field of 
IORs has taken place in various disciplines, from different theoretical backgrounds, 
under various terminologies, such as: partnerships, networks, collaborations, 
coalitions, contracting
23
, and supply chain contracts. The unifying aspect of IOR 
research is that ―in one way or another, it focuses on the properties and overall pattern 
of relations between and among organizations‖ (pg. 9), suggesting that at its ‗core‘ is 
the organizations and the relationship between them.  
Relationships between organizations are conceptualized into three sub 
dimensions: content (the flow of resources), governance (the means through which 
actors manage the flow of contents) and structure (that is, the opportunities and 
constraints placed upon them by the relationship) (Huxham et al., 2008). Researchers 
have generally took to defining the values of one or more of these three sub 
dimensions and have tried to link these with some aspect of performance or outcome, 
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 Contracting is generally argued as being a collaborative endeavor. O Leary and Vij (2012) 
argue that by its very nature, outsourcing is a collaborative endeavor, as collaboration can also 








‗Structural aspects‘ of the IOR refers to the implementation structure of the 
policy. Structural aspects of the IOR have been studied extensively under the network 
and contract design literature. As such, the implementation structure could be 
structured either in the form of a hierarchy, contract or network or a mix of these 
approaches. Governance activities in the IOR have been mainly studied under the 
approaches of network management/governance, collaborative governance and 
contract governance, where each approach focuses on a particular aspect of IOR.  
The next section (2.4) unpacks the IOR into implementation structure and 
compliance mechanisms. Section 2.5 presents the dynamics of IOR which influence 
implementation performance. The next section discusses issues in measuring IOR 
(sub-section 2.6.1) and links IOR to implementation performance (sub section 2.6.2).  
Thus, there is a need to understand the role of IOR in implementation performance. 
How do IOR dynamics emerge in implementation context? How do they influence 








2.4 Unpacking Inter-Organizational Relations   
Policy implementation is an operational part of the governance approach (Hill 
and Hupe, 2014). The governance approach as explained by Hill and Hupe refers to 
―the way in which collective impacts are produced in a social system. (pg 13).    
Policy implementation consists of two components – how implementation is 
structured – also known as mode of organization – and how implementation is 
managed (also known as mode of compliance).  
The mode of organization, along with mode of compliance, constitutes the 
resulting mode of governance (Considine, 2001) or mode of IOR. The congruent 
mode of governance implies a governance of the relationship between organizations 
(compliance mechanisms) which matches with modes of the 
organization/implementation structure.  
The hierarchy/bureaucracy, market and network are the three commonly 
discussed modes of organization, having different modes of compliance, and are 
briefly described in Table 2.1.  
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The hierarchy/bureaucracy, market and network community are the three most 
commonly discussed modes of organizations, having different goals (respectively: order, 
economic and cultural), mechanisms of social control (authority,  exchange/price, 
persuasion/trust), powers (political and military power, economic power, social), 
characteristic behaviors  (threat, exchange, love) and organizing principles (authority and 
rules, incentives and prices , norms values and networks). 
 
Recently Peters (2014) has tried to describe the policy implementation process in 
different service delivery regimes, drawing from governance literature. Based on the 
mode of governance utilized, Peters (2014) identified three distinct policy compliance 
mechanisms.   
 In hierarchy/bureaucracy, the focus is to successfully implement the policies, 
decided upstream, using a hierarchy as the resource allocation mechanism.  In this 
governance approach, IOR lies completely in the public sector. Thus, as all organizations 
belong to the public sector, they share public sector values and are therefore expected to 
have commitment to implement programs by legal means and norms.  These distinctive 
values facilitate communication among participants, reducing the risk of conflict and 
misunderstanding that generally occurs due to differences in values, myths, symbols and 
routines. (March and Olsen, 1984; 1989).   The general pattern of management is the use 
of hierarchy and authority.   
 In the market the focus is on the intra-organisational process with an emphasis 
on efficiency and economy in producing services.  The resource allocation mechanism is 
a variable combination of competition, contract and price allocation. Principle-agent 
relationships are most clear in these variants of the IOR and as the private sector is 





hazard necessitating higher monitoring and control. The reliance on incentives is much 
greater in this form of implementation structure.    
In networks, the central resource allocation mechanism is an inter-organisational 
network.  The participants join the network to advance their own interests, which may not 
be in harmony with the interest of the network. Even when they have the same interest, 
they may not share the same perspective, suggesting a potential for conflict and 
competition as well as cooperation (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). The bargaining process 
in the network is expected to influence the policy implementation dynamics and financial 
incentives, which, as well as persuasion, is used for enforcement.       
 A number of themes emerge from the categorization of the policy 
implementation as discussed above. First, in much of the contemporary public 
administration, implementation is conducted through interactions across multiple levels 
of government, and at each level, non-governmental actors may be involved, but the 
pattern of interaction between the public and private sector is more convoluted and 
complex, compared to the idealized extremes presented above, where implementation is 
either multi-organizational in a neat sense or single-handedly managed by public 
organizations (Peters, 2014).  Howlett and Ramesh (2014) identify a dozen sub-types of 
governance arrangements based on varying combination of these modes of governance. 
Therefore, these three governance regimes serve as conceptual tools and provide a 
conceptual map to analyze the variation in the task and policy sector which requires 
different approaches to organization and delivery.  
Second, in the case of mixed modes, the implementation structure can be 
analyzed in terms of a dependency relationship. The dependency relationship between 
organizations is considered as one of the important aspects of the implementation 
structure (Peters, 2014).   It is not the number of units, but rather their pattern and the 





organizational arrangement, that determines the points of the influence and the strategies 
that can be used to influence. Three types of interdependence have been identified in the 
context of IOR (O‘Toole, 2012).  These include: sequential, reciprocal, and pooled 
independence.  In sequential interdependence, the output of one agency serves as the 
input of the other, without receiving outputs from the second organization, as can be 
observed in an assembly line. Thus, each organization has a veto point. This increases the 
complexity of joint action. In reciprocal interdependence, each party‘s output serves as 
input for the other party, thus creating a situation of exchange. This exchange may 
require some coordination but can also decrease the likelihood of veto points, because 
both parties have an incentive to cooperate. (Winter, 2012, Implementation chapter) In 
the case of pooled interdependence, each organization acts independently of the other and 
therefore multiple organizations can produce and deliver implementation outputs in 
parallel and independently. Thus, the form of interdependence determines the mode of 
governance approach or compliance mechanism employed.  
 
Thirdly, the literature on public service delivery regimes (Osborn, 2010; Parsons, 
1995),  governance design (Considine and Lewis, 1999; Howlett and Ramesh, 2013), 
policy implementation (Peters, 2014) defines service delivery regimes – Hierarchy, 
Market and Network- as a unique combination of implementation structure (mode of 
organization ) and compliance mechanism (mode of compliance) for that. For example, a 
hierarchy is a combination of bureaucratic organizational structures and ensures 
compliance by authority and rules. The literature, in general, treats these service delivery 
regimes as single variables during analysis, making the assumption that agents in 
bureaucratic organizational structure will mainly use authority and rules to ensure 





In-congruency between the implementation structure and compliance mechanism 
is more common than expected. Studies of contracting in the government sector have 
suggested that contracts may be designed in a formal manner because of the 
accountability and transparency requirements in the public sector but they are managed in 
an informal approach (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Goo and Huang, 2008; Van Slyke, 2006, 
2007; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; Amirkhanyan, 2009). 
Recently Hill and Hupe (2014; pg.191) have alluded that in-congruency between 
implementation structure and compliance mechanism will affect performance, but there is 
no conceptualization on what criteria the in-congruency is decided and how it influences 
performance.  
Most of the research on IOR has linked either implementation structure or 
compliance mechanism with performance without considering the congruency between 
them.  To put this in other words, how is a compliance mechanism congruent with the 
implementation structure which influences performance, vis-à-vis a compliance 
mechanism which is incongruent with implementation structure? What are the criteria on 
which the congruency between the compliance mechanism and implementation structure 
is assessed, particularly in the context of hybrid governance designs, observed more 
commonly in the real world?  
It is thus critical to obtain an understanding of the IOR that is (perhaps) present 
during the implementation of any policy process, the dynamics of the relationship 
between implementation structure and compliance mechanism, and its influence on 








2.5 Dynamics of IOR in Implementation Performance  
 
Prevention and control of opportunism is considered to be one of the most 
important components of implementation performance and examines how organizations 
involved in an inter-organizational arrangement prevent and manage each other‘s 
opportunism, suggesting a critical role of IORs in context of opportunism. 
This section presents the theoretical development in managing opportunism in 
the inter-organizational context and the role of IORs in the prevention and management 
of opportunism, especially in the public sector context. Given the limited theoretical 
development on IORs in public policy and public management literature, much of the 
review here draws heavily from business studies.  
2.5.1 Opportunism in Public Contracting Context: Implementation Structure 
as a Driver of Opportunism  
 
Opportunism has a varied definition. Williamson defines opportunism as a ―self-
interest seeking with guile‖, where he describes guile as ―lying, stealing, cheating and 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse‖ ( 
Williamson, 1985; pg. 47). This conceptualization of opportunism has been extended 
further by including the violation of implicit norms of contract that also includes actions 
that are ―contrary to the principles of the relation in which it occurs‖ (McNeil, 1980; pg. 
1024). Violation of the principles of exchange can (and should) be considered 
‗Opportunism‘, and not necessarily as quasi-rent appropriation, as argued by some 
economists (Wathne and Heide, 2000). For practical purposes, opportunism can be 
referred to as the pursuit of self-interest in an exchange that violates either explicit or 
implicit norms of contract and that has an adverse effect on the other party. 
Opportunism has severe consequences. It reduces performance; increases 





motivation and increases conflict between parties (Hawkins, 2008; Caniels et al., 2012). 
Controlling opportunism is thus critical for contract performance. A number of factors 
give rise to opportunism of parties, but I limit the discussion here to the factors that are 
relevant for government contracting. 
Contracting by a public agency to the private sector is generally conceptualized 
as a principal/agent relationship, where the public agency is a principal and the private 
sector is considered an agent. One of the primary factors which gives rise to opportunism 
is information asymmetry - principle and agents differ in their goals, available 
information, attitude towards risk and preferences for actions (Eisenhardt, 1989), i.e. 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Adverse selection occurs when an agency does not have information about the 
true capability of the other agency (agent) to meet contractual obligation (hidden 
information), and the other agency misrepresents it at the onset of the contracting 
relationship (Varian and Repcheck, 2010). The awarding of contracts based only on the 
lowest quoted bid, a common practice in developing countries, increases the risk of 
adverse selection. Often, bidders compete aggressively by offering attractive quotations, 
but once the contract is granted, they either call for renegotiations to change formal 
contractual commitments (Guasch, 2004; Iossa et al., 2007) or provide very poor quality 
service. These opportunistic behaviors can be managed by proposing a menu of contracts 
in such a way that the agent‘s hidden information can be revealed (Varian and Repcheck, 
2010). However, in the public sector, because of reasons of accountability and 
transparency, there are limitations to how contracts can be designed and auctioned (the 
private sector bids, the public sector auctions). Sometimes public sector agents (the 
principals) can also behave opportunistically as they abuse their advantage of information 
- which the private sector lacks - because of their experience of delivering same services 





Moral hazards occur in public contracting when the private sector/public sector 
avoids fulfilling contractual responsibilities (Varian and Repcheck, 2010). This is 
common in public contracting, as the lowest cost bidder is selected, whose main focus 
during implementation is to cut costs by reducing quality and innovations. Therefore, the 
contractor has a tendency to provide poor quality service, if the quality of the service is 
not adequately specified and not monitored to reward or penalize the service provider 
(Hart, 2003). In most developing countries, the public sector lacks the capacity as well as 
motivation (Venkataraman, 2009) to monitor quality of services. Another approach to 
address moral hazard is through tying incentives to the observed result (Iossa et al., 
2007), but bureaucratic procedures and a limited ability to quantify the results of public 
services prohibit the development of such an incentive scheme.  
Apart from the information asymmetry that leads to Adverse Selection and Moral 
Hazard, the other primary factor that underlies opportunism is the issue of bounded 
rationality
24
 - incomplete contracting of agents‘ future action - that leads to contract 
renegotiation. However, these opportunistic behaviors are not relevant in the case of the 
RSBY scheme, as RSBY contracts are only for a short period of one year and are non-
negotiable during the contract period. More relevant opportunistic behavior due to 
bounded rationality occurs through the public sector attempting to create complete 
contracts without complete information, leading to redundant terms or complex terms 
(Brown, Potoski and Slyke, 2007). In this case, the private sector accepts these contracts, 
assuming either a renegotiation at a later date or a leeway in using workaround strategies 
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 Because of the issue of bounded rationality, complete contracting of agents‘ future action is 
impossible, and third parties cannot verify ex post the real value of some of the variables central to 
the interaction between agents.   Contracts can be designed to addresses this coordination dilemma 
by assigning unilateral property rights to one party at the same time providing a minimum 






(Campbell, 2012) but the public sector may behave opportunistically, and insist the 
private sector comply with the redundant terms of the contract and request rent instead.   
The third factor that underlies opportunism is a mismatch between transaction 
characteristics and the governance structure used. For services which have high asset 
specificity, uncertainty and frequency, complete specification is challenging (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992; Tirole, 1999) and even if it is done, ―self-interested individuals with 
guile‖ (Williamson, 1985) will produce creative ways to fix the system and avoid 
fulfilling their contractual obligations (Granovetter, 1985). Therefore, high transaction 
cost exchanges require more integrated governance modes which consist of bilateral 
procedures for resolving disagreements (contract allocations decision rights, supervisory 
and coercion mechanisms), safeguards to protect each party from the opportunistic 
behavior of other and incentives to commit to contracts (Williamson, 1985, 2000, 2005).  
Further, the contracting of social services has the challenge of low measurability and 
contestability (Prekar and Harding, 2000) and therefore an inappropriate governance 
approach accentuates opportunities for rent seeking. 
2.5.2 Matching Compliance Mechanisms to Implementation Structures in 
the Context of Opportunism: Theoretical Review   
 
In the context of opportunism, one of the features of the implementation structure 
that directs congruency between implementation structure and compliance mechanism is 
the dependency relations between organizations. As discussed in Section 2.5, 
implementation structures can be characterized either as the market, hierarchy, network 
or a combination of these. A general analysis of the structure will reveal the combination 
of methods employed. One of the approaches is to study the dependency relationship 





Similar to the implementation structure, the compliance mechanism also varies in 
its influence in preventing and controlling opportunism of the partner agencies.   Various 
types of IOR dynamics exist simultaneously in the same policy implementation structure, 
at different levels, as suggested by Hill and Hupe (2014). One of the most important 
levels is the dyadic level, at which two agencies manage each other‘s opportunism. At the 
dyadic level, the most appropriate approach to examine governance dynamics in a 
contractual relationship is contract governance.  
Contract governance literature has identified two polar approaches to manage 
contract - Transactional Governance and Relational Governance. Both approaches differ 
in terms of their assumptions towards human beings and approaches towards contract 
design and each suggest approach to manage contract that are poles apart.  Transactional 
Governance has its origin in Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. This 
approach assumes that all human beings are not only self-interested, but they are ―self-
interested with guile‖ (Williamson, 1985) and therefore the sole purpose of contract 
governance is to overcome opportunism. The governance approach is based on the 
premise of goal conflict, information asymmetry, bounded rationality and an inclination 
to opportunism which suggests rational controls - well written contracts with incentives, 
transaction specific investments, monitoring and sanctions.  
The theory of Relational governance developed as a critic of transactional 
governance and considers that transactions occur in a social context and are deeply 
embedded within social relations (Maculay, 1963) and social institutions (Granovetter, 
1985). This approach considers human beings as both ―entirely selfish and entirely social 
creatures‖ (MacNeil, 1983; pg. 348) and depend upon reciprocity and solidarity 
(MacNeil, 1983).  
In transactional governance, incentives and authority are used to govern 





governance). Contracts are the major instruments through which control is exercised 
(Ferguson et al., 2005; Gundlach and Achrol, 1993; Heide, 1994; Lusch and Brown, 
1996). Contracts are highly detailed, characterized by ―sharp in/sharp out‖, and include 
all relevant contingencies (Williamson, 1985; MacNeil, 1978).  Parties are expected to 
adhere to contract terms and are not expected to behave altruistically. Contracts are 
referred to frequently and contract monitoring is used to ensure accountability. In the case 
of dispute, parties are expected to ―seek recourse from the courts rather than depending 
on the [other] party to ‗make things right‘‖ (Ring and Van de Van, 1992; pg. 490) and 
rewards and sanctions are used without discretion (Canon and Perrault, 1999; Reeves, 
2008). 
In relational governance, a transaction is governed through relational norms- 
information exchange, flexibility, solidarity, and trust rather than rational controls (see 
Appendix 2.1 for more details on governance tools under contract). Thus, instead of 
contracts, it is the relationship which assumes greater importance (MacNeil, 1978; 
Colledge, 2005) and serves as the reference point for any adaptations, and guides process 
to resolve and address disputes.  Contracts are generally loosely defined, less rigid, lack 
contract performance indicators and are not referred to regularly (Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Williamson, 1985; pg. 72). Parties are adaptable and solve disputes with a focus on 
salvaging and continuing relationships rather than strictly following legal mechanisms 
offered by the specific contract (McNeil, 1978; 1980).   
Relational theories argue that all exchange ‗‗is carried on within relations‖ 
(MacNeil, 1986; pg. 577) but the extent of the role the relationship plays in a transaction 
differs. The extent to which relational norms are used determines the relationalism of the 





Based on this, transactions can be characterized as ranging from discrete to non-
discrete, such as a near discrete
25
 transaction - like the purchase of fuel at a petrol station, 
where relationships play a very minimal role - to a relational transaction
26
, like a 
marriage, where relationships between parties play a very important role. Discrete 
transactions are governed by the transactional approach - by the use of incentives and 
authority - but relational transactions require governance based on relational norms- 
behavioral expectations that are shared by both parties in the relationship.  
 Most of the literature juxtaposes these two extreme relational exchanges, though, 
in practice, both of these extreme exchanges are rare. In practice, most of the exchanges 
have elements of both approaches and thus can be situated anywhere along this 
continuum, but in the literature all exchange relationships are either lumped together 
under the monolith of a transactional or relational approach. Further categories, such as 
repeated transactions and interimistic exchanges, were added to create more typologies of 
exchange relationships.  
Repeated transactions are predominately transactional approaches, but occur 
frequently and thus the repeated exchange leads to the development of relational 
dimension of the relationship (Webster, 1992). An interimistic relational exchange is 
defined as ―a close, collaborative, fast-developing, short-lived exchange relationship in 
which companies pool their skills and\or resources to address a transient, albeit 
important, business opportunity and\or threat.‖ (Lambe, 2000; pg. 213).  Interimistic 
exchanges occur in situations which are characterized by shorter time duration and 
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 A discrete transaction can be defined as a ―transaction of short duration involving limited 
personal interactions and with precise part measurements of easily measured objects of exchange‖ 
(McNeil, 1978; pg. 12). 
 
26
 Transactions ―characterized by long duration personal involvement by the parties and the 






limited future transactions. Because of the shorter time duration, there is less time for the 
development of relational attributes, such as trust and relational norms.  
2.5.3 Matching Compliance Mechanisms to Implementation Structure in the 
Context of Opportunism: An Empirical Review   
 
The following section summarizes the interaction between these two governance 
approaches in the context of opportunism and how these two governance approaches 
interact to prevent and control opportunism. All governance approaches used in practice 
have elements of both approaches, and therefore their interaction and combination 
determines the ‗dynamics of governance‘ and ultimately influences performance.  
In public contracting, both transactional and relational approaches have  been 
examined in controlling opportunism (Zheng et al., 2008; Davis, 2007) individually  but 
use of both governance mechanisms together as a ‗governance dynamics‘  in the context 
of opportunism has received much less attention (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Cavusgil et 
al., 2004).  Thus, it is critical to understand the exploration of mixed governance in public 
contracting.  
In public contracting, studies suggest that contracts are designed in a formal 
manner because of the accountability and transparency requirement, but they are typically 
managed in a relational style (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Goo and Huang, 2008; Van 
Slyke, 2006, 2007; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; Aamirkhanyan, 2009) suggesting a 
mixing of governance approaches, which is different to the approach taken by the private 
sector (Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012). In the public sector, Third Party Opportunism
27
 
(Spiller, 2008), administrative and transparency requirements and differences in culture 
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Third party opportunism occurs when interested third parties collect rent by exposing corruption 
in public agents‘ actions. Public sector projects are generally complex and hence require flexible 
contract adaptation, but in practice, it is difficult to differentiate complex implementation from 
corrupt implementation giving opportunity for third party opportunism (Spiller, 2008). Because of 
the third party opportunism, public agents and their contractors have an incentive to design more 





(Bennet,  2005), force the public sector to design contracts that are rigid-inflexible and 
overtly dependent on formal accountability mechanisms. But public managers face 
considerable cost in using penalties and enforcing sanctions (Girth, 2011; Slyke, 2009). 
Thus, the public sector prefers formal contracts, given these transparency and 
accountability requirements, but uses collaborative strategies to manage contracts. It was 
observed that, over time, contractual relationships become more trust-based and 
collaborative, leading to two dimensions in a contract - a hard dimension (classical 
contract) and a soft dimension (relational norms) (Greve and Ejersbo 2005). The hard 
dimension is used as the basis of the contract, and parties then build soft measures upon 
it, step by step. Which dimension dominates the relationship depends upon the parties in 
the contract (Greve and Ejersbo, 2005). Research on public contracting has strongly 
suggested a complementary relationship between these two approaches.  
 In contrast to public contracting, the literature on private contracting, especially 
in supply chain relationships, suggests a complementary, supplementary, or both types of 
relationship between these governance approaches.  Studies suggesting complementary 
relationships
28
 demonstrate that transactional and relational mechanisms complement 
each other and therefore their joint use will reduce opportunism better.  On the other 
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  A number of scholars have contributed in this tradition both from theory (Ring Van De Van, 
1994; ref) as well as empirical evidence (Popo and Zenger, 2002; Luo, 2002; Mayer and Agyres, 
2004; Olsen et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2009; Zheng et al., 2008; Caniels et al., 2012; ).  Poppo and 
Zenger (2002) argue that relational governance mechanisms govern transactions through norms, 
and therefore fails to specify the safeguards, the absence of which raises the risk of opportunism. 
The control governance approach addresses this problem by articulating specific appropriate 
behaviors. When the contracts are well specified, the risk and severity of exchange is reduced, 
which encourages cooperation between parties (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  Similarly, relational 
governance mechanisms complement formal governance mechanisms by overcoming the problem 
of inflexibility of the formal governance mechanisms.  It is not only expensive but also impossible 
to draft a contract that includes all future states and contingencies therefore during unexpected 






hand, studies suggesting a substitutive relationship
29
 suggest that when these governance 
mechanisms are  used jointly, it leads to a worse effect, compared to when they are used 
alone (Das and Teng, 1998; Wuyets and Geyskens, 2005). Recent studies suggest that 
these governance approaches could  both complement as well as substitute for each other 
at the same time (Huemer et al., 2009;  Roehrich and Lewis, 2010)  and that the 
relationship between these two approaches changes over a period of time (Olsen et al., 
2005; Caniëls and Gelderman, 2010; Liu et al., 2009) depending upon the intentions to 
which they are used (Woolthuis et al., 2005).  
There is also significant contradictory opinion about the best governance 
approach in controlling opportunism, when approaches are used in combination. Some 
studies have found that the relational approach prevents opportunism better compared to 
the transactional approach, when they are used in combination (Wang et. al., 2012; 
Cavusgil et. al., 2004; Zhou and Xu, 2012; Caniels and Gelderman, 2010). On the other 
hand, other studies find that transactional approaches do better than relational approaches 
in preventing opportunism (Liu, 2009). Some studies suggest that it is not merely the 
presence or absence but also the form of governance mechanism and the sequence in 
which they are combined which influences opportunism (Zhou and Xu, 2012; Ying et al., 
2011) but there have also been contradictory results in measuring this
30
.   
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 For substitutive examples, see Dyer and Singh (1998); Granovetter (1985); Ghoshal and Moran 
(1996); Gulati (1998); Bradach and Eccles (1989); Wuyts and Geyskans (2005); Gulati and 
Nickerson (2008); and Caniels and Gelderman (2010). 
30
 For example, Zhou and Xu (2012) found that transactional governance controls opportunism in 
the presence of high level of relational governance, but that the same governance approach 
increases opportunism if the incidence of relational governance is low. If there are relational ties 
before contracting, parties can draft detailed contracts jointly and transactional governance in this 
situation reduces opportunism, but if the contracts are drafted in detail without relational ties, 
parties in the contract take detailed contract drafting as a sign of distrust leading to higher 
opportunistic behaviors.    Yang et al., (2011) find contradictory results, whereby in the case of 
high relational governance (strong tie), the transactional mechanism is not effective, whereas in 
the case of low relational governance (weak tie relationship), the transactional mechanism is 






The contradictory results are probably due to most of these studies being 
quantitative and there are only two studies (Olsen et al., 2005
31
; Caniels et al., 2012
32
) 
which have gone beyond mere empirical evidence to try to understand how these two 
governance approaches interact with each other in context of opportunism. Olsen et al., 
(2005) and Caniels et al., (2012) highlight that how transactional and governance 
mechanisms are combined is important. In the extreme, each governance mechanism was 
found to increase opportunism whether it is a relational (see Anderson and Jap, 2005) or 
transactional approach.  Both governance mechanisms are important and required in 
order to prevent opportunism and, if properly combined, based on the context, can lead to 
synergistic effects in controlling opportunism as seen in Olsen et al. (2005) but if they are 
not mixed judiciously, than it can affect performance, as seen in the case of Caniels et al. 
(2012).  
In case of public contracting, this author was unable to find any study which has 
explicitly studied the influence of ‗governance dynamics‘ to reduce opportunism and how 
these two approaches interact with each other, except Van Slyke (2007
33
, 2009), though 
they do not explicitly focus on managing opportunism.    
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 Olsen et al. (2005) found that o–incentives,  authority and trust do not simply substitute or 
complement each other as others have suggested but they have specific relationships with each 
other. Each mechanism facilitates or hampers use of the other methods depending upon how it is 
used. The pattern of interaction that develops in the initial stages is difficult to change later on.   
32
 Caniels et al. (2012) found that trust in the absence of contractual incentives and control leads to 
bad project outcomes. When trust between the parties is reduced, it leads to contractual incentives 
and control systems. Thus, they argue that in order to achieve project performance, all three 
mechanisms must function in combination and support and stimulate each other which does not 
happen automatically. 
33
 In an examination of service contracting, Van Slyke (2007) found that public managers start 
with a more arm‘s length relationship with formal controls as they do not initially trust their 
contractors. Contractual compliance by contractors gives rise to cooperation between parties and 
as information exchange and communication increase over time, they develop a trusting 
relationship (Van Slyke, 2009). The collaboration between parties develops in tandem with the 
development of the trust and leads to development of a trusting and collaborative relationship with 
each other. As the trust and collaboration between organizations increases, ―traditional contract 
and governance issues were not abandoned; rather, they remained in place but were exercised with 





The need to understand the interaction between the relational and control 
approaches in the context of  opportunism becomes more important as contracts in the 
public sector are generally designed in a formal manner, but managed in a relational 
manner (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Goo and Huang, 2008; Van Slyke, 2006; 2007; 
Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; Aamirkhanyan, 2009). There is limited understanding on 
how public managers combine and use these two approaches together to manage 
opportunism and which strategy - relational or transactional - in the context of developing 
countries - is more effective in controlling opportunism by parties. 
Secondly, most studies have generally measured the perception of opportunism 
and do not differentiate between types of opportunism - such as formal or informal - and 
therefore have failed to link the effectiveness of the governance mechanism to the type of 
opportunistic behaviors, except in some studies like Lumineau and Quelin (2012). This 
linkage between the types of opportunistic behaviors and the effectiveness of governance 
mechanisms in a given type would be a valuable guide for practitioners, as this can guide 
the use of appropriate governance strategy, given an expected type of opportunism.  
As such, the following sub-research questions emerge under the first research 
objective.  
1. Which factors drive the choice of governance approach in the case of the RSBY 
scheme?  
2. How do parties combine different governance approaches to control 
opportunism? 
                                                                                                                                                              
mean that parties reduce the contractual specificity. Instead of using formal sanctions and 
rewarding parties in the contract (especially in the public sector), trust and  reputation should be 
used as tools to sanction and reward (Van Slyke, 2009; Girth, 2011). In the case where contractors 
behaved opportunistically, public managers confronted the provider but did not sanction them 
formally; rather, they no longer trusted the contractor, stripped them of discretion and legitimacy 






3. Does initial trust lead to the interplay of governance dynamics that produces 
positive outcomes as seen in Olsen (2005)? 
4. How do different governance mechanisms interact leading to an evolution of 
governance dynamics? 
5. What is the connection between the types of opportunism and the type of 
governance approach?  
The hypothesis on these questions has been generated in the scheme background 
chapter in Section 4.2, using the case of the RSBY scheme. The methodology to answer 
these questions is presented in the methodology chapter in Section 3.2.2. The empirical 
part is presented in Chapter 5 of the thesis.  
2.6 Impact of Congruent IOR on Performance   
 
Congruent IOR implies that a compliance mechanism matching with the 
implementation structure if an appropriate compliance mechanism is not used, which  
leads to non-congruency between the implementation structure and IOR (Hill and Hupe, 
2014; pg. 191). For a particular policy, if a network mode of governance is requested and 
if the compliance mechanism has a command character (authority mode), then this 
implies a congruency between the implementation structure and compliance mechanism. 
When the compliance mechanism matches the implementation structure, performance is 
expected to be higher.  In the case of the network implementation structure, the 
implementation process needs to be governed using a network approach to governance, 
relying on complex bargaining and collaborative process among the participants. 
Therefore collaboration is the dominant compliance mechanism in the case of networks. 
Higher use of collaboration is expected to lead to higher congruence between structure 





use of collaboration. After a certain level, more use of collaboration will decrease the 
congruence of compliance mechanism with the structure leading to lower performance as 
found in other studies (Villena et al., 2011; Anderson and Jap, 2005).     
The development of methods of collaboration (the congruent compliance mechanism 
in this case),  requires considerable investment in time, money and personnel (Frazier et 
al., 1988) and it is important to weigh the costs and benefits of investing in compliance 
mechanisms. This would move the research agenda beyond simply linking relationship 
and performance to estimating the cost of using appropriate IOR with that of gains from 
increase in performance resulting from that. In assessing impact of congruent IOR, the 
first step is to measure congruent IOR.  
2.6.1 Measuring Congruent IOR     
 
This section reviews approaches to measure IOR in the network context 
involving the public sector.  The case used for this study is implemented in a lead 
network format and therefore the implementation structure is network. There are four 
main literature segments that have measured IOR in different modes- networks, contract 
management\contract governance, social capital or trust studies, and collaboration 
studies. Approaches used to measure IOR and their limitation in each of them are 
discussed here. The purpose is to identify a suitable approach with minimum limitations 
in measuring IOR suitable for the case used for this study. 
2.6.1.1 Network Tradition  
 
Quantitative studies in the network tradition have mainly measured structural 
aspects of the network (like extensiveness, density, centrality and reach) and network 





analysis, it is the relationship between actors and not their attributes which is important 
(Kenos and Ore Lemans, 2008).  That is, these measurement approaches do indicate the 
strength of the connection but they do not explain it in terms of the content of relations 
and what occurs within and between connections (Jack, 2010).   In the RSBY scheme, all 
districts have some organizational and implementation structure and contracts and 
implementation process are followed. Thus, the structure of relationship is almost similar 
in all states and therefore social network analysis is expected to provide limited 
information in the case of RSBY scheme.  
2.6.1.2 Social Capital  
 
The second stream of literature, where IORs have been studied extensively, is 
social capital.  Social capital is defined as a resource that actors can use and benefit from 
(Adler and Kwon, 2002). Research in social capital is performed from various 
perspectives, but the two most common perspectives used are - structural (Social Capital 
as Networks) and cultural (social capital as trust and reciprocity) (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). Limitations of the structural dimension have already been described above. In the 
cultural dimension, there is an extensive research on trust. Research on trust has basically 
used psychometric techniques to measure relational trust.  These measurement indicators 
are limited to the trust component only, which consists of only one component of the IOR 
and therefore these measures fall short of indicating the complete spectrum of IOR. 
Secondly, studies have used more than 129 different measures of trust, but with 
weak evidence regarding construct validity and consensus on operational dimensions 
(McEvily and Tortoriello, 2011).   Most of the studies use newly developed instruments, 
while replications of previously developed instruments are very limited (McEvily and 





2.6.1.3 Contract Governance   
The third stream of literature that has studied IOR is contract governance and 
contract management. As discussed earlier, contract governance literature has organized 
contract governance into two poles-apart approaches to manage contract - transactional 
governance and relational governance. The transactional governance approach is an 
incentive based approach, whereas the relational governance approach is based upon the 
relationship and social norms. 
Studies in contract governance have developed and used a number of constructs 
and scales to measure the contract governance approach
34
. Table 2.2 provides a list of 
constructs, most commonly used in studies measuring contract governance.  In the 
contract governance stream, a review of existing studies suggests there are four 
limitations related to existing constructs in measuring the relationship between parties in 












                                                          
34
 For transactional governance, see Cannon Pereault (1999); Andaleeb (1995). For relational 





Table 2.2 Commonly Used Constructs in Contractual Governance 
 
Construct Studies using this construct 
Transactional Governance 
Detailed Contract Drafting  Lamothe and Lamothe (2011); Liu et al. (2009); 
Lusch and Brown (1996); Poppo and Zenger (2002); 
Wuyts and Geyskens (2005); Yang et al. (2011); Yu 
et al. (2006)  
Legal abidingness of the 
contract 
Cannon and Perreault (1999) 
Ferguson et al (2005) 
 
Administrative control or the 
extent to which process of 
contract implementation is 
controlled  
Caniels and Gelderman (2010); Heide and John 
(1992) 
Asset specificity or Transaction 
specific investment.  
Gulati and Nickerson (2008); Heide and John (1992); 
Liu et al. (2009); Poppo and Zenger (2002); Yu et al. 
(2006); Jap and Anderson (2003) 
 
Relational Governance 
Information sharing,  Cannon and Perreault (1999); Caniels and Gelderman 
(2010); Ferguson et al. (2005); Liu et al. (2009); 
Lusch and Brown (1996); Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
Flexibility Cannon and Perreault (1999); Caniels and Gelderman 
(2010); Ferguson et al. (2005); Gundlach and Achrol 
(1993); Heide and John (1992); Liu et al. (2009); 
Lusch and Brown (1996); Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
Solidarity  
 
Cannon and Perreault (1999); Caniels and Gelderman 
(2010); Ferguson et al. (2005); Gundlach and Achrol 
(1993); Heide and John (1992); Liu et al. (2009); 
Lusch and Brown (1996); Poppo and Zenger (2002) 
Harmonization of conflict  Ferguson et al. (2005); Gundlach and Achrol (1993); 
Heide and John (1992) 
 
Trust  Gulati and Nickerson (2008); Liu et al. (2009); Poppo 
and Zenger (2002); Yang et al. (2011); Yu et al. 
(2006) Jap and Anderson (2003) 
Long term orientation Lusch and Brown (1996); Yang et al. (2011); Yu et al. 
(2006) 
 
There are several limitations to using constructs of contract governance for 
measuring relationship among agencies. The first is that existing constructs  measure 
different management activities separately and there is not a single index that 
consolidates these management activities, in a single concept linking it with performance 





The second limitation is related to existing constructs is that they have 
overlapping relationship among constructs measuring similar things but in different 
directions. As seen from Table 2.2, constructs designed to measure a governance 
approach have considerable overlap between them. For example, consider the construct, 
legal binding nature of the contract used generally to measure transactional governance, 
and other constructs- flexibility and solidarity, which are used for indicating relational 
governance. The legality binding contract implies that contract terms are rigidly enforced 
and penalty is imposed without any discretion. This is exactly the opposite of the 
implications of constructs -flexibility and solidarity. Thus, these constructs measure the 
same thing, but in reverse, and cannot be used to create a single concept. As these 
constructs have overlapping relationship with each other, measurement values of these 
constructs cannot be simply added up or aggregated to create a relationship index.  
The fourth limitation is regarding one of the constructs used to measure 
transactional governance - contract design.  Most of the studies use contract design as a 
key indicator of transactional governance, but this approach may be misleading in a 
public contracting context. A number of studies in public contracting suggest that in 
public contracting, contracts may be designed in a formal manner because of the 
accountability and transparency requirements of the public sector, but they are managed 
in a relational style (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Goo and Huang, 2008; Van Slyke, 2006, 
2007; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; Amirkhanyan, 2011). 
Thus, the dichotomy between transactional and relational contracts, as observed 
in business contracting, is not applicable in the public sector contracting context. The 
public sector prefers formal contracts, given the transparency and accountability 
requirements, but at the same time uses collaborative strategies to manage these contracts 





approaches used to assess transactional governance as performed in the private sector 
cannot be used in the case of public sector contracting. 
Present measurement techniques only establish the link between the use of 
different  governance activities with performance, but there is no scale in contract 
governance  research that can capture the complexity of IOR in one single measure such 
that variation in a single measure could be linked with variation in performance.  
The core of governance measures, in essence, should capture the influence of 
various governance activities (rather than simply measuring different governance 
activities) into a single measure of governance and in a more parsimonious and direct 
approach, thus allowing a connection between IOR and implementation performance to 
be drawn. 
2.6.1.4 Collaborative Governance: A Suitable Approach to Measure IOR in the 
RSBY Scheme  
 
Apart from contracting, networks and social capital literature, IOR has also been 
examined in one of the segments of public management and public administration 
literature, known as collaborative governance. Collaboration has been defined from a 
narrower range of inter-organizational arrangements, as in case of Ansell and Gash 
(2008); and Thomson (2009), to a wider range, as in case of Emerson et al. (2012).  
Emerson et al. (2012) define collaborative governance as ―the processes and 
structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people 
constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government, and/or the 
public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could not 
otherwise be accomplished.‖ (Emerson et al., 2012; pg. 2).  Ansell and Gash (2008) 
define collaborative governance in a narrower sense, which includes only formal 





directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is 
formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public 
policy or manage public programs or assets‖ (Ansell and Gash, 2008; pg. 544). Thomson 
et al., (2009) defines collaboration as ―a process in which autonomous actors interact 
through formal and informal negotiations, jointly creating rules and structures governing 
their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together. It is 
a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions‖. 
As this study relates to a narrow scope of inter-organizational relations, a 
narrower definition of collaboration is preferred, as in the case of Thomson (2009) or 
Ansell and Gash (2008), compared to Emerson (2012).   Thomson (2009) followed a very 
rigorous process, reviewing 26 different approaches to define collaboration and 
developing a measure of collaboration. Thomson‘s (2009) measure of collaboration has 
been used by a number of other studies (Chan, 2010; Queen, 2011) and therefore 
Thomson (2009) approach to collaboration is preferred over other approaches.  
 Gray (1989) distinguishes collaboration from other, lesser forms of cooperation 
by four requirements: interdependence of the stakeholder, ability to address differences 
constructively, joint ownership of decisions and collective responsibility for the future of 
partnership.  Collaboration is different from cooperation and coordination in the sense 
that it is a dynamic and emergent process (Gray, 1989; Gray and Wood, 1991) and 
involves different forms of risk (Feiock, 2009; Feiock and Scholz, 2010) when compared 
to cooperation and coordination. The literature on collaboration considers collaboration 
as a process that can occur in any form of IOEs - partnership, alliance, network or 
contract
35
 (Gray and Wood, 1991). Collaboration is the interactive process of 
organizations working in tandem to achieve common goals. In other words, collaborating 
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is what is actually performed. Thus, collaboration is basically how partners in a 
relationship interact with each other and is the result of contractual governance in the 
contracting context and the result of network governance, in the network context, while 
contractual/network governance is how parties manage a relationship, collaboration is the 
strength of the relationship. Thus, collaboration between agencies can range from high to 
low, depending on the type and combination of management strategies used.  More 
incentive/authority based management strategies will lead to less collaboration, whereas 
greater use of relationship based strategies
36
 is expected to lead to greater collaboration 
between agencies. 
The structure and inter-organizational governance activities can lead to a status 
of relationship which could be measured as collaboration between agencies as shown in 
the Fig 2.2. Trust studies also measure status of the relationship, but they have been 
limited to measuring only one component of the relationship.   
 
Figure 2.2 Relationships between Theoretical Paradigms in IOR (Source: Author) 
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 A relational approach to contract governance leads to a relationship between parties which  is 
characterized by joint problem solving, flexibility, solidarity and trust (Haugland and Reeve, 1994; 
Heide and John, 1992; Wong, 2008 and Walker and Davis, 1999). The relationship between the 
parties is the most important part of transaction.  Therefore, the relationship strength increases as 







Thus, collaboration as a process measures the strength of a relationship, where 
higher levels of collaboration suggest higher levels of relationship strength, whereas 
lower levels of collaboration suggest lower levels of relationship strength.  This could be 
connected to variation in program performance. The measure of collaboration (for 
example, Thomson et. al., 2009) used in the collaborative governance studies is a better 
measure of IOR than the constructs used in contract governance studies, due to a number 
of reasons.  
Firstly, collaboration as a process can occur in any inter-organizational 
arrangement (Gray and Wood, 1991) and this feature makes it an appropriate lens for 
studying and comparing relationship between parties in various organizational 
arrangements. Next, research in collaboration governance measures collaboration as a 
relationship status. Applied to the contracting context, collaboration is the status of 
relationship between the parties and ranges from high to low depending upon the type 
and mix of contract management strategies used. Since the level of collaboration 
indicates the strength of relationship, collaboration could be linked with variation in the 
program performance in a dose-response relationship 
Thirdly, collaboration is more suitable for conducting case analyses because it 
has been used in the multi-stakeholder network context, involving public and private 
agencies collaborating to implement programs (Ansell and Gash, 2008),
37
 similar to what 
is commonly performed in the RSBY scheme.  
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2.6.1.5 The Mapping Collaboration Process  
 
Thomson et al. (2009) reviewed 26 different approaches defining and delineating 
collaboration and suggested a five dimensional construct of collaboration after a rigorous 
theoretical review and factor analysis. To some extent, this addressed one of the major 
issues in collaboration research - the lack of consensus on the definition of collaboration 
and a valid and reliable measure of the collaboration process (Graddy and Chen, 2009; 
McGuire and Silvia, 2009; Moynihan et al., 2011; O‘Leary and Bingham, 2009; 
Tschirhart, Amezcua, and Anker, 2009).  
Following Thomson et al. (2009), there are two structural dimensions 
(governance and administration), two social capital dimensions (mutuality and norms) 
and one agency dimension (organizational autonomy). These five constructs of the 
collaborative process help guide the process of the information, manage the depth and 
breadth of interaction, and capture the complex and dynamic interchange between 
partners. 
The first two constructs - joint decision-making and administration - capture the 
governance and administrative aspects that organize collaborative relationships where 
decision making and management responsibilities are jointly shared among partners. 
Joint decision-making is the extent to which partners in collaboration engage jointly in 
service planning and goal setting and has been emphasized as critical in the collaboration 
process (Ring and Van de Van‘s, 1994; Gray, 1989; Bardach, 1998; Alter and Hage, 
1993). The administration aspect basically covers specifying roles and responsibilities, 
defining and coordinating the task each partner is supposed to perform in day-to-day 
administration of service delivery (Bardach, 1998; Narus and Anderson, 1987). 
The two other constructs, mutuality and trust, cover the social capital dimension 





other‘s resources for mutual benefit; whereas trust in an inter-organizational context 
basically means the reliability of the partner (Cavusgil et al., 2004). Finally, autonomy in 
collaboration implies retaining independent decision-making powers even when 
organizations agree to abide by the shared rules (Wood and Gray, 1991). Thus, in 
collaboration, partners need to maintain their own distinct identities and organizational 
authority both separate from, as well as simultaneously connected to, the collaborative 
effort. Expecting gains from collaboration, partners relinquish some autonomy 
(Cummings, 1984).  
The above five components of the collaboration process were validated by a 
confirmatory factor analysis and measured through a set of 17 measurement indicators. 
(please refer to Appendix 2.2 for a description of measurement indicators used by 
Thomson et al., 2009). Using mail survey data, Thomson et al. (2009) did a confirmatory 
factor analysis to refine the collaboration scale. The standard procedure is to test the 
refined model after confirmatory factor analysis with another data set, but Thomson et 
al.‘s (2009) model has not been validated with another data set, though this scale has 
been used by other scholars (Chan, 2010; Queen, 2011), albeit without performing 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
In Chapter 5, this  collaboration model of Thomson et al. (2009) will be validated 
using data from a lead network in the context of a developing country. The Thomson 
scale is used to measure collaboration in the network of agencies implementing the 
scheme. This is followed by confirmatory factor analysis to assess the extent to which the 
model fits the data. The model is then refined through a series of confirmatory factor 
analyses. Though the refined model should ideally have been tested with a new set of 
data, given the time and resource constraints, the same data set has been used.  
 The methodology for this analysis is presented in the methodology chapter and 





presented in the case background chapter, Section 3.2. The result of the confirmatory 
factor analysis is presented in Chapter 6 of the thesis.  
2.6.2 Linking IOR with Implementation Performance     
 
After measuring congruent IOR in the previous subsection, this subsection 
reviews literature linking IOR with the implementation performance. In public sector IOE 
analyses, there are very limited quantitative studies determining the extent of effect of 
appropriate IOR on performance, in a developing country context controlling for 
structural and incentive based factors. There has been a number of studies where the inter 
agency relationship has been examined, but there is very little quantitative causal analysis 
connecting the inter-organizational relationship between agencies with the performance 
of inter-organizational entity (IOE) (Hill and Hupe, 2014; pg. 148).  
At the dyadic level, the relationship between IOR and performance is studied 
using a  model of contract governance and there is extensive literature
38
 linking  different 
approaches of   contract governance with  contract performance in pure private 
contracting. The general conclusion from these studies is that the use of the relational 
governance approach along with transactional governance mechanism improves the 
performance of the contract, irrespective of the organizational structure. But the results of 
private contracting cannot be applied across the board to public contracting context as 
public contracting differs from private contracting. Contrary to contracting in private 
sector, in public sector contracting, because of the transparency and legitimacy 
requirements, contracts are designed in a formal manner but managed in a relational 
approach (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Goo and Huang, 2008; Van Slyke, 2006; 2007; 
Lamothe and Lamothe, 2012; Aamirkhanyan, 2009). Therefore studies which have used 
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contract design as an indicator to measure transactional approach will misinform the 
results in case of public contracting.  
Secondly, a number of studies in public contracting have tried to link contract 
management approach and performance (Romzek and Johnston, 2005; Palmer, 2000; 
Lonnoroth et al., 2007; Guinness, 2011; Perrot, 2006; Palmer and Mills, 2003; Lonnoroth 
et al., 2006; Davis, 2007; Walker and Davis, 1999; Beinecke and DeFillippi, 1999) but 
most of these studies are qualitative and there is dearth of quantitative studies linking 
contract governance with performance. These studies suggest that use of the relational 
approach to contract management is associated with higher performance.  
In social services contracting, a number of qualitative studies have stressed the 
important roles played by IORs/government contractor relationship in determining 
contract performance (Fernandez, 2009; Perrot, 2006; Palmer and Mills, 2003; Lonnoroth 
et al., 2006). Contract management and the resulting relationship  moderates the impact 
of contextual factors and contract design (Guinness, 2011
39
; Zaidi, 2011; Lonnoroth et 
al., 2006; Brown et. al., 2007; Van Slyke, 2007; Palmer and Mills, 2003; Lonnoroth et al., 
2006), shapes contract monitoring and evaluation, and takes care of  the incomplete 
aspect of the contract (Zaidi, 2011; Van Slyke, 2009; Girth, 2011).  But there has been no 
quantitative study in the public contracting context which measures the extent to which 
implementation management and government contractor relationship determines the 
performance of the contract. Therefore, it is important to assess the extent to which 
implementation management and resulting relationship among implementing agencies 
influences contract performance. 
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Thirdly, as discussed in Section 2.2, the constructs used in present contract 
governance studies have limitations in capturing the complexity of relationship and 
strength of relationship between parties. The present approaches merely establish a link 
between use of various governance activities and performance and there lacks a scale that 
can capture the complexity of relationship between parties in a contract and measure the 
strength of relationship between parties, such that variation in strength of relationship 
between parties could be linked with variation in performance in a dose-effect manner.  
   Apart from the contract governance studies at the dyadic level, there is an 
extensive literature that links IOR with performance at the network level. At the network 
level, quantitative studies have mainly studied structure of the network as a determinant 
of the network effectiveness (Turrini et al., 2010). Most of the studies follow an approach 
similar to Milward and Provan (1995), investigating structural factors as a possible 
reason for network effectiveness. There are very few studies in the public management 
stream (such as Klijn et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2007; Meier and O‘Toole, 2001) which 
have examined the link between network governance and network performance and only 
a small number (Klijn et al., 2010 and Meier and Tool, 2001) have tested separately the 
effect of network governance activities and its resulting relationship on network 
performance. Turini et al. (2010) in their review observe that this stream of literature 
suffers from ―a plurality of definitions, multiple theories, multiple methods and multiple 
explanations‖ (pg. 528).  
 
Another network stream is Collaborative governance, where a number of studies 
have tried to assess, impact of collaboration on performance quantitatively (Chen, 2010; 
Amirkhanyan, 2010; Selden Sowa and Sandfort, 2006; Thomson et al., 2009; Myhr and 
Sperkman, 2002; Chuang and Lucio, 2011). But these studies also suffer from two 







 or process based measures
41
  to measure performance. There are only two 
studies: Brudney et. al. (2009) and Aamirkhanyan et. al. (2010) which have used 
objective based measures for performance, but none of them do enough justice
42
 in their 
use of these objective measures. The key reason for the preference for 
subjective/perception-based measures is due to an inability to control other confounders, 
if objective performance measure is used. Though some also argue that subjective 
performance is a valid measure of the performance of parties in collaboration, as those 
involved in the collaboration know best about the collaboration process (Pandey et. al., 
2007), we contend that objective performance measurement is the gold standard in public 
policy research (Johnsen, 2005) and therefore it is important to find out how 
collaboration process is related to both perceived performance, as well as objective 
measures of performance.   
Secondly, most of the studies on collaboration are conducted in developed 
countries - mostly in United States and Europe - and these findings may not be applicable 
for Third World countries (Hirschmann, 1999). As the socio-cultural and environmental 
conditions in developing countries are different from the developed world, both 
constructs as well as results obtained in a western context would not be applicable in the 
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 Perception based study: these studies have used data on both collaboration outcome and 
collaboration process as a perception of concepts in the collaboration process and collaboration 
outcome. Thomson et al. (2009) and Chen (2010) are perception-based studies. In both studies, the 
same measurement constructs were used to measure collaboration process and perceived 
collaboration outcomes. Collaboration process was measured as a construct consisting of five 
components - joint decision making, administration, autonomy, mutuality and trust.  The 
perceived collaboration outcome was measured as another construct consisting of five components 
- goal achievement, quality of working relationship, broadened views, increased interactions, and 
equitable influences.  
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 Process-based studies: in these studies both collaboration process as well collaboration 
outcomes are measured as perception of some concrete collaboration activities (collaboration in 
administrative activities, collaboration in person ties) and concrete collaboration outcomes like 
funding gains, cost reduction etc. Some of the process-based studies include: Myhr and Spekman 
(2002), Chuang and Lucio (2011), and Selden Sowa and Sandfort (2006).  
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 For example, Amirkhanyan et. al. (2010) used only one objective indicator and they themselves 





developing world (Manning et. al., 2000).  Thus it is worthwhile to compare the results 
obtained in Western countries with that of Asia. 
The following summarizes the methodological limitation of present studies, 
discussed above. First, in the public inter-organizational context, there are very limited 
quantitative studies which link IORs with performance.  Secondly, existing studies 
linking IORs with performance do not link relationship strength with performance. 
Thirdly, there is a limited use of objective based performance indicators to measure 
performance because of inability to control structural and incentive-based factors.  




















3 CHAPTER THREE:  Case Background 
 
This chapter provides the details of the public–private partnership case in the 
Indian health sector, first providing a brief background of the healthcare system in India 
and the case used for this thesis: the National Health Insurance Scheme (section 3.1). 
This is followed by a discussion on the performance of the scheme (3.2); the final section 
analyzes the performance from an implementation perspective.  
3.1 Background: The Healthcare System in India  
 
In post-independent India, health was considered as a state responsibility, but the 
state has slowly retreated from this responsibility and the gap is now being filled by the 
private sector (Peters, 2002; Baru, 1998), whose role has grown in size and plays a 
dominant role, especially in healthcare.  
The planners in post-independent India were poised with zeal to emulate the 
National Health Service of Britain (Amrith, 2009) but this dream of policy makers 
remains unfulfilled. A number of institutional failures
43
 along with low levels of public 
financing has plagued the public system over the years (Rao, 2005).   
Public spending on health in India has remained historically very low. It peaked 
at about 1.6% of the GDP in mid-1985, but from then until very lately, it was less than 
1% of the GDP – one of the lowest in world, severely affecting growth and maintenance 
of public sector facilities.  
Until 2005, public facilities were housed in pathetic states, healthcare providers 
were absent, drug supplies and consumables were unavailable and most of the time 
facilities were closed (Banerjee et al., 2004; Rao, 2005). As a result, public facilities have 
lost the trust of even the poorer segments of the population as they prefer to use private 
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providers (Rao, 2005). The richest income quintile captures three rupees for every single 
rupee spent on the poorest income quintile (Peters et al., 2002).  
Similar to the poor status of the public health delivery system, the social health 
insurance system also performed poorly until 2005. The social health insurance system in 
India was started in 1948, but until 2003 it only covered around 3% of the population 
(Bearing Point, 2008), and provided such poor quality services that an enrolled 
beneficiary, even after contributing their wages, preferred to use private healthcare 
providers (Business Line, 2008; Mathew, 2000).  
The failure of the public system has allowed for the private sector to grow over 
the years. In addition to this, the government has facilitated growth of the private sector 
by offering a number of incentives, such as subsidies on land, water, and electricity, 
concessions on importing of medical equipment, and easy access to credit. In the 1950s, 
only 8% of healthcare facilities were in the private sector, but it grew rapidly during the 
mid-1990s (Baru, 1998) because of the incentives. By the end of the century, the private 
sector had become the dominant provider. By 2000, 70% of hospitals, 38.2% of hospital 
beds, 60 to 79% of doctors, 80% of outpatient care, and 57% of inpatient care were in the 
private sector (Bhat, 1996; Ramani and Dileep, 2006; Decosta and Diwan, 2007; Peters et 
al., 2002; Report of The National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2005). 
This rapid growth of the private sector was not corroborated with regulation. There is still 
very little regulation related to health services standards, healthcare charges, or quality of 
care. 
As the majority of the population uses private providers and lacks social health 
insurance coverage, private expenditure on health has become a major source of health 







                                           (Source: Planning Commission, 2011) 
Figure 3.1 Sources of Health Expenditure 2010 
 
By 2002, the private health insurance market, along with social health insurance 
covered less than 5% of the population (Bearing Point, 2008) and therefore households 
mainly paid out of pocket in the form of fee for service. The fee for service method of 
payment led to over-servicing and various forms of unethical and exploitative practices 
(Mishra and Ramanathan, 2002; Muraleedhran, 2000; Yesudian, 1994; Varkey et al., 
2000). In the absence of financial protection, poor income groups have to either forsake 
care
44
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 28% of the ailments in rural areas went untreated because of lack of money (Report of the 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2005). 
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 47% financed their hospitalization by loans and sale of assets (Report of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, 2005) and 25% of cases of these hospitalizations forced the 





The National Health Policy (2002) clearly articulated partnering with the private 
sector for service delivery with public financing as one of the most feasible approaches to 
universal coverage. It stated, 
―In the context of very large numbers of poor in the country, it would be difficult to 
conceive of an exclusive Government mechanism to provide health services to this 
category. It has sometimes been felt that a social health insurance scheme, funded by the 
government and with service delivery through the private sector, would be the 
appropriate solution.‖ (National Health Policy, 2002) 
A number of health insurance schemes have been launched in the successive years 
after the National Health Policy (2002) by various state governments and the central 
government, increasing health insurance coverage from around 5% in 2005 to around 
25% by 2010 (Reddy et al., 2011).  Economic growth and resulting fiscal space has 
allowed for exploring and experimenting on a number of policy options to increase 
healthcare access through insurance. These experiments are seen as a precursor to a social 
health insurance system. 
The Universal Health Insurance scheme, launched in 2003, was the first attempt by the 
central government to introduce health insurance for workers in the informal sector.  In 
the period 2003-08, five government-sponsored low-cost health insurance schemes were 























































Karnataka  2010 1.4 million 403 95% 
 ( Source: Adopted from Reddy et al 2011) 
In these schemes, generally a conglomeration of the private sector, NGOs and the 
public sector come together to provide health insurance to a defined population. The 
public sector in these partnerships generally funds the insurance premium either partly or 
completely, participates in oversight of the program, and also competes in service 
delivery. For service delivery, public-private as well as not-for-profit hospitals compete 
in delivering the services.  
The next section discusses one of the most prominent government supported 
social health insurance schemes, touted as the biggest public-private partnership in 
India‘s heath sector.  
3.2 Background: National Health Insurance Scheme  
 
The National Health Insurance Scheme, known as Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojana (hereafter RSBY) is the largest government sponsored social health insurance 
scheme in India implemented through a public-private partnership mode. The scheme 







 but now it also includes specific vocational groups like domestic workers, 
Beedi workers, construction workers, etc. As of April 2014, the scheme covered around 
37 million families in 436 districts across 29 states (RSBY website). The health insurance 
coverage is expected to reach to 50% of the population (630 million lives) by 2015, 
assuming continued political and financial support from the Government. 
The health insurance coverage, or total sum assured, is US $750 per (30,000 
INR) BPL family per annum on a family floater basis. The benefit package of the scheme 
covers hospitalization expenses (including OPD expenditure
47
 and transportation 
expenditure
48
) of all diseases
49
 including pre-existing diseases. Some states have added 
additional benefits in the package like OPD coverage or additional financial coverage 
(more than 30,000 INR per year). The beneficiary is entitled to seek treatment across the 
country in any of the RSBY empanelled hospitals. 
The scheme is funded through general taxes, where state and central government 
both contribute. The central government pays 75% of the total funding, and state 
governments pays the remaining 25%
50
. Beneficiaries only pay a token amount of 30 
rupees as a registration fee per annum. There is no user charge or co-payment at the time 
of utilization of service as the scheme is 100% pre--paid.  The scheme is voluntary and 
covers the Below Poverty Line (BPL) population and some additional groups in different 
states
51
. A family is a unit of coverage and the definition of family in the scheme includes 
a family of five: husband, wife, and three dependents. The scheme is voluntary and 
                                                          
46 BPL population in India is considered as those earning less than a dollar per person per day.  
47
 Includes OPD expenditure for five days before hospitalization and post hospitalization visits 
(including lab investigations).  
48
 Transportation assistance of 100 rupees per visit up to a maximum of 1,000 rupees per year (10 
visits a year). 
49
 The conditions which are not included are congenital external diseases, drug and alcohol 
induced illness, sterilization and fertility-related procedures.  
50
 Except in case of J&K and North Eastern States where state governments contribute 10% of the 
premium and the Government of India contributes 90%.  
51
 The other categories are Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 






therefore a BPL family may choose not to enroll in the scheme. A family is considered as 
a BPL family if it is included as a BPL family in the state departments list
52
 or it is from a 
selected vocational group. 
Families who are in the state BPL list can enroll in the scheme by paying 30 
rupees as a registration fee. On enrolment, they get a smart card which has a photo of the 
head of family, thumb impressions of four other family members and has a value of 
30,000 INR. This card can be used throughout India at any RSBY network hospital. The 
BPL family, when someone falls sick, visits the network hospital. Providers at the 
network hospital diagnose the case, select the appropriate procedure from the list of 1,094 
packages, and block the package amount in the card. If the condition is not included in 
the list of packages, then the hospital sends a pre-authorization form to a Third Party 
Administrator (TPA) for authorizing the treatment. After completing the treatment, the 
provider fills in the case details through an online claims database and submits the claim, 
which the TPA is supposed to reimburse within 30 working days. 
The scheme is implemented through a Public Private Partnership (PPP) mode, 
where state governments have contracts with an insurance company to provide defined 
health insurance coverage to a defined population in a district, on the basis of a premium 
per family decided through a competitive bidding process. The insurance company 
provides health insurance coverage and defined healthcare services in collaboration with 
other agencies and healthcare facilities from both the public and private sector. Different 
agencies in the scheme play different roles as shown in Table 3.2:   
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 The quality of the BPL list used is very poor in many states. The false positive could be as high 
as 49% (Jalan and Murgai, 2007) whereas false negative could be up to 53% (Dreze and Khera, 
2010). There is extensive variation also, as in Andhra Pradesh the false positive is around 59% 







Table 3.2 RSBY Scheme Implementation Structure 
 








Insurer/TPA NGOs  Providers 
of Care 
Oversight of the 
scheme 
√ √  √    
Financial 
management/planning 
√ √  √    
Package of service √ √ √     
Selection of providers     √   
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
√ √   √   
Contract with insurer   √ √    
Actuarial analysis      √   
Awareness of the 
scheme  
  √ √ √ √  
Enrolment    √ √ √ √  
Claims processing and 
payment 
    √   
(Source: Adopted from Reddy et al., 2011) 
 
At the federal level, the Ministry of Labor & Employment (hereafter MOLE) 
provides stewardship and overall oversight of the scheme. State government contributes 
financially and facilitates implementation of the scheme by creating a state nodal agency, 
and identifying and deploying human and infrastructure resources at the state and district 
level. State government also decides which districts need to be covered and any 
amendments, if needed, in the financial and health service coverage. The State Nodal 
Agency (SNA) contracts with the insurance company (IC) as well as  provide support to 
various agencies implementing the scheme, supervises their activities, and acts as a 






As seen in Fig 3.2, RSBY is implemented at the district level through a lead agency 
network model
53
, where the insurance company works as a lead agency at the district 
level, contracting and coordinating with other agencies like TPA, smart card providers, 
district administration, and hospitals. As a lead agency, the insurance company contracts 
with other agencies who provide these services, but the overall responsibility of service 
delivery lies with the insurance company. In most cases, the insurance company contracts 
with a TPA to do beneficiary enrollment, provider selection, claims processing and 
payment. The TPA then hires a smart card provider company to provide smart cards. The 
TPA also creates a provider network in each district (both public and private providers 
are included) and contracts with them on the terms and guidelines included in the contract 
between state government and insurance company. The TPA does the claims processing, 
provider payment  and claims monitoring. For the enrollment function, the insurance 
company, along with the TPA and smart card providers, work with appointed officers at a 
district level (also known as Field Key Officers) and the State Nodal Agency in a 
collaborative manner. Similarly for awareness, the generation State Nodal Agency 
collaborates with insurance companies and the district administration.   
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 The use of lead agency networks, especially in social services, has gained a lot of prominence 
because of the ease of contracting. Some of the other schemes in India which follow lead agency 







Figure 3.2 Implementation Structure RSBY scheme 
 
 
3.3 Performance of the Scheme   
 
The primary objective of the scheme is to provide financial security to families 
from catastrophic healthcare expenditure. Reducing out of pocket (OOP) expenditure is 
an important corollary of the scheme (Selvaraj and Karan, 2012). But the focus of this 
dissertation is to understand the role of IORs in the performance of the scheme from an 
implementation perspective, rather than a health insurance perspective. From a health 





of scheme should result in a reduction in healthcare expenditure and an improvement in 
health status. But since the focus of this dissertation is from an implementation 
perspective, the performance of the scheme will include  objectives achieved by 
measuring the extent to which the contracted service delivery achieves the goals of 
contracting in terms of quantity and quality (Aamirkhanyan, 2007). The quantity 
dimension measures the extent to which the contracted service delivery achieves the 
program objectives. The quality dimension of contracting performance is assessed by 
compliance of the implementation with expected specifications detailed in the contract on 
structure, process and outcome using the Donabedians framework of quality 
(Aamirkhanyan, 2007; Martin, 2003).  
3.3.1 Implementation Performance in RSBY   
 
A programmatic perspective analysis of the RSBY scheme suggests that it must 
perform three critical programmatic functions in order to achieve its objectives. First, the 
scheme should enroll the entire target population, which would not only increase 
coverage but also expand the risk pool. Second, it should deliver good quality healthcare 
services to the entire target population without additional costs to beneficiaries, so that 
the enrolled population can utilize these services. Third, to keep the cost low, the scheme 
should control opportunistic behavior of the parties, especially the providers.  
 Performance in these three critical functions may be measured by assessing (i) 
the success of implementing agencies in enrolling the target beneficiaries in the program, 
measured as an enrolment ratio; (ii) the extent to which target beneficiaries utilize the 
health services offered under the program, measured by hospitalization rate; and finally 
(iii) the extent to which the program controls fraudulent behavior and moral hazards of 





Analysis of the scheme shows wide variation in the performance of the scheme 
across states and across districts on two indicators: enrolment ratio and hospitalization 
rates, as seen in Fig 3.3 and 3.4. Wide variation is observed not only between states and 



























What factors lead to variation in the performance? In the case of the RSBY 
scheme, all districts have the same contract design and similar contract administration 
structure, suggesting that contract design and incentive structure have no role in 
explaining variation in the performance. In all the districts, the same healthcare 
services are being purchased, and the same organizations are working in different 
districts and in different states; therefore the role of market and contextual factors are 
also limited in most districts. Regarding the institutional environment, the RSBY 
scheme does not depend on the formal institutional system for addressing conflict 
between parties, as it has its own private order institutional arrangement for grievance 
redress, and therefore the role of the formal institutional system is expected to be very 
limited in explaining variation in the performance.  
Regarding implementation management, all districts have the same 
administration structure, but as the constitution of the teams and the approach to 
management differs from place to place, the variation in compliance mechanisms 
could be a possible factor causing variation in the performance of the scheme. 
Therefore, it is important to assess the extent to which compliance mechanisms and 
their dynamics with the  implementation structure influences contract performance, 
including prevention and management of partner opportunism.  
3.4 Role of IORs: Explaining Variation in Implementation Performance   
 
The contract between the State Nodal Agency (SNA) and the insurance 
company is the key implementation document for the scheme within the district. This 
contract includes not only the terms between the insurance company and SNA, but it 
also specifies the key terms of the relationship in which the insurance company may 
enter with other agencies (like TPA and Smart Card service provides). The contract 
includes a detailed implementation structure of the scheme, including the role of 
various stakeholders, selection of intermediaries and their selection criteria, hardware 





systems. Through this contract, the SNA exercises hierarchical control over the whole 
implementation process. This principle contract is designed by the MOLE and has 
evolved over the years. The SNA can make some changes in the contract but the key 
terms remain the same. The contract with the insurance company is for three years 
and is renewable every year based on performance assessment by the SNA.  
Insurance companies, along with their associates, are expected to perform on 
three deliverables: enrolment of beneficiaries, empanelment of hospitals, and 
payment of claims. These outputs are expected to lead to health service utilization in 
the scheme. The quality and quantity of inputs and process of each of the deliverables 
are explicitly defined in the contract. The contract also specifies the responsibilities of 
each agency, including the government agencies and the support they are expected to 
provide.  
3.4.1.1 Implementation Dynamics during Enrolment 
Enrolment is the process of enrolling a target population in the scheme. The 
process
54
 is described in detail within the principal contract and includes standards for 
inputs and process (see Appendix 3.1 for details of the enrolment process). The 
enrolment process is done by a network of agencies
55
: insurance companies, Third 
Party Administrators, Smart Card Service Providers (SCSP) and District Key 
Managers. However, the key role is played by the SCSP which carries out enrolment. 
The district administration guides the private sector agencies as they are new to the 
district.  
The private sector agencies organize enrolment based on the BPL list 
provided by the state government. As the quality of the BPL list varies from state to 
state, poor quality, outdated BPL lists lead to disputes at the time of enrolment and 
increase the cost of identifying beneficiaries, thus reducing enrolment performance.  
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 The process involves collecting data, photographs, and thumb impressions of the 
beneficiary, and on-the-spot preparation and distribution of the smart card which has data 
about the beneficiary family. 
55





 All stakeholders who are involved in the enrolment process have an incentive 
to increase enrolment
56
 numbers, except the public sector partner at the district level 
(District Key Manager and district administration), whose support is critical for the 
enrolment performance. The role of the district administration is to provide required 
support as well as to monitor other agencies. District administration can prevent 
opportunism from various parties involved in the process, but at the same time can 
also behave opportunistically, therefore affecting the performance of the scheme.  
District administration support is critical for the enrolment performance. The 
enrolment team is generally an outsider in the district and therefore they are not 
familiar with the geography and facilities that are available. Secondly, District 
Administration is also responsible for making Field Key Officers (FKO) available. 
These officers carry out the critical task of increasing awareness of the scheme and 
verification of beneficiary. Without presence of FKOs, the new smart cards (64KB) 
cannot be issued; therefore, availability of FKOs considerably influences enrolment 
performance, and this depends upon the support of district administration to the 
enrolment team.  
Insurance companies are dependent on the support of the district 
administration but they do not have any direct control on the district administration. 
Therefore the kind of support insurance companies receive depends considerably on 
the kind of relationship they share with the district administration. A high level of 
collaboration between insurance companies and the district administration is expected 
to lead to higher enrolment performance. Therefore, collaboration is the congruent 
compliance mechanism for the network of agencies involved in enrolment function.  
 Hypothesis 1a: Collaboration is the congruent compliance mechanism in the 
enrolment network. 
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 The insurance company receives a premium based on the number of families enrolled in the 
scheme. The Smart Card Service Providers who do the core process of enrolment (taking the 
photo and thumb impression of the beneficiaries, printing the smart card and preparation of 





Apart from support, monitoring by the district administration is critical in order 
to prevent opportunism from partner agencies. In the present payment method, 
agencies have an incentive to increase quantity of enrolment but not quality. The 
quality of the enrolment
57
 is described in the contract, but it is neither measured nor 
monitored. In fact, the process of ensuring quality increases costs
58
 for insurance 
companies as well as the Smart Card Service Providers (SCSP), and therefore the 
quality of enrolment has a high risk of not being delivered. This becomes more 
prominent if one of the partners starts making loss, specifically the SCSP. SCSP 
profitability depends on the number of cards issued per day
59
, and this decreases if 
there is any delay in the enrolment process. When the SCSP starts losing, they start 
compromising on the service and quality to save costs, and can end up committing 
fraud. This may take many forms, for example: reducing and replacing equipment, or 
charging more than the designated enrolment fee from the beneficiary. Insurance 
companies have no incentive to control these opportunistic behaviors, as poor quality 
of enrolment ultimately reduces future claims, which is in the interest of the insurance 
company.   
The district administrator can monitor the quality of enrolment and provide 
pressure on the insurance company and their allies, thus preventing opportunistic 
behaviors, however the district administration has no direct incentive
60
 to ensure 
either quantity or quality of enrolment. Due to lack of incentives, the district 
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 Beneficiaries receive their card on the spot with the correct name and complete the data 
within the card, information on the process of claiming benefits, and a distribution list of 
empanelled hospitals. 
58
 For example: a quality enrolment process would include making the beneficiary aware of 
how to access the benefits of the smart cards and hospitals from where he can access care. 
This is likely to increase the use of benefits when needed, ultimately leading to a higher claim 
ratio, which is not in the interest of insurance companies.  
59
 SCSP makes an upfront investment in hiring equipment and staff and so their investment 
(cost) is on daily basis, whereas their revenues are dependent on numbers of enrolment 
completed.    
60
 The district administration implements a plethora of schemes and programs. Thus, until 
higher authorities at the state level catch up with the district administration, it is unlikely that 
the district administration will pay enough attention to the enrolment process in general. 
Therefore the extent to which the state government or the State Nodal Agency is able to 






administration can also behave opportunistically by not providing the required 
support, or by exploiting the dependency of the insurance company by asking favors 
in return.  
Table 3.3 summarizes the type of opportunistic behaviors by each party, and 
the approaches to prevent as well as manage these opportunistic behaviors according 
to the scheme implementation guidelines.  
Table 3.3 Opportunistic Behaviors in Enrolment 
 
Committing Party  Description of Opportunism  
Insurance company  Limited supervision of TPA and Smart Card 
Service Provider 
Smart Card  Poor quality enrolment  
Smart Card Service Provider 
and FKO  
Fraud and collusion with hospitals and FKOs 
TPA Limited supervision of Smart Card Service 
Provider 
District administration Not providing enough support  
 Asking favors for support 
 
The district administration can prevent, control and also facilitate 
opportunism within the enrolment process. But in the present institutional structure, 
neither the insurance company nor the SNA has direct control over the district 
administration. Therefore the relationship which these agencies share with the district 
administration can determine prevention and control of opportunism. Thus,  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship with the district administration plays a critical 
role in determining the prevention and control of opportunism.   
 
3.4.1.2 Implementation Dynamics during Empanelment of Hospitals  
Hospital empanelment is process of empanelling a qualified hospital to 
deliver health services to beneficiary (see Appendix 3.2 for details of the hospital 
empanelment process). Insurance companies empanel interested hospitals on a set 





There is a conflict between insurance companies and the district 
administration in the empanelment process. Insurance companies would prefer to 
have a fewer number of hospitals, and have those hospitals provide low quality 
services so as to keep the ratio low; whereas the district administration would like to 
have a large number of hospitals of good reputation. The insurance company is an 
outsider in the district, and therefore, the district administration facilitates the process 
by suggesting hospitals to be empanelled, so that there are adequate numbers of 
hospitals with good reputation with an appropriate geographic distribution. These 
terms are not defined in the contract.  
According to contract, insurance companies have complete autonomy to 
empanel a hospital, though the district administration can suggest hospitals since 
insurance companies may not be aware of the practices of the hospitals in their 
districts. The district administration can only suggest, but ultimately it is the 
prerogative of the insurance company to empanel a particular hospital. But in 
practice, the district administration and the SNA considerably influence this process 
because of their position and the dependence of insurance companies on them.  The 
district administration and the SNA pressurize insurance companies to empanel their 
favored hospital.  
Sensing the amount of public money coming in and in absence of providers 
in rural areas, hospitals have sprung up in rural areas exclusively designed and 
customized for RSBY patients (International Insurance News, 2011) even though 
package rates under the RSBY scheme are much lower than the usual fees for 
charged services (Reddy et al., 2011; Laforgia and Nagpal, 2012). These new 
hospitals are small, low volume hospitals which tend to provide low quality care 
(Laforgia and Nagpal, 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests that most of these 
hospitals are in some way connected to the stakeholders who are involved in 
implementing the scheme. Hospitals pressurize or collude with insurance companies, 





scheme. As rural areas have a low supply of health facilities, the pressure and limited 
choices for the insurers mean these hospitals get empaneled even if they do not 
qualify with the empanelment criteria. 
Hospitals protected by the district administration and the SNA behave 
opportunistically, and sensing an inability to control them, insurance companies also 
resort to opportunistic behaviors in order to control cost. This leads to a vicious cycle 
of opportunism and counter-opportunism. This disturbs the empanelment, enrolment 
and claims management function, reducing the performance of the scheme. 
Opportunism by one agency leads to counter-opportunism by other agencies, 
reducing the performance of the scheme further.   
Therefore private hospitals have much stronger incentive to get empaneled; at 
present, private hospitals dominate in the empanelment process in most states except 
a few like Punjab, Himachal, West Bengal and North East states (see Appendix 3.3 
for the share of private hospitals in the scheme). The following Table 3.4 lists the 
type of opportunistic behaviors observed during the empanelment process and their 
prevention and control strategies as per the scheme guidelines.  
Table 3.4 Opportunistic Behaviors in Empanelment 
 
Committing Party  Behavior   
Hospital  Posing as a hospital with the required qualification  




Colluding with hospitals   
Insurance company  Empanelling low quantity and quality hospitals   
District administration Favoring certain hospitals in empanelment and de-
empanelment  
 




In the process of empanelment of hospitals, the relationship between the 
insurance company and the district administration is tenuous; the district 
administration can play a role that ranges from supportive to exploitative. For 





can control the district administration through the State Nodal Agency, provided the 
State Nodal Agency has control over the district administration. Thus the extent to 
which district administration supports or behaves opportunistically depends upon the 
relationship between the triad of the relationship between the insurance company and 
district administration; insurance company and State Nodal Agency; and State Nodal 
Agency and district administration.  
3.4.1.3 Implementation Dynamics in Claims Management   
 
In the process of claims management, hospitals generate the claims, Third 
Party Administrators monitor and approves the claims, and insurance companies pay 
those claims (see Appendix 3.4 for details of claims management process). All the 
stakeholders in the claims process have differing interests; for example, hospitals 
want to make as many claims as possible with the highest margins of profit. On the 
other hand, insurance companies want to keep the claims ratio to a minimum to keep 
their profitability high in the short term; whereas Third Party Administrators want to 
claim the maximum service fee while investing a minimum in service delivery. Thus, 
we see conflicting goals from the agencies in the claims management process. Given 
the short relationship duration, parties are expected to behave opportunistically and 
pursue their objectives.   
The present scheme has been designed from a mass policy perspective and so 
there are very low margins per case in order to prevent exorbitant profits. Packages to 
hospitals are not sufficient to cover each case but they are sufficient when considered 
for the hospital over a whole year (Reddy et al., 2011; Laforgia and Nagpal, 2012).  
But hospitals calculate their profits on the basis of individual cases. As hospitals are 
paid on the basis of package rates (fixed cost per disease condition), this gives them 
incentives for a number of opportunistic behaviors, like those generally observed in 
the insurance based payment made on the basis of package of services. These include 





(supply induced demand), treating low cost cases (cream skimming), coding high 
profit conditions (Diagnosis Related Group creep), and providing low quality 
treatment.     
Another major type of fraudulent activity comes in the form of ghost patients, 
where hospitals collude with the beneficiary (where the beneficiary is paid a part of 
the claimed amount) or enrolment agencies and make fraudulent claims without 
providing any care. Hospitals also collude with the Third Party Administrator 
employees or State Nodal Agencies and district administrators to reduce detection of 
fraud and its impact on the hospital. 
Private hospitals have strong incentives to commit fraud; therefore, the higher 
the number of claims from the private sector, the higher the risk of fraud, and as a 
result, the greater the potential for disputes in claims management. The states with 
higher private sector participation have been found to have more disputes in claims 
management.  
Insurance companies behave opportunistically to control claim ratios when 
the claim ratio reaches unsustainable proportions. A number of insurance companies 
have claimed a ratio reaching more than 100%, as seen in Fig 3.5. These claim 
controlling strategies include unethical approaches like repeatedly suspending 
hospitals which submit higher claims so that they cannot file claims, delaying 










(Source: Presentation Nishant Jain GIZ, National Workshop, 2013) 





Bonafide hospitals find it difficult to manage the revenue cycle when claims 
payments are delayed. Genuine hospitals leave the scheme since they find it difficult 
to sustain financially. Some hospitals anticipating payment delay take money from 
the patient and refund them later. Fraudulent hospitals anticipating insurance 
company strategies inflate their claims so that there is no loss even if some of the 
claims are not paid, leading to a vicious cycle of opportunism and counter-
opportunism. 
Table 3.5 Opportunistic Behaviors in Claims Management 
 
Committing party and incentives  Description of opportunism  
Hospital   Fraudulent claims  
Third Party Administration   Poor quality monitoring  
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 Burn out ratio refers to claim ratio without taking into account administrative cost.   









3.4.1.4 Implementation Dynamics and Health Service Utilization  
 
The scheme design assumes that if the right beneficiaries are properly 
enrolled and the right hospitals are properly empaneled, then in times of need, 
beneficiaries will approach hospitals for care. If claims are managed properly then 
hospitals will provide services, thus increasing utilization of care by beneficiaries. 
Therefore, performance in all other areas ultimately influences utilization of the 
scheme.  
Performance in the utilization function is measured by the hospitalization 
ratio, which is the ratio of the number of hospitalizations to the number of enrolled 
families in the district. Is higher hospitalization better? Does higher hospitalization 
reflect higher performance of a health insurance scheme? In the context of the RSBY 
scheme, higher hospitalization rates can be considered a desired performance goal 
given the population to which the program is targeted. It is well established in the 
literature that this category of population forgoes treatment because of its higher 
cost
62
. Underutilization over the years has led to a considerable pent up demand in the 
population (Krishnaswamy and Ruchismita, 2011). Therefore, utilization of health 
services is a desired performance in the context of RSBY scheme and the 
hospitalization rate can be considered as valid performance measure of the scheme. 
Performance in utilization depends upon performance in enrolment, hospital 
empanelment, claims management and fraud management. Performance in enrolment 
has been discussed earlier. A good quality hospital empanelment process will lead to 
adequate numbers of hospitals of good reputation with appropriate geographic 
distribution that will facilitate utilization by the beneficiary. Secondly, an efficient 
and timely claims management process will motivate providers to provide care
63
, and 
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 In 2004, 28% of the ailments in rural areas went untreated because of lack of money 
(National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2005). 
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 Claims delay has been a major reason for denying care to the beneficiaries in the scheme 
and lowering service utilization or hospitalization in the scheme. Delays in claims payment is 
one of the most common problems reported by hospitals across districts (Herald, 2013; 





a good system of fraud control will incentivize insurance companies to pay in a 
timely manner. One rejected beneficiary can spread the word, leading to 
underutilization of the scheme. Therefore, an efficient claims management process 
considerably influences hospitalization in the scheme. But these three activities 
require support and collaboration from other agencies.  
The process of hospital empanelment, claims management and fraud 
management can be grouped under the hospitalization function. The hospitalization 
function involves Third Party Administrators, insurance companies and district 
administrations, which can be considered as the hospitalization network. A good 
quality hospital empanelment requires collaboration among the insurance companies, 
Third Party Administrators and district administrations, since the insurance 
companies, as an outsider in the district, are not aware of the hospitals in the district, 
their practices and reputation. An efficient and timely claims management process 
depends upon the collaboration between the Third Party Administrators and insurance 
companies, as the efficiency of the claims management process depends on the trust 
of the insurance companies in claims processing by the Third Party Administrators.  
Collaboration between agencies in the claims payment process also reduces fraud as 
insurance companies need the support of the district administration to de-empanel 
hospitals.  
Collaboration among agencies will lead to better quality hospital 
empanelment (high quality hospitals empaneled with appropriate geographic 
distribution), better claims management processes (quicker payment of genuine 
claims and lower fraud) and lower incidences of fraud. All this will lead to better 
hospital service utilization and a higher hospitalization ratio. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Higher collaboration among agencies involved in 





Hypothesis 2b: Higher opportunism among agencies involved in 
hospitalization functions is related with a lower hospitalization ratio. 
3.4.1.5 Implementation Dynamics and Prevention of Opportunism  
 
When the agencies do not follow the expectations as per the contract and/or the 
norm of exchange, then that behavior is known as opportunism (Wathne and Heide, 
2000). The compliance of the agencies with contracts depends on incentives they 
have to comply with. Generally, monitoring the quality of inputs, processes and 
outcomes is possible only to a limited extent, and therefore parties have an incentive 
to shed quality – especially if it saves costs and is not monitored (Hart, 2003).  
Therefore, the extent to which the network performs from a quality perspective can 
be gauged by the extent to which network members behave opportunistically. One of 
the purposes of the collaboration among agencies is to reduce opportunism by 
collaborating members, thus it is expected that when the collaboration between 
parties is high, the opportunism by network members will be low. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 3: Higher collaboration among agencies is related with low 
opportunism by network members. 
3.4.1.6 Implementation Dynamics and Control of Opportunism    
 
 
Policy mechanism designers have consistently evolved the scheme design, 
refining the contract document and standardizing implementation processes as much 
as possible, leaving limited scope for discretion and ambiguity.      
 The contract document is specific to the extent that it specifies the formula for 
using various equipment according to population size. One of the officers in an 





to know anything else... One has to just follow the guidelines (specifications in the 
contract).‖64 
The scheme designers‘ main focus was to improve performance. Rather than 
focus on the formal accountability process (like reports), they focused on the informal 
accountability process, like meetings and discussions. This allowed them to sit, 
discuss, analyze and find solutions to the problems faced by the implementing 
agencies. The scheme designers had the objective that those who are keen to perform 
and deliver in the scheme should be there. As the contract between agencies is only 
for one year, there is no point in having penalties. One of the key people involved in 
the scheme design said, ―Our approach is either you are with us or you are not with 
us. There is no penalty. If you are not performing, then you are out, then you are not 
with us. Only if you are performing, you are with us.‖65 
Penalty clauses were not included in the scheme because the scheme designers 
believed that if penalties were included, then the ―whole focus would be on how to 
make penalties work rather than making the scheme work.‖66 For example, if a 
monetary penalty is included then it is ―difficult to define the penalty amount and 
how that penalty amount is used.‖67 In a few situations, delay and negligence can 
happen from the public sector, and it is difficult to include the government in penalty 
payments under existing administrative rules.  
Because of these reasons, penalty clauses have not been included in the contract. 
The scheme management approach promotes working as a ―team and not be 
dependent on penalties but facilitate and support each other in performing.‖68 In the 
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case of problems, stakeholders are advised to ―sit together discuss and seek a 
response from the agency and make them do it, rather than penalizing them.‖69 
Scheme designers have tried to come with set guidelines for each and every 
process, so if an agency consistently flouts the norms, then they are required to give 
an explanation. If the agency doesn‘t change its behavior, even after discussion and 
support, then the contract will not be renewed with the agency next year. Thus rather 
than depending on penalties, the scheme focuses on making the scheme work, and if 
not, then ending the relationship rather than depending on penalties and counter 
penalties to address the issue. The defaulting agency will not be contracted again in 
the next year and the agency could even be blacklisted and debarred from 
participating in the scheme at the state, or even at the national level. If a severe 
problem arises midway, the contract can also be cancelled.  
The majority of the contracts are designed in a transactional manner, but at 
the same time, there is a relational component that includes coordination clauses and 
dispute redress mechanisms. These specify using discussion to resolve disputes. 
Implementers are expected to adhere to the contract and use internal grievance 
redress mechanisms in disputes rather than the formal judiciary. This approach to 
solving disputes has changed the overall scheme compliance mechanism. 
The grievance redress system is a three tiered system with grievance redress 
committees set up at district, state and national level, comprised of the stakeholders at 
the respective levels, and chaired by a public functionary. The grievance redress 
committee at the district level is chaired by the District Magistrate; at the state level, 
by the State Principle Secretary, or Principle Secretary of the department handling the 
RSBY scheme; and at the national level, by the Director General handling the RSBY 
program. Based on the type of the complaint, the aggrieved party is expected to lodge 
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grievances at the appropriate level. The grievance system is an online system and 
standards have been set up for processing grievance redress.  
All disputes are expected to be resolved through discussion at the grievance 
redress system but there is no legal sanctity to the arbitration at the grievance redress 
committees, as ―no legal power and legal sanctions can be put or implemented except 
renewing the contract next year.‖70 At the time of data collection, the grievance 
redress system has not really taken off, even in well performing states. Rather, 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR: Research Design and Methodology  
 
 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology used in this 
thesis. Section 4.1 discusses the research design and the research objectives which 
this thesis aims to answer. Section 4.2 lays out the methodologies used to address 
each of the research objectives. First, to understand the dynamics of IOR and its link 
with implementation performance, a multi-case multi-level analysis using primary 
qualitative data was done. This is described in Section 4.2.1. The next step was to 
measure the dominant compliance mechanisms in the RSBY scheme. For this 
purpose, a measurement approach was selected and a measurement index was created 
using a confirmatory factor analysis based on data from a primary survey. The 
methodology used is described in Section 4.2.2. Finally, to assess the extent to which 
congruent IORs influence performance, a regression analysis was done using primary 
survey data. The estimation methods used for the regression analysis with a 
combination of primary survey data and secondary data is outlined in Section 4.2.3.  
4.1 Research Design  
 
The subject of study in this thesis involves analyses using different 
approaches at different levels of aggregation. Thus, a case study research design is 
used here as it allows ―different levels of analysis that are relevant to the theory being 
evaluated‖ (King, Kohene, and Verba, 1994). For the analytical methodology, a 
mixed-methods approach was followed to address the three research objectives in 
each of the three different parts.  
 For understanding the dynamics of IOR, a multi-case multi-level analysis 
was conducted using qualitative and quantitative data to examine how IOG influences 
one of the important aspects of performance – opportunism. For measuring IOR, a 
series of confirmatory factor analyses were carried out using primary survey data to 





scheme context. To assess the impact of IOR on implementation performance, 
regression analysis was conducted using program performance data from the RSBY 
database as a dependent variable. The  data on IOR from the primary survey was used 
as an explanatory variable. Thus this analysis  determined the extent to which IOR 
measured as collaboration between agencies influence performance and reduce 
opportunism.   
For the case of RSBY, the unit of analysis is the program implementation 
unit of the program, i.e.: the network of agencies at the district level. The case of the 
RSBY scheme serves as an analytical heuristic case study as it tries to use causal 
investigation to generate new hypotheses to enhance theory (Eckstein, 1992). The 
study was approved by the National University of Singapore Institutional Review 
Board. The approval letter of the study is provided in the Appendix 4.1.  
4.1.1 Understanding the Implementation Dynamics of the Scheme  
 
Opening the black box of IORs and understanding the IOR dynamics of the 
scheme requires identifying implementation networks, actors involved, processes of 
implementation, and factors affecting performance. To establish this background 
knowledge, a series of documentation and literature reviews were required, together 
with a set of preliminary interviews.  
The preliminary field work was conducted in two phases: January 2012 to 
February 2012, and April 2012. Before the preliminary interviews, a number of 
informal discussions were conducted. 
Table 4.1 Preliminary Field Work 
 
Methods  Numbers  
Informal discussions  9 
Preliminary interviews 9 
Workshops/meetings 2 






Firstly, a series of informal discussions were conducted by email and phone. 
These informal discussions and reviews of the secondary literature helped to develop 
an understanding of the general dynamics of the scheme implementation and helped 
to identify the key informants. The list of informal discussants is given in Appendix 
4.2. 
This was followed by nine in-depth interviews. Each of these interviews was 
conducted in multiple sessions. A semi-structured interview schedule was prepared. 
The interview questions were derived from the theoretical framework of contract 
governance (see Appendix 2.1 for details on components of contract governance).   
These preliminary interviews identified various critical factors that 
influenced implementation performance of the scheme as well as possible 
opportunistic behavior that may be exploited from the scheme. The scheme has a high 
possibility of exploitation by both implementers (principals) and private contractors 
(agents), where exploitation means maximizing individual benefit according to the 
contractual and legal boundaries, as well as including illegal activities that affect the 
quality/quantity of service delivery to the final end user (consumers). It also helped in 
refining interview questions for future surveys and in-depth interviews, in selection of 
implementation networks surveyed, and the selection of states for the qualitative part 
of the study. The list of preliminary interviews is given in Appendix 4.3. 
In addition to the interviews, the researcher also attended two national level 
workshops to gain a better understanding of the scheme. These workshops provided 
the opportunity to observe the general scheme management approach, dynamics 
between various stakeholders, and the opportunity to network for data collection. 
  
Table 4.2 Data Collection: Events Attended 
 
 Name of the Event  Place  Date  
1 2
nd
 National Workshop Ranchi  Ranchi  9 to 11 April 2012 
2 ‗RSBY: Learning and Moving 
Forward‘ 29th and 30th November 
2012  







4.2 Understanding IOR Dynamics in Controlling Opportunism  
 
Understanding IOR dynamics in controlling opportunism required using an 
explorative approach to understand interaction between different stakeholders from 
multiple perspectives . Multiple cases were used as they represent multiple 
replications, analogous to multiple experiments and thus overcome limitations of 
using a single case study, for example, generalizations of the conclusions and 
representation of the case (Yin, 2011). Both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
have been used to explore the dynamics of IOR. Qualitative approaches (Olsen, 2005; 
Caniels et al., 2012; Van Slyke, 2007) have provided a more nuanced understanding 
of the dynamics of IOR, but these studies were confined to single cases and limited 
their analysis to one level. The use of a multi-case, multi-level analysis in this thesis 
strengthens both the internal and external validity of the findings, with the potential 
for far greater nuances to be uncovered.  
4.2.1 Case Selection  
 
The selection of cases for the case study is based on a different rationale from 
the selection for large-size sampling. In multiple case studies, cases are selected with 
the expectation that they either predict similar results, or predict contrasting results 
but for anticipated reasons, and thus lead to development of a rich theoretical 
framework that identifies conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to 
be found (literal replication), as well as conditions under which a particular 
conclusion does not hold (theoretical replication) (Yin, 2011). Thus cases are selected 
with prior hypothesizing of the different types of conditions that may affect 
outcomes, and are intended to cover each condition as best as possible (Yin, 2011).   
In this study, the variable of interest is mixing of governance approaches for 





observations in the workshops it was observed that three states – Uttar Pradesh, 
Himachal Pradesh, and Punjab – differ in the extent of opportunism, performance in 
the scheme, and various contextual conditions like social economic development, 
corruption in public services, etc. Thus we expected that variation in explanatory 
variables and contextual factors are likely to best help in developing causal inference 
on the variation in opportunism.  
The objective is to trace the influence of IOR on opportunism. That is, how 
variation in IOR influences opportunism. Therefore, cases were purposely selected on 
the basis of variation in the dependent variable of performance. So a high 
performance state, a medium performance state and a low performance state was 
selected. Though the level of poverty and corruption in general is expected to 
influence level of opportunism, the purpose here is not to assess the variation in 
opportunism across states, but to trace the effect of governance mechanisms on the 
opportunism. Therefore variation in opportunism across states is purposely done to 
enrich the analysis on linkage between governance mechanisms/IORs and 
opportunism (implementation performance).  
In the quantitative analysis, these variables (poverty, corruption) are 
controlled as the quantitative analysis deals with level of opportunism and 
performance. The three selected states represent three different points in the 













Table 4.3 Background Comparison of Cases 
  
  Himachal 
Pradesh  
Punjab  Uttar Pradesh   
GDP per capita  $1,333 $1,520 $551  
% of population below poverty line
71
  10 8.4 32.8  




0.647 0.538 0.122  
Infant Mortality Rate (2009)  45 38 63  
Maternal Mortality Rate (2010-12) N/A 155 292  
Rank in Corruption
73
  2 7 10  
 
4.2.1.1 Selection of Districts  
  
The research question required studying the same phenomenon from multiple 
perspectives, which required in-depth study of the context and data collection from all 
involved stakeholders. Given time and resource constraints, it was decided that in 
each of the states, a smaller sub-unit should be selected to make data collection 
manageable. The district is the implementing unit of the RSBY scheme and therefore 
from each state, one district was selected. The selected district is an average 
performing district of that state. This allowed collection of data from all stakeholders, 
yielding data with high informational content within a manageable timeframe so as to 
generate an in-depth understanding of the relationship between stakeholders and the 
management of relationships from different perspectives.  
All the stakeholders in the selected districts were interviewed; to maintain 
anonymity, the name of the district is not disclosed. The following Table 4.4 presents 
some of the program related details of the selected district from each of the three 
states.  
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Table 4.4 Characteristics of selected districts 
 




District  A  B  C  
No. of months completed 
in the scheme  
28  33  27  
No. of months with the 
same insurance company  
6  33  14  
Premium rate INR 407  INR 398  INR 610  
Public/Private hospitals  7/2 24/21  24/72  
Type of insurance 
company  
Private  Public  Public  
TPA P  Q  R  
 
4.2.2 Data collection  
 
4.2.2.1 Sources of Data  
 
Face to face interviews, informal discussions and direct observation are the 
primary sources of data. Thirty-seven in-depth interviews were done in the selected 
three states. I also attended two state level meetings and two field observations.  
This qualitative data (interviews/observations) was complemented with 
secondary data. The secondary data included program data provided by agencies and 
ministries, reports, concept notes, newsletters, published and unpublished articles, 
data published on official websites, newspaper reports, evaluation studies, and 
postings on social media forums. 
4.2.2.2 Field Work Strategy  
 
Data collection was completed between August 2012 and January 2013. First 
step in data collection, consisted of collecting data from a central core group 







Table 4.5 Data Collection: Main Interviews 
 
Category of Respondents  Number of 
Interviews 
Central Core Group 5 
Punjab 8 
Himachal 10 
Uttar Pradesh 10 
Workshops/meetings/field observations 4 
Main interviews (total) 37 
 
Five interviews were done on scheme design and management (see the 
interview schedules of the core group in Appendix 4.4). The interviews of the central 
group and the preliminary interviews/informal discussions facilitated the selection of 
states for comparative study were authorized by the Ministry of Labor and 
Employment (see Appendix 4.5 for the formal approval letter).   
After selecting study states, a district which closely resembled the state in 
scheme performance was selected. All the stakeholders that were involved in the 
management of the scheme at the relevant districts – Officials of State Nodal Agency, 
insurance companies, and TPA – were interviewed in order to generate multiple 
perspectives and find convergent viewpoints.  
A separate interview schedule was prepared for each of the stakeholders in 
the scheme (see Appendix 4.6 for the interview schedule of various stakeholders). 
Appendix 4.7 provides a list of the interviews conducted in each state, along with the 
number of reports and other research studies which were consulted. The RSBY 
scheme has been marred with fraud and abuse, and therefore given the sensitive topic 
of the research (opportunism and its management), it was discovered during 
preliminary interviews that anonymity was needed to get candid responses from the 
candidates. The accuracy of the data is critical to understand the dynamics of contract 
management, otherwise key informants warned that I would get official answers. 





responses. It was experienced that after assuring anonymity, interviewees responded 
more openly to queries in the questionnaire.  
Table 4.6 Data Collection: Events Attended During Main Data Collection 
 
 Name of the Event  Place  Date  
1 Deputy Medical 
Commissioner meeting 
Chandigarh  
Mohali  06/12/2012 
2 State Level meeting 
Maharashtra  
Mumbai  02/01/2013 
3 Block level workshop   07/12/2012 
 
4.2.3 Data Organization Framework: Critical Incident Technique  
 
Critical incident technique was used to collect and organize data, and was 
useful as an exploratory method for increasing knowledge about little-known 
phenomena (Gremler, 2004). It maps micro level incidents and facilitates reduction of 
complex qualitative data (Chell and Pittaway, 1998).   
Under this approach, four critical events in the program implementation were 
identified, as shown in Appendix 4.8. Each implementation milestone of the program 
was then organized on the following dimensions: preparing plans, decision making 
processes, problems during implementation, approaches to manage problems, types 
of possible opportunistic behaviors by each partner, and management of opportunistic 
behavior at each milestone.  
For each of the theme of a critical event, all the involved stakeholders were 
asked to share their perspective. This generated multiple perspectives on each theme 
in a critical incident. This improved the validity of the data collected. For each dyad, 
the data was collected from both partners in the relationship, thus providing complete 







4.2.4 Data Interpretation Approaches  
4.2.4.1 Within Case Analysis 
A within case analysis was first conducted.   Analysis within each case was 
done  at three levels: programmatic level or state level (macro), network level (meso) 
or district level, and dyadic level (micro). The approach to analysis differed for these 
three levels.  
At the programmatic and state level (macro-level), a contextual analysis was 
used to understand scheme implementation in each state in the three function areas: 
enrolment of beneficiaries, empanelment of hospitals, and management of claims. 
The purpose of analysis was to identify the factors that drive program performance in 
these three areas. Analysis focused on identifying opportunistic behaviors in each of 
the function areas and the general approach at the state level to manage these 
opportunistic behaviors. This helped to identify types of opportunism by each partner 
and the factors driving them.  
The second level of analysis is at the dyadic level (micro level). At the dyadic 
level, I explored how parties manage relationships with other stakeholders, both in 
general and specifically, within the context of opportunism. The main interviews 
generated information on dyads of relationship as shown in Table 4.7 below. As the 
information was collected from both the stakeholders in the dyad, this helped to 






























Ministry – State Agency  3 5 8 
State Agency – insurance company  3 3 6 
State Agency – district 
administration  
3 3 6 
Insurance company – third party 
administration 
3 3 6 
Insurance company – smart card 
provider 
3 0 4 
Insurance company – district 
administration 
4 2 6 
Insurance company – District Key 
Manger 
4 3 7 
Third party administrator – smart 
card provider 
4 0 4 
TPA – district administration 4 2 6 
Third party administration – 
District Key Manger 
4 3 7 
District administration – District 
Key Manager 
2 3 5 
 
For each relationship, I organized the data into the following categories: (a) 
evolution of the relationship; (b) factors that strengthened and/or deteriorated the 
relationship; (c) present coordination and communications process followed; (d) 
combination of trust and monitoring; (e) prevention of opportunistic behavior of 
partner; (f) response to partner opportunism. This helped to construct the 
characteristics of the relationship that provided foundation for analysis of governance 
at the dyadic level.  
The third and main level of the analysis for this study is the network, or 
district level (meso-level). At this level, the analysis focused on governance of 
networks in three function areas: enrolment, empanelment, and claims management. 
Each of these three networks has different stakeholders and incentives structures. 
Therefore governance in each of these three networks differs from each other. 





with the prevention and management of the opportunism in that function area. 
Management of the scheme at each critical event was classified as either a 
transactional approach, a relational governance approach, or a mix of both (for the 
network based on the classification given with the governance approach at each 
critical event, see Appendix 4.9). The general governance approach used by each 
agency was characterized into transactional/relational, or a mix of both based on the 
general governance approach classification given in Appendix 4.10.   
For each opportunistic behavior, the analysis was conducted to identify (i) the 
aggrieved party and aggrieving party; (ii) the context and structure driving that 
opportunistic behavior; (iii) the governance approach used to prevent that 
opportunism; (iv) step-wise approaches used to control and manage the opportunism; 
(v) reasons for selection of tools at each step; (vi) effectiveness of each step; and (vii) 
dynamics of interplay with other governance tools.   
This analysis helped to identify the predominant governance approach at the 
network level in a function area, so that its relation with the scheme performance in 
that function within that district could be understood. This analysis, along with the 
programmatic analysis, helped to disentangle influence of contract governance and 
contextual factors on scheme performance. It, along with the other two levels of 
analysis (state level and dyadic level), helped to answer the research questions that 
this thesis aims to answer.  
4.2.4.2 Cross Case Analysis 
  
 Cross case analysis was conducted after individual case analysis to detect 
patterns in convergence and divergence across the cases. This was to further validate 
the case findings if similar patterns were found across cases, or absent, based on a 
priori expectations. The cross case analysis was organized on the following sequence: 
1. Factors driving use of a compliance mechanism  





3. Combining compliance mechanisms across cases and their variation 
4. Types of opportunisms and types of compliance mechanisms used  
Structure, agents, compliance mechanisms, and the interaction between them 
are thus the four pillars on which the analysis will be built. This thesis will trace each 
of these pillars during different stages of policy implementation. This tracing of the 
structure during different stages will reveal the actions permissible and not 
permissible for the agents. The tracing of the agents‘ roles and power relations will 
explain  the behaviors of the agents.  
The dependency relationships between agencies are considered an important 
feature of the implementation structure, suggesting that contexts which have more 
dependency relationships will be more prone to conflict, and hence require different 
IORs than contexts that have fewer dependency relationships. Similarly, a lack of 
performance incentives for public sector managers, compared with those in the 
private sector, is a critical factor relating to agents in a developing-country context. 
Therefore, it is expected that public managers, in a context where they have 
incentives to perform, will adopt the governance approach that is in alignment with 
the implementation context; but in a context where they do not have incentives to 
perform, the managers will use the IOR approach based on their interests, rather than 
the needs of the context.     
The tracing of the compliance mechanism among agents will involve 
identifying variations in the compliance mechanism and the factors responsible for 
them. For this, the thesis will identify the factors influencing the choice of 
governance tools, and trace the interaction between governance tools and the 
combination of governance tools that will lead to an effective compliance 
mechanism.  
Finally, the fourth pillar of analysis will trace the interaction between the 
structure, agents, and compliance mechanisms, mapping the effectiveness of IORs in 





constraints imposed by the structure. This will reveal the effectiveness of the IOR 
compliance mechanism at that stage of policy implementation, suggesting the degree 
of alignment between the compliance mechanisms and implementation structure. This 
tracing of the interaction between structure, agents, and compliance mechanisms will 
be done at three levels – the dyadic level (micro), the network level (meso), and the 
state level (macro). The analysis at dyad level will feed into the analysis at network 
level, which in turn will ultimately feed into the analysis at state level. 
4.3 Measuring IOR  
 
 
To devise a measurement index to measure IOR among implementing 
agencies in the RSBY scheme, the literature review identifies Thomson‘s model of 
collaboration as most rigorously designed and tested. Thomson used this model in a 
US context.  
However, the Thomson (2001) model has not been validated with another 
data set thus far, although this scale has been used by other scholars (Chen, 2010; 
Queen, 2011) to measure collaboration, without first performing confirmatory factor 
analysis. 
In the next part of the chapter, the collaboration model of Thomson (2001) is 
validated using data from a developing country. The Thomson Scale is used to map 
collaboration in the network of agencies implementing the scheme as described in 
Section 4.3.1. This is followed by confirmatory factor analysis to assess the extent to 
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4.3.1 Mapping Collaboration Process in the RSBY scheme  
 
Following Chen (2010) and Thomson (2001), collaboration among the agencies 
implementing the RSBY scheme at the district level was measured through a survey. 
The RSBY scheme is implemented in a lead network format where lead networks are 
formed when a public agency hires one general contractor. The agency, in turn, hires 
other contractors and organizations, and takes complete responsibility of delivering 
project.  
 In the case of RSBY, the State Nodal Agency contracts with insurance 
companies to implement the scheme in each district. The insurance company acts as a 
lead agency and implements the scheme in each of the districts by working with other 
agencies like Third Party Administrators (TPA), Smart Card Service Providers 
(SCSP), District Key Manager (DKM), district administration, hospitals, NGOs and 
village councils known as Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs).   
Figure 4.1 District Level Network in the RSBY Scheme 
 
 
An insurance company has district level officers appointed in each of the 
districts
75
 and their responsibility is to coordinate and collaborate with all other 
agencies in the district to implement the scheme. The district level officer for the 
insurance company is the key person at the district level and collaborates with all 
other agencies involved in RSBY implementation. Thus it was decided to survey 
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district level officers of insurance companies as they understand the status of 
collaboration with other agencies. The survey was sent to insurance company 
representatives and a collaboration score was elicited for four main partners: Third 
Party Administrator, Smart Card Service Provider, District Key Manager, and district 
administration. Hospitals, though a very important partner, were left out because 
there were a number of hospitals in each district, ranging from 10 to 70. Thus it was 
difficult to collect data on relationships with each hospital. We collected data on 
following four dyads of relationships in each districts: 
1. Insurance company ---- Third Party Administrator 
2. Insurance company/Third Party Administrators ---- Smart Card Service 
Provider  
3. Insurance company/Third Party Administrators ---- district administration 
or district magistrate 
4. Insurance company/Third Party Administrators ---- District Key Manager  
This provided relational information of the kind of relationships district level 
officers from the insurance companies share with other stakeholders. This is known 
as egocentric data (Campbell and Lee, 1991), where the lead organization reports 
about its relationship with each of the partners. This egocentric data can then be 
reshaped such that each relation (relationship with the partner) is treated as a case in 
the dataset. In the case of RSBY, each dyad serves as a data point in the dataset as the 
analysis is done at the dyadic level. Insurance companies on an average  partner with 
four agencies in each district, therefore each interview with district nodal officers 
generated on average four cases for the dataset. In many districts, there is no Third 
Party Administrator or Smart Card Service Provider and these services are done in-







4.3.2 Data Collection 
4.3.2.1 Selection of Districts: Sample Size  
 
At the time of data collection, the RBSY scheme covered 465 districts across 
twenty five states. New programs generally exhibit more administrative problems in 
the first year of implementation and therefore, first year data is not expected to reveal 
an accurate picture. Therefore, it was decided to only include districts which have 
completed more than two years of the program.    
In the RSBY scheme, the policy contract is for two years and renewed every 
year based on performance. Thus, after one year, another insurance company might 
get the contract, leading to changes in the implementation network. The process of 
collaboration generally requires some time to get started between partners and 
therefore it was decided to select districts which have completed at least six months 
in the present policy period. Taking these two decision rules, selection of districts 
generated a list of 202 districts out of 465 districts which are implementing the 
scheme (see Appendix 4.11 for the list of districts regarding insurance companies).  
4.3.2.2 Survey Mode 
 
Data collection was only possible either through mail/telephonic or web-
based surveys due to time and resource constraints and inability to physically visit 
202 districts. Chen (2010) and Thomson (2001) used mail surveys. The survey 
questions are Likert-type with a scale from 1 to 7, making mail or web-based surveys 
more appropriate than telephonic surveys for these types of questions.   
Web-based surveys are a cost and time efficient method (Dillman et al., 
2009) and favored by respondents as it provides respondents with flexibility of time 
and place. Respondents can also answer questions more thoughtfully as compared to 





quality of web-based surveys is better compared to others in terms of missing data 
and response errors (Weible and Wallace, 1998).   
Web based surveys are criticized for leaving out particular population groups 
that do not have access to computers and Internet, leading to selection bias (Duda and 
Nobile, 2010). In the case of the RSBY scheme however, all the district level officers 
have access to computers and Internet and therefore, selection bias due to 
inaccessibility of Internet was not a disadvantage to using web-based surveys in this 
particular case. Given the cost and time efficiency and ease of follow up, it was 
decided to use web-based surveys.  
4.3.3 Survey Instrument 
 
The survey instrument was adopted from the collaboration questionnaire 
developed by Thomson. The Thomson (2001) questionnaire has seventeen questions 
to measure five components of collaboration. Written permission was taken to use the 
scale (see Appendix 4.12 for the permission email). The Thomson (2001) questions 
on collaboration were designed for a native English speaker working at the director or 
senior managerial level in a non-profit organization in America (refer Appendix 4.13 
for more details on the Thomson‘s Collaboration questionnaire). The key difference 
between the survey undertaken and analyzed for this thesis, and Thomson (2001) is 
that the survey respondents in this case were young undergraduates in the first few 
years of their jobs, with generally limited English language capacity. Thus, it was 
necessary to simplify Thomson‘s (2001) questions and change the contextual framing 
of some of the questions to make them easier for respondents to understand (refer to 
Appendix 4.14 for comparison of questions between my survey and Thomson 
(2001)). The questionnaire was also adapted to the context of the RSBY scheme. It 
was first translated into Hindi and then it was retranslated back into English. The 





could answer them based on their linguistic capacity (see Appendix 4.15 for the web-
based survey tool used). 
In addition to the collaboration scale, the questionnaire included several other 
components which were adopted from similar constructs in previous research. These 
components include perception of collaboration outcomes, opportunism by partners 
and partner performance (see Appendix 4.16 for constructs and their sources). The 
instrument was pretested with district officers from insurance companies and 
modifications were done regarding the language of the questionnaire. 
4.3.4 Survey Process  
 
Given the problem of poor response rates in the case of a voluntary internet 
based survey, it was decided to send the survey to all 202 districts. The survey was 
sent through an email to the National Nodal Officers
76
 (NANO) of the eleven 
insurance companies implementing the RSBY scheme in the selected 202 districts 
(see Appendix 4.17 for the sample email). The purpose of the survey, the 
questionnaire and other research details were explained to each of the nodal officers 
in person, and a copy of all relevant authorization and information documents was 
provided to the NANO officers (see Appendix 4.18 for the information package given 
to NANOs). The email containing more information and the link to the survey was 
sent one week after meeting these officers in person. National Nodal Officers of these 
insurance companies were asked to instruct their district level officers to take up the 
online survey.  
A rigorous survey follow-up was done using phone calls and emails. 
Uncountable numbers of reminder emails and phone calls were made and it took 
nearly six months to get an adequate number of survey responses. Out of the 202 
districts to which survey was sent, a response was received from 47 districts (24%). 
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This response rate of 24% is within the acceptable range given the developing 
country context and sensitivity of the issue (Cook et al., 2000; Duncun, 2008).    
As the RSBY program implementation was marred with reports of corruption 
(Hindustan Times September 24, 2012; Times of India March 10, 2013; The Hindu 
September 2, 2013), there was apprehension in responding to the survey and this lead 
to a response bias. Discussion with RSBY core program staff raised two further key 
issues about the survey: first, lack of incentives for insurance companies to respond to 
the survey; and second, a lack of capacity at the district level to understand and 
respond to such kinds of questionnaires. All three issues were expected to lead to 
poor quality of information from the survey data.  
To improve the quality of the survey data, after receiving the survey 
response, the responses were verified by telephonic interview. During these telephone 
interviews, questions were explained in detail and answers to all the questions were 
verified and confirmed. Each interview lasted about 35 minutes. Respondents in 
many cases changed their responses after getting assurance of their anonymity. This 
significantly improved the quality of the survey data. Out of 47 responses, 43 
responses were verified over phone calls. In the remaining four surveys, the surveyed 
could not be contacted for various reasons. Therefore, these four responses were 
discarded.  
4.3.5 Creation of a Collaboration Index: Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
After collecting survey data, and given the poor fit of the data and respondent 
profile, and unsuitability of some of the indicators in the context of the RSBY 
scheme, the collaboration model of Thomson was modified based on theory and data. 
A confirmatory factor analysis was done to assess the fit of the collaboration model 
with the data. The details of the process of confirmatory factor analysis are presented 
in Appendix 4.19. The confirmatory factor analysis led to the dropping of four 





data. After refining the collaboration model, collaboration scores for each dimension 
of collaboration (collaboration score at the dimension level) was calculated, followed 
by calculation of the collaboration score for each relationship (collaboration score at 
the relationship level), and then finally the calculation of a collaboration index for the 
district (collaboration score at the network level) taking into account all the 
relationships in that district.   
4.3.5.1 Collaboration Score at the Dimension Level  
The refined collaboration scale consists of five dimensions with thirteen 
measurement indicators. A dimension score for each dimension was calculated by 
taking an average of the scores of the measurement indicator for that dimension. For 
example, the dimension of decision making consists of two measurement indicators: 
DM1 and DM2. So for calculating a dimension score, I took an average of 
measurement indicator DM1 and DM2. This was the process followed by other 
studies, which have also calculated a dimension score for each dimension like Chen 
(2010) and Thomson (2001).  
4.3.5.2 Collaboration Score at the Stakeholder Level  
 
After calculating the dimension score, the next step was the calculation of the 
collaboration score for the relationship. The collaboration score for a relationship was 
calculated by averaging the score of all the five dimensions of collaboration scale.  
The following formula was used to calculate collaboration score for each relationship: 
Collaboration Score of Relationship = {(Decision Making + Administration + 
Mutuality + Trust) – (Autonomy)} 
Autonomy has a negative relationship with all the other dimension of the 
collaboration (see Appendix 4.20 for the relationship between the five dimensions of 






4.3.5.2.1 Collaboration Score at the Network Level  
 
After calculating the collaboration score at the relationship level, the next 
step was to calculate the collaboration index for the network level carrying out a 
particular function. There are two networks in the district: the enrolment network and 
hospitalization network. There is an overlapping membership between these two 
networks. The enrolment network consists of the Third Party Administrator, Smart 
Card Service Provider and the District Key Manager. The hospitalization network 
consists of Third Party Administration, district administration and District Key 
Manager. Simple arithmetic mean was used again to calculate collaboration index at 
network level: 
Collaboration Index     Collaboration score of (Third Party Adm + Smart Card + 
District Key Manager) 
 of Enrolment    =  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------- 
 Network                                                             No. of Agencies in  
 
Collaboration Index     Collaboration score of (Third Party Adm + District Adm + 
District Key Manager) 
 of Hospitalization =  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------- 
 Network                                                             No. of Agencies in   
 
4.3.6 Limitation of Methodology: Overcoming the Disadvantages of an 
Arithmetic Mean 
 
There are several shortcomings to an arithmetic mean (Dawson, 2002) but 
diagnostic tests suggest that the data gathered for this thesis do not suffer from those 
issues. The normality analysis of the sample data suggests that variables appear to be 
normally distributed with acceptable level of skew and kurtosis index. Secondly, i 
weightage principle is being applied while calculating the arithmetic mean. Thomson 
(2001) and Chen (2010) used factor analysis to aggregate the score at the dimension 





aggregate any further. In this case, aggregation is done three times
77
 using the 
arithmetic average.  
Furthermore, the context-specific circumstance of the RSBY scheme suggests 
other alternatives are not viable. First, one of the commonest approaches suggested is 
factor analysis. In case of RSBY, as the collaboration index needs to be calculated for 
the network based on the data at dyads, if factor analysis if used, it has to be done 
thrice. That is, one has to take factor score (network level) of factor score 
(relationship level) of factor score (dimension) to calculate the collaboration index at 
the district level. This complicates the understanding of factor score.  
Secondly, as the network structure is not the same across all districts (many 
districts do not have TPA and/or SCSP) there is a variation in the number of dyads in 
a district, so factor analysis cannot be considered for aggregation, specially for 
creating a collaboration index at a network level. 
Thirdly, the relationship between the dimensions of collaboration is not 
uniform (autonomy has negative relationship with other dimensions) and therefore an 
aggregation method like the geometric mean would be difficult to use. In light of 
these issues, an arithmetic mean thus offers a best option for use.  
4.4 Assessing the Impact of IOR on Implementation Performance 
 
 
The third research objective requires testing the relationship between 
performance measures of the RSBY scheme in various districts with the status of IOR 
in the network of agencies implementing the scheme in those districts. This requires a 
quantitative analysis using a regression technique (King, Koehen and Verba, 1994). 
This thesis follows a similar approach as used by Thomson (2009) and Chen (2006), 
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 For the first step, I aggregate the indicators to create a score at the level of dimension of 
collaboration. In the second step, I aggregate the dimension score to create a collaboration 
score at the relationship level. In the third step, I aggregate the collaboration scores of all 







for linking collaboration and performance. But this study used objective performance 
indicators rather than subjective measures of performance, which required controlling 
a number of structure and agency related factors which Thomson (2009) and Chen 
(2006) did not have to do.    
The research strategy measures collaboration among agencies in the 
implementation network within the district, and links this collaboration with the 
network performance of the scheme at the district level. The RSBY scheme‘s unique 
program design controls a number of important performance determinants, like 
structural factors, incentives and service characteristics, which are generally difficult 
to control in other studies.  
Data on collaboration comes from surveys of district level officers of 
insurance companies, whereas data on network performance comes from both the 
RSBY program database as well as surveys. Data on control variables is mainly taken 
from secondary sources (see Appendix 4.21 for sources of secondary data). 
OLS regression was used to do a linear regression using network 
performance as the dependent variable and network collaboration as the explanatory 
variable. The dependent variable – performance of the network – is measured in two 
ways: goals are achieved in terms of quantity and quality. In terms of quantity, goals 
are achieved in two functional areas: enrolment (enrolment ratio) and hospitalization 
(hospitalization ratio). In terms of quality, in the present scheme, monitoring 
processes have only a couple of indicators
78
 that measure the quality dimension. The 
data on these quality indicators was neither published in the public domain nor was 
accessible even after repeated requests. Therefore, goals achieved in terms of quality 
are measured as subjective measures: opportunism in the network and perception of 
collaboration outcomes. Data on control variables was used from secondary sources.  
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 These are family size, delay in distribution of the smart card  and percentage of claims paid 






The explanatory variable is a collaboration among agencies in each of the 
networks (hospitalization and enrolment). This collaboration is measured at the 
dyadic level through a survey of lead agency officers who report their collaboration 
with each of the stakeholders. These collaboration scores of each dyad are aggregated 
to create a collaboration index at the network level which serves as an explanatory 
variable. The following is the regression equation for this research objective:  
 Yi = á + â* District + D2* Agency + D3i*Program + D4i* Network level +µs 
(1) s  
Here Ys is a network performance in district i.   
District is district level contextual factors that influence network 
performance. For example, socio-economic development, burden of disease, and 
infrastructure development. 
Agency is organizational level factors that influence network performance. 
For example, the capacity of organizations.  
Program is programmatic factors that influence network performance. For 
example, duration of the program implementation.  
Network refers to the key explanatory variables-collaboration and 
opportunism among agencies in the network measured through a measurement index 
created in Chapter Five (for more details on the constructs and questionnaire, please 
see Appendix 4.13 and 4.14). The details of the collaboration model survey tool and 
factor analysis are explained in detail in the previous section.   
Data on Network Performance: Two types of network performance data is 
used: objective and subjective. Objective performance data is performance in 
enrolment and performance in hospitalization, which is measured as ‗enrolment ratio‘ 
and ‗hospitalization ratio‘ respectively. Enrolment ratio is ratio of the number of 
Below Poverty Line (BPL) families enrolled divided by the total number of BPL 
families in that district. The data on enrolment is taken from the Ministry of Labor 





payment. Insurance companies have an incentive to provide data as their premium is 
linked to the number of families enrolled in the process. Therefore validity and 
reliability of the data is high in this case.  
Enrolment Ratio = (Number of families enrolled in the program X 100) / 
(Number of families in the BPL list)  
Performance in hospitalization is measured as a hospitalization ratio, which is 
the ratio of number of hospitalizations in a district in a given year divided by the 
number of beneficiaries enrolled in the program. Hospitals submit data on claims 
which is used by insurance companies to pay providers. This claims data is then 
aggregated at the district level to create the hospitalization ratio. The data is verified 
by agencies and therefore its validity and reliability is high.  
Hospitalization Ratio = (Number of hospitalizations in a year X 100) / 
(Number of beneficiaries enrolled in the program)  
Subjective performance data: Two types of subjective performance data are 
used: perception of collaboration performance of network members, and perception 
of opportunism among network members.  
For measuring collaboration performance, I used a scale based on the 
theoretical framework of perceived collaboration outcome developed by Gray (2000). 
Please refer to Appendix 4.22 for a brief description of the Gray (2000) framework on 
collaboration outcomes.  
Gray‘s (2000) framework suggests five perceived collaboration outcome 
measures:  
(1)  Achieving goals  
(2)  Generating social capital 
(3)  Creating shared meaning  
(4)  Increasing interaction  





Cronbach‘s Alpha provides an indicator of reliability between a range of 0.0 
and 1.0. A higher value suggests a more reliable scale. In this case, the Cronbach‘s 
Alpha of the scale is 0.7991, suggesting an acceptable reliability of the scale. The 
network performance indicator was calculated using a similar approach as in the case 
of calculating the collaboration index of the district. First, the performance score of a 
stakeholder was calculated by taking an average of five indicators from the 
collaboration outcome scale. Then the performance score of all stakeholders in a 
network was averaged to calculate a collaboration performance index of the network.  
The subjective measure of opportunism is measured through a survey using 
an index consisting of five indicators: (1) To what extent this partner tells lies for its 
benefit; (2) To what degree this partner fails to deliver its promises if it is in its 
interest; (3) Sometimes this partner will not do even things which are commonly 
considered as granted, even if it is in its interest; (4) To what degree this partner takes 
advantage of the situations which are not discussed or decided earlier; (5) To what 
extent this partner takes undue advantage of its position for its own interests. These 
measures were borrowed from Liu et al. (2009), Yang et al. (2011) and other similar 
studies.  
The wording of the questions was modified based on the local context and the 
questions were pre-tested. These measurement indicators have Cronbach‘s Alpha of 
0.86, suggesting a high reliability of the scale. We followed an approach similar to 
the construction of the collaboration index for calculating the opportunism index of 
the district. We first calculated the score for each relationship, and then averaged 
them to calculate an opportunism index of the district. 
Finally, using an OLS estimation method, a linear regression was performed 
on 43 districts using network performance (enrolment ratio and hospitalization ratio) 






4.5 Research Credibility: Reliability and Validity  
 
 
Validity and reliability often refers to the quality of the research. ―Validity‖ 
refers to ―measuring what we think we are measuring‖ (King et al., 1994; pg. 25); and 
―reliability‖ refers whether ―applying the same procedure in the same way will 
always produce the same measure‖ (King et al., 1994; pg. 25). A number of types of 
reliability and validity are suggested, but three types of validity are most commonly 
used: construct, internal, and external. Construct validity refers to the extent to which 
correct operational measures are used for each construct under study (Yin, 2011). 
Internal validity refers to whether collected data and analysis supports the findings. 
External validity denotes whether the findings can be generalized to other contexts.  
For a survey, validity and reliability of the survey instrument was a matter of 
great concern as the survey used by Thomson (2001) was used for English speaking 
directors and chief executive officers (CEO) of the organizations; whereas in case of 
RSBY, the survey was being sent to district level officers of insurance companies or 
Third Party Administrators who are generally graduates, or even less than that. To 
improve comprehension of the questions, some of the questions were adopted and 
simplified. In addition, the survey tool was translated into the local language, so the 
survey questions were provided in both English and the national local language 
(Hindi) on the webpage.   
As the survey questions were about sensitive issues, there was a risk of 
response bias. This was clearly evident from the review of initial surveys. Therefore, 
in addition to the survey, a confirmatory telephonic interview was made. In this 
telephonic interview, the respondents were again reminded of the confidentiality of 
their identity and were urged to answer the survey without any fear of reaction. This 
improved response in many of the questions and some qualitative data was also 
collected through this survey. Each of the telephonic interviews on average lasted for 





social relations, collaboration outcome, and opportunism were found to be within 
appropriate limits to ensure construct validity.  
To ensure internal validity (in the quantitative study), a number of steps were 
taken. Two pertinent threats to internal validity are selection bias and maturation 
effects. The threat of selection bias was real because respondents were expected to be 
different from non-respondents. The comparison of the background characteristics of 
the respondents with non-respondents confirmed a minor difference between the 
respondents and non-respondents. The second risk of maturation effects was 
controlled by using the duration of the collaboration as a control factor. To improve 
causal validity, an effort was made to control for confounding variables to the extent 
possible. The unique design of the scheme controlled structural, incentive and 
institutional factors to a certain extent. Some important programmatic factors like 
IEC effort, awareness level of the program, and leadership of the district 
administration were left out because of the lack of data. Wherever possible, if direct 
measures were not available, indirect or proxy indicators were used, for example, 
birth registration data that is used in place of a quality of the BPL list.   
 For external validity, (in the quantitative study) an effort was made to take a 
census of all districts which have completed more than two years in the program, but 
the response rate was less than expected. Secondly, the external validity of the 
findings is limited to some extent because of the design of the program, which 
influenced the key explanatory variable relationships between agencies. Given the 
short contract duration (from one to three years), the relationship between agencies 
did not take off and therefore results are more applicable to exchanges characterized 
of short duration rather than longer duration exchanges.  
In the qualitative study, construct validity was ensured by defining each 
construct and its operational measures. A set of preliminary interviews and informal 
discussions helped to refine the operationalization of each construct in the context of 





implementation, scheme implementation was divided into three distinct phases: 
enrolment, hospital empanelment, and claims management. Each phase was further 
organized into five dimensions: planning, decision making, implementation process 
monitoring, sharing resources, addressing problems and opportunisms. For each 
project activity, the category of relational and transactional extent was identified (see 
Appendix 4.8 for critical events in program implementation). To ensure the validity 
of the responses and reduce response bias, an effort was made to interview all 
stakeholders in the district, triangulating the experience of each stakeholder about the 
relationship between agencies. All the interviews were audio recorded and transcribed 
by the researcher. Given the limitation of space, the original material was referred 
only in selected places.  
To ensure internal validity, considerable time was devoted to understanding 
the scheme implementation by attending workshops and events at national and state 
levels (Appendix 4.23 photos of field work), by direct field observation, and by 
conducting a series of preliminary interviews and informal discussions. The data 
collection was done in three phases: from December 2011 to February 2012; August 
2012 to January 2013; and February 2013 to April 2013.  
Response bias was expected to be one of the key threats to internal validity. 
To address that, the data collected from the field through interviews and observations 
was triangulated through official reports and data from the scheme, published 
research papers, newspapers, media reporting, social networking forums, reports by 
various agencies and discussion with experts (see Appendix 4.24 for a list of other 
sources of data). The data was analyzed using nVIVO. The list of codes was 
identified prior to data analysis and some of the codes were added later. Each code 
was described to understand the application of the code. Memos were written first for 
each family of codes and then for each theme, which were selected prior to analysis 
and also evolved as the analysis proceeded. Secondary data was collated with primary 





The external validity of the case study research is limited for the population, 
but it is the theoretical and not statistical generalization that case study research relies 
on (Yin, 2011). Using a multi case-multi level analysis, this research has improved 



























5 CHAPTER FIVE: Dynamics of IOR Governance in the 
Context of Opportunism 
 
It is argued that partnerships, contracting and collaborations deliver higher 
value for money due to their increased synergy and efficiency. They can, however, 
also become wasteful, rent seeking and highly inefficient arrangements, if not 
properly managed (Mills, 1998; Liu, 2004; Pollock et al., 2005; Lonnoroth et al., 
2006; Bhat et al., 2007; Liu, Hotchkiss and Bose, 2008; Loevinsohn, 2008; 
Venkataraman, 2009; Zaidi, 2011; Guinness, 2011). One aspect of poor management 
is higher opportunism by partners during the implementation phase. Despite its 
importance, there have been very few studies in the public contracting sector which 
explore the prevention and control of opportunism.  
This chapter addresses the first research objective - understanding the effect 
of inter-organizational relations (IORs) on implementation performance, and 
specifically partner opportunism. There is very limited information available as to 
how agencies utilize and mix various compliance mechanisms in order to control 
opportunism a, critical part in performance?  For example, how do the various 
compliance mechanisms interact to prevent and control opportunism, and which 
compliance mechanisms are preferred by one organization over others?  
This chapter attempts to answer the above questions by exploring the 
dynamics of IORs and their effect on opportunism, in the case of the RSBY scheme. 
Here, opportunism is defined as all those behaviors of partner agencies which can be 
characterized as pursuits of self-interest, violating either explicit or implicit norms of 
the contract leading to an adverse effect on the other party, based on the definitions of 
opportunism suggested by Williamson (1985; pg. 47) and McNeil (1980; pg. 1024). 
Various compliance mechanisms have been found to be effective in 
preventing and controlling opportunism, however recent studies have provided 
contradictory findings on the interaction between these compliance mechanisms, 





This chapter traces the effect of IORs on the prevention and control of 
opportunism by mapping variations in IORs during different stages of policy 
implementation and the influence of these variations on partner opportunism. At each 
stage of policy implementation, the analysis examines a number of themes. These are: 
(a) factors influencing choice of governance tools; (b) combination of governance 
tools that constitutes compliance mechanism; (c) alignment of compliance 
mechanism with implementation structure; and (d) effectiveness of resulting IORs in 
controlling and preventing opportunism.  
The analysis uses a four pillar approach to untangle the dynamics between 
structure, agents and compliance mechanisms, and the interaction between them, 
linking with performance at various stages of policy implementation. This approach 
is first followed within a case and then across cases. Each of these four pillars is 
traced during different stages of policy implementation. Tracing of structure reveals 
those actions permissible, and not permissible, for the agents. Tracing of agents' role 
and power relations suggests behaviors of agents. Tracing of compliance mechanisms 
among agents involves identifying variations in compliance mechanisms used and the 
factors responsible. Finally, the fourth pillar of analysis traces the interaction between 
structure, agents and compliance mechanisms, mapping the effectiveness of IORs in 
managing the behavior of agents who are attempting to exploit the opportunities and 
constraints imposed by the structure. This reveals the effectiveness of the IOR at that 
stage of policy implementation, indicating the degree of alignment between the 
compliance mechanism and the implementation structure. This tracing of the 
interaction between structure, agents and compliance mechanisms is carried out at 
three levels – at dyadic level (11 dyads), at network level (Enrollment Network, 
Empanelment Network, Claims Management Network) and at state level (Uttar 
Pradesh, Punjab , Himachal Pradesh). The analysis at dyad level will feed into the 





Findings from the individual case analysis and comparative case analyses are 
presented in the following sections.  
Section 5.1 provides detailed case analyses of three cases: Uttar Pradesh 
(5.1.1), Punjab (5.1.2) and Himachal Pradesh (5.1.3).  
Section 5.2 presents cross case analysis. Section 5.2.1 presents the variations 
observed in opportunism across cases, and Section 5.2.2 discusses the management of 
eight opportunisms across cases, organized according to three critical events.  
Section 5.3 provides a discussion of four key themes based on the gaps 
identified during theoretical review – factors driving choice of governance approach, 
interaction between governance approach, link between governance dynamics and 
performance at the dyadic and state level. A conclusion of the above findings is 
presented in Section 5.4. 
5.1 Case Studies 
 
This section discusses three case studies – Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and 
Himachal Pradesh. Each of the case analyses is presented according to three critical 
incidents in the program implementation - enrollment, empanelment and claims 
management, as well as an overview analysis of each case. Analysis of each critical 
incident identifies the performance in that area and the factors responsible. A list of 
opportunistic behaviors observed in each critical incident is identified and the process 
used to prevent and control each particular opportunistic behavior is described, 
tracing the compliance mechanism and its effectiveness on preventing and controlling 
opportunism. Finally, all opportunistic behaviors observed, and the compliance 
mechanism used to prevent and control such opportunism in each case, is compiled, 







5.1.1 Uttar Pradesh 
 
Uttar Pradesh is considered to be one of the most backward states in India in 
the areas of economic and social development. Uttar Pradesh has the country‘s worst 
health indicators
79
 (Office of Registrar General India, 2011) and poor health seeking 
behaviors (International Institute of Population Sciences et al., 2007). The public 
health care system suffers from poor infrastructure, massive absenteeism of providers 
and lack of drugs (Mehrotra S., 2008). Use of private providers is very common, even 
by the lowest income quintile (International Institute of Population Sciences et. al., 
2007). 
5.1.1.1 Scheme Expansion 
 
In Uttar Pradesh, the scheme was first implemented in 2008, and at the time 
of data collection (2012-13) the scheme was in its fourth year of implementation. 
Until 2010, the scheme was managed by only one IC (ICICI Lombard), however due 
to irregularities by that IC, more ICs became involved and each was given a group of 
districts known as a cluster (The Indian Express July 09, 2010; The Indian Express 
October 22, 2010). 
From the first implementation of the scheme, the department of rural 
development managed the scheme with a very skeletal structure with  two officers at 
the state level and only one officer at the district level. This led to poor monitoring, 
weak accountability and considerable discretion given to implementers, resulting in 
widespread irregularities and corruption at various stages of scheme implementation 
(The Indian Express, August 22, 2011). The ministry of labor and employment 
(MOLE) intervened and, in consultation with the state government‘s State Agency for 
Comprehensive Health Insurance (SACHI), an autonomous society was created. One 
                                                          






of the administrative officers, who had a close association with the political party 
ruling the state, was appointed to lead the scheme (Times of India, May 11, 2012).   
With a new organizational structure, new leadership and operational 
autonomy, the newly formed State Nodal Agency (SNA) began reforming the scheme 
implementation structure, improving accountability at the state and district levels and 
engaging stakeholders at various levels. These changes included the creation of a 
district insurance committee, headed by the district magistrate at the district level, the 
hiring of additional staff and adoption of new processes, improved monitoring, and 
capacity building for scheme implementation which improved accountability. This 
led to a turnaround in the performance of the scheme and, at the National Workshop 
in May 2013, the state was recognized with an award for making significant 
improvements in program implementation.  The SNA Manager was also awarded for 
making a significant individual contribution to the performance of the scheme in 
Uttar Pradesh. 
5.1.1.2 Overall Scheme Performance 
 
The scheme's performance in Uttar Pradesh was at a very low level in the 
first couple of years , however following a change in the organizational structure and 
governing agency, the performance of the scheme improved rapidly as shown in 
Table 5.1. Table 5.1 presents the key performance indicators of the scheme based on 





































53.1 2.0 3.1 5200 87.23 80 596 
2009-
11 
38.7 2.8 2.1 5200 81.31 81 542 
2011-
12 
31.1 3.4 2.7 6600 67.31 128 463 
2012-
13 
34.25    51.58  312 
2013-
14 
36.54      286 
 
5.1.1.3 Enrollment Performance 
 
As shown in Fig 5.1, enrollment was high in the first year of the scheme, 
probably due to higher expectations of beneficiaries and the pilot effect; however in 
later years it decreased as irregularities in scheme implementation increased, 
especially enrollment
81
, resulting in poor utilization, which further reduced the 
enrollment ratio in successive years
82
. This decrease in enrollment ratio is presented 
in Fig 5.1.  
With the change in the SNA and strengthening of the field implementation 
activities, enrollment teams were able to reach and enroll more of the population, 
leading to an increase in enrollment ratio in Round 5 as seen in Fig 5.1.  
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 Here Burn Out Ratio refers to claim ratio without considering administrative cost.  
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 A performance evaluation done in 2010, commissioned by UNDP in three districts of Uttar 
Pradesh, suggested that enrollment quality was very poor. It was found that only 42% of the 
enrolled beneficiaries were aware of the scheme benefits and entitlements. (Amicus Advisory 
Pvt Ltd, 2010). The majority of the cards (88%) were received from the Sarpanch and very 
few respondents received the scheme details (13%) or the list of panel hospitals (12%). 
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 Results from other studies have suggested that enrollment rate is higher in the districts if the 








Figure 5.1 Enrollment Ratio trend in Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
The new SNA, with its autonomous status and political support, acted swiftly 
to strengthen implementation structure and processes that played a key role in 
improving enrollment performance. One key process which improved enrollment 
performance was fixing the responsibility for making FKOs available, as the 
unavailability of FKOs was one of the biggest issues in Uttar Pradesh. The efforts of 
the new SNA, however, had only a limited effect on the enrollment ratio due to other 
contextual factors (discussed later) which detrimentally affect the enrollment 
performance.  
For enrollments, ICs are completely dependent on the DKM, and therefore in 
order to gain their support the ICs go beyond their required role to create, improve 
and preserve their relationship with the DKM. In the context of Uttar Pradesh, district 
administration is not under the direct hierarchical control of any other agency, 
including the SNA,
83
 and has a number of veto points in the scheme implementation; 
therefore district administration behaves opportunistically by either neglecting their 
responsibilities or asking for favors in return. The opportunistic behavior of district 
administration instigates the TPA to behave opportunistically by neglecting their 
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 In Uttar Pradesh, although there is no direct relationship between district administration and 
the SNA, they are within the same department (department of health), and therefore the SNA 





responsibilities and cost cutting, resulting in poor quality of service. 
5.1.1.4  Empanelment Performance 
 
When the scheme was established in Uttar Pradesh, the RSBY scheme was 
seen as a source of easy revenue, and so to capture this resource, new hospitals were 
established while older hospitals vied to become empanelled for this new market 
segment. Hospitals lobbied to become empanelled, leading to massive politicization 
of the overall hospital empanelment process. As a result, the private hospitals' share 
in the scheme increased because of the vested interests, as shown in Fig 5.2. Fig 5.2 
presents the share of private hospitals empanelled in the scheme over the years.   
 
 
(Source: RSBY website) 
Figure 5.2 Participation of Private Hospitals in RSBY Scheme-Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
These hospitals, as a result of the immunity provided by their connections, 
became involved in massive collusion and fraud at multiple levels of the scheme. 
These fraudulent activities reached a peak during the period 2009-10, when the 








(Source: Based on data from Ministry of Labor & Employment) 
Figure 5.3 Trend in Hospitalization Ratio-Uttar Pradesh 
 
As shown in Fig 5.3, the hospitalization rate was low in the first year of 
policy implementation (with the exception of two districts, Sant Ravidas Nagar and 
Kanpur Nagar), however in the following policy period (2009-10) it increased rapidly 
in almost all districts. In nine districts, the hospitalization ratio surpassed 10.00 (see 
Table 5.2 below), while the claims ratio escalated between 100 to 600%. Table 5.2 
presents the hospitalization ratio and claims ratio as observed in the year 2009-10 in 
selected districts of Uttar Pradesh.  
Table 5.2 Districts with High Level of Hospital Frauds 
 
Districts    2009-10 
 Hospitalization Ratio Claims Ratio 
Gorakhpur 10.40655 118.99 
Banda 11.44402 142.28 
Kanpur Dehat 12.3464 237.95 
Baghpat 12.4556 250.74 
Jaunpur 12.62018 250.54 
Varanasi 17.43975 572.46 
Kanpur Nagar 19.66587 344.27 
Fatehpur 20.46424 597.19 
Sant Ravidas Nagar 24.7107 438.03 






The sudden increase in utilization is difficult to attribute purely to an increase 
in the level of awareness and suppressed demand, as the utilization observed was well 
beyond the hospitalization ratio observed in other surveys (NSSO around 5%). There 
is sufficient anecdotal evidence to suggest that massive fraudulent claims by hospitals 
were the responsible factor.  
After the new SNA took over the administration of the scheme, however, 
hospital empanelment was brought under the scrutiny of SNA and the district 
insurance committee
84
 (DIC) and a number of other check points were added to the 
empanelment process in order to significantly improve accountability in the system at 
the district level. By January 2012, empanelment was removed from 110 out of 158 
hospitals nationally, from Uttar Pradesh (MOLE, Government. of India and German 
Development Cooperation, 2012). As a result, the hospitalization ratio decreased in 
the following year (2011-12) in almost all districts, including those nine districts 
which had experienced very high levels of hospitalization in previous rounds, as 
shown in Fig 5.4. Fig 5.4 presents the trend in hospitalization ratios observed in 
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 DIC consists of district magistrate as a chair, district key manager as convener and other 






(Source: based on data from MOLE) 
Figure 5.4 Hospitalization Ratio in Selected Districts -Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
The trend in claims ratio followed the trend in hospitalization ratio
85
 as indicated in 
Fig 5.5.  
 
 
(Source: based on data from RSBY Uttar Pradesh) 
Figure 5.5 Claims Ratio Trend in selected Districts -Uttar Pradesh 
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 In most districts, the claims ratio was high in 2009-10 and came down in 2011-12; however 





Fig 5.5 presents the trend in claims ratio of selected districts in Uttar Pradesh, 
showing a decline in claims ratio over the years. The data on hospitalization ratio and 
claims ratio for the year 2013-14 was not available to track this trend for 2013-14, 
however data on premium rates is presented in Fig 5.6, which clearly indicates a 
similar trend. Fig 5.6 presents the premium rates in districts over the years. As the 
fraud and claims ratios decreased, premium rates also lessened in the year 2014 
(indicated by blue crosses) in most of the districts, as shown in Fig 5.6. 
 
(Source: Based on Data from RSBY Uttar Pradesh) 
Figure 5.6 District-wise Premium Price - Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
The authority for decision making on hospital empanelment in Uttar Pradesh 
was transferred from the IC to the DIC, which changed the responsibility for the 
decision-making process from one person to a group. This was expected to lead to a 
consensus-based approach resulting in the redistribution of power among the 
agencies, thereby preventing politicization of the hospital empanelment process.  
One officer of the IC said,  
―The system of the policy is such that no one can do manmani (act 
whimsically). In every district, there is a grievance committee,  there is District 





consensus of all five. . Till last year, it was only one person and so he was doing 
according to his desires.  If we see now the power is with everyone and if we do 
not see than it is not with any one also‖.  
In practice, however, district administration was still able to exercise its veto 
power, given the dependency on them by other agencies and the limited control of 
other agencies on district administration
86
. It is difficult to question the role and 
influence of district administration
87
, even under the new arrangements. District 
administration abused their veto power extensively for personal gains, causing 
considerable loss to other agencies, especially the IC and its beneficiaries. The 
manager of the IC says that: 
―Those who have resources  ... those who have power they only give 
instructions   ...  and the weakest link among all is IC‖.  
The extent of mistrust, lack of coordination and conflicting interest is 
evidenced by the fact that, in 2012-13, each party conducted their own hospital audit, 
rather than a single coordinated audit. The quality of hospital audits carried out by the 
DIC was poor
88
, however other stakeholders could not question the credibility of the 
audit and had no other choice than to do their own audits. As a result, multiple audits 
were carried out and the same hospital was audited by four different agencies.  
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 The process adopted by the DIC in empanelment is not questioned, nor the role of the DIC 
members monitored by any agency. Only after considerable evidence against any district 




 There is no direct link of authority between the SNA and district magistrate. The SNA 
cannot even question the district magistrate as he is an IAS officer. The SNA also cannot take 
any action against the CMO, unless there is considerable credible evidence against him. The 
SNA has to go through the chief secretary if they want to issue any instructions for district 
administration (interview with officer from the state nodal agency, UP8). 
 
88
 DIC audits spent less than 30 minutes assessing each hospital. These audits were not 
surprise visits, however the dates of the audits were already advertised in the newspaper, 





5.1.1.5 Claims Performance 
 
Following the launch of the scheme, in the initial couple of years there were 
extensive fraudulent claims and an unsustainable level of claims ratios in many 
districts as described earlier. Private ICs responded to these fraudulent claims by 
using various tactics, both ethical and unethical, to reduce claims in the short term. 
This delayed claims payments as shown in Fig 5.7. In 2008-09, the majority of claims 
were paid within the stipulated time. In 2009-10, only around 40% of claims were 
paid after the stipulated time, however in 2011-12, in almost all districts, 65% of 












This delay, and uncertainty in claims reimbursed, led to honorable hospitals 
dropping out of the scheme and more and more fraudulent hospitals remaining in the 
scheme
89
. With the new SNA, hospital empanelment and controls on fraudulent 
claims, payment function improved. Anecdotal evidence suggests that ‗this year 
payment has started. Within a month of starting policy, (which) last year hospitals got 
it (payment) after 6 months?‖90 Fraudulent behavior persists, however, and the ICs 
use audits to help prevent
91
 fraud. 
Private hospitals have been guilty of extensive fraud under the protection of 
district administration. Private ICs respond to these frauds by using various tactics, 
including some unethical tactics, to reduce claims. The unethical tactics of ICs 
include: instructing hospitals to admit only a certain number of patients; not 
providing any information on claim status; rejecting claims after months due to 
minute technical issues; blocking transactions from a hospital such that the hospital 
cannot file claims; purposely delaying claims and then clearing long-pending claims 
at a fraction of their original value
92
. As a formal grievance system is not functioning, 
in many places, aggrieved hospitals have used informal channels to raise awareness 
of their situation, including social media forums such as Facebook. 
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 Those hospitals which already have a high client base generally do not engage in fraudulent 
claims. One officer of the third party administrator said that ―RSBY is good for doing fraud  




 Interview, state level manager (UP3) in a TPA, working in Uttar Pradesh. 
 
91
 The IC uses audits to prevent fraudulent claims by threatening hospitals. Based on the audit, 
the IC runs the show as notice and transaction software is blocked, meaning that for 10 days 
that hospital will not be able to make claims and thus it is a saving for the IC. Hospitals are 
also alerted if their transaction identity (TID) is blocked. So even if the IC cannot de-empanel 
a hospital because of their political connections, they can threaten hospitals and reduce claims 
volume by using audits as a tool.  
 
92
 For claims which insurance companies find difficult to reject but suspect to be fraudulent, 
they delay settlement, and when the claim amount has reached a considerable value, the IC 






5.1.1.6 Governance and Control of Opportunism 
 
The scheme was previously managed by the department of rural 
development, with a very skeletal implementation structure which provided 
unsatisfactory levels of discrimination and opportunity to seek rent from other 
stakeholders, creating a system of ‗Inspector Raj‘.   
Private hospitals and private ICs, with distorted expectation, joined the 
scheme, expecting it to be a money minting scheme, however in reality the scheme 
was expected to yield only a small marginal profit to stakeholders, if implemented as 
per the contract in an ethical manner.  
All participants hold the perception that ―I have to make money through this 
scheme‖; therefore, participants joined to extract the most government revenue they 
possibly could. In the absence of any control, there was collusion, rent seeking and 
bribe payments in almost all activities, whether through hiring of an IC, TPA or smart 
card service provider (SCSP), gaining the support of district administration, 
enrollments in the field, empanelment of hospitals or even the audit of the hospitals. 
A number of stakeholders, with the promise of anonymity, confirmed that bribes were 
taken even by the district administration to support implementation. One officer of 
the IC said, ―the situation here has become hellish."93 
With the new SNA in office, the situation has begun to change with the 
creation of new guidelines to reduce ambiguity, the creation of new structures (such 
as the DIC) to increase participation from other departments, the hiring of staff at 
state level and at the field level to improve monitoring, and the use of technology to 
improve transparency in the system. These cross checks have reduced discrimination, 
increased control and reduced fraudulent behavior, especially blatantly fraudulent 
activities, such as under the table payments for awarding a contract or gaining the 
support of district administration. Some opportunistic behaviors, however, still 
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continue in certain vulnerable areas such as hospital empanelment, enrollment quality 
and claims payment function.  
Table 5.3 presents a list of opportunistic behaviors, the responsible agency 











favoring in hospital 
empanelment and de-
empanelment 
District Administration not 















Smart Card Service 




ng party  
District administration have 
considerable power in 
empanelment and neither IC nor 
SNA can control them 
District administration have 
considerable power in 
empanelment and neither IC 




TPA has no 
power 
IC has power to some extent in 
claims as it affects their cost  





Low cost relational approach such 
as providing information and 
including district administration 
in the audit process 
APOs support coordination 







Claims payment  
Monitoring 
Monitoring by the 
technical assistant 
appointed by SNA 
Monitoring  
Step 1  IC-ignores the pressure  








 Shuffle the 
TPA staff  
(Authority) 
 
Hospitals complain to District 
Magistrate, SNA etc. through 
various means. District Magistrate 
instructs insurance company 
Authority  
DMC through SNA 
inform the IC. IC 
asks them  
Authority  







  DIC informs APOs of the SNA 
and APOs discuss with the IC  
Authority Transactional  




Step 3 IC- asks district administration to 
give in writing  
Transactional  
Accommodating interest of 
the district administration 
(reduction in autonomy) 
Relational  
  APOs raise this issue in weekly 
meetings  
(authority) Transactional  
Warnings and letter 
(authority ) 
Transactional  
Step 4 IC accepts some of the requests of 
the district administration which 
are feasible (Relational) 
Complain to APOs of SNA 
Relational 
  Email to IC and CC to Ministry of 
Labor Director General  
(authority) Transactional 
 
Step 5 IC complains to SNA about non-
cooperation of the district 
administration (Transactional) 
(contract authority) 




Cut the fee as a 
penalty (authority ) 
Transactional  
 





In Uttar Pradesh, as discussed earlier, the public sector dominates at both 
state and district levels, and the private sector has limited support or recourse if 
troubled by the public sector, especially at district level. Therefore, in Uttar Pradesh 
we see a dominant public sector, dominating the decision-making powers of the 
private sector. For example, empanelment of hospitals in Uttar Pradesh is not under 
the control of ICs as seen in all other states, but is under the control of the DIC, 
headed by the district magistrate.  
The public sector uses its authority to try to enforce a contract on the private 
sector. As the contract design provides very limited transactional tools, the SNA uses 
the available tools in a gradual manner, with the use of threats being one of the most 
commonly used tools. Unlike the public sector, the private sector uses a relational 
approach in an endeavor to preserve its relationship with the public sector.   
The table on the preceding page presents information on each opportunistic 
behavior and the steps that were taken to manage such behavior
94
. The first three 
columns present opportunistic behaviors of the public sector to which the private 
sector responds, and the latter three columns present the three types of opportunistic 
behaviors of the private sector agency.  
As indicated in the table, there is a clear difference between opportunism 
management by the public sector and that of the private sector. The private sector 
consistently uses a predominantly relational approach to manage opportunistic 
behaviors of the public sector, as it relies on the public sector to achieve its goals and 
aims to preserve its relationship with them and to maintain their support. As there are 
limited tool options in the contract, both agencies use a calibrated approach. The 
private sector aims to preserve the relationship as it cannot afford to risk relationship 
and therefore when all options fail, the private sector finally yields to the demands of 
the public sector.  
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 The types of opportunistic behavior were observed at the time of data collection, and their 








Punjab is one of the wealthiest and most developed states, but performs 
comparatively poorly in terms of social development due to the legacy of political 
conflict and a populism-driven political system (Singh Nirvikar, 2011). The health 
sector performance is mixed with stagnated maternal and infant mortality rates and 
high female infanticide (Singh Nirvikar, 2011). Poor public healthcare spending, 
coupled with higher purchasing power, has stimulated the development of the private 
healthcare system, and private providers dominate in health service delivery as 72% 
of institutional deliveries and 80% of hospitalizations are in the private sector (social 
economic survey, International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and Macro 
International, 2008). 
Health services in Punjab were the first to become corporatized, with the 
establishment of the Punjab Health System Corporation (PHSC) in 1996 through a 
World Bank sponsored project – India state health systems development project – II.  
PHSC is a government-funded corporation without a revenue stream, and is 
responsible for managing more than 150 state healthcare institutions as well as being 
responsible for administering the RSBY scheme as the  state nodal agency (SNA).  
5.1.2.1 Scheme Expansion and Key Feature of Implementation 
 
The RSBY scheme was launched in July 2008 in a phased manner. In the first 
phase (2008-09), eight districts were included; in the second phase (2009-10), the 
scheme was extended to all the twenty-two districts in the state. The nodal agency 
who implemented the scheme is the Punjab Health Systems Corporation (PHSC), 
headed by an Indian administrative service officer (IAS). The SNA staff includes an 





At the district level, the SNA has appointed deputy medical commissioners 
(DMCs) as the DKMs. Each DKM is provided with a nodal officer and a statistical 
analyst. The DMC is under the direct control of the PHSC (the state nodal agency) 
and is fully accountable to the SNA. The field key officers (FKOs) work directly 
beneath the DMC and, therefore, the participation of health workers is simplified 
under the scheme.  
In addition to the RSBY scheme, the DMC is also responsible for managing 
public hospitals in the district and has greatly facilitated more participation of public 
hospitals in the scheme compared to participation in other states. Punjab falls into the 
category of a high performing state due to its ability to properly manage the scheme 
implementation. As a result of the ability to manage implementation well, a number 
of pilot initiatives were first implemented in Punjab.  
The ability of the Punjab State Nodal Agency  to effectively manage the 
implementation process is due to a number of factors, including the unique position 
of the SNA which provides them direct authority to control stakeholders, the sound 
administrative structure
95
 of the scheme providing in-depth information and control 
over field operations, and a high level of political support. The SNA has benefited 
from these advantages and emerged as one of the best managers of the scheme
96
, 
leading to high performance in scheme management. In recognition of the high 
performance of the state in scheme management, the Punjab SNA was presented with 
an award at the National Workshop in May 2013 for outstanding performance in 
providing facilitation to stakeholders. 
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 SNA has designated DMCs working directly with them as district nodal officers. They have 
provided these DKMs with a statistical analyst and thus the SNA has a team under their direct 
authority at the district level.  
96
 PHSC has learned quickly and is proactive in adopting technology. They have a nuanced 
understanding of not only the scheme but also the technology and software. They have used 
various methods to monitor activity at the field level. They view success of the scheme as 
their success. For each district the SNA goes through details of the district, asks DMCs to find 
the reasons and takes their commitment on targets. The SNA sets targets for each and every 
district and schedules for training, health camps and reconciliation meetings, etc. The SNA 






5.1.2.2 Overall Performance  
 
In Punjab, there has been a steady increase
97
 in performance in all three 
function areas considering the specific context of the state  context is taken into 
account.  
 













Conversion rate   39 38 46 61 47% 55 50.4% 
Members per card  2.9 2.4 2.5 1.5 2.9 3.21  
Public claims  14.3% 22.5 39.9 55.2   
Private claims   85.7% 77.5 60.1 44.8   
Total claims   4308 7880 10775 6155   
Public claim value   11.82% 15.78 30.52 42.78   
Private claim value   88.18% 84.22 69.48 57.22   
Total   277.78 511.76 632.29 202.24   
Government 
hospital  
     154  
Private hospital       144  
Hospitalization ratio  0.9 2.3 1.9 1.4  5.04  
Average claim size   5900 5200 5700 4500   
Claim ratio   56 94 91 62   
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 The performance of the scheme declined in the year 2012-13 as a result of the 
implementation of 64kB cards. Punjab was the first state to implement the 64kB cards. The 
process experienced several issues and the hospital software underwent modifications 16 
times, consuming a considerable amount of energy in training and retraining of the staff and 







5.1.2.3 Enrollment Performance 
 
 
(Source: Various Sources) 
Figure 5.8 Trend Conversion Rate: Punjab 
 
Punjab‘s performance in the enrollment process is above average and is 
steadily improving as a result of strong scheme implementation, however a number of 
contextual factors reduce the conversion ratio. Punjab, being a wealthy state, has a 
lower population of BPL beneficiaries and therefore a lower target group per district, 
which increases the average cost of enrollment. Additionally, the BPL list that is used 
in Punjab was compiled in 2001 and 2002, and contains a number of errors which 
reduce the calculation of conversion ratio and increase the cost of enrollment.
98
 
The SNA facilitates the process by instructing district level officers, 
monitoring their presence in the field and tracking enrollment performance. Most of 
the decision making in the process is collective, however public agencies do have an 
advantage in the decision-making process
99
. Support from the DMC varies across 
districts, which leads to variations in enrollment performance.  
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 Interview with state level officer (PJ2) of the IC working in Punjab. 
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Table 5.5 Performance Indicators Selected Districts: Punjab 
 










HIGH PERFORMING DISTRICTS  
Mansa 40 82 75.3 42 -6.64 15855 
Kapurthala 32 56 75.1 24 19.16 6915 
Faridkot 39 40.
43 
65.7 1.43 25.28 10814 
Moga 36 46.
14 
65.5 10.14 19.44 19303 
Amritsar  30 47 65.1 17 18.12 32423 
Tarn Taran 27 60 61.6 33 1.67 33334 
LOW PERFORMING DISTRICTS  
Gurdaspur 34 42.
7 
45.3 8.72 2.66 28317 
Patiala 34 52 45.0 18 -6.99 39970 
Mohali 47 62 40.3 15 -21.6 8042 
Fazilka  40 38.7 40 -1.24 24969 
Sangrur 51 50.
4 
36.22 -0.5 -14.1 43868 
Firozpur 35 38.
6 
31.20 3.6 -7.49 28673 
(Source:  compiled by author from various sources) 
 
One of the most important factors that has led to variations in the enrollment 
performance across districts is the approach of the DMC
100
. The DMC has limited 
motivation to perform, and therefore their approach towards the scheme is 
predominantly neglecting their responsibilities and delegating all tasks to the private 
sector. 
ICs, being dependent on the DMC, value their relationships with the DMC. 
To prevent exploitation, however, and in order to preserve their interests, they use 
formal communication with higher authorities. In districts
101
 where the DMC is more 
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 Interview with state level officer (PJ2) of the IC working in Punjab and state level officer 
from the TPA (PJ3) working in Punjab. 
 
101
 For example, in Manasa, Kapurthala, Hoshiarpur, Amritsar and Moga, the DMC has a 
good understanding of the scheme, and they actively participate and support the enrollment 





motivated, the DMC and the ICs collaborate and therefore these districts have higher 
enrollment performance. In other districts, the DMC‘s approach towards the scheme 
implementation is to comply with minimum requirements and behave 
opportunistically wherever possible.  
Where DMCs are not motivated, a shirking
102
 and opportunistic approach 
towards the scheme‘s implementation tends to be adopted. They take up a supervisory 
rather than a facilitator‘s role103 and blame the ICs and their allies for problems, even 
those caused by the DMCs' own inefficiencies
104
. These opportunistic behaviors of 
DMCs increase further if the TPA refuses to empanel a particular hospital suggested 
by the DMC. 
Overall, in the enrollment process, a higher level of collaboration between the 
IC and the DMC is associated with better performance.  Even when there is a 
transactional relationship, the performance is above average as a result of intensive 
monitoring
105
, which keeps the opportunism of the agencies at a lower level. It is only 
when the DMC behaves opportunistically that the enrollment performance is lower.   
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 DMCs have a lackadaisical attitude towards their responsibilities. They delegate all the 
work to lower level officers and do not even respond to communication.  When the 
instructions are issued for the hospitals, they do not communicate that information to the 
respective hospitals.  
 
103
 DMCs consider ICs/third party administrators as subordinates rather than partners and 
expect the ICs/third party administrators to follow them (interview with state level officer 
(PJ2) of the IC working in Punjab). 
 
104
 DMCs have a tendency to blame everything on the private sector agencies because private 
sector agencies are foreign and keep changing. For DMCs, it is much easier to blame the new 
third party administrator in the district, as he has not developed enough contacts and, as he 
needs the support of the DMC, he does not protest and complain.  
 
105
 The enrollment process is actively monitored by the IC, SNA and DKM. The IC uses 
various methods - visits, direct calls and field level information sources - as it is not feasible 
for IC staff to visit each place of enrollment. The SNA monitors the process through DMCs, 
FKOs, ICs and third party administrators. They also track the enrollment data. The DMC 





5.1.2.4 Empanelment Performance 
 
The health system in Punjab is highly privatized and the population, in 
general, prefers using private healthcare services, even in low income groups
106
. This 
is partly due to the poor quality of services delivered by public hospitals (PHSC 
report, 2008). In RSBY Punjab, however, more than 50% of the hospitals empanelled 
are from the public sector, as the SNA applies pressure in order to direct revenue to 
public hospitals through the RSBY scheme
107
. The unstated policy of the SNA is to 
focus on public hospitals
108
, and therefore the SNA controls all the affairs in relation 
to public hospitals, but leaves the affairs of private hospitals to the ICs. The DMCs 
have been instructed by the SNA not to interfere with issues related to private 
hospitals, however when such interference is necessary, the DMCs are required to 
keep the SNA informed. Over the years, this has resulted in a steady increase in the 
share of public hospitals in RSBY claims. In 2013-14, the share of claims by public 
hospitals was 68%, even though they only comprised 48% of total hospitals 
empanelled. This is shown in Fig 7.9 (Ministry of Labor and Employment, 
Government of India and Indo-German Social Security Program, 2014).  
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 Only 19.2% of the households used public sector facilities when sick according to 
National Family Health Survey, 2005 (International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) 
and Macro International, 2008). 
 
107
 Based on the statement made by the MD of the PHSC during the DMC meeting. 
 
108
 The SNA instructs the ICs on which public hospitals to be empanelled and monitors their 







(Source: Nain Saroj, 2012) 
Figure 5.9 Share of Public Claims in Total Claims in Punjab in RSBY 
 
The contrary result in the RSBY scheme suggests a high level of performance 
in the areas of public hospital empanelment and claims management. Neglecting the 
affairs of private hospitals, however, has led to poor performance in private hospitals 
empanelment and claims management. Empanelment and de-empanelment of private 
hospitals is marred with political pressure. Even though the DMC is prohibited to 
interfere in the affairs of private hospitals, they apply pressure on ICs/TPAs to 
empanel particular private hospitals, and in return provide support in the enrollment 
process. ICs have the final authority to make a decision regarding the empanelment of 
a particular hospital, however they sometimes submit to political pressure, especially 
when local politics become involved. The SNA works in favor of the ICs, especially 
in matters related to private hospitals, in return for the support they need for public 
hospitals. There are no reconciliation meetings held for claims of private hospitals as 
is done for public hospitals. 
This poor management of private hospitals has resulted in poor quality 
services at private hospitals for RSBY patients, especially for patients presenting 
themselves as potentially low value cases
109
, or in cases where there have been delays 
and/or uncertainty of payment by the IC. Therefore, in the hospital empanelment 
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 The package charges under the RSBY scheme are much lower than the private market 





function, the SNA dominates the decision-making process and exerts its authority to 
enforce decisions on the ICs, as well as on district administration.  
5.1.2.5 Claims Performance 
 
The claims management process is well managed and its effectiveness can be 
proven by the fact that not a single dispute reached a point where it became 
unmanageable and was redirected to a higher level, such as ministry. Although the 
claims process is managed well, health service utilization has remained low. Hospital 
services utilization is at approximately national average level, which is less than 
expected as the geographical accessibility to hospitals is high due to infrastructural 
development and the fact that, under the scheme, Punjab has the highest number of 
empanelled hospitals per thousand empanelled population
110
. Utilization under the 
RSBY scheme is lower than the utilization rates found in other surveys 
(hospitalization rate in NSSO survey is 3 percent in Punjab: National Sample Survey 
Organization, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 5.10 Trend Hospitalization Rate in Punjab 
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The poor utilization as described above could be due to poor quality service 
as public hospitals consider RSBY patients to be burdensome
111
. In order to reach the 
target set by the SNA, public hospitals often run health camps in order to reach their 
target number of claims
112
. 
Similarly to the public sector, RSBY patients also receive poor services at 
private hospitals due to the non-interference in the affairs of private hospitals by the 
SNA, and also due to the collusion of DMCs with fraudulent hospitals. Non-
interference of the SNA in the affairs of private hospitals has given free rein to the 
ICs, and they behave opportunistically in denying and delaying claims. Collusion of 
DMCs with private hospitals has led to fraudulent claims. This opportunism and 
counter-opportunism between ICs and private hospitals delays claims payments, 
resulting in denial, poor quality of service
113
 and ultimately in poor utilization. 
 
(Source: RSBY website) 
Figure 5.11 Trend of Share of Private Hospitals Claims in Punjab 
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 Public hospital staff perceives RSBY patients as burdensome because their workload is 
increased but money coming from RSBY does not directly benefit them. For RSBY patients, 
hospitals have to arrange medicines which are not available in public hospitals (interview with 
district officer (PJ5), third party administrator working in Punjab). Therefore staff at the 
public hospitals view RSBY patients as an additional burden and prefer to avoid treating 
RSBY patients. There is sufficient anecdotal evidence to suggest that doctors at the public 
hospitals refer the RSBY patients to private hospitals in return for favors (including monetary) 




 In the year 2012-13, 273 camps were run by public hospitals in Punjab (Nain Saroj, 2012). 
113
 Private hospitals refuse low value cases and only take selected cases where the margins are 






As a result of the focus of the SNA on public hospitals
114
, the claims 
performance in public hospitals has improved considerably in spite of the lax attitude 
of public hospitals towards claims submission
115
. The SNA has initiated claims 
reconciliation meetings, where public hospitals and ICs reconcile their claims, and 
these meetings have considerably reduced claims-related disputes.  
In the area of public sector hospitals, the SNA has been able to use their 
authority to force ICs and district administration to collaborate and address tensions 
over claims issues. Public hospitals claim that ICs behave opportunistically, however 
most of these opportunistic behaviors by ICs were reported by district administration 




Some of the opportunistic behaviors of ICs reported by district administration 
include intentionally delaying the enrollment process
117
, delaying the installation of 
hospital equipment
118
, concealing claims information
119
, informing of claims rejection 
after months
120
, conducting poor quality training in hospitals in relation to claims 
                                                          
 
114
 The SNA in Punjab is focused on directing revenue to public hospitals through the RSBY 
scheme (observation from DMC meeting and interview with officer (PJ4) of the SNA). 
 
115
 DMCs are not very active in collaborating with ICs/third party administrators in the claims 
management process. They do not show interest in notifying claims, and when the IC seeks to 
submit the claims, many of the public hospitals/DMCs do not respond. 
116
 In Punjab ICs are making considerable profit as indicated by the burn out ratio of the last 
few years; thus it is less likely that the ICs engage in considerable claims denial strategies as 
have been found in districts where the claims ratio is very high and the ICs are losing.  
 
117
 ICs purposely delay the enrollment period so that the claims period reduces, reducing 
claims payouts and increasing profits (observation from DMC meeting). 
 
118
 After empanelling the hospitals, ICs do not install hospital software in time and thus the 
service points are not functional, which leads to the hospitals refusing to provide services to 




 ICs do not provide information about those claims which are accepted and those which are 
rejected, so hospitals cannot track which claims have been paid and which have not (interview 








 and paying claims according to their convenience
122
. Older claims have 
become a difficult issue in claims management
123
.  
Governance and Control of Opportunism  
In the case of Punjab, opportunistic behaviors are concentrated in private 
hospital empanelment and claims management. Table 5.6 presents a list of observed 
opportunistic behaviors, the responsible agency and other related stakeholders.   
 






Description of Opportunism 
1 Deputy Medical 
Commissioner  
IC\TPA Lack of support by Deputy Medical 
Commissioner in enrollment  
2 Deputy Medical 
Commissioner  
IC Pressuring IC for hospital 
empanelment 
3 IC Hospitals\SNA  IC using unethical approaches to 
delay claims payment  
4 TPA IC Collusion with hospitals  
5 TPA SNA Cost cutting in enrollment  
6 SNA Private 
hospitals  
Neglecting private hospitals  
 
The lower level of opportunism in Punjab, in comparison with other states, 
could be attributed to a number of factors. First, the SNA in Punjab, due to a strong 
information network, sees the overall ground situation and therefore can identify the 
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 ICs reject claims on technical grounds and inform the hospitals after months of filing them 
and, because of this long gap, it is not possible for the hospital to trace the patient and correct 
errors in claims. In this way ICs attempt to avoid paying such claims (interview with nodal 
officer (PJ6), district administration). 
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 For hospital training workshops, ICs employ low-trained personnel who do not simplify the 
claims process to help hospital staff to understand how to make claims (interview with officer 
of the SNA (PJ1). 
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 ICs do not adhere to the contract norms regarding payment of claims and pay according to 
their own convenience. As one officer from the third party administrator said: ―Hospital feel 
that they have submitted the claim today and so they will get the payment within 10 days.. it 
doesn’t happen this way. Insurance company release payment on their own level.‖ (interview 
with manager (PJ3), third party administrator). 
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 When claims are pending and they become old, both the ICs and hospitals argue and it is 





aggrieving agency. The SNA has also been successful in earning the trust of both the 
ICs and the DMC, and so if there is any problem, the SNA is able to effectively play 
the role of arbitrator and use its authority to solve the problem. The second reason for 
a lower level of fraudulent behavior is the focus of the scheme on public hospitals 
rather than on private hospitals, and the freedom given to ICs to manage private 
hospitals.  
As discussed earlier, the involvement of private hospitals in the scheme 
distorts incentives, increases opportunistic behaviors and reduces performance. In 
Punjab, the SNA has strongly focused on public hospitals and this has reduced 
hospital-based frauds, as well as opportunism to some extent. The SNA also has a 
non-interference policy for affairs related to private hospitals, giving complete control 
to the ICs as they are better able to manage opportunistic behaviors of hospitals and 
ward off any political pressure.  
The third reason for the reduction in the incidence of fraudulent behavior is 
the various implementation processes that have improved the efficiency of scheme 
implementation, such as regular claims reconciliation meetings, training of staff at 
various levels, a structured approach towards health camps, regular performance 








Lack of support by District Key 















District Key Manager (Deputy 
Medical Commissioner) plays an 
important role but is controllable to 




TPA has no 
power 
IC has power to some extent in claims as it 
affects their cost  
TPA have minimum power. 
 
Prevention  IC gets SNA to send instructions.  



















Monitoring by Deputy 














Hospitals complain to DMC. DMC 
instructs insurance company. 
Authority  
(Transactional) 
DMC discusses with TPA  
Authority. 
(Transactional) 
Step 2 Sharing resources with District Key 




 DIC informs SNA and SNA discusses. 
 
Relational 
DMC complains to SNA 
and SNA first discusses 
with both parties. 
Relational  
Step 3 Repeated reminders. 











Step 4 Complain to SNA 
(Transactional) 
  Written notice to CEO. 
(authority) Transactional  
Removal of TPA. 
(Transactional) 
Step 5 (Contract authority) 
(Transactional) 
  Blacklisting of IC. 
(authority) Transactional 
Cut the fee as a penalty 
(authority). 
Transactional 





Table 5.7 above presents information on each opportunistic behavior and the 
steps that were taken to manage such behaviors. As shown in the table, there is a clear 
difference in opportunism management by the public sector compared to that of the 
private sector.   
The first two columns represent opportunistic behaviors of the public sector, 
and the latter three columns present the opportunistic behaviors of the private sector 
agency. It is clear from this table that, for the prevention of opportunism, all agencies 
rely on a transactional approach rather than a relational approach.  
In managing the opportunistic behaviors, the parties first use a relational 
approach and if not successful, they then move towards a transactional approach. In 
the existing contract design, there are limited transactional approach tools that can be 
used by the parties in the contract. Both the private sector and the public sector use a 
mixed approach, however the use of a relational approach is much higher in the 
private sector compared with the public sector. 
5.1.3 Himachal Pradesh 
5.1.3.1 Scheme Background  
 
Himachal Pradesh is an economically developed state (GDP per capita is 
higher than the national average) with a high level of literacy
124
 and an even higher 
health status relative to Punjab and Uttar Pradesh
125
. Government health services have 
been active both in the preventative and curative segments. Himachal Pradesh has 
become one of the first smoke-free states in India.  
The public sector delivers 56% to 79% of healthcare services consumed and, 
contrary to other states, the utilization of health services from the public sector is 
continually increasing (Ali Rabia et al., 2008). 
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 Total literacy rate for 2011 census was 83.78.  
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5.1.3.2 Scheme Expansion 
 
In Himachal Pradesh, in the first phase (2008-09) the policy was 
implemented in only two districts (Shimla and Kangra) and in the second phase the 
scheme was extended to the whole state. At the time of data collection, the policy was 
in its third year of implementation in most districts, except for Shimla and Kangra 
where it was in its fourth year.  
In 2010, Himachal Pradesh became the first state to provide additional 
coverage beyond the basic package of the RSBY scheme, through a critical care 
policy known as RSBY Plus, increasing financial coverage from INR 30,000 to INR 
175,000.  
In Himachal Pradesh, the scheme is implemented through Himachal 
Pradesh's Swasthya Bima Yojana Society, an agency affiliated with the department of 
health. At the time of data collection, the agency had a very skeletal staff
126
, managed 
by only one person at the state level. Coordination at the state level is through 
monthly meetings which are chaired by the secretary of health or the health minister. 
At the district level, the department of rural development (district administration) is 
the nodal agency. The project officer, district administration (district rural 
development agency) is the DKM and panchayat secretaries are the FKOs. 
5.1.3.3 Overview Scheme Performance 
 
Himachal Pradesh is a high performer in all three areas of enrollment, 
empanelment and claims management, as shown in Table 5.8 below.  
Table 5.8 Performance Indicators: Himachal Pradesh 






1 80.9 2 102 3.9 
2 79.9 5.1 234 3.3 
3 78.4   3.0 
4 67.13  288  
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Himachal Pradesh was recognized for high performance in the area of 
enrollment for three consecutive years in 2009, 2010 and 2011. In 2013, Himachal 
Pradesh was also recognized as the best performer in the scheme utilization. 
Himachal Pradesh has also been successful in containing hospital level frauds and 
there have been very few hospital de-empanelments in the state.   
5.1.3.4 Enrollment Performance 
 
Himachal Pradesh is a top performing state in enrollment and a number of 
village councils have achieved 100% enrollment rate. A number of factors contribute 
to this. First is the quality of beneficiary data. High quality beneficiary identification 
data
127
 considerably improves the efficiency of enrollment
128
. In Himachal Pradesh, 
FKOs have continuously revised the BPL list, after every enrollment, improving 
quality, reducing errors and omissions. As a result of the accuracy of the BPL list, a 
number of village councils were able to enroll 100% of the population on their BPL 
lists.  
The second factor that drives enrollment performance is access to 
information regarding the RSBY scheme at the community level. In Himachal 
Pradesh, the appointment of panchayat secretaries as FKOs has provided a strong 
army of field level workers, who personally know the beneficiaries and are accessible 
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 The RSBY scheme uses a BPL list as beneficiary identification data and only those who 
are in the BPL list can be enrolled in the scheme. If the BPL list is of poor quality and only 
60% of the people in the BPL list are presently available in that geographic area, and even if 
all of those who are available are enrolled (that is 100% enrollment), still according to the 
present approach of measuring performance, enrollment performance will be calculated as 
60% as we could only enroll 60% of the population from the original BPL list. Thus the 
quality of the BPL list is a critical factor in computing enrollment performance in the present 
performance measurement approach.   
 
128
 In many states the beneficiary lists are very old and have a number of errors, creating a lot 
of problems in enrollment. In these places the deserving candidates are not in the BPL list, 
while the undeserving candidates are, and this creates confusion and chaos at the enrollment 
station. Adding to this chaos is the FKOs who are not local and are there just to put their 
thumb impression as they don't really identify the beneficiary. These problems which are 
common in other states do not pose a problem in the case of Himachal Pradesh because of the 






to the beneficiaries before and after the enrollment. This has been reflected in 
research studies which have found that, for the majority of the beneficiaries, the 
source of information was the panchayat secretary (62%) or the local government 
officer (8%) (Amicus Advisory Pvt Ltd, 2011). 
The third reason is the level of commitment by the state government. Due to 
the populist appeal of the scheme, the state government is very keen to make the 
scheme successful and therefore there is considerable pressure on district authorities 
to reach targets. As a result of pressure from the state authorities, district 
administration is willing to provide any kind of support to the implementing agency. 
In Himachal Pradesh, the TPA is the central stakeholder and works to keep 
its relationship with district administration, with the SNA and with the ICs and 
reports to all three agencies; however the process of enrollment is "mainly between 
the ICs and district administration‖129. The IC, being a public IC, is not much 
concerned with profitability and performance, whereas the SNA lacks direct 
authority
130
 and control and therefore does not actively monitor or facilitate the 
process. Therefore, there is no pressure from the SNA to perform. District 
administration tends to have an upper hand
131
 in decision making. District 
administration, however, is under pressure to enroll a target population
132
 and, as a 
result, they collaborate with the TPA and district administration. Given the pressure 
to perform, district administration provides the necessary support to the IC and 
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 District administration in Himachal Pradesh is from the rural development dept. and is not 
under the direct authority of the SNA which is situated in the health department. 
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 Upper hand of district administration is visible from the fact that third party administrators 




 If there were no pressure for enrollment, district administration would probably not be 
concerned with the activities in the field and would probably see the enrollment as a 





therefore the TPA/Smart Card Service Provider need not resort to cost cutting to 
remain profitable.  
5.1.3.5 Empanelment Performance 
 
The utilization of the scheme has increased considerably from a 
hospitalization ratio of 2% in the first year to 5% in the second year. With increasing 
utilization, the burn out ratio has increased considerably, reaching an unsustainable 
level by 2012. In Himachal Pradesh, the public sector dominates in service delivery 
as shown in Fig 5.12 below. With the exception of the district of Solan, the role of 
private hospitals in most other districts is almost negligible and they occupy less than 
10% in claims.  
 
(Source: Data from Himachal Pradesh State Nodal Agency) 







(Source: Data from Himachal Pradesh State Nodal Agency) 
Figure 5.13 Share of Private Hospitals in Claims value: Himachal Pradesh 
 
 
Higher utilization could be attributed to the type of hospitals empanelment 
which is in tandem with the population's healthcare-seeking behavior. Empanelment 
of some hospitals to which the beneficiaries are accustomed to attending, reduced a 
number of barriers which are associated with using a new facility. One survey in 
Himachal Pradesh found that 90% of the beneficiaries underwent treatment prior to 
being hospitalized under the RSBY scheme and most (83%) had availed themselves 
of treatment from public facilities, which made the referral process easier (Amicus 
Advisory Pvt Ltd, 2011). Second, public hospitals as well as the SNA are within the 
same department, which further facilitates their relationship. Third, very few disputes 
in the case of hospital empanelment in Himachal Pradesh ensured the continuity of 
services to beneficiaries.  
5.1.3.5.1 Governance Dynamics and Opportunism 
 
The state government is very much committed to keeping the scheme clean, 
and therefore they pressurize ICs to empanel mainly public hospitals and severally 
punish fraudulent hospitals. The process of hospital empanelment and de-





all stakeholders adhere to their roles as described in the contract. The district officials 
say that ―in this (hospital empanelment) we cannot say anything. This is done at the 
state level and national level and the health department will take that decision‖. This 
gives complete autonomy to the ICs. The ICs do not reciprocate by considering the 
SNA's suggestions to empanel private hospitals.  
5.1.3.6 Claims Performance  
 
The state of Himachal Pradesh has performed exceedingly well in the case of 
utilization of services. The state was recognized at national level as the ―Best 
Utilization Rate State‖ during the national workshop in 2013. With increasing 
utilization, the burn out ratio has also increased. The graph below indicates that the 
burn out ratio has increased considerably in the scheme, suggesting a combination of 
poor premium pricing
133
 and higher utilization.  
 
Compared to other states, there are limited opportunistic behaviors in the 
claims management process in Himachal Pradesh. There has been no report of 
massive hospital fraud as it has been observed in other places. The state government 
has acted very strongly to send a message to hospitals, especially private hospitals, to 
deter them from fraudulent claims. Dominance of public hospitals in empanelment 
and claims has also worked to reduce claims related opportunistic behaviors in the 
scheme. In addition, an intensive monitoring
134
 process by the TPA has reduced the 
claims related fraud, however delay in claims payment is one of the biggest factors 
affecting the performance of the scheme.
135
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 The premium per family has remained at the level of 350 rupees per family, which is 
among the lower premiums range in the scheme. 
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 Claims management is offline in Himachal Pradesh since last year because of the internet 
and connectivity issues. The third party administrator has employed four hospital coordinators 
for monitoring in the absence of an online claims process. These hospital coordinators go to 
each hospital and observe and verify each of the hospital admissions and submit a claims 
report to the third party administrator on a daily and weekly basis.   
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Governance Dynamics:  
In Himachal Pradesh, the same IC has been implementing the scheme since the 
start of the scheme and has developed a strong rapport with the minister of the health 
and secretary of health. Therefore, in many situations the IC bypasses the SNA 
officer or does not take seriously their suggestions. This has resulted in a situation 
where the IC does not consider the suggestions or demands of the SNA, especially if 
doing so would increase the cost to the IC or cause inconvenience to the IC staff. It is 
only when the state nodal agency instructs the insurance company via the secretary of 
health or the minister of health that the IC takes it seriously.  
This high-handed approach of the IC has resulted in animosity between the 
SNA and the IC.  This has led to deterioration of the relationship between these two 
agencies. This deterioration of the relationship has adversely affected the 
performance of the scheme as the IC and the SNA are constantly disagreeing over 
issues which are not clearly articulated in the contract. The SNA has become more 





solidarity and has increased their monitoring of the IC, moving from the role of 
facilitator to monitor.   
In the case of Himachal Pradesh, five types of opportunistic behaviors were 
found, as shown in Table 5.9. Based on the experiences of various stakeholders, the 
prevalence of opportunistic behavior in Himachal Pradesh is considered to be very 
low, as compared to other states. In the selected study district, only one case of 
hospital de-empanelment has been found. No opportunistic behavior has been 
reported by any of the agencies in the areas of hospital empanelment or de-
empanelment. There have been no cases of enrollment fraud reported. Although there 
are some issues in claims payment, up until now there have been no written 
complaints by hospitals. This suggests that the level of opportunistic behavior in the 
case of Himachal Pradesh is lower compared to other states.   
A number of factors contributes to the lower level of fraudulent behavior in 
the case of Himachal Pradesh. One of the most important factors is the level of 
commitment of the state government, which filters down to the district 
administration. This strong commitment to improve performance at the state 
government level deters opportunistic behavior by public sector officials, as they are 
expected to provide all kinds of support to private agencies to assist in project 
performance. Because of the lower level of opportunistic behavior by the public 
sector agency, the private sector responds by keeping their opportunistic behaviors 
low.  
The second reason is strong monitoring at the field level, which prevents 
opportunistic behavior in the enrollment function and subsequently in claims 
management. In Himachal Pradesh, FKOs are panchayat secretaries who report to the 
department of rural development. Therefore, there is a high level of accountability at 
the field level. Also, panchayat secretaries are under the direct hierarchical control of 





target population. This has also made available first-hand information regarding field 
implementation for the monitoring of field activities. 
Third, in Himachal Pradesh the state nodal agency/state government has a 
greater control over the hospitals as the majority of the empanelled hospitals are from 
the public sector. Also, the IC is a public insurance company and, therefore, despite 
making a loss, they do not resort to unethical practices for reducing claims as the 
managers do not have strong incentives to reduce the claims ratio as they do in the 
private sector. Therefore, better control over the agents which have the opportunity to 
commit fraud is the prime reason for the low level of opportunistic behaviors in 
Himachal Pradesh. 
From Table 5.10, it is clear that informal opportunism is mainly managed by 
informal approaches. Parties for preventative purposes in general use transactional 
approaches such as monitoring, however for managing the opportunism they first 
begin with a relational approach and, if that is unsuccessful, they then move to other 
transactional approaches. Here, we find that both the public sector agency and the 






Opportunism  Poor quality 
enrollment by 
TPA as they do 






activities on TPA 
leading to poor 
quality  
Insurance company 
did not honor the 
informal norm of 
exchange  
IC delay the claims 
payment  
Aggrieving agency  TPA District 
Administration 
IC IC IC 
Aggrieved agency  District 
Administration 
TPA SNA SNA SNA 
Type of opportunism  Passive Formal 
Low visible and 
Low consequence 
Active Informal 
Low visible High 
consequence 
Passive Formal visible 
and Low consequence  
Active Informal 
Visible and High 
consequence  
Passive Formal visible 
High consequence 






 Monitoring  
(Transactional) 







relational norms and 
support (Relational) 
Verbal reminders  
(Relational) 





Taking note of it for 
evaluation  
(Transactional) 
Reduction in trust and 
support 
(Relational) 
Written reminders  
(Transactional) 





 Increased monitoring  
(Transactional) 




Step 4     Use it during 
evaluation of IC 
(Transactional) 
 





5.2 Cross–Case Analysis 
 
The purpose of performing a cross-case analysis is to trace the influence of 
IOR dynamics on opportunisms and implementation performance. First, the dynamics 
of IORs in the prevention and control of opportunism is explored at the dyadic level, 
predominantly relying on the theory of contract governance. For each of the 
opportunistic behaviors observed in the scheme, variations across cases are traced, 
including the factors causing these variations (5.2.1), and the governance approach 
used to prevent and control that opportunistic behavior is mapped for eight commonly 
observed opportunistic behaviors (5.2.2). This analysis is then used to inductively 
generate the key issues in the management of opportunism (5.2.3), which include the 
factors driving the choice of governance approach, the pattern of interaction between 
governance approaches and the linkage between types of opportunism and types of 
governance mix.  
5.2.1 Variation in Opportunism and Opportunism Management  
 
5.2.1.1 Variation in Opportunism  
 
The appearance of opportunistic behaviors and their management differs 
considerably in the three states. As shown in Fig 5.15, opportunism is very high in all 
three function areas in the case of Uttar Pradesh, whereas in Punjab opportunism is 
between low and moderate, and in Himachal Pradesh it is at the lowest level. 
There are some similarities in terms of opportunism in Uttar Pradesh and 
Punjab, whereas Himachal Pradesh stands as a contrast case. Uttar Pradesh and 
Punjab both have district administration agencies, having veto power in hospital 
empanelment, and so they behave opportunistically, collude with private hospitals 
and pressurize ICs to empanel these hospitals. These private hospitals, with the 





empanelment, de-empanelment and claims management process. In response to this, 
ICs also behave opportunistically to control the claims ratio.  
In contrast to Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, in Himachal Pradesh, district 
administration has no role in the hospital empanelment process, and due to strong 
hierarchical control by the state government, the public sector agencies play their 
respective roles and do not interfere in one another's jurisdiction, resulting in lower 




Figure 5.15 Opportunism Variation across States 
 
 
5.2.2 Management of Opportunism  
 
All three states differ in their overall governance approach used to manage 
the scheme, and the governance approach used in a particular state also varies 
according to the stage of scheme implementation. The reason for this is that during 
different stages, different stakeholders dominate the scheme implementation process. 
Management of the opportunism at each stage depends upon the predominant 





the variations in the governance approaches at each stage and in each state, refer to 
Appendix 5.1 governance approach at different stages).   
5.2.2.1.1 Opportunism Management in Enrollment  
 
In the enrollment function, the relationship between the IC, which carries out 
the enrollment, and district administration, which facilitates the enrollment process, is 
of paramount importance. The appearance of opportunistic behaviors, as well as their 
management, differs considerably in the three states as shown in Table 5.10.  
Table 5.10 Enrollment Opportunism Variation across States 
 






Smart Card Service 
Provider  
Poor quality enrollment Yes Yes No 
SCSP and FKO  Fraud and collusion 
with hospitals and 
FKOs 
Yes Yes No 
TPA Limited supervision of 
SCSP 
Yes No Yes 
District 
Administration  
Not providing enough 
support 
Yes Yes No 
 
 
Each opportunistic behavior is managed differently in different states but 
there are also similarities. The first type of opportunistic behavior (poor quality 
enrollment by smart card service provider and third party administrator) is prevented 
by monitoring of enrollment activity by district administration, as shown in Table 
5.11.   
Table 5.11 Management of Enrollment opportunism-1 
 
Management of Opportunistic Behavior1 : Poor quality enrollment by SCSP and 
TPA 
 Uttar Pradesh Punjab Himachal Pradesh 
Prevention  Monitoring Monitoring Not observed 
Tool 1 Verbal Complaint (T) Verbal Complaint (T)  
Tool2 Authority (letters) (T) Scolding (T)  







In both states, despite monitoring, enrollment teams continue to behave 
opportunistically until it is brought to the attention of higher authorities. Higher 
authorities initially deal with this relationally, as this opportunism is not clearly 
visible at the initial stages, however if the behavior of the enrollment agencies does 
not change, then the SNA uses a transactional approach. Generally, enrollment 
agencies curb their opportunistic behaviors before that becomes necessary. The SNA 
of Uttar Pradesh uses a transactional approach, more actively than the SNA of 
Punjab, and they quickly reach the penalty stage. 
Table 5.12 Management of Enrollment Opportunism-2 
 
Management of Opportunistic Behavior 2:  District Administration not 
providing enough support to TPA 
 Uttar Pradesh Punjab Himachal 
Pradesh 
Prevention  Relationship with higher 
authority (R) 
Formal written 
instructions  (T) 
Not observed  
Tool 1 Liaison (R) Liaison (R)/Sharing of 
resources (R) 
 





Tool 3  Loss of autonomy (R) Verbal complaint (T)  
Tool 4  Verbal complains (T) Written complaint (T)  
 
 
The second type of opportunism in enrollment is district administration not 
providing sufficient support to the TPA. This opportunism, as shown in Table 5.12, is 
observed in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab in different magnitudes, and in Himachal 
Pradesh, it is not observed. ICs in both states require the support of the SNA to 
pressurize district administration. As the SNA in both states has different levels of 
control over district administration, they use different approaches. The SNA in Uttar 
Pradesh attempts to persuade district administration (relational approach) by SNA 
officers discussing and asking district administration to support enrollment, while the 
SNA in Punjab uses authority by issuing a written order (transactional approach) to 





ICs in both states follow the strategy of creating, improving and preserving 
their relationships with district administration. This dependence of ICs on district 
administration is much greater in Uttar Pradesh than Punjab, and therefore ICs in 
Uttar Pradesh use more relational approaches to gain the support of district 
administration. If these relational approaches of ICs fail
136
 to motivate district 
administration to provide support in enrollment, then the ICs approach SNA to gain 
support. As the SNA in each state has a different degree of control over district 
administration, they manage the issue differently. The SNA in Uttar Pradesh uses 
their close contact with higher authorities in state government (principal secretary) to 
threaten district administration, while in Punjab, the SNA uses their direct authority 
(discussion and scolding). Therefore, for prevention, the use of a transactional 
approach is dominant, but a relational approach is more commonly used by 
management. A relational approach is used when the aggrieving party is powerful and 
there is no other method of controlling that party, but if there is an alternative, the 
aggrieved party uses a transactional approach.
137
  
5.2.2.1.2 Opportunism Management in Empanelment  
 
As far as the empanelment function, the most critical factor determining the 
extent of opportunism is the level of autonomy that the ICs can exercise in a practical 
sense in empanelling hospitals. Officially, ICs have a veto power in hospital 
empanelment, however in practice, due to their dependence on district administration, 
district administration ultimately exercises this veto power. Therefore, the extent to 
which a state IC can control district administration determines the autonomy the IC 
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 This is evident from the comparison of the response by the IC in Punjab vis-a-vis Uttar 
Pradesh. Punjab uses more authority than Uttar Pradesh in relation to district administration, 
which is very powerful in Uttar Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh, the IC also uses reduction in 
autonomy, i.e. choosing some things that are not in the interests of the company just to please 
the other party. This suggests the extent to which the IC values their relationship with district 
administration in Uttar Pradesh and also suggests the powerful position of district 





has in hospital empanelment. In states where the SNA is able to control district 
administration, opportunism in empanelment is low and the governance approach 
used by the IC is different.  
As shown in Fig 5.16, in Himachal Pradesh district administration has been 
kept out of the hospital empanelment process, and therefore ICs have a high level of 
autonomy in hospital empanelment. In Punjab, district administration interferes in 
hospital empanelment, although they are to some extent controlled by the SNA. In 
Punjab, the SNA supports the autonomy of ICs in the private sector hospital 
empanelment, and therefore ICs in Punjab have considerable autonomy in hospital 
empanelment. In Uttar Pradesh, district administration has the veto power in hospital 
empanelment and the SNA has no control over district administration, and therefore 
















Table 5.13 Management of Empanelment Opportunism-1 
 
Management of Opportunistic Behavior 1:  DA Favoring in Hospital Empanelment 
and De-Empanelment 
 UP PJ HP 





Tool 1 Ignore the pressure (R)  Information provision 
(R)  
 
Tool 2 Information provision communication (R) Ignore the pressure (R)   
Tool 3  Formalizing authority (T) Formalizing authority 
(T)  
 
Tool 4  Low autonomy (R) Verbal complains (T)  
Tool 5 Verbal complains (T)   
 
 
The first opportunism in empanelment function, as shown in Table 5.13, is 
district administration favoring private hospitals in empanelment and de-
empanelment. Collusion of district administration with private hospitals is a major 
source of controversy at the district level and influences all other functions. This 
opportunism was not found in Himachal Pradesh, as in this state  all agencies prefer 
public hospitals, meaning there is a limited opportunity for district administration to 
collude with private hospitals.  
To prevent this opportunism, Punjab's SNA uses a transactional approach 
(instructing all DMCs to refrain from empanelment of private hospitals) as DMCs are 
under their direct line of authority, while the SNA in Uttar Pradesh uses a 
participatory decision-making
138
 (relational) approach as they do not have any direct 
control over district administration. These preventative steps, however, have not been 
able to completely halt the opportunistic behavior, and therefore ICs manage the 
pressure of district administration depending on the type of support the ICs expect to 
be given by the SNA.   
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 In Uttar Pradesh, district administration is included in the DIC which decides on the 
empanelment of hospitals. This was expected to distribute the power which was earlier with 





ICs in both states respond in a gradual manner, first trying relational 
approaches such as ignoring the pressure, providing information
139
 and formalizing 
authority
140
. If the pressure continues, however, the IC in Punjab complains to the 
SNA (transactional approach) as they are able to control district administration to 
some extent, while the IC in Uttar Pradesh ultimately accepts the demands of district 
administration (relational approach), because ―if one has to live in water, he cannot 
fight with the crocodile"
141
. The IC can also complain to the SNA (transactional 
approach), but the SNA, just on the basis of complaints by the IC, does not take any 
action against these senior government officers.   
Therefore, we see that ICs first start with a relational approach and continue 
using a relational approach as long as there is value in preserving the relationship 
with district administration. Later, however, the two ICs in the two states differ in 
their approaches. In Uttar Pradesh, the IC prefers to accept the pressure of district 
administration given the importance of their liaison with district administration, while 
in Punjab, as the IC has the support of the SNA, the IC prefers to use a transactional 
approach and complain to the SNA.   
Table 5.14 Management of Empanelment Opportunism-2 
 
Opportunistic Behavior 2:  SNA favoring in hospital empanelment and de-
empanelment   
 UP PJ HP 
Prevention  Information and 
communication (R) 
  
Tool 1 Low autonomy (R) Low autonomy 
(R) 
Ignores the 
pressure (R)  
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 Providing reasons for not empanelling a particular hospital.   
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 ICs ask district administration to formalize the pressure by providing a formal request to 
empanel that hospital in place of informal pressure.  
 
141





Table 5.14 presents the second type of opportunism in the empanelment 
function and the governance approach used to manage it. When pressured by the 
SNA, the IC has no option as the IC is completely dependent on the SNA. 
Additionally, MOLE cannot interfere to any great extent, as the contract is between 
the SNA and the IC, and the IC would not wish to take the issue to national level 
until, and unless, the issue becomes very serious. Therefore, there have been very few 
cases where there has been a complaint against the SNA. ICs have no option other 
than buckling under the pressure of the SNA, however this is not always the case as 
seen in Himachal Pradesh. In Himachal Pradesh, the IC has connections with higher 
authority and power centers, and therefore they do not get pressured by the SNA.  
5.2.2.1.3 Opportunism Management in Claims Function 
 
In claims function, there is a conflict of interests among all stakeholders
142
 
and therefore there is a possibility of opportunism by each agency. The most critical 
issue in opportunism is the extent of autonomy available to ICs in a practical sense to 
de-empanel a hospital, and the extent to which ICs can preserve their autonomy by 
controlling district administration, which generally tries to pressure the ICs. This is 
similar to the empanelment function and, therefore, we find governance dynamics 
similar to empanelment. The higher the level of autonomy the IC has, the greater is 
the extent to which they can control claims management.  
In Himachal Pradesh, the claims management process is governed according 
to the process laid down in the contract and the IC manages the claims process 
without any interference. In Punjab, the SNA interferes and ensures that claims are 
being paid, especially in the case of public hospitals. In Uttar Pradesh, there are direct 
and indirect pressures on the IC to pay hospital claims for fraudulent hospitals. Apart 
from the fraudulent claims by the hospitals, which is not the focus of this analysis, 
two other opportunistic behaviors were observed in the claims management function: 
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 In claims payment, hospitals are keen to make claims, whereas ICs want to keep claims 





TPAs colluding with fraudulent hospitals, and unethical behaviors by ICs in claims 
management.   
Table 5.15 Management of Claims Opportunism-1 
Management of Opportunistic Behavior 1: TPA colluding with hospitals 
 UP PJ HP 
Prevention  Monitoring  Monitoring  Warning (authority) 
Tool 1 Remove the person 
(T) 
Remove the person 
(T) 
Remove the person 
(T) 
 
The first opportunistic behavior (collusion of TPAs with hospitals) as 
presented in Table 5.15, has not yet been observed in Himachal Pradesh, as most of 
the hospitals empanelled are public hospitals with limited incentives to commit fraud. 
In Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, lowly-paid staff of the TPAs collude with fraudulent 
hospitals to facilitate fraudulent claims. The ICs ask the TPAs to remove the 
concerned officer (transactional approach).  
Table 5.16 Management of Claims Opportunism-2 
 
Management of Opportunistic Behavior 2: IC unethical behavior to control 
claims 
 UP PJ HP 
Prevention  Monitoring (T) Monitoring information and 
communication (T)  
 
Tool 1 Verbal (T) 
complaints  
Verbal complains(T)   Verbal (T) 
complaints  
Tool 2 Verbal complaint  
higher level(T) 
Verbal complaint higher 
level (T) 
Delay in payment of 
premium (R) 
Written 
complaint ( T) 
Tool 3  Documented 
complaint (T)  
Written notice (T)   
Tool 4  Written letter (T)  Letter to CEO (T)   
Tool 5 Penalty (T) Blacklisting (T)  
 
 
The second opportunistic behavior in claims management, as presented in 
Table 5.16, is one of the most commonly observed opportunistic behaviors. This is 





In the states of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, in many districts the 
claims ratio is very high and the ICs are losing in both states
143
. Therefore, the ICs 
behave opportunistically, using various tactics 
144
to avoid paying claims. In Himachal 
Pradesh and Punjab, the ICs delay payment of claims to discourage claims by 
hospitals. In Uttar Pradesh, because of extensive fraudulent claims and immunity 
granted to these fraudulent hospitals by district administration, the IC denies paying 
claims by using various tactics.  
SNAs monitor the claims payment process and the IC is required to regularly 
report claims payment status. In Uttar Pradesh, written instructions are issued to 
comply with the claims payment (transactional approach). In Punjab, claims 
reconciliation meetings are organized to avoid delay/disputes in claims payment to 
public hospitals (relational approach). In Himachal Pradesh, the SNA actively 
monitors the claims process.  
Opportunism management begins with district administration raising this 
issue, first with the IC, and if there is no improvement then they complain to the 
SNA. The SNA discusses this issue with the IC and, if required, also cross-checks 
with the hospitals. The SNA, given a limited number of tools in the contract, moves 
step by step, from low cost approaches to high cost approaches. The SNA gives 
written instructions to the IC, sends a written notice to higher authorities in the IC 
and, if necessary, initiates the process to blacklist the IC. If the SNA lacks sharp 
teeth, as seen in Himachal Pradesh, they use pressuring tactics and, instead of sending 
a formal letter, they highlight this shortcoming of the IC in review meetings with 
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 The reasons are different in each state. In Uttar Pradesh, fraudulent claims are leading to a 
high burn out ratio, whereas in Himachal Pradesh it is due to a combination of low premium 
rates and high utilization. In Punjab, claims ratio is low, but because of the lower target 
population, the overhead expenses of the IC are higher and therefore the IC is keen to keep the 
claims ratio low. 
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 The unethical tactics of the IC are: instructing hospitals to admit only a certain number of 
patients, not providing any information on claims status, rejecting claims after months on the 
basis of minute technical issues, blocking transactions coming from the hospital such that the 
hospital cannot file claims, purposely delaying claims and then clearing long-pending claims 





MOLE. During this whole process, the flexibility and freedom given to the IC by the 
SNA is slowly reduced at every step.  
Although the SNA have limited options, they go step by step, starting first 
with low cost approaches. The SNA also understands that there are only a limited 
number of ICs with whom they can work, and therefore they use threats more often, 
gradually increasing pressure on the IC, with an understanding that they cannot take 
the extreme step in all cases.   
5.2.2.2 Governance Tools used for Prevention and Management of 
Opportunisms 
 
Table 5.17 presents the various governance tools used by stakeholders with 
each other in the context of the RSBY scheme, providing a broad overview of the 
different tools used in the scheme and not specifically by one partner, and therefore 




































Table 5.17 Use of Governance Tools across Study States 
 
*Each point in the table presents one incidence of use of the governance tool in a 
function. So, for example, one point liaison in Punjab implies that liaison was used as 
a governance tool in one of the functions by one of the agencies. Two would imply 
either use by two agencies in one function, or use by an agency in two different 
functions. 
 
Being a public sector scheme, contracts are designed in detail and parties in 
general are expected to adhere to the contract. As seen in Table 5.17, transactional 
governance tools dominate in usage as they comprise around two-thirds of all 
governance tools used. Among transactional tools the most commonly used are 
monitoring and verbal/written complaints.  
Among all types of governance tools, authority is the most commonly used 
governance tool (around 32%) while trust is the least used (1.3%). The lower use of 





TRANSACTIONAL TOOLS  
Referring to contract  1 1  2 (2.6) 
Authority - Threats  2 2  4 (5.3) 
Authority - Formal Approvals  2 1  3 (4) 
Formal Communication  2 2 1 5 (6.6) 
Monitoring 3 3 2 8 (10.6) 
Verbal complaints  3 5 1 9 (12) 
Written complaint 3 3 2 8 (10.6) 
Penalty 2   2 (2.6) 
Sub Total  18 (56.2) 17 (60.71) 6 (40) 41 (54.6) 
RELATIONAL TOOLS  
Non-response/ignoring the issue 1 1 1 3 (4) 
Participatory decision making 2 1 1 4(5.3) 
 
Discussions  3 3 1 7(9.3) 
Follow up/Reminding  3 3 2 8(10.6) 
Approaching Higher Authorities   1 1 2(2.6) 
Low autonomy  3 1 1 5 (6.6) 
Liaison 2 1 1 4(5.3) 
Trust    1 1(1.3) 
Sub Total  14 (43.8) 11 (39.2) 9 (60) 34(45.33) 





trust is as per the expectation of iInterimistic relational exchange relationship (Lambe 
et al., 2000). Among the relational governance tools used, reducing autonomy and 
coordination (participatory decision making and discussion) are used more often than 
other tools. Liaison includes all other approaches such as flexibility and solidarity, 
and therefore this has been created as a special category. 
Among the states, transactional governance tools dominate in Punjab (around 
60.71%) and Uttar Pradesh (56.2%), while in Himachal Pradesh the use of relational 
approaches dominates (60%). In Uttar Pradesh, both higher level transactional and 
higher level relational tools are used extensively. For example, transactional tools 
such as penalty are used only in Uttar Pradesh and not in other states. Similarly, 
higher relational tools, such as reducing autonomy and liaison, are also used more 
extensively in Uttar Pradesh than in other states. This probably suggests that two 
different agencies are using different categories of governance tools: one extensively 
using transactional tools and the other extensively using relational tools. This is 
explained in detail in the next section.  
 
5.3 Discussion: Answering the Research Questions 
 
In this section, based on the individual and cross-case analysis presented in 
previous sections, discussion is organized to answer five sub-questions generated in 
Chapter Two.   
5.3.1 What Factors Drive Choice of Governance Tool? 
 
A host of factors have been found to influence the choice of governance tool. 
In the following paragraphs, these factors are described and then an example is given 







5.3.1.1 Cost of Using a Governance Tool 
 
The key factor driving the choice of governance tool is the cost of using the 
governance tool, which is calculated as follows: 
Cost of using governance tool = (effectiveness in addressing the problem − 
effect on relationship − cost of implementation). 
The cost is calculated as the expected effect of the governance approach on 
the situation, taking into account the relationship and efforts required to implement 
this governance approach. The governance tool is selected based on the availability 
and increasing cost. In the case of opportunism, if one governance tool is found to be 
ineffective, parties move to another governance tool with a minimum increase in cost. 
5.3.1.2 Alternatives Available 
 
After cost, the second factor that drives the choice of governance tool is the 
availability of governance tools. In the existing scheme design, there is a limited 
number of governance tool choices. For example, in the existing system, the only 
penalty available is quitting the relationship at the end of the contract and blacklisting 
the agency. Experience suggests that the usefulness of other tools is also limited, 
given the cost involved in using them
145
. As parties could not use penalty as a tool, 
they have invented tools such as the threat of penalty, but agencies have also 
understood the limitation of this tool
146
. The lack of transactional tool choices has 
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 The officer of the SNA says that ―I am telling you one practical thing, nobody does it; 
(nobody blacklists an IC) it is an option which is just there. You move the file from here to the 
upper level; still it will not be blacklisted. Reference of the clause is given because at least 
there will be some improvement, so that there may happen some improvement, but they at 
their level also will only make that much improvement where they feel that there would not be 
any problem to them or there will be not any danger to their job‖ (interview with officer of the 
SNA (UP8), Uttar Pradesh). 
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 As the parties realize their limitations and the cost of using extreme transactional steps, 
they try to make best use of them by issuing threats more often than required. For example, in 
the case of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, the SNA frequently threatens ICs with blacklisting 
them, although in reality they are aware that this is difficult and impractical. Private sector 
agencies are also aware of it and therefore they respond accordingly, making only limited 





considerably limited the scope of using transactional governance
147
 in the scheme 
management.   
5.3.1.3 Past Experience 
 
In addition to cost and other alternatives, whether a governance tool was used 
in the past influences whether it is chosen again. Previous studies suggest that 
contract management is not a consequence of the contract design and certain 
characteristics of managers are associated with the use of a relational approach 
(Esteve et al., 2012). Previous experience with a governance tool is associated with 
its higher use in public sector managers (Bryson, Crosby and Stone, 2006; Ansell and 
Gash, 2008). Some governance tools have become popular among the ICs, as they 
share the experience of managing similar issues. For example, using formal 
communication and formalizing authority by asking for a written instruction are two 
of the most common tools used by private sector agencies to prevent opportunism by 
the public sector, especially with other members.   
 
5.3.1.4 Relationship Factors  
 
At a given cost, among the alternatives available, the choice of governance 
tool depends upon the relationship factors. Autonomy, hierarchical authority over the 
other agency and availability of information facilitates the choice of a transactional 
approach by an agency, while the incentive to perform, dependence on another 
agency and lack of options to address problems facilitates the choice of a relational 
governance approach.   
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 One of the officers of the SNA said ―Some complaints may be serious and that may require 
termination of the contracts and some complaint may be frivolous that can be ignored also but 
in between this…. some complaints may not be that much serious but it is also not frivolous, 
and it needs to be attended and (therefore). ..IC should be penalized somewhere but because of 
lack of that moderate penalty we could not take action on the insurance company‖ (interview 





5.3.1.4.1 Choice of Transactional Governance over Relational Governance   
 
The governance approach used by the SNA in the three states clearly 
demonstrates the roles played by autonomy, hierarchical authority over the other 
agency and availability of information in the choice of a transactional approach. The 
following paragraphs compare how these three factors drive variations in the 
governance approach used by the SNA.  
The SNA in Punjab enjoys a considerably autonomous position and strong 
control over other agencies as a result of its hierarchical authority over both the IC 
and district administration.  Therefore, the SNA in Punjab is able to use its authority 
to enforce decisions. They have also developed a field level monitoring network that 
provides them with on-site real information, which is an important prerequisite for the 
judicious use of a transactional approach. The SNA in Uttar Pradesh is autonomous, 
has a strong informational network due to having field level staff, and has control 
over the IC, however it does not have direct authority over district administration. 
Therefore, the SNA in Uttar Pradesh uses a control-based approach towards the IC, 
but not towards district administration.  
The SNA in Himachal Pradesh has the least autonomy as the state 
government micromanages the scheme, and even routine decisions such as deciding 
on scheme targets are made by the state government. In practice, the SNA in 
Himachal Pradesh has direct control over neither the district administration nor over 
the IC. Additionally, the SNA in Himachal Pradesh has limited access to information 
from the field. Therefore, the SNA in Himachal Pradesh does not use a strong 
transactional approach with either of the agencies (the IC and district administration).  
5.3.1.4.2 Choice of Relational Governance Approach over Transactional 
Governance Approach 
 
Incentives to perform, dependence on another agency and lack of options to 





clearly reflected in the variations in governance approach used by district 
administration and the IC. Dependence has also been highlighted as an important 
driver of a relational governance by Lamothe and Lamothe (2012; 2011). 
Dependence on another agency is a critical factor in choosing a relational 
approach. Parties cooperate and use a relational approach if there is some 
dependence. If the agency is not dependent, then they tend to dominate and behave 
transactionally. In the RSBY scheme, public sector agencies are not dependent on the 
private sector and, therefore, they tend to behave opportunistically. Similarly, when 
the private sector is not dependent on the public sector, they also behave 
opportunistically
148
.   
The level of dependence determines the extent of the relational approach 
used. The agency which is completely dependent, with limited other options, behaves 
relationally to the point of a reduction in autonomy-incurring losses in order to 
preserve the relationship. They collaborate in administrative activities and express 
flexibility and solidarity solely for the purpose of gaining support. Therefore, they use 
relational activities extensively. However, trust does not develop between them.  
In the case of Uttar Pradesh, the IC does not have the option to address their 
grievances should there be any dispute with either district administration or the SNA, 
therefore the IC has no choice other than a reduction in autonomy (relational 
approach) or quitting the relationship. In the case of Punjab, however, the IC can 
approach the SNA if they have any grievances with the DMC. Therefore, in their 
relationship with DMC, they use a relational approach, but only up to a certain extent, 
and later use a transactional approach. In the case of Himachal Pradesh, the IC is not 
dependent on the public agency, and therefore they use a completely transactional 
approach up to the point that they do not even honor relational norms of conduct.   
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 As seen in the case of Himachal Pradesh where the IC is not dependent on the SNA and 





The incentive to perform also plays a critical role in the choice of governance 
tool. If there is an incentive to perform, then even public agencies, which are not 
dependent on the private sector, also use relational approaches. In some of the 
districts in Punjab, where district administration is motivated to perform, the agencies 
are found to use more relational approaches than in other districts. Similarly, in 
Himachal Pradesh, there is considerable pressure from the state government on 
district administration to perform and, therefore, district administration in Himachal 
Pradesh uses a relational approach, providing many levels of support. In Uttar 
Pradesh, district administration is not under the direct control of any agency, and 
there is little pressure on district administration to perform, therefore district 
administration, in many places, uses an opportunistic transactional approach.  
5.3.2 Mixing of Governance Approach  
 
Governance tools are selected based on the increasing cost. In the case of 
opportunism, if one governance tool is found to be ineffective, parties move to 
another governance tool with minimum increase in cost. This next tool could be 
either from a transactional or a relational category. A low-cost transactional approach 
is used after a relational approach has failed to address the issue. For example, in both 
states of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, the ICs continue to ignore pressure (relational) 
from district administration regarding hospital empanelment until the pressure is 
indirect. However, when the pressure becomes direct and starts to impact the scheme 
implementation, the ICs can no longer ignore it, and at this point the ICs explain to 
district administration why they cannot empanel a particular hospital (relational 
approach). If the information and explanation does not work, the ICs move to a low-
cost transactional approach that is formalizing authority (asking for a written request 
by district administration for empanelling a hospital). If, however, the pressure 
continues in Uttar Pradesh, the IC capitulates and accepts some of the demands of 





As governance tools are selected in terms of increasing cost, movement from 
a relational to a transactional approach is smooth, as the difference between the 
impacts of two successive governance tools on a relationship is minor, even in the 
transition from a relational to a transactional approach. Parties do not use governance 
tools in succession if there is a considerable difference in their impacts on the 
relationship, even if the tools belong to the same category.   
5.3.3 How Parties Combine Governance Tools to Control Opportunism 
 
Appendix 5.3 provides a list of all opportunistic behaviors and comparative 
steps taken in each case to manage these opportunistic behaviors. The following 
paragraphs summarize the trends observed in mixing governance approaches in 
managing opportunistic behaviors.  
As discussed earlier, agencies use relational activities and transactional 
activities based on cost, previous experience in using the activity and availability in a 
given situation. Agencies freely mix relational and transactional approaches and 
certain factors favor the use of a transactional approach over a relational approach. 
Factors such as control over another agency, support from higher authorities and the 
availability of information favor the use of a transactional approach, while 
dependence on another party and ambiguity favors the use of a relational approach 
over a transactional approach.   
In the beginning of the relationship, partners collaborate as they are unclear 
as to their position, their vulnerability and the support they will need from the other 
partner. As this information is unclear, partners maintain the relationship in order to 
achieve the favorable response, however as dynamics become clearer, agencies' 
behavior is driven more by calculation and incentives rather than by the relationship.   
In all cases, parties generally begin with a relational approach or a low-cost 





The public sector favors a transactional approach as they consider the private sector 
to be transitory, while as the private sector agencies are new in the district and 
considerably dependent on the public sector, they therefore prefer a relational 
approach. The contract provides a very limited number of tools and, therefore, 
agencies generally move step by step and use the available tools in a calibrated 
manner. This calibrated approach mixes relational and transactional approaches in a 
synergistic way.  
Private agencies use predominantly a relational approach, attempting to avoid 
confrontation and to maintain cordial relationships, as they are in the district for only 
a very short time and are dependent on the public agencies for their work to be 
carried out. At every stage, private agencies choose a governance tool that does not 
impact their liaison with other agencies. They approach higher agencies only if they 
believe that the higher authorities will be able to address the problem. If they foresee 
only limited support from the higher authorities, they capitulate to the demands of the 
public agencies, even if those demands are not included in the contract. However, if 
they have a close relationship and the strong support of the higher authorities, they do 
not buckle under the pressure as seen in Punjab. In fact, if the private agencies have a 
very close relationship with the higher authorities, they even ignore justified requests 
of other authorities, thereby behaving opportunistically as seen in Himachal Pradesh. 
The relational and transactional tools are used both as supplement and as 
complement. In Punjab, there is considerable synergy in the mixing of governance 
tools. The SNA uses flexibility, solidarity and professional trust, and mixes these well 
with monitoring, discussion and instructions. There is also a supplementary 
relationship as the reduction in relational activities is supplemented by an increase in 
the use of transactional approaches. In Punjab, a reduction in flexibility, when 
complemented with increased monitoring and reference to the contract, produces a 
synergistic effect in controlling opportunism and the SNA has been able to manage 





Using a lone governance approach leads to a poor outcome. In Uttar Pradesh, 
the approach of the SNA has been predominantly transactional and they are unable to 
provide the required support to private agencies due to their limited control on district 
administration. This use of a transactional approach, without a relational approach to 
support and flexibility, has led to escalation of conflicts and the inability to contain 
the opportunism of agencies. Instances such as multiple audits, blacklisting of 
agencies, hospitals approaching the ministry of labor and intervention by the ministry 
of labor suggests ineffective governance dynamics. This suggests that some relational 
governance is required for the effective use of a transactional approach. The case of 
Uttar Pradesh highlights that a transactional approach alone is not sufficient to 
contain opportunism, while the case of Himachal Pradesh suggests that a lone 
relational approach is also not sufficient to contain opportunism. The SNA in 
Himachal Pradesh, due to limited support from the state government, is not able to 
use a transactional approach and, therefore, uses predominantly relational approaches 
and other pressurizing techniques but is not effective in containing opportunism by 
the IC.  
Agencies prefer to use basic transactional approaches for preventative 
purposes. Agencies reduce flexibility and trust, increase monitoring and use formal 
approaches such as official instructions and letters to induce the other agency to 
reduce opportunism. A similar approach has been observed by Van Slyke, (2007) 
where public managers reduce flexibility and trust and increase monitoring. If 
managers themselves cannot use the formal approach, they highlight opportunistic 
behaviors by the other agency to the third party, which can control the aggrieving 
agency. However, contrary to Van Slyke, (2007), in the RSBY scheme we find that 
agencies always use some minimal basic transactional tools such as cross checking or 
monitoring, even if there is a strong relational approach as seen in the case of 





tie as parties do not have any interpersonal trust beyond professional trust, as found in 
interimistic exchanges.   
Agencies generally avoid extreme steps such as penalty, not only because it is 
cumbersome to use this tool as some suggest (Girth, 2011), but also because of the 
consequences of the use of penalty on the relationship. In the case of the RSBY 
scheme, agencies understand that there are only a limited number of stakeholders 
with whom they can work, and therefore they avoid using extreme steps. As a result 
of the limited tools available to punish/penalize, they use threat more often. 
Therefore, agencies gradually increase pressure on the aggrieving agency, knowing 
their own limitation and the limitations of governance tools.   
        
5.3.4 How Governance Mechanisms Interact in the Context of 
Opportunism 
 
Two distinct phenomena characterize the interaction of transactional and 
relational governance mechanisms in the context of opportunism, as observed in the 
case of the RSBY scheme. First is observation of dual governance, where agencies 
use different governance approaches with one other. The second important 
observation is that a complementary, as well as a supplementary, relationship exists 
between the two governance approaches in the case of the RSBY scheme.  
5.3.4.1 Dual Governance 
 
As discussed earlier, the scheme has been designed in a transactional manner 
with great contract specificity and extensive detail in all areas, including in the area of 
conflict resolution. In case of a dispute, parties are expected to solve the dispute 
through discussion and arbitration rather than penalty. This approach to solving 
disputes has changed the overall scheme compliance mechanism, as parties are aware 
that a dispute has to be resolved through discussion and, therefore, parties use 





In the existing scheme, for solving any issue/dispute/conflict, parties are 
expected to approach the grievance redressal committee. However, in many states, 
including the studied states, the redressal system is not functioning properly, 
grievance committee meetings are not held regularly, and accessing the committee 
incurs costs in terms of time and opportunity. In the absence of any pre-identified 
courses of action listed in the contract, which an agency can take in inter-agency 
disputes, agencies try to manage the issue themselves by using ―private order 
systems‖. In this private order system, parties use approaches which consist of using 
strategies at the interpersonal level.  These strategies consist of a mix of relational and 
transactional governance tools.   
During the period of the contract, changing the terms of the contract is not 
possible, as for a period of one year both parties are locked into the relationship. 
Therefore, there is very little that one party can do to police other parties. As a result, 
parties which have a high power position exploit their position, while parties which 
are dependent on others have to prevent and manage this exploitation.  
The public sector has a higher power position, which they exploit, while the 
private sector, because of their dependency and limited control over the public sector, 
predominantly uses relational activities to gain support and do their work in the short 
term. These relational activities also include massaging the egos of the public sector, 
labeled as 'cheap talk' in the institutional economics parlance (Ostrom, 1990).  
Parties are also aware that this relationship is temporary (as the contract is 
only for one year) and, therefore, they do not wish to invest time in the relationship as 
a relational approach requires considerable investment in terms of time and cost 
(Frazier, 1988; Lambe, 2000). Therefore, parties use relational strategies at a very 
superficial level, without any trust, which is the core of a relational strategy. These 
collaborative/relational activities could also be termed forced collaboration, as the 
private sector agencies, in many situations, do not have any choice other than using 





Therefore, if there is incentive, the agencies feign collaboration if they cannot 
truly collaborate. They know they are not truly collaborating, however they do it in 
order to make gains from activities that appear to be collaboration. This forced 
collaboration is evident from the fact that the private sector agency continues to use a 
collaborative strategy, even if the other agency (the public sector) uses a transactional 
approach, and even exploits private sector agency . This is especially true in the case 
of the public agencies on which the private sector has little control (e.g. district 
administration and the SNA in Uttar Pradesh and the SNA in Punjab). 
This has led to the development of a new approach to governance, which can 
be termed dual governance. Dual governance is a governance approach in which an 
agency uses a particular governance approach towards another agency, irrespective of 
the governance approach used by the other agency. As neither agency takes into 
account the governance approach used by the other agency, they never reach 
equilibrium in terms of the governance approach used, and this has led to dual 
governance between agencies. Dual governance was observed in the case of the 
relationship context in the RSBY scheme, specifically between public (the SNA and 
district administration) and private sector agencies (ICs and the TPA). ICs generally 
use a predominantly relational approach towards the SNA/district administration, 
while the SNA/district administration uses a predominantly transactional approach 
towards the ICs/TPA. This dual governance approach, however, is not observed in the 
case of the public–public sector or of the private–private sector.  
A review of literature suggests that the choice of governance approach used 
by parties in a relationship is the outcome of the interaction of governance approaches 
used by each other over a period of time. A party responds to the other party's 
behavior and modifies its own behavior, and over a period of time the parties 
approach an equilibrium where both parties use a similar governance approach, which 





approach emerges as parties respond in a tit-for-tat manner
149
. In the RSBY scheme 
context, however, the parties do not modify their behavior and continue with the same 
governance approach, irrespective of what the other party does. This is because the 
governance approach used is a dominant strategy (from a game theoretic perspective) 
for the party. Due to the short term nature of the relationship, agencies use a relational 
approach as a strategy for reaching goals, contrary to the common finding, where the 
relationship is the outcome of common goals and activities. Existing literature does 
not cover this dual approach to governance, although the literature has identified a 
dual identity where the collaborator maintains two distinct identities: one 
organizational, which is based on self-interest, and the other collaborative, which is 
based on the collective interests for achieving the goals of collaboration (Bielefeld et 
al., 2010).   
Table 5.18 presents the overall governance approach found in each of the 
relationship dyads observed in the scheme.  
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 Reciprocity is one foundational component of the relationship between agencies as it 
emerges from the work of Axelrod, (1984; 1997); Ring and Van De Van, (1994); Ostrom, 
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Table 5.19 Governance Approach between categories of Stakeholders 
 
Category of Relationship 
Dyad  
Predominant Governance Approach used  
Private to public  Mostly Relational 
Private to private  Predominantly Transactional 
Public to private  Transactional  
Public to public  Transactional (except problems) 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.19, the public sector (the SNA and district administration), 
in order to address opportunism of the private sector (the ICs, TPA and smart card service 
provider) predominantly uses a transactional approach. When private agencies (ICs and 
their allies) attempt to address opportunistic behaviors of the public agencies (the 
SNA/district administration), they use a relational approach. The relationship between 
public agencies is overall a transactional relationship, except for during problems when 
they express solidarity with each other, rather than using punitive actions. The private 
sector also uses a predominantly transactional approach with the private sector. 
5.3.4.2 Relational Activity and Trust 
 
In the case of the RSBY scheme, private sector agencies, as discussed in the 
previous section, are generally found to use relational activities to get the work done, 
even if the public sector agencies use a transactional approach and behave 
opportunistically, as a result of their dependence. As the level of trust lowers between the 
agencies and the risk of opportunism increases, private sector agencies use more 
relational activities to prevent opportunism, leading to the unique phenomenon of high 
relational activity use associated with a lower level of trust. 
Due to the short term of the contract, the development of trust and relational 
norms are stunted (Lambe, 2000) and, therefore, agencies use relational activities to 





relationship strength. In fact, a higher use of relational activities is associated with a 
lower relational strength. Therefore, this could be termed a situation of forced 
collaboration as the private sector agency is forced to collaborate in the absence of any 
other option.    
Specifically, in the relationship between the public and private sectors, generally 
lower relationship strength was found to be associated with the higher utilization of 
relational approaches. In the studied districts, the highest level of relational activity is 
used in Uttar Pradesh; however Uttar Pradesh has the lowest level of trust among 
stakeholders, while Punjab and Himachal Pradesh have higher levels of trust among 
agencies but a low level of relational activities. 
Therefore, the relationship approach used in a dyad can be disaggregated into 
two dimensions: relationship strength (based on trust), and relational activities. 
Relationship strength is measured to indicate the inner core of the relationship, while the 
use of relational activities indicates the extent to which the activities included in 
relational governance are used. As observed in the case of the RSBY scheme, a higher 
use of relational activities is not necessarily associated with a higher relationship 
strength, as most of the studies on relational governance assume. 
5.3.4.3 Relationship between Transactional and Relational Governance 
 
In the case of the RSBY scheme, the relationship between relational approaches 
varies in ways which are sometimes complementary and sometimes supplementary, but 
never completely complementary or completely supplementary.  
A case of a complementary relationship was observed in the use of a relational 
approach by public sector agencies. In public sector agencies, it was found that, only 
when the agencies had some control over the other party, they used relational approaches 





reason the SNA in Punjab uses a relational approach with the IC as well as the DMC. The 
SNA in Punjab use a relational approach to some extent with the IC, as they can control 
the IC as a result of their informational network. They also use a relational approach with 
the DMC as they can control the DMC by threatening them on the issue of secretary 
health. In Himachal Pradesh, the SNA has very limited control over any other agency, 
and therefore they have changed to a completely transactional approach where their main 
role is monitoring.    
A case of supplementary relationship was also observed between relational and 
transactional governance approaches. In all three states, it was observed that partners 
increased monitoring and relational activities, with a reduction in credibility and trust. In 
Himachal Pradesh there was a considerable level of professional trust and credibility 
among partners (except for hospitals) and, therefore, their use of monitoring and 
relational activities was very limited. Apart from a lower level of monitoring, they also 
used limited relational activities. As trust and credibility reduces, the risk of opportunism 
increases and, therefore, partners use relational activities to prevent opportunism, 
however at the same time they also increase monitoring to detect opportunism. Therefore, 
in the states with lower levels of trust and credibility, the use of monitoring and relational 
activities was found to be higher, as observed in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh. This suggests 
a substitution relationship between monitoring and trust in the RSBY scheme context.   
As discussed above, the governance approaches served as both complementary 
and supplementary, however it was observed that they neither complemented nor 
substituted completely. In this case, when they complemented or supplemented, they did 
so only to a certain extent. This is probably due to the fact that they work from different 
mechanisms, even when they are used for the same purpose. 
As these governance mechanisms could be used in various ways, ICs use 





incentives, ICs use relational approaches even when it is humiliating (as observed in 
Uttar Pradesh), however they convert to transactional approaches as soon as their 
dependence is reduced. This can even go to the extent of behaving  opportunistically-  not  
honoring social norms when their dependence is low.  
5.3.5 Link between Inter-Organizational Governance and Opportunism 
 
The link between governance dynamics and opportunism is explained at two 
levels: dyadic level and state level. The relationship between opportunism and 
governance dynamics at the network level has been explored using a quantitative 
approach in Chapter 6. The relationship between governance dynamics and opportunism 
is presented first at dyadic level, and then at state level.   
5.3.5.1 Governance Dynamics and Opportunism at Dyadic Level 
 
Depending upon the nature of opportunism, the aggrieved agency selects a 
prevention method, an initial approach and a later approach. This was observed in all 
opportunisms despite the considerable differences in the opportunistic behaviors, their 
incidence and the relationship contexts in which these opportunistic behaviors were 
observed.  
At each step of governance management, the aggrieved agency uses either a 
relational tool  or a transactional tool, depending on the availability of the tool, the cost of 
the tool, the importance of the relationship with the aggrieved agency, and whether any 
alternative options are available.  
In the case of the SNA, its status and the amount of control it can exercise over 
other key stakeholders determines the governance approach used by the SNA, as shown 







Table 5.20 Governance Approach used by Stakeholders across states 
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The SNA in Punjab judiciously mixes relational and transactional (authority) 
tools to manage the relationship with both the DMC and the IC, as per the need of the 
context. The SNA in Punjab enjoys a considerably powerful position and strong control 
over other agencies, due to its hierarchical authority over the IC and district 
administration. The SNA in Punjab has an in-depth monitoring network which provides 
them with on-site real information for tracking stakeholders and their activities, which is 
an important prerequisite for the judicious use of a transactional approach. Due to this, 
the SNA is able to use a 'carrot and stick' approach and a corporate approach for 
governing the scheme. Therefore, the SNA in Punjab uses its authority to enforce 
decisions and foster collaboration, and is better placed to resolve and mediate issues 





credibility of threats from the SNA in Punjab is much higher and, as a result, other 
agencies comply with the authority of the SNA.  
As shown in the second column of the first row in Table 5.20, the SNA in Uttar 
Pradesh uses a hierarchical approach towards the IC; however, given their limited direct 
authoritative control over district administration, their approach towards district 
administration is more collaboration-oriented, based on persuasion. The SNA in Uttar 
Pradesh wields high powers, as it is an autonomous agency which experiences limited 
interference from the state government. The SNA in Uttar Pradesh is also capable and 
resourceful and has control over the IC; however it does not have direct authority over 
district administration, which limits its ability to address issues at the field level and 
limits its use of control-based tools. Therefore, the SNA in Uttar Pradesh uses persuasion 
towards district administration, rather than authority, to incentivize collaboration.  
The SNA in Himachal Pradesh lacks autonomy as well as practical authority to 
enforce decisions and, therefore, their approach is mainly an ineffective hierarchical 
control over other agencies. Among all three states, the SNA in Himachal Pradesh is the 
weakest; it is understaffed, and it lacks expertise and control over other agencies. This is 
due to the fact that the state government has taken over the functions of the SNA and the 
state government micromanages the scheme, using mainly a hierarchical approach. Even 
routine decisions, such as deciding on scheme targets, are made by the state government. 
The SNA has direct control over neither the district administration nor over the IC.  
Therefore, in Himachal Pradesh, the SNA has become more a monitor of the scheme 
implementation rather than an agency that uses carrots and sticks to facilitate the 
implementation of the scheme. Therefore, the role of the SNA is limited to the 
monitoring and coordination of activities, but does not include managing the scheme, and 
therefore the SNA tries to use a procedural (hierarchical) approach to governance, 





Therefore, across the three cases, the main factor influencing the prevention and 
control of opportunism in the scheme is the relationship dynamics between the SNA and 
district administration. The use of governance tools/compliance mechanisms by district 
administration depends upon the hierarchical control to which they are subjected by 
higher authorities, and the opportunity to pursue self-interest as a result of the veto power 
they have in the scheme implementation. In those states where district administration has 
no veto power and higher authorities have direct control over them, the higher authorities 
use hierarchical power to incentivize district administration to collaborate, as seen in the 
case of Himachal Pradesh.  
In states where district administration has veto power, and if they are under the 
direct hierarchical control of higher authorities, the higher authorities have been able to 
control the opportunistic behavior of district administration to some extent, and also have 
them collaborate to some extent, as seen in the case of Punjab.    
In those states where district administration is not under the direct control of 
higher authorities, and if there is veto power available, this provides ample opportunity 
for district administration to pursue self-interest, leading to counter-opportunism by other 
agencies and rampant opportunism in the state, as seen in the case of Uttar Pradesh.  
The ICs basically respond to incentives as a profit-oriented company and use 
mainly incentives or a collaborative approach.  In the case of the TPA, the approach of 
ICs is mainly performance-oriented, based on incentives, while in the case of public 
agencies the ICs mainly use collaboration as they are dependent on them, and they even 
feign collaboration, as discussed earlier.  
Therefore, the dynamics of governance approach observed in a particular case 
depends upon the dynamics of governance between the SNA and district administration. 
The role of ICs and their associates (the TPA and smart card service provider) is limited 





5.3.5.1.1 Initial Trust and Interplay of Compliance Mechanisms 
 
Does initial trust lead to the interplay of compliance mechanisms, producing 
positive outcomes? In partnerships, partners collaborate, initially expecting support from 
their partners in case of need, as they are not clear about their position; however as the 
parties settle into the relationship and as initial ambiguities become clear, calculations 
dominate. This is clearly visible in the case of Himachal Pradesh. In Himachal Pradesh, 
the same IC and the same SNA has been there for the last four years and, therefore, the 
evolution of their relationship is a good case to examine. In Himachal Pradesh, during the 
first year of the scheme implementation, the IC and the SNA shared a good relationship. 
The IC was new and so they were quite dependent on the SNA, and the SNA supported 
and coached them. The IC officers were active and visited the field and participated in the 
project activities. However, as the IC gained experience, their dependence on the SNA 
decreased. Simultaneously, the IC's rapport with high level public officials grew. With 
decreasing dependence on the SNA, and increasing support from higher officials, the IC 
began to realize that they could manage without following the suggestions of the SNA, 
and therefore they started ignoring the SNA's suggestions, which increased costs (not 
necessarily monetary ) for the IC.   
An IC officer commented, ―I have liaison with the TOP bosses (health secretary 
and minister). We do not even ask the CEO of RSBY, for everything we have not made 
this habit.‖ This has resulted in a situation in which the IC does not consider the 
suggestions and demands of the SNA, even if they are legitimate. An officer of the IC 
says, ―Basically if they (SNA) ask to do something, we just listen but we just do what we 
want.‖ 
As the SNA learned about this, they first reduced all informal and relationship 





to use a more formal approach (authority) for managing this relationship. This approach 
included publicly highlighting the shortcomings of the IC in various forums, and 
intensely monitoring the activities of the IC. The SNA changed their approach towards 
their relationship with the IC from the role of facilitator to the role of monitor.  
Therefore, initial good behavior did not continue for long, as the parties became 
clear about their incentives and calculations, suggesting that initial trust may not 
necessarily lead to the interplay of governance mechanisms that produce positive 
outcomes. 
5.3.6 Variation in Governance Dynamics : Network Level Analysis  
 
An analysis of the relationship between the implementation structure and 
compliance mechanisms with performance, in terms of opportunism control, revealed 
interesting patterns. The three networks differed in terms of their structure. In the case of 
enrollment, all agencies had the same common interest, being to enroll the beneficiaries, 
and therefore the agencies had an incentive to collaborate. In the case of hospital 
empanelment, a conflict of interest was found between the ICs and district administration. 
In the case of claims management, the conflict of interest between agencies was much 
higher than in other networks.  
In the case of enrollment, as all agencies had a common interest, most of the 
variations in performance can be explained by other factors. Collaboration among 
agencies drives performance. To initiate collaboration, Himachal Pradesh used authority 
to pressurize district administration to collaborate with other agencies. On the other hand, 
Punjab used all three mechanisms: hierarchy, incentive and authority. In the case of Uttar 
Pradesh, however, there was intensive monitoring of field activity, and their inability to 
hierarchically control district administration was responsible for a poor level of support 





of opportunistic behavior in the enrollment process was reported during the data 
collection, while in Punjab, few incidents of opportunism were reported. In the case of 
Uttar Pradesh, several incidents of opportunistic behaviors were reported. In Himachal 
Pradesh, the state government and district administration had very strong control over the 
FKOs, which played a critical role in keeping opportunisms low, while for the same 
reason opportunism was found to be high in the case of Uttar Pradesh.  
 
Network  Implementation approach 
Collaboration  Collaboration +  
Authority  
Collaboration + 
Authority + Incentive  
Enrollment  Uttar Pradesh  
(Low-moderate 
performance) 
Himachal Pradesh  







Uttar Pradesh  
(Low performance) 
 








Claims Management   Himachal Pradesh  
(Low to moderate) 
 
Uttar Pradesh  
(Low performance)  
 
   Punjab  





Table 5.21 Implementation Management and Performance 
5.3.7 Variation in Governance Dynamics: State Level Analysis  
 
All three states differ in their overall IORs approach, their composition of IORs 
and the resulting opportunism. In Himachal Pradesh, the overall IORs can be 
characterized as a mix of hierarchical and collaborative. Members are expected to follow 
the procedural rules, while higher authorities actively manage the scheme, including 
routine decisions and the setting of targets. Agencies try to adhere to the contract and 






Figure 5.17 Governance Dynamics in study states 
management. The stakeholders do have a level of professional trust between them, and do 
not expect to receive favors. In general, there is a high level of compliance with rules and 
procedures, trust at a professional level, limited use of relational activities, and limited 
opportunism (for more details, refer to Appendix 5.5, for general governance dynamics in 
Himachal). The veto points available to the district level authorities are limited and, 
therefore, district authorities have limited opportunity to behave opportunistically. Higher 
authorities are able to foster collaboration as a result of their authority. 
 
As shown in Fig 5.17, in the case of Punjab, overall governance can be 
characterized as a mix of all three types: hierarchy, incentive or market, and 
collaboration. The SNA, as a corporatized department, has considerable flexibility and 
authority in the governance of the scheme. Higher authorities actively manage the 
scheme in a planned and goal-bound approach. The SNA has hierarchical authority and 





between agencies is moderate to low, as the relationship is based on performance. Private 
agencies use relational activities to gain the support of public agencies; however public 
agencies, especially district administration, continues to behave opportunistically. 
Authorities at the SNA level actively monitor and support the high performing 
stakeholders and actively control opportunistic behaviors of the public sector 
stakeholders. When required, higher authorities actively provide support, flexibility and 
transparency in management, earning the trust of all agencies. The level of opportunism 
is lower and mainly concentrated in hospital claims by private hospitals (for more details 
refer to Appendix 5.6, general governance dynamics in Punjab). 
In Uttar Pradesh, the overall governance can be characterized as a mix of 
dysfunctional hierarchy, incentive and market. Agencies use the governance tools that are 
in contrast to the requirements of the structure. In the implementation structure, district 
administration were given veto points in almost all activities. This, coupled with the 
inability by the SNA to control district administration, provided ample opportunity for 
district administration to behave opportunistically. Therefore, there was a need for the 
SNA to control district administration hierarchically, however they were not able to do 
so. As they could not control district administration, the SNA could foresee the problems 
the IC would encounter due to this inability. This suggests that the SNA needed to 
collaborate with the IC to offer them support however, to the contrary, their approach 
towards the IC was authoritarian. Rampant opportunism by district administration led to a 
vicious cycle of opportunism and counter-opportunism by agencies. The ICs, lacking 
support from the SNAs, responded to opportunism of district administration by counter-
opportunism.  The governance system became dysfunctional. Very low relationship 
strength was observed between the agencies as a result of the deep distrust between them. 





forced to use extensive relational activities
150
. The SNA used a collaborative approach 
towards district administration rather than authority/control and, therefore, were unable to 
control the opportunistic behavior of district administration. Contrastingly, the SNA used 
hierarchy and control with the private sector agencies that required their support and 
collaboration. Therefore, there are very low levels of relational strength among agencies, 
feigning of collaboration and extensive opportunism (for more details refer to Appendix 
5.7, general governance dynamics in Uttar Pradesh). 
 
Table 5.22 Determinants of Governance Dynamics 
 
  
















Hierarchy + Incentive + 
Collaboration) 
Himachal Pradesh 
(Hierarchy + Collaboration) 
 
5.4 Summary, Conclusion and Emerging Themes 
 
In the RSBY scheme, contracts are designed in a transactional manner, with a 
very detailed contract including the activities and responsibilities of the various parties, 
however the management approach encouraged is collaboration rather than using 
incentives or hierarchy. The scheme's management philosophy is ―either you are with us 
or you are not with us‖151. That is, organizations work with one other, but if a partner 
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 In Uttar Pradesh, the IC has lower power position and is dependent on both the agencies, and 
therefore has to use extensive relational approaches with them, even though they use a 




 Interview with Mr. Anil Swarup, director general (labor and welfare), ministry of labor and 





behaves opportunistically then the partner is not included in any future collaborative 
activities. In view of this philosophy, penalty clauses are not included in the scheme 
design. The central governing body of the scheme has purposely cultivated this 
philosophy of no penalty during the period of the relationship. The only penalty included 
for opportunistic behavior is severing the relationship and engaging in no future trade. 
The central body has blacklisted a number of ICs and TPAs for behaving 
opportunistically. Disputes between the agencies are resolved through an internal 
grievance redressal system rather than relying on the courts. A number of opportunities 
are provided in the scheme to share information and concerns, and to resolve issues 
through discussion. Therefore, although the contracts in the scheme are designed in a 
transactional manner, the operational mode of governance is a mix of incentives, 
hierarchy and collaboration, although collaboration dominates as an operational mode of 
governance. As found in other studies in public contracting (Van Slyke, 2007), in the 
RSBY scheme we also find that agencies have adopted a mixed compliance mechanism 
(or governance approach as compliance mechanism is part of the governance approach), 
although collaboration dominated as the mode of IORs in the scheme. 
 
Evolution of IOR  
The comparative case analysis presented above illuminates the process of the 
evolution of IOR dynamics, its influence on performance at both micro and macro level, 
and the factors that have led to the creation of appropriate IORs. The process of evolution 
of IOR dynamics in a given context includes: governance tools used by the stakeholders 
at different stages of the scheme implementation, the factors driving the choice of these 
governance tools, and the interaction between these governance tools, leading to the 





At the beginning of the relationship, partners collaborate initially as they are not 
clear about their position, their vulnerability and the support they require from the other 
partner. However, as soon as they become clear on these issues, their behavior is driven 
more by calculation and incentives rather than by the relationship. Agencies use 
governance tools in an increasing cost format, from low cost through to high cost. At any 
given point, the choice between governance tools (either a relational or transactional 
approach) depends upon additional factors such as the tool's availability, past experience 
in using that particular tool, and relational dynamics. 
 
Choice of Governance Approach  
The choice of governance approach in a given context depends upon a number of 
factors. Generally, stakeholders prefer to use a transactional approach given its 
predictability. In situations where an agency has required information about the situation, 
as well as the capacity to bear the consequences of using a transactional approach, they 
prefer to use a transactional approach. With more information, power and authority, 
agencies are able to identify, measure and address the issue, and use transactional tools as 
they are more predictable and deliver faster results.  
Dependency on another agency limits the use of formal means (transactional 
approach) to ensure compliance, as the use of formal means is either unfeasible in the 
given context or leads to undesirable results. Therefore, in the case of dependency, 
agencies prefer to use a relational approach.  
For managing opportunism, the aggrieved agency selects a prevention method, an 
initial approach and a later approach, depending on the nature of the opportunism. At 
each step of opportunism management, the aggrieved agency chooses either a relational 
approach or a transactional tool, depending on factors other than the characteristics of the 





Aamirkhanyan, (2009) and others suggest that public managers use relational approaches, 
even though the contract is designed in a transactional manner, as they expect that the use 
of a relational approach is more effective and overcomes some of the inflexibility in 
public sector contracts. Similarly, in this case, the choice of governance approach 
depended on its cost-effectiveness, and not only on the relationship shared between the 
agencies.  
The choice of appropriate governance approach depended on the incentive for 
stakeholders to perform. When there was no incentive to perform, agencies preferred to 
use a least-cost governance approach. Neither the relationship between the agencies, nor 
the type of opportunism, was the driving factor for the choice of governance approach. 
When there was an incentive, a governance approach was used, even if the existing 
nature of the relationship did not favor the choice of governance approach. For example, 
private sector agencies used relational activities to gain the support of government 
stakeholders, even in situations where these stakeholders behaved opportunistically. 
Private sector agencies, due to incentives and limited other options, feigned collaboration 
using relational activities even if the other agency was behaving transactionally and 
opportunistically, leading to the phenomenon of a ‗dual governance approach‘. Dual 
governance approach refers to the phenomenon in which an agency uses a particular 
governance approach towards another agency, irrespective of the governance approach 
used by the other agency. Therefore, with increasing opportunism from the public sector 
stakeholders, the private sector agencies increased the use of relational activities, leading 
to a unique situation of a higher use of relational activities associated with a lower 
relational strength. Therefore, each agency used a governance approach based on its 
incentives, irrespective of the governance approach used by the other agency.   
Collaborative activities used by the ICs, therefore, are mainly based on incentive 





and Gray, (1990) and Huxham, (2003) suggest, true collaboration is mainly relationship 
driven and is not feasible in goal-conflicting situations. In the case of the RSBY scheme, 
as the duration of the relationship is only short, the development of trust and 
collaboration is stunted. Agencies use collaborative activities when given incentives to 
so. This has two implications: First, the case of the RSBY scheme cannot be considered 
as collaboration in the true sense, as parties engage in collaborative activities for a clear 
benefit, either in the present or in the future. This could be due to the short term contract 
in the RSBY scheme, which does not allow relational approaches to flourish, as 
commonly seen in short duration relational exchanges described as interimistic relational 
exchanges by Lambe et.al. (2000). 
Second, this also implies that collaboration cannot be inferred based purely on 
the presence/use of collaborative activities and, therefore, those measures which only 
include collaborative activities for measuring collaboration can lead to incorrect results.  
Based on the two different drivers for collaboration, the strength of the relationship (a 
feature of true collaboration) and incentive to collaborate, the relationship between 
agencies can be organized into a spectrum, as shown in Fig 5.18. 
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Figure 5.18 Spectrum of Relationship in IORs 
 
 
In this spectrum, at one end are the IORs which offer no incentive to collaborate 
but where there is a strong relationship strength which drives the collaboration among 
agencies. These IORs can be considered as natural collaborative arrangements which 





On the other extreme are the IORs which do not have any relationship strength. 
Agencies in these IORs do not trust one other, however they still use collaborative 
activities as there are incentives to do so. These types of arrangements have a very low 
relationship strength, however collaborative activities are used as a result of the 
incentives. Most of the other arrangements can be organized along this spectrum, taking 
into account the degree of the presence of these two factors. 
Evolution of Governance Dynamics  
The IOR dynamics in a given context emerge from the interaction of different 
compliance mechanisms used by stakeholders with one other. Agencies generally have a 
strategy to manage an issue/problem and use different governance tools, supplementing, 
complementing and mixing them. Similar to observations in other studies (Greve et al., 
2005), a transactional approach serves as the basis on which a relational approach is built. 
Governance tools do not supplement or complement completely as they have their own 
individual effects and, depending on the intention with which they are used, they either 
complement or supplement. These findings support the observation of Woolthuis et al. 
(2005), suggesting that the relationship between compliance mechanisms changes with 
the intention in which they are used and, therefore, they can complement as well as 
supplement.   
In the context of opportunism, all three compliance mechanisms were used to 
contain opportunism. In most cases, the use of only one approach was found to be 
ineffective and the use of more than one approach was required. When agencies used a 
combination of approaches, in an increasing cost form according to the need of the 
situation, it led to a calibrated strategy to manage opportunism. In general, hierarchy and 
incentives were found to prevent blatant opportunisms, while collaboration and trust 
prevented invisible opportunisms and, therefore, when they were used in a synergistic 






Congruency of IORs   
Finally, it was observed that the appropriate compliance mechanism in each case 
differed as each case varied in terms of its implementation structure, even though the 
implementation design and capacity may be similar across the cases. To what extent the 
appropriate compliance mechanism was operationalized determined the performance of 
the scheme in these cases.   
A comparison of the three cases suggested that a variation in implementation 
structure required different compliance mechanisms. The dependency relationships 
between agencies, and veto points available to them, determined their use of compliance 
mechanisms and the resulting IOR dynamics. In a context characterized by high 
interdependence, the agencies used a collaborative approach, leading to a high level of 
collaboration.   
Correspondingly, in the context where there is a conflict of interest and veto 
points available to agencies, in addition to collaboration, hierarchical control was 
required to ensure compliance. In these contexts, motivation needs to be combined with 
accountability for results and incentives to ensure performance. Therefore, the IOR 
dynamics need to match with the inter-organizational context for higher implementation 
performance. Those states which operationalized appropriate compliance mechanisms 
performed better than those states which were not able to do so.  
In the case of Punjab, IOR dynamics (hierarchical control and monitoring) 
matched, leading to a better performance than in Uttar Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh, the 
creation of a district insurance authority gave many veto points to street level bureaucrats. 
Additionally, the state level agency could not exercise hierarchical control over district 
level authorities and, therefore, these district level bureaucrats behaved opportunistically, 





are increased, more hierarchical authority is needed. In Uttar Pradesh, at district level, 
autonomy was not complemented with accountability and, therefore, the inter-
organizational governance was unable to control opportunism of agencies.  
In Himachal Pradesh, the role of district level authorities was restricted to their 
main responsibilities, reducing their role (veto points available for the district 
administration) in those areas which could lead to a conflict of interest. This reduced the 
dependence of the IC on district level authorities. In low dependence, a hierarchical 
approach served the interests and delivered high performance.  
 
Incongruent Governance Mix and Performance  
Although collaboration is a dominant mode of governance for the scheme 
overall, different networks formed in the scheme implementation have different modes of 
governance. In the case of the enrollment network, all members have the same interest in 
increasing enrollment numbers, suggesting a pooled interdependence between agencies 
which implies a network with limited conflict (Peter, 2014). In the absence of conflict 
and veto power, the dominant mode of governance in the case of the enrollment network 
is expected to be collaboration, and other modes of governance are expected to play a 
very limited role. 
In the case of the hospitalization network, collaboration is not the dominant mode 
of governance and network members have conflicting interests. District administration 
may have different interests from the ICs and, in districts where district administration 
has veto points, the conflict is expected to be enhanced. Therefore, an appropriate 
governance mix in hospitalization function is expected to include hierarchical control. 
During the scheme implementation, a number of factors may change the 
implementation structure, and therefore a uniform compliance mechanism would lead to 





implementation performance. The context characterized by mixed implementation 
structures requires a mixed mode of compliance mechanisms.  
When the compliance mechanism is completely inappropriate, it will lead to 
incongruent governance mixes (Hill and Hupe, 2014). Incongruence leads to poor 
performance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the case of the RSBY scheme, if there 
is no hierarchical control and management is based on performance, collusions emerge 
between network members (i.e. between the TPA and hospitals, between hospitals and 
district administration, or between ICs and district administration). As there is no 
monitoring (due to the absence of hierarchical control and monitoring of performance), 
parties collude and do not comply with requirements in the contract, or they comply only 
on paper. Evidence of the dark side of collaboration is the result of incongruent mixes. 
The findings clearly suggest that a compliance mechanism (mode of compliance) 
which is congruent to implementation structure leads to higher performance. This 
suggests that, as the appropriate mode of IORs was operationalized, performance 
increased.  
All districts have a similar implementation structure, however subtle changes in 
the structure of the relationship alters the opportunities and threats that arise during the 
implementation process and, therefore, the originally conceived compliance mechanism 
may no longer be able to manage them successfully, leading to dysfunctional IORs. The 
compliance mechanism needs to be tweaked to match the changes in the structure of the 
relationship. Districts which were able to put in place the appropriate compliance 
mechanism had higher levels of performance. This provides empirical support to the 








6 CHAPTER SIX: Collaborative Governance & Network Level 
Performance  
 
This chapter addresses the second research objective of this dissertation that is 
the impact of IOR on performance.  To achieve that first the level of IORs among 
agencies implementing RSBY scheme in a district is measured, such that it can be linked 
with the performance of scheme in the next step.  
As discussed in the chapter two, among the various approaches used, 
collaboration approach has been found to be most appropriate in measuring IOR in 
network setting.  For measuring collaboration in RSBY, Thomson (2009) measure of 
collaboration is selected. Using the selected measures, data was collected and a 
confirmatory factor analysis of the both measurement and structural model was done to 
tests its validity and reliability so as to arrive at a model that best fits the sample data. 
The refined model was then used to calculate relationship strength first at the 
dyadic level and then at the level of network. Calculation of the relationship strength in 
this study serves as the foundation of quantitative analysis linking IOR with 
implementation performance in the next step.  
In the second step, provides quantitative empirical evidence to the congruency 
argument. The implementation structure is generally hybrid therefore there is a dominant 
mode of IOR and other subsidiary modes. In case of the RSBY the dominant mode of 
IOR is network and therefore collaboration is the dominant compliance approach. The 
extent to which the compliance mechanism is congruent with the implementation 
structure, implementation performance is expected to be higher.  Therefore in case of 
RSBY, higher use of collaborative approach during implementation is expected to be 
associated with higher performance.  In the second step we test this thesis. The result 






   This chapter measures collaboration among agencies implementing the scheme 
and assesses the impact of the collaboration on implementation performance of the 
scheme. Section 6.1 presents a descriptive analysis of the data. Section 6.2  measures the 
collaboration among agencies implementing the scheme- in two networks –enrolment 
network , and hospitalization network.  Section 6.3 assess the impact of collaboration on 
implementation performance. The impact of collaboration is assessed on enrolment 
performance (sub-section 6.3.1), hospitalization performance (sub-section 6.3.2) and 
quality aspect of the implementation performance that perception of opportunism (sub-
section 6.3.3) . Final section 6.4 presents discusses these findings and concludes.   
6.1 Descriptive Analysis  of the Survey Data.  
 
Out of the 202 districts to which survey was sent, responses were received from 
47 districts giving a response rate of 23%? Table 6.1 compares the background data from 
responding districts with the National average on indicators like GDP per capita, 
Enrolment Rate, Claims ratio, hospitalization ratio, literacy rate, and infant mortality rate.  
Comparison of the basic socioeconomic indicators suggests that sample districts are 
comparatively less developed than the National average;   therefore the results of this 












Table 6.1 Comparison of the Responding Districts with National 
  
 Sample  National Average  
hospitalization Ratio 2.5 2.4 (NSSO 2006) 
GDP per capita 27049  
Literacy rate 71.99 
 
74 
Infant Mortality rate 53.88 
 
44 
% of care accessed from private 
sector 
41.67 36.3 
Mean percentage of Institutional 
deliveries  
41.12 41 (NFHS-3) 
GDP Per capita 27049.93 (2005) 
 
35830 (2005) 
% of hospitals in private sector 63.09696  
(R* = Responding and N** = National Average) 
 
 
Most of the districts (33) are managed by private sector insurance companies. 
The average number of years where the scheme is running in a responding district is 3.3 
years.  The sample districts vary considerably on program
152
 as well as performance
153
 
indicators suggesting that any analysis is likely to yield sufficiently representative results, 
i.e. they are valid for inference across a large population of districts.  
6.1.1 Description of Program Performance of Sample  
 
The performance of the scheme differs by Insurance Company as each company 
is directly responsible for implementation. Both, in the sample as well as on national 
level, Chola, United India and New India are better performers in terms of enrolment 
numbers than other Insurance Companies as seen in the table 6.2. In hospitalization, 
United India Insurance Company has a higher hospitalization rate (5) and claims ratio 
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 The average number of hospitals in the sample vary from 206 to 6. The GDP 
per capita vary from INR85735 to INR5522.  
153
 The enrolment ratio varies from 72.55 % to lowest 14.79 % whereas 





nationally, but in the sample it is Oriental Insurance Company probably because there is 
only one district managed by United India Insurance Company in the sample.  
Table 6.2 Performance of the Districts in the Sample Compared to National Categorized 






Enrolment rate hospitalization 
Rate 


















ICICI 16.28 26 51.55 51 1.57 2.42 395 562 82 
Chola 11.63 7 59.11 56 0.65 1.24 502 536 78 
Apollo 18.60 3 49.78 54 2.54 2.04 441 473 71 
United 
India 
2.33 16 57.86 56 2.39 4.52 410 506 104 
Oriental 18.60 16 36.15 49 3.75 1.86 610 532 77 
Star health 9.30 2 43.49 50 0.85 1.25 376 393 72 
New India 2.33 9 75.95 57 2.79 2.37 398 490 96 
Reliance 18.60  51.87  2.47  407   
Max- Bupa 2.33  16.1  2.14  310   
(Source: Author Collected from Various sources) 
 
The performance of the insurance company can significantly influence the 
performance of the scheme in the district.  
The performance of the district also differed by whether it is managed by public 
Insurance Company or Private Insurance Company. Districts managed by private 
Insurance Companies have higher enrolment ratio, lower hospitalization ratio and lower 








Table 6.3 Comparison of performance of Public Insurance companies Vs. Private 
companies (one way ANOVA) 
  





way Anova ) 
1 Enrolment 
Ratio 
 49.9 (33) 39.1(10) ** 
2 Hospitalization 
rate 
 2.13 (28) 3.5 (10) ** 
3 Premium Rate  420 (33) 568 (10) *** 
(No of observations in Parenthesis * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01) 
 
 
This variation in performance could be attributed to incentives to managers in 
public Insurance Company. In public sector insurance companies, generally one 
insurance company officer is responsible for managing a number of districts and 
therefore they completely delegate implementation to the Third Party Administrators, 
who have an incentive to shirk in absence of monitoring.  They also have limited 
incentives to improve performance as their compensation is not based on the 
performance. Compared to this, private sector insurance companies employ many more 
staff
154
 at the district level to oversee the implementation of the scheme and provide 
performance based incentives to staff. Many private Insurance companies have in-house 
staff to manage implementation of the scheme, reducing their reliance on the TPA.  
Public Insurance Companies devote limited human resources because for them  
RSBY business is more of social responsibility and also health insurance, forms a very 
small fraction of their overall business (Bearing Point, 2008) and therefore they have 
limited incentives to build their capacity in this area.  Compared to Public Insurance 
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 In private sector, Insurance Company there is generally one district coordinator who reports to 
a zonal coordinator or clusters coordinator. A zonal coordinator looks after a few districts in a 






Company, some of the Private Insurance Companies 100% business comes from health 
insurance and therefore they have developed required expertise in this area.  
6.1.2 Description of Respondents and their Organizations 
 
As seen in Table 6.4, most of the respondents of the survey were district level 
officers and around one fourth of survey was taken up by state level managers or high 
level official  




Compared to this in case of Thomson, (2001) the respondents were high level 
managers generally director and deputy directors whereas in case of Chen, (2010) the 
respondents were program managers who were directly involved in the service delivery. 
In the case of RSBY, the respondents are mainly field level staffs (district coordinators/ 
senior officer/ state level Managers) that are directly involved in the service delivery and 
therefore they actually experience the relationship dynamics compared to other studies 
where respondents had little direct experience.  
Table 6.5 compares the selected characteristics of the Insurance Companies to 
which respondents belong. As seen from the table 6.5, New India Assurance Company is 
the largest Insurance Company in terms of staff and health insurance business volume. It 
is a public sector Insurance company and at present manages 106 districts in the RSBY 
Designation Responding 
Districts 
Regional / Higher level Manger  3 (6.98 %) 
State level Manager and similar  13 (30.23%) 
Senior officer  13 (30.23%) 
District Coordinator  14 (32.56%) 





scheme. Second largest in terms of business volume is Oriental Public Insurance 
Company which is another public sector Insurance company. But the largest number of 
districts in the scheme is managed by the ICICI; a private sector insurance company 
which has completed 177 district years at present. Private Insurance companies are 
interested in RSBY scheme because it is seen as an opportunity to expand business into 
low cost health insurance segment and as an opportunity to penetrate rural markets.  






















ICICI Private 7208 13,776. 029 24.68 177 
Chola Private 704 2289 17.00 48 
Apollo Private 800 5932.4 82.99 22 
United India Public 18300 24373.107 28.00 106 
Oriental Public 15000 14478.555 23.94 108 
Star health Private  10551.1 100 16 
New India Public 19000 23491  27.5 63 
Reliance Private  1893.474 11  
Max- Bupa Private     
 
(Source: Authors compilation from various sources) 
 
 
The insurance company holds overall responsibility for the implementation of the 
scheme in a district but it contracts with other agencies to accomplish the tasks. In 25 
districts, Insurance companies have contracted out the back office functions to Third 
party administrators where as in remaining 18 districts, Insurance companies have their 
own staff doing back office function. All public sector Insurance companies have 





(See appendix 6.1) TPA with higher capacity and experience are expected to influence 
performance.  
6.2 Measuring Collaboration in case of RSBY scheme.  
 
6.2.1 Refined Measure of collaboration  
 
 
As the context of RSBY scheme differs from the AmeriCorps, (case of Thomson 
(2001) model) a number of measurement indicators in the original Thomson model didn‘t 
fit well with the context of the RSBY scheme. Based on theory and data, these 
measurement indicators were removed generating a refined model that is fitting better 
with the data and context. All the steps involved in the process of confirmatory factor 
analysis are presented in appendix 6.2.  
Given the context of contracting, out of five indicators of Mutuality, three 
indicators were not applicable to the context of the scheme.  In the RSBY contracting 
context, there is a well-developed formal contract, specified in great detail. The parties in 
the contract are well aware about the terms of the contract and goals of the collaboration. 
The approach to solving of most common disputes is already has been identified and a 
system has been put in place to deal with disputes. Therefore in the context of the RSBY 
scheme, indicators which measures extent of sharing of resources, working through 
differences and agreement on goals are not applicable and were dropped during the 
confirmatory analysis. Dropping of these indicators improved fit of the model. Similarly 
one indicator from autonomy dimension and trust dimension were also dropped.  
The refined model consists of the same five components measuring collaboration 
as in the case of Thomson model (2001) but confirmatory factor analysis lead to change 
in the measurement model. As seen in the table 6.6, the refined measurement model has 





Thomson (2009). The modified model‘s fit indices are within acceptable limits with 
RMSEA
155
 equal to 0.068 and CFI
156
 equal to 0.968. Following table presents the refined 
measurement model  
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 Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is a statistical test used to evaluate 
fitness of the model in structural equation modeling.  RMSEA is used for parsimony correction as 
in this index has a penalty function for poor model parsimony. Brown (2006) considers RMSEA 
as an ―error of approximation index ...as it assess the extent to which a model fits reasonably well 
in the population‖. Brown (2006) suggests a score close to 0.06 or below for RMSEA acceptable 
model fit indices.  
156
 Comparative fit index (CFI) is a statistical test used to evaluate fitness of the Model in 
structural equation modeling.  It indicates comparative fit of the model. Brown (2006) suggests 





Components   Thomson model (2001)  Refined Model 
Used in this  
Decision 
Making  
DM1 This partner organization takes your organization‘s opinions seriously when decisions are made about 
collaborative implementation of the activities. 
 Yes 
DM2 Your organization brainstorms with this partner organization to develop solutions to problems during 
collaborative implementation of the activities. 
Yes 
Administration ADM1 You, as a representative of your organization understand your organization‘s roles and responsibilities in the 
collaborative  implementation of the scheme while working with this partner 
Yes 
ADM2 Meetings with this partner organization accomplish what is necessary for collaborative implementation of the 
scheme?  
Yes 
ADM3 This partner organization agrees about the goals of the collaboration for implementation of the scheme? Yes 
ADM4 Your organization‘s tasks are well coordinated with those of this partner organization while working in 
collaboration for implementation of the scheme? 
Yes 
Autonomy  AUTO1 Working in collaboration with this partner for implementation of the scheme hinders your organization from 
meeting its own organizational mission (profit)? 
 
AUTO2 Your organization‘s independence is reduced by having to work in collaboration with this partner organization? Yes 
AUTO3 You, as a representative of your organization, feel pulled between trying to meet both your organization‘s and 




Res-1 Your organization and this partner organization have combined and used each other‘s resources so both parties 
benefit from collaborating? 
 
Res-2 Your organization shares information with this partner organization that will strengthen their operations and 
programs? 
Yes 
Res3 You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and respected by this partner 
organization? 
Yes 
Res-4 Your organization achieves its own goals better by working with this partner organization than working alone?  
Res-5 Your organization and this partner organization work through differences to arrive at win-win solutions?  
Trust T1 People who represent this partner organization in the collaboration are trustworthy. Yes 
T2 My organization can count on this partner organization to meet its obligations to the collaboration. Yes 
T3 My organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with this partner organization rather than leave the 
collaboration. 
 





  The refined model is fitting well with the data and has strong and significant 
relationships between dimensions of collaboration. The measurement indicators have 
acceptable index of validity and reliability.  
Using the refined collaboration model, collaboration score for each dimension of 
collaboration (collaboration score at dimension level) was calculated, followed by 
calculation of collaboration score for each relationship (collaboration score at relationship 
level) and then finally collaboration index for the district (collaboration score at the 
network level) was created taking into account all the relationships in that district. 
Mean collaboration score with Third Party Administrators is highest (18.80) 
followed by Smart Card Service Providers (17.33), District Key Manager (15.61) and 
District Administration (15.51) (please see appendix 6.3 for more details).  The levels of 
collaboration with each of the relationship dyads varies across districts without any 
particular patterns (see appendix 6.4)   
Comparison of collaboration score between private and public sector suggests 
that insurance companies have overall higher collaboration with private sector 
organizations compared to public sector organizations. Collaboration with public sector 
agencies is less participatory in decision making , lead to greater reduction in autonomy 
of the collaborating agency , has lower collaboration on administrative side  and has 
lower trust when compared to private sector ( for details see appendix 6.5)  
After calculating collaboration score at the relationship level, the next step is to 
calculate collaboration index for the network level carrying out a particular function. The 
mean collaboration in the enrolment network is higher than hospitalization network. (See 
appendix 6.6) though there is wide variation in the collaboration across districts (see 







6.3 Assessing Impact of Collaboration on Implementation Performance  
6.3.1 Collaboration and Enrolment Performance 
 
Here, I provide a regression model with enrolment performance as a dependent 
variable. Before going to results, I would first describe in detail the enrolment 
performance model. The enrolment performance is expected to be influenced by 
following four categories of factors.   
(i) Agency level factors,  
(ii) District level factors, 
(iii)  Program level factors and 
(iv) Network level factors.  
6.3.1.1 Agency level factors:    
 
These are related to agencies which are involved in the implementation of the 
programs.  The agencies involved are Insurance Company, Third party administration, 
Smart Card Service Providers, District Key Manager and District Administration.  
The competency of these agencies and their motivation is expected to influence 
performance of the program.  Based on the availability of the data, factors related to each 
agency that can influence the performance are discussed here.  
Insurance Company: (a) The ownership of the company is important as private 
insurance companies have performance incentives that would positively influence 
scheme enrolment ratio (b) second is implementation capacity of the Insurance Company. 
Higher experience in the program implementation is expected to influence positively 





TPA– (a) Whether or not the Third party administrator is contracted in the 
district? TPAs can better monitor smart card service providers and therefore presence of 
Third party administrator is expected to positively influence enrolment ratio;   
District Administration and District Key Manager: Capacity and leadership of 
people in these agencies is expected to influence enrolment performance, but data on 
these measures is not available.  
6.3.1.2 District Level Factors:   
A number of contextual factors, as listed below are expected to influence 
enrolment performance.  The sign in the parenthesis presents the expected direction of the 
influence.   
1. Status of Infrastructure (+) 
The variables used for the status of infrastructure are -Length of Length of P.W.D 
Pucca roads per thousand Sq. Km. 
2. Socio –economic development - Health , Education, Income levels (+) 
3. Demand for health insurance (+) 
4. Use of private health care services (+) 
5. Preventive behavior of the population (+) 
6. Geographic accessibility of the district (+) 
7. Community development (+) 
6.3.1.3 Programmatic Factors:   
The following is a list of factors inherent in the programme that can influence the 
enrolment performance:  
(a) Duration of the program implementation – with increasing duration of the 
program implemented in a district, it is expected that awareness about the program will 





 (b) Quality of the BPL list:  BPL list with fewer errors will decrease conflict among 
beneficiaries and enrolling team, and help in tracing of the beneficiaries, thus reducing 
effort and time taken by the enrolment process.  As there is no direct measure of the 
quality of the BPL list, I take a proxy for that – percentage of births registered in the 
district. High percentage of births registered in the district reflects behavior of the 
populations in terms of getting vital events registered public sector records and therefore 
higher registration implies higher quality of the list available with the government. 
(c) IEC (Information, Education and Communication) efforts for enrolment: Number 
of families enrolled in the program depends considerably on the IEC efforts to generate 
awareness about the scheme and enrolment process. But due to the lack of data, a 
measure of IEC efforts cannot be included in the analysis.  
(d)  State level capacity and leadership: These are potential variables that are 
expected to influence performance but there is no indicator available to capture these 
variables. One of the suggestions could be to include state level fixed effects but the 
districts in the sample are drawn from 11 states and therefore including state level effect 
will drastically reduce degree of freedom.  
(e) Resources: One of the critical variables that could have an impact on the 
performance is human resources and operational budget.  Variables have been included 
that reflect these parameters. Premium rate is included as a controlled variable that 
indicates the resources available for insurance company per family per year. The smart 
card service providers receive similar fee across India and therefore that is not expected 
to be a critical determinant. Hospitals across the nations receive same package rate for a 
given package of services and therefore, design also controls the resources available to 
hospitals. Similar state nodal agency in all states receive the same amount of operational 
budget per family (30 INR per family ) across states and therefore resources available to 





6.3.1.4 Network level Factors: 
 
As discussed earlier, collaboration between agencies is expected to influence 
enrolment performance. Collaboration between agencies is indicated by a network level 
collaboration index created by aggregating collaboration scores of each stakeholder 
partners involved in the enrolment process.  
 
6.3.1.5 Empirical Specification and Descriptive statistics 
 
I estimate following linear regression model,  
Yi= á + â* District level factors + D2* Duration of the program + D3i*TPA + 
D4i*INS + D5i* Programmatic + D6i*COLLABORATION +µs (1) s 
Here Ys is a performance variable -enrolment ratio - in district i.  This enrolment 
ratio is taken from the program database.  
All variables -dependent, independent and control variables vary considerably in 
the sample (please see appendix 6.8 for summary statistics). Table 6.7 presents 
correlation coefficient of variables used in the model. From the table, we can observe that 
enrolment rate is significantly positively correlated with % of birth registered. This is as 
per expectation as higher birth registered is a proxy of the high quality BPL data and high 
quality BPL data is positively related to enrolment rate.  
Premium rate of the scheme is significantly positively associated with Infant 
Mortality Rate. This is as per expectation as higher Infant Mortality Rate suggests higher 
































% of women 
ANC care from 
private sector 
Enrolment Rate 





0.0858 1        
Infant Mortality 





-0.061 -0.1564 0.0764 1      
Premium Rate 
-0.1885 0.0406 0.3391* 0.090 1     
% of Villages 
with health 
Committees 
0.0431 0.1278 -0.0260 -0.118 0.114 1    
Population 
Density -0.0328 0.0873 0.3152 -0.327* 0.312 -0.4346* 1   
% of Births 
Registered 0.3451* 0.1809 -0.5602* 0.105 -0.132 0.3361* -0.5963* 1  









Table 6.8 Enrolment ratio: Effect of Collaboration index of Enrolment network 
 
 1 2 3 
Collaboration in  
Enrolment Network 
























% of Birth Registered in 










Population Density   .0005 
(.0006) 
 
% of villages with Health 










 0.0361 0.5585 0.5330 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0093 0.3779 0.4209 
N 38 32 32 
VIF(Multi-co linearity)   Not Sig 
Whites Test 
(Heteroskedasticity) 
  Not Sig 
Link test (specification 
error) 
  Not Sig 
Ovtest (omitted variable 
bias) 
  Not sig 
F test 0.2533 0.0148 0.0023 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0:10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 6.8  presents the results of linear regression analysis, taking enrolment ratio 
as the dependent variable.  Only significant control variables are presented in the above 





from the regression model (1) and, collaboration index is not significantly related with 
the enrolment ratio.  Models (1) clearly suggests omissions, therefore based on the 
theorization presented we run the regression with all variables in the model except 
duration of collaboration.  
It is expected that as duration of partnership increases, collaboration between 
agencies increases (Huxham 2003) and this will increase performance of the insurance 
company. Contrary to expectation age of collaboration that is duration of partnership is 
not included in the analysis. This is because of the validity of the data. The duration of 
partnership ranges from 4 months to 40 months (see appendix 6.8). But the duration of 
the partnership doesn‘t truly represent the age of collaboration.  This is because in many 
cases the age of the network is much longer than official age. The official age is 
calculated from the date Insurance company gets the contract in the district and when the 
insurance company changes it is assumed that the district network has changed but in 
many districts this may not be so.  The district officers of Insurance company and TPAs 
are generally locals‘ who know the locality and are familiar with local level public 
officials. When the contract in the district changes these officers change their jobs and 
join the new insurance company which has received the contract in the district. The 
incoming insurance company hires the district level officer of the previous company and 
so, even after the change of the insurance company in the districts in many cases, the 
district level network of persons of insurance company and TPA doesn‘t change.  This 
could be the reason why duration of the partnership is not significant in any of the 
models.  
 Model (3) presents the key variables in the models based on the theory. 
Relationship between collaboration in enrolment network and enrolment ratio is 
significant according to the conventional standards.  Increase in collaboration by one unit 





increase in enrolment ratio (see Model 8). One standard deviation is equal to 13.78 and 
therefore 0.378 standard deviation equal 5.2. Therefore increase in collaboration in the 
enrolment network by one unit is associated with increase in enrolment ratio by 5.2 units 
or 5.2%. 
Collaboration index variable also has the highest coefficient among all other 
variables suggesting that collaboration in the enrolment network explains most of the 
variation in enrolment performance of the district.  
Among the agency level factors, number of district rounds per IC is significantly 
correlated with enrolment ratio. This suggests that the experience of the Insurance 
Company and its capacity influences enrolment ratio. An additional district year of 
experience is associated with 0.014 standard deviations increase in enrolment ratio that is 
equal to 0.22 units.  
Infant mortality rate not only captures the disease burden but it is also a good 
indicator of socio economic development. Higher infant mortality rate suggests more 
disease burden as well as poor socio economic development suggesting that poor and less 
developed districts have lower enrolment rate compared to others.  
Another population level factor that is associated with enrolment ratio is 
percentage of women seeking ANC care from private sector which suggest higher level 
of healthcare seeking behavior.  Population with a high level of healthcare seeking 
behavior is expected to enroll more in a health insurance program. Secondly, a population 
with higher proportion of women accessing ANC care from private sector also suggests 
higher private sector utilization. RSBY schemes offer a choice of accessing care from 
private sector as well as public sector but private sector dominates in both empanelments 
as well as in utilization ( La Forgia and Nagpal, 2012). Therefore, a higher health seeking 
behavior is expected to be associated with higher healthcare utilization from private 





enrolment, as they will perceive the need of health insurance and the problem of 
catastrophic healthcare expenditure. Therefore, a positive association between women 
accessing ANC care from private sector and enrolment ratio is as per the expectation of 
health seeking behavior. 
One of the key programmatic factors which emerged during discussion is quality 
of the BPL list. Quality of BPL list is expected to be positively related, as better quality 
of list will lead to lesser problems in identification of beneficiaries and therefore higher 
enrolment ratio. Quality of the BPL list is found to be significantly associated with 
enrolment ratio. Quality of BPL list is measured by a proxy indicator, the percentage of 
birth registered in the district. A higher percentage of birth registered in the district 
indicates better registration and data collection system at the district level.  A better data 
collection system in a district would imply better quality of data at the district level and 
this would also apply to quality of BPL list data. Better BPL list data is expected to be 
associated with higher enrolment which is confirmed by the results reached here.   
The sign of number of agencies involved in the collaboration is as per the 
expectation. It is expected that more number of agencies involved in the network lower 
will be the collaboration. The results suggest that number of agencies involved in the 
collaboration is related to lower enrolment performance.  
Some other factors that were anticipated to have a strong relationship with 
enrolment ratio were found to be not significantly associated in the sample data. Factors 
like enrolment contracted to TPA and villages with Health and Sanitation committees 
were not significantly associated with enrolment ratio.   
Thus we find that collaboration in the enrolment network is a strong predicator of 
enrolment performance measured as enrolment ratio.  Field staff generally claim that 
quality of the BPL list and support of Field Key Officers are the main driver of enrolment 





enhance the analysis. At present, there is no direct measure of support of field key 
officers but we can indirectly measure this as collaboration with District Key Manager. 
District Key Manager is the official responsible for making Field Key officers available 
in the field and monitors their performance therefore collaboration with District Key 
Manager is expected to influence the support of field Key officers and thus enrolment 
performance. In the next table, I disaggregate the collaboration index at district level into 









































Table 6.9 Enrolment Ratio: Effect of collaboration with Individual Stakeholders 
 Dependent Variable:   Standardised Enrolment Ratio 
 1 2 3 
Collaboration with District Key Manger .189* 
(.101) 
  
Collaboration with Smart Card Providers   .123 
(.137) 
 
Collaboration with Third Party Administrators   .442** 
(.170) 
























































 0.5460 0.6571 0.7430 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3602 0.4000 0.5778 
N 32  24 
VIF 2.35  4.55 
IM -test     
Hottest    
Prob > F  0.0661  
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 
 
 
Table 6.9 presents result of regression model using collaboration with individual 
stakeholder as key explanatory variable.  As we can see from the table, collaboration with 
District Key Manager and collaboration with Third Party administrator is significantly 
related with the enrolment performance. District Key Manager plays an important role in 





map , identification of enrolment stations , supports IEC for enrolment, makes Field Key 
Officers available (Field Key officers verify the identity of beneficiary  during enrolment 
and without field key officer enrolment cannot be done) for enrolment etc. Therefore 
higher collaboration with District Key Manger is expected to be associated with higher 
enrolment ratio. A one unite increase in collaboration with a district key manager 
improves enrolment ratio by 0.189 standard deviations that is 2.8 enrolment rate units.   
Similar to District Key Manager, collaboration with Third party Administrator is 
also associated with higher enrolment ratio. A one unit increase in collaboration with 
Third Party Administrator is associated with 0.442 standard deviation increase in 
enrolment ratio that is 6.09.  The district where third Party administrators are involved, 
enrolment performance is a complete responsibility of the third party administrators. This 
is especially in case of public sector insurance company, as they are considerably 
dependent on Third party administrators for implementing the scheme and therefore 
higher collaboration with third party administrator is related to higher enrolment 
performance.  
Thus, we find that not only collaboration in the enrolment network but 
collaboration with individual stakeholders influence network performance.  Higher 
collaboration among network members is expected to lead to higher perception of 
collaboration performance among network members and that is expected to lead to higher 
network performance (Chen, 2010).  In the next table, we examine the relationship 










Table 6.10 Enrolment Performance (perception based measure): Effect of 
Collaboration 
   
 1 2 
Collaboration in  
Enrolment Network 
.724*** (.183) .905*** 
(.227) 
Infant Mortality Rate   -.0263 
(.018) 
Number of district rounds per IC  .0027 
(.005) 
ANC care from private sector   -.007 
(.0106) 
No of agencies worked enrolment   0.0193 
(.103) 
Percentage of Birth Registered in 
the district  
 .011 
(.007) 
Enrolment contracted to TPA  .532 
(  .369) 
Population Density   -.0002 
(.0006) 
Percentage of villages with Health 
and sanitation committee  
 -.011 
(.008) 




 0.3289 0.6340 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3079 0.4606 
N 34 29 
VIF  2.81 
IM -test   Not significant  
Hottest  Not significant 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 
 
 
The above table presents results of regression model with a subjective measure of 
enrolment network performance as a dependent variable. We can observe from the table 
6.10 that most of the variation in the perception of collaboration performance is explained 
by collaboration index of the enrolment performance network.  A unit change in the 





index. No other variable is significant suggesting that variation in the perception of 
collaboration outcome is not related to other variables.  
The relation between perception of collaboration performance and objective 
performance measures need to be examined to understand the extent to which the 
perception measures match with the objective performance indicators. Following figure 
6.1 presents, a scatter diagram of the subjective performance measure that is perception 
of collaboration performance with objective performance measure that is Enrolment Rate. 
It is expected that both should go together, but in this sample, it was found that the 
relationship between subjective and objective performance measures is contrary to our 
expectation. Perception of collaboration performance in enrolment network is inversely 
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Figure 6.1 Relation between Subjective and Objective Measures of Performance 
 
This suggests that perception of performance data is not a good indicator of 





as district level officers would tend to overstate the performance especially if they are not 
doing well in terms of indicators of performance which can be collected and objectively 
reported.  
Second reason is that subjective performance measure responses were not 
validated in the telephonic interview. To keep the telephonic interview short, I only 
validated selected questions from the survey form. These questions included 17 questions 
on Thomson collaboration scale, 5 questions on opportunism scale and 3 questions on 
overall performance of the district. Thus , given the poor quality of the data of the 
perception of collaboration performance , the link between collaboration performance in 
the network and network performance in the sample data should be viewed as weak at 
best.  
If collaboration among agencies in the network leads to higher performance, than 
the lack of collaboration among agencies is expected to lead to lower network 
performance. One dimension of lack of collaboration among agencies is opportunism 
among members in the network. Table 6.11 presents an analysis of the relationship 
between opportunism among network members and network performance.  It is expected 
that higher opportunism in the network will lead to lower network performance measured 














Table 6.11 Enrolment ratio: Effect of opportunism 
 Dependent Variable: Standardised Enrolment Ratio 
 1 2 3 4 
Opportunism in enrolment network    -.350** 
(.136) 
Opportunism  by District key Manager   -.472** 
(.188) 
 
Opportunism  by Smart Card Providers   -.348* 
(.170) 
  




   



























Percentage of Birth Registered in the 
district  
    
Enrolment contracted to TPA   0.125 
(.33) 
 










 0.5036 0.3268 0.4624 0.3706 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3485 0.2626 0.2833 0.2738 
N 22 24 29 31 
VIF 2.48 1.05 1.92 1.93 
IM -test  Not sig  Not sign Not sig 
Hottest Not sig  Not sign Not sig 
Prob > F 0.0326 0.0157 0.0436 0.0142 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 
 
The above table 6.11 presents, results of regression model using opportunism as 
an explanatory variable. Opportunism arises when a party violates a principle of 
exchange
157
. Opportunism increases transaction cost (bargaining, monitoring and mal-
adaptation), reduces trust, satisfaction, motivation and increases conflict between parties 
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 Though some economist consider any situation that involves appropriation of quasi rents as 
opportunism but legal scholars consider violation of principles of exchange as a criteria to 





(Hawkins 2008) and thereby reduces performance. Thus keeping opportunism under low 
levels is one of the most important goals of the governance system.    
 We can observe from the above table that individually opportunism by all 
members is significantly related with enrolment ratio. As opportunism by one member 
will lead to counter opportunism by other members therefore, opportunism scores of 
individual members are expected to be correlated with each other. Therefore opportunism 
score of each member is included one at time rather than including all.   
The impact of opportunism by District Key Manager has much higher coefficient 
than other members of the network. This is expected based on the role of District Key 
Manager.  A one unit increase in opportunism by District Key Manager (measured on a 
scale of one to six) is associated by 0.473 standard deviation reduction in enrolment ratio 
which is equal to 6.51 units‘ reduction in enrolment ratio. Capacity of Insurance company 
(Number of district rounds per IC), Infant mortality rate and number of agencies involved 
in enrolment have similar effect as observed in previous models.  Variables like Birth 
registration, Number of district rounds per IC, No of agencies worked in enrolment are 
aggregated data at the state level and therefore in case of small samples, they create 
problems.  
Opportunism by individual network members as well as overall opportunism 
situation in the network adversely affects the network performance.  
Summary:   The results presented suggest that collaboration between 
organizations in a network is significantly related to enrolment performance when 
performance was measured through an objective measure.  Similarly, opportunism in a 
network is also significantly related to enrolment performance.  All stakeholders play an 
important role in determining enrolment performance as both collaboration and 
opportunism by each stakeholder influences the enrolment performance. Among network 





enrolment process. A higher degree of collaboration by the District Key Manager is 
associated with high enrolment ratio whereas high opportunism of District Key Manager 
is related with lower enrolment performance.  This suggests that care should be taken to 
empower and motivate district manager to perform. 
6.4 Collaboration and Hospitalization Performance  
 
Here I provide a series of regression results with hospitalization Ratio as a 
dependent variable. Before going to results, I first describe in detail the hospitalization 
model.  
 Similar to enrolment performance, hospitalization performance is also expected 
to be influenced by following four categories of factors.   
(i) Agency level factors,  
(ii) District level factors, 
(iii)  Program level factors and 
(iv) Network level factors.  
Agency level factors are factors related to agencies which are involved in the 
implementation of the program that is Insurance Company, Third party administration 
and District Administration. A number of characteristics of these agencies listed below 
agency-wise are expected to influence hospitalization performance of the scheme. 
Insurance Company: (a) The ownership of the company is as important as 
private insurance companies have profit targets (Claim Ratio) that would negatively 
influence; hospitalization (b) second is capacity of the Insurance Company to control 
fraud and utilization. Higher experience in the program implementation or health 
Insurance is expected to influence negatively hospitalization ratio.  
TPA– (a) whether Third Party Administrator (TPA) is contracted in the district or 
not? (TPAs can better control utilization therefore presence of TPA is expected to 





leadership of people in these agencies is expected to influence hospitalization and 
utilization of the scheme, but data on these measures is not available.  
District Level Factors:   A number of contextual factors, as listed below are 
expected to influence hospitalization performance.  The sign in the parenthesis presents 
the direction of the influence.   
1. Status of Infrastructure (+) 
2. Socio –economic development - Health , Education and Income levels (+) 
3. Disease burden (+) 
4. Use of private health care services (+) 
5. Geographic accessibility of the district (+) 
6. Community development (+) 
Programmatic Factors:  following is the list of programmatic factors that can 
influence the enrolment performance.  
a) Duration of the program‘s implementation – with increasing duration of the 
program implemented in a district, it is expected that awareness about the 
program will increase leading to increase in utilization of the scheme.  
b) Total No. of Hospitals Empanelled: More hospitals empanelled in the 
district will increase accession of the hospitals to beneficiary increasing 
hospitalization.  
c) Percentage of empanelled hospitals from private sector: Private hospitals 
with their residual rights have more incentive to hospitalize a patient. 
Therefore higher the proportion of private hospitals empanelled in the 
program, higher will be hospitalization ratio. 
Network level Factors: Collaboration of agencies involved in the hospitalization 





rate of hospitalization, where district administration will be interested to improve 
hospitalization in the program. At high level of hospitalization ratio, collaboration 
between agencies will try to reduce hospitalization ratio so that claims ratio are 
sustainable and there is no loss to the insurance company. Thus the relationship between 
collaboration and hospitalization ratio is expected to be non-linear.  
Opportunism of different network members will have a different effect on 
hospitalization ratio. For example opportunism of Insurance Company will reduce 
hospitalization ratio as insurance company has an interest to reduce hospitalization ratio. 
On the other hand, opportunism of District Administration can positively influence 
hospitalization ratio. When district administration behaves opportunistically, they favor 
empanelled hospitals that leads hospitals to make fraudulent claims that falsely inflates 
hospitalization ratio of the district. 
We have not measured opportunism of Insurance Company in our survey tool 
and therefore, we really will not know how overall opportunism of the network is 
expected to influence the hospitalization ratio. 
Overall,  we expect hospitalization ratio to be related to the number of rounds the 
scheme is renewed ( with more years of implementation utilization will be higher ) , the 
need for health services ( higher need higher utilization ) , demand for services ( more 
private hospital users in the district, more services utilization ) , availability of services ( 
more hospitals will lead to more utilization ) , proportion of private hospitals empanelled 
( more private hospitals will lead to more utilization) , characteristics of Insurance 
Company ( more experience of IC will lead to less hospitalization ) ,  contract to Third 
party administrator (TPA) ( TPA would try to reduce hospitalization), and collaboration ( 
higher collaboration increase hospitalization), geography ( density – more density high 






6.4.1 Empirical Specification and Descriptive Statistics 
 
I estimate the following linear regression model,  
Yi= á + â* District level factors + D2i*TPA + D3i*INS + D4i* Programmatic + 
D5i*Network +µs (1) s 
Here, Ys is a performance variable – hospitalization ratio - in district i.  This 
hospitalization ratio is taken from the program database. First, I present a descriptive 
analysis of the variables used in the analysis here followed by a number of regression 
models linking network factors with network performance. 
Table 6.12 Summary Statistics 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
hospitalization Rate  38 2.50 1.90 0.36 11.02 
Collaboration Index of hospitalization 
Network  
43 4.03 0.94 2 5.673611 
Age of Network in months  43 15.35 10.05 4 40 
No of District Rounds of Insurance 
Company  
43 69.28 58.58 3 177 
Literacy Rate  43 72.00 10.32 39 88.6 
GDP per Capita  42 27049.93 23269.31 5522 85735 
Total no of Hospitals Empanelled  43 35.05 32.68 6 204 
Infant Mortality  43 53.89 18.28 21.6 101 
Percentage of households with electricity 
Connection  
43 54.38 33.47 10.6 99.9 
Percentage of Institutional Deliveries  43 41.12 21.30 7.1 87.4 
Percentage of Villages with health 
committees  
43 22.68 21.30 0 89.47 
Population Density  42 783.69 518.79 46 2399 
Percentage of women taking ANC care 
from private sector  
42 41.67 18.68 4.3 74.6 
Percentage of Villages with availability of 
a doctor  
42 19.55 14.32 2.2 55.3 
Proportion of Private Hospital Empanelled 
in the program 
43 63.10 28.27 0 100 
 
From the above table 6.12, we can observe considerable variation in the 





percentages which is close to the National hospitalization rate (National hospitalization 
rate was 2.4 in 2006 according to National Sample Survey Organization –NSSO; cited in 
Prasad 2012) as well as average hospitalization rate in RSBY districts (Average 
hospitalization rate among RSBY district which have completed 2 years was 2.2 
according to Jain, 2013) suggesting that the sample districts do not represent extreme 
cases. The mean hospitalization ratio in the sample districts is 2.40 with a standard 
deviation of 1.90.  The variation in hospitalization rate in the sample is low without 
extreme values and therefore the risk of U shape variation in the logistic regression is 
limited. Thus the hospitalization rate can be used in the logistic regression. 
The mean collaboration index of hospitalization network is 4.03 and ranges from 
2 to 5.67 suggesting a considerable variation in the collaboration index across districts.  
Other control variables also have wide variation across districts.  The mean literacy rate 
of the sample is 72, which is little lower compared to National average of 74.  The 
sample mean percentage of Institutional deliveries is 41.12, which is also very close to 
National average of 41 (International Institute of Population Sciences et al 2007). 
The districts have on average around 63 percentages of hospitals empanelled 
from private sector and this ranges from zero to 100 percent suggesting that the sample is 
reflective of the National situation.  
Table 6.13 presents the Pearson Correlation score of independent variables used 
in the model. As seen from the table, a number of variables are significantly correlated 
with each other.  The explanatory variable collaboration index is significantly correlated 
with percentage of household with electricity connection and percentage of institutional 
deliveries. Variable percentage of household with electricity connection indicates level of 
infrastructural development whereas the variable institutional deliveries indicates level of 





together indicate level of socio economic development. This suggests districts with more 
socioeconomic development have more collaboration.   
 Second important variable premium rate under the RSBY scheme is positively 
correlated significantly with the Infant mortality and population density. Both are 
expected findings as infant mortality and population characteristics are used by Insurance 
companies to set the premium price. 
Correlation between total number of hospitals empanelled under the scheme and 
percentage of household with electricity connection, percentage of institutional deliveries 
and percentage of women seeking ANC from private sector is as per expectation. More 
infrastructure development is expected to have high number of hospitals available, 
whereas more institutional deliveries suggest higher health care utilization behavior and 
thus more number of hospitals existing in the district. Higher ANC care from private 





Table 6.13 Correlation between Variables (*P<0.05) 
  Collaborati




















%  of 
Institutional 
Deliveries  
























1                     
Premium Rate   -0.0547    1                   
Literacy Rate  0.2849    0.0489   1                 
GDP per Capita  0.2708   -0.1810    0.5944*   1               
Total no of 
Hospitals 
Empanelled  
0.1226     0.0165 0.3115* 0.1516  1             
Infant Mortality  0.0216   0.3347
* 
-0.4704* -0.5424* -0.0688 1           
% of households 
with electricity 
Connection  




0.3557*    0.0563  0.7474*  0.7346* 0.4372* -0.3524* 0.8380* 1       
%  of Villages 
with health 
committees  
0.1906    0.1456  0.3451* 0.3085*  0.0059 -0.0270  0.3206*  0.4278*  1     
% of women 
taking ANC care 
from private 
sector  














 Dependent variables : Log(hospitalization  Ratio) 
 1 2 3  




























Percentage of Business 






Road Per Km   .0004* 
(.0002) 
  
Percentage of children 




Private hospitals as 







  .133 
(.11) 
 









 0.11 0.65 0.57  
Adjusted R
2
 0.08 0.56 0.48  
F  0.03 0.00 0.00  
N 38 38 37  
VIF  1.4 1.38  
IM –test   Not Sig   
Hottest  Not Sig   
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 
 
 
Table 6.14 presents step-wise linear regression model taking hospitalization 
ratio as the dependent variable.  Broadly, the results of regression model are as per 
expectation. As seen in the model, (1) collaboration in the hospitalization network is 
positively significantly related to hospitalization ratio but we expect omissions and 






 Model (2) explains 65 percent of variation (R2 0.65) in the hospitalization 
ratio. As seen in the model (2), one unit change in collaboration in the hospitalization 
network (collaboration is measured on 6 point scale) is associated with a 16 percent 
more hospitalization ratio.  More than collaboration among agencies in the network, 
round of the scheme (duration of scheme implementation) is more impactful, as one 
more year of program implementation is associated with 23% more hospitalization 
ratio. With increasing years of implementation, awareness about the scheme and its 
utilization increases leading to higher hospitalization ratio. This is supported by the 
national data too. Average hospitalization rate for the districts which have completed 
1
st
 round is 1.9 percentage and 2.2 percent for the districts which have completed two 
rounds. The hospitalization rate climbs up rapidly to 5.3 percentages for the districts 
which have completed round three (Jain, 2013). These two variables account for 26% 
variation in the hospitalization ratio.  
As found in other studies, we also find that number of hospitals empanelled 
in the network is positively associated with hospitalization ratio. Another variable 
that is significantly related to hospitalization ratio is, total number of hospitals 
empanelled.  The coefficient suggests that a one percent change in the total number of 
hospitals empanelled is associated with 23 percentage more hospitalization ratio.  
 Another variable that explains variation in the hospitalization ratio is 
ownership of the insurance company. A publically owned insurance company is 
associated with 79 % more hospitalization as compared to privately own insurance 
company.  This suggests that privately owned insurance companies are either better at 
controlling frauds or they are denying genuine care under the scheme or both. Though 
the analysis is based only on the data from 10 districts which are managed by public 
insurance companies, but out of these 10 districts, eight districts are managed by one 
insurance, which has lowest hospitalization ratio and claim ratio
158
 suggesting that 
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 Oriental Insurance Company has 16 % of the total districts in the RSBY scheme (Jain 





analysis presented here underestimates the difference between public sector and 
private sector insurance companies.  The difference between the performance of 
public insurance company and private insurance company is because of the 
management of the scheme. Private insurance companies are more vigilant about the 
utilization ratio /claim ratio and employ a number of ethical as well unethical 
approaches to control utilization in the scheme. Public insurance company generally 
depends completely on the third party administrator for the claims processing and 
therefore utilization and fraud control in these districts depend upon the performance 
of the third party administrators. Public insurance contracting to third party 
administrator is based on the cost and not quality of work leading to selection of 
lowest bidding third party administrators.   
Other control variables like proportion of health business of insurance 
company, length of road in Km in a district per square km, percentage of children 
suffering from diarrhea are also significantly related with the hospitalization ratio but 
in terms of impact they lead a small variation in the hospitalization ratio.    Private 
hospitals as proportion of total hospitals empanelled are expected to influence 
hospitalization ratio but was not found to be significant in the sample data. 
 Capacity of the insurance company was found to be significant with another 
measure of network performance that is enrolment ratio, but was not found to be 
significantly associated with hospitalization ratio.   The relation between level of 
socio-economic development and health service utilization is well established 
therefore, an index of socio economic development was created by doing a factor 
analysis of a number of contextual variables. These variables included Literacy rate, 
GDP per capita, Infant Mortality rate, percentage of house with electricity 
connection, percentage of institutional deliveries, length of road in Km per square 
                                                                                                                                                        
districts managed by Oriental Insurance Company in 2013 was only 2% (least among the 
public insurance companies) and burnout ratio of 77%, again lowest among other public 






KM, and percentage of women accessing Antenatal care.   This index of socio 
economic development was not related significantly with the hospitalization ratio as 
seen in the model 4, suggesting that program variables play an important role in the 
sample data compared to contextual variable. But these results should be interpreted 
with caution given the small sample size.   
Given that the collaboration with agencies in the hospitalization network is 
significantly associated with hospitalization performance, it is important to assess the 
extent to which collaboration with each of the network member in the hospitalization 
network influences hospitalization ratio. In the next table, I present results of 
regression models using collaboration with each stakeholder as a key explanatory 
variable  
Table 6.15 Hospitalization Ratio: Effect of Collaboration with Individual 
Stakeholders 
 Dependent variables : Log(Hospitalization  Ratio)  
 1 2 
Collaboration with DA  .06 
(0.07) 
Collaboration with DMK  0.180** 
(0.072) 
 


























 0.62 0.56 
Adjusted R
2
 0.55 0.47 
N 38 38 
VIF 1.43  
IM –test  Not Sig  
Hottest Not Sig  
Prob > F 0.0000  






First of all, there are only 26 districts were TPAs are working therefore the 
sample data for the collaboration with TPA is very small and hence I didn‘t run a 
regression model using collaboration with TPA as an explanatory variable.   As 
collaboration with TPA was dropped due to low sample data only two model could be 
run using collaboration with District Administration and collaboration with District 
Key Manager as explanatory variables.  As can be seen in the table 6.15, 
collaboration with District Key Manager is significantly related with the 
hospitalization ratio but collaboration with district administration is not significant. 
This suggest the important role that District Key Manager play in the implementation 
of the scheme.  A one unit increase in the collaboration with DKM is associated with 
18% more hospitalization ratio.  
 Other control variables are also significant as seen in the previous analysis 
using collaboration in the network as an explanatory variable.  Thus among individual 
stakeholders collaboration with District Key Manager is significantly associated with 
hospitalization performance and therefore we expect that opportunism of District Key 
Manager  will also be  significantly associated with hospitalization ratio. In the next 
table 6.16, we present results of regression model using opportunism with individual 














Table 6.16 hospitalization Ratio: Effect of Opportunism of Individual Partners 
 
Dependent variables : Log(Hospitalization  Ratio) 
 1 2 
Opportunism by DA .0417 
(.077) 
 
Opportunism by DMK  -.15** 
(.07) 
Opportunism by TPA   












Percentage of Business from Health of IC  0.01** 
(0.003) 
District Rounds of Insurance Company  0.14 
(0.13) 






 0.3289 0.58 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2450 0.48 
N 37 32 
VIF   
IM –test    
Hottest   
Prob > F   
 
Standard errors in parentheses   * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01 
 
As expected, opportunism of DMK is significantly associated with lower 
hospitalization ratio but the opportunism of DMK has an opposite sign than expected 
suggesting that opportunism of DMK is associated with lower hospitalization ratio 
than with higher   
Summary: Similar to case of enrolment performance, I found that the 
collaboration between organizations in a network is significantly related to 
hospitalization performance.  Similarly opportunism in a network is also significantly 
related to hospitalization performance.  Though hospitalization performance is also 
influenced by burden of disease and geographic accessibility, but program variables 





number of hospitals empanelled and type of Insurance Company play a more 
significant role than contextual factors like socio economic development of the state.  
District Key Managers plays an important role in the hospitalization performance and 
collaboration and opportunism of DKM influence hospitalization performance.    
6.5 Results: Quality Aspect of Network Performance 
 
The opportunism among network members is expected to be influenced by 
following four categories of factors.   
 Agency level factors,  
 District level factors, 
 Program level factors and 
 Network level factors.  
 
Agency level factors:   These are factors related to agencies which are 
involved in the implementation of the programs.  The agencies involved are Insurance 
Company, Third party administration, Smart Card Service Providers, District Key 
Manager and District Administration.  
The competency of these agencies and their motivation is expected to 
influence performance of the program.  We discuss factor related to each agency that 
can influence the performance and availability of the data.  
Insurance Company: (a) Private insurance companies have more staff per 
district and therefore they have high monitoring therefore we expect lesser 
opportunism among the district networks lead by a private Insurance company  
District Level Factors.   A number of contextual factors, as listed below, are 
expected to influence opportunism by agencies.  The sign in the parenthesis presents 
the direction of the influence.   





2. Geographic accessibility of the district (-) 
3. Community development (-) 
Programmatic Factors:  following is the list of programmatic factors that can 
influence the enrolment performance  
 Duration of the program implementation – with increasing duration of the 
program implemented in a district, it is expected that there will be higher 
collaboration and therefore less opportunism among network members. 
 Number of agencies: we expect that as there are more number of agencies 
involved in collaboration, there will be, more opportunism as monitoring 
activities of wide array of members becomes difficult. 
Network level Factors: As discussed earlier, collaboration between agencies is 
expected to influence opportunism among network members  
6.5.1 Empirical Specification  
 
I estimate following linear regression model,  
Yi= á + â* District level factors + D2* Duration of the program + D3i*INS + 
D4i*COLLABORATION +µs (1) s 
Here Ys is a performance variable –opportunism index of network members- in 













Table 6.17 Opportunism in Network: Effect of Collaboration in Network 
 
 1 2 







Public Insurance Company   -.227 
(.45) 
Number of Agencies   .012 
(.125) 






 0.2581 0.3180 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2400 0.2393 
N 43 30 
IM -test  Not sig  
Hottest Not sig  




Table 6.17, presents linear regression model taking opportunism among the 
network members as the dependent variable.  As seen in the model (2 collaboration in 
the hospitalization network is positively significantly related to hospitalization ratio. 
No other control variable is significantly related with the network performance.  
Collaboration among network members alone explains around 25% of the variation in 
the hospitalization ratio.   
6.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The results discussed above suggest that collaboration as an IOR in networks 
is positively associated with implementation performance.   Both quantitative 
(enrolment performance and hospitalization performance) and qualitative 
performance (opportunism among network members) is positively related with the 





As found in other studies in public contracting (Van Slyke, 2007), in RSBY 
scheme too, we find that agencies adopted a mix mode of IOR, but collaboration  is 
the dominant IOR in the scheme.  
Though collaboration is a dominant mode of IOR for the scheme overall, 
different networks formed in the scheme implementation, have different modes  of 
congruent IOR. In case of enrolment network, all members have same interest in 
increasing enrolment numbers, suggesting a pooled interdependence between 
agencies that implies a network with limited conflict (Peter 2014).  In absence of 
conflict and veto power the dominant mode of IOR in case of enrolment network is 
expected to be collaboration and other modes of IOR are expected to play very 
limited role. This was confirmed empirically as the impact of collaboration on 
enrolment performance is much higher compared to performance in hospitalization 
network.  
In case of hospitalization Network, collaboration is not the dominant mode of 
IOR and network members have conflicting interest. District Administration may 
have different interest than Insurance Company and in districts where district 
administration has veto points the conflict is expected to get enhanced.  Therefore 
appropriate IOR mix in hospitalization function is expected to include hierarchical 
control as suggested by qualitative analysis in chapter five.  This was also supported 
empirically as collaboration was positively associated with the hospitalization 
performance but only to a limited extent and the impact of collaboration on 
hospitalization performance is much lower than that on enrolment performance.  
This suggests that as the appropriate mode of IOR was operationalized, the 
performance increased. Districts which were able to put the appropriate compliance 
mechanism in practice in different function areas had higher performance in those 
function areas. The findings clearly suggest that a compliance mechanism (mode of 






As the collaboration increased performance was found to be higher. At a low 
level of collaboration, low performance was observed, but as collaboration increased 
performance also increased but also a level more collaboration will make the 
compliance mechanism incongruent reducing performance.  Therefore a curvilinear 
relationship between collaboration and performance was expected, but in this sample 
no curvilinear relationship was found probably because of the shorter duration of the 
relationship that stunted collaboration as happens in case of Interimistic exchanges ( 
Lambe et al 2000). But a number of studies have suggested a non-linear relationship 
between mode of IOR and performance  (Villena et al 2011; Anderson and Jap 2005; 
Caniels 2012; Gundalach and Cannon 2010). Specially in case of collaboration , 
studies have found a decreasing rate of return and a curvilinear relationship between 
collaboration and performance (Villena et al 2011; Anderson and Jap 2005). After a 
point more collaboration leads to incongruency and poor performance. Evidence of 
dark side of collaboration (O Toole and Meier 2004; O‘Flynn 2009) are the results of 
incongruent mixes. This suggest that congruency is a continuum and ranges from low 
congruency -- high congruency –low congruency. This suggests that between 
implementation structure and compliance mechanism, there is a simultaneous 
existence dose dependent relationship between them along with congruency 
phenomenon, but within a short range.  
When the compliance mechanism is completely inappropriate, it will lead to 
incongruent governance mixes (Hill and Hupe 2014). Incongruence leads to poor 
performance.  
The findings also have implications for the RSBY scheme. These results 
suggest that managers of lead agencies need to work on collaboration to improve 
enrolment performance. Secondly, highest impact of collaboration and opportunism 
with DKM suggests that insurance companies need to make sure that they have a high 
level of collaboration with District Administration being a critical partner, if they 





needs to focus on assigning officers with collaborative capacity/ experience   for the 
post of DKM as collaboration requires different set of capacity (Agranoff and 
Mcguire 2004).  
This is the first study that linked Thomson (2001) collaboration model with 
the objective performance data.  Earlier studies Chen (2006) etc. have linked 
Thomson scale (2001) with the subjective performance but not objective 
performance. Thomson (2001) and Chen (2006), using the same scale received mixed 
results for the association between collaboration process and collaboration outcomes, 
with some variation
159
. Both studies found a strong relationship between three 
collaboration processes- resource sharing, trust, reduced autonomy and performance.  
The two other processes- Joint operation and joint decision making- were found to 
have limited influence on the performance measures. Contrary to Thomson (2001) 
and Chen (2006) who used each component of the scale as an explanatory variable, 
this study, aggregated collaboration dimensions in an index for each district but has 
similar results suggesting that these components could be aggregated into an index.  
This is also one of the few studies that link implementation performance with 
the IORs in a public contracting context. This study highlighted that increasing 
appropriate IOR by one unit, performance in enrolment will increase by 6 units and 
performance in hospitalization ratio would increase by 16% of the previous rate, 
keeping all other factors constant. This provides practical guidance on managers of 
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 In both the studies, sharing resources was found to have significant impact on the 
collaboration outcome- all five outcomes in case of Chen (2010) and on three outcomes in 
case of Thomson (2001). Similarly trust was found to be highly significant with collaboration 
outcomes in both the studies. It was found to have predicted positive influence on four 
collaboration outcomes (except broadening views) in case of Chen (2001) and three 
collaboration outcomes (except broadening views and increased interaction) in case of 
Thomson (2001).  Joint operation was found to be insignificant in all collaboration outcomes 
in Chen (2010) whereas it was only significant with goal achievement in Thomson (2001). 
Similarly for reduced autonomy, both studies (Thomson 2001, and Chen 2010) found positive 
relationship with increased interaction. In Chen (2010) reduced autonomy was also found to 
be significant with equitable influences whereas in case of Thomson (2001) it was found to be 
significant with broadening partner‘s views.  Joint decision making was found to have positive 
significant association with goal achievement, it was found to have positive association with 






the program to decide how much they should invest their energy and time. 
Developing collaboration requires considerable investment of time and energy 
(Frazier 1988; Lambe, 2000) and therefore managers of the districts can now weigh 
cost and benefits of using collaboration approach to improve performance. 
 
This is the also the first study in public contracting context that links IORs 
with implementation performance using quantitative approach with an objective 
performance measure. The existing literature predominately uses perception based 
measures of network performance because there are just too many variables that 
influence performance of a network and it is not always easy to measure and control 
them.  Some studies bypass these problems by measuring performance at the 
organizational or individual level rather than at the level of network.  
In this study, we were able to overcome the problems related with using 
subjective based performance measures because of the unique design of the RSBY 
scheme thus disentangling effect of structure as suggested by Sandifort and Milward 
(2008).   Thus this study is one of the very few studies that link quantitatively 
objective network performance with collaboration among agencies.  
The problem with perception based measure of performance is a problem of 
reliability. It‘s difficult to identify, whether a respondent is truthful and accurate and 
to what extent he is truthful and accurate in his reporting of subjective experience 
(Nelson 2008). These problems will get more accentuated in case where respondent 
who is responsible for performance of a program is asked to rate the performance of 
program as it is in case of RSBY scheme. This is like rating one‘s own performance.  
To support this, discrepancy was found between subjective performance measures 
and objective performance measures. The relationship between subjective and 
objective performance measures is negative, contrary to expectation suggesting that 
those districts whose performance was low , they rated much higher on the perception 





There are very few studies on link between inter-organizational relationship 
and performance in the developing countries context (Gulzar and Henry 2005; Liu et 
al 2009) and therefore, this study adds to the literature on inter-organizational 
relations / collaboration/ IOG in the developing country context.  The environmental 
and socio-cultural context of developing societies is different from the western 
countries, where the theories models and scales of collaboration have been developed. 
Thus, scholars (Kiggundu, Jorgensen, and Hafsi 1986) caution to use these models 
without taking into account the unique context of developing countries. Gulzar and 
Henry (2005) proposes that differences in environmental factors in developing 
country context will lead to outcomes that are different from that is observed in 
western countries.  Manning (2000) suggests that collaboration and networks are 
more suitable for developed economies as they possess required basic capacities in 
traditional approach to management. Developing countries, public administration 
system lack basic management capacity and therefore new public governance 
approaches  like collaboration and networks will be counterproductive and could 
become  breeding grounds for corruption and favoritism (Manning, 2000).  Empirical 
evidence supported this argument. In states where collaboration was not 
complemented with the hierarchical control and performance monitoring, widespread 
collusion developed among agencies. This was specially observed in the 
hospitalization and claims management function as there are conflicting interest and 
veto points. But at the same time where collaboration was appropriately mixed with 
other modes of governance performance was much higher as seen in Punjab as 
discussed in the qualitative study in chapter five. If the required governance mode is 
collaboration than it needs to be adopted for that implementation structure. I found 
the result which is very similar to that found in other studies like Thomson (2001) and 
Chen (2010) but as the performance measures used were different in my case, there is 
a need for few more replication using Thomson (2001) to test its validity in 





7 Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
7.1  Summary of Main Findings:  
 
This thesis has tried to explicate the factors that led to variations in the 
implementation performance of the RSBY scheme, which has the same contract 
design and implementation structure across districts. The analysis suggests that 
alignment of the compliance mechanism with the structure determined the 
performance. The more the compliance mechanism aligned with the implementation 
structure, the higher the performance.   
As shown in Table 7.1, the implementation structure determined the level of 
opportunism or problems during implementation, and incentives to perform led to the 
choice of the appropriate governance approach to fix those problems. The use of the 
appropriate compliance mechanism was found to be responsible for the variations in 
implementation performance.  
When Structure and compliance mechanism align to provide accountability, 
incentive and motivation for performance, this leads to congruent IOR which 
effectively manages the threat and opportunities offered by implementation structure 
resulting into high performance.  
As collaboration is the dominant compliance mechanism of the RSBY 
scheme, the level of collaboration among agencies was significantly associated with 
the performance. Higher collaboration among agencies suggested higher level of 
congruence between structure and compliance mechanism leading to higher 
performance. Collaboration improved performance, only when it was combined with 
the other compliance mechanism, collaboration alone was insufficient if the 
implementation structure varied. This suggested that there is continuum of 
congruency between compliance mechanism and implementation structure. The 





Table 7.1 Implementation Performance Variation across States 
 
  Degree of Alignment between compliance 
mechanism and implementation structure 
  High  
Moderate  




High     Low Performance  
(Uttar Pradesh) 









The choice of compliance mechanism depends heavily on the incentive to 
perform. If the street-level bureaucrats have incentives to perform, they use 
governance tools that align the compliance mechanism with the needs of the 
implementation structure, leading to higher performance. Control as a governance 
tool has limited effectiveness compared with incentives. 
These findings have wider implications for public policy and policy 
implementation. Policy implementation occurs in the non-linear world, a world that is 
dynamic and complex. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to predict the interactions 
between thousands of variables, and their outcomes. This implies that implementation 
design can never be perfect, and that the compliance mechanism needs to fill the gaps 
in the implementation design. However, there are limitations to the extent to which 
the gap in the implementation design can be filled by the compliance mechanism.  
This chapter provides a synthesis of the findings presented in the previous 
chapters. Section 7.2 integrates the key findings of the three empirical chapters. 
Section 7.3 discusses the theoretical implications of these findings, and Section 7.4 
discusses the policy implications of these findings. Section 7.5 enumerates the 







7.2 Integration of Findings  
 
7.2.1 Factors Driving Opportunistic Behavior During Implementation : issues in 
Implementation Context   
 
The variations in the implementation structure determine the level of 
opportunism observed at the dyad, network, and state levels during the different 
stages of the scheme implementation.   
The variations at the network level are driven by the structural factors like 
incentive (commonality of interest among network members), accountability and 
motivation for performance. Commonality of interest and accountability for 
performance reduce opportunistic behaviors and motivation for performance prevents 
opportunistic behavior. 
 The enrolment network has the highest commonality of interest among 
network members, as its specific purpose is to increase the level of enrolment; as all 
members‘ incentives are tied to the number of enrolments, each agency‘s 
accountability for performance is highest in the network. As a result, very few 
opportunistic behaviors were observed during the enrolment, and those few were only 
of the Smart Card Service Agency, when they started losing and their profitability 
was reduced.  
 The Hospital empanelment network, on the other hand, has diverging 
interests. The insurance company wants to empanel hospitals which have lower 
tendencies for fraudulent behavior, while the district administration is keen to 
empanel hospitals that provide high-quality care and can be accessed by the 
beneficiaries. Thus these interests are diverging but complementary as high-quality 
and high-client-load hospitals are also the least likely to engage in fraudulent 
behavior. However, if the district administration has the opportunity to collude with 





fraudulent hospitals, which contradicts the interests of the insurance company, 
leading to a conflict of interest and an increase in the opportunistic behavior of both 
agencies. Similar dynamics were observed in the claims management network. 
The approach of the State Nodal Agency towards private hospitals played an 
important role in determining opportunities for opportunistic behavior.  If the state 
government did not favored public hospitals, the public hospitals played a 
perfunctory role and private hospitals dominated in empanelment and service 
delivery. In order to capture the booty coming from these schemes, entrepreneurs 
(friends and relatives of the persons involved in scheme implementation) set up the 
hospitals and colluded with the district administration to get them empanelled.   
.Therefore in states where the state government has a higher preference for 
public hospitals, opportunities for collusion and rent seeking by the district 
administration is limited, as observed in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Thus the level 
of opportunity for rent seeking depends on the preference for empanelment of 
hospitals in the scheme 
Second implementation structure factors that contributed to the opportunism 
are veto points available to agencies. If an agency has a veto points they used it for 
seeking opportunity especially public agencies. Insurance company is considerably 
dependent on district administration for the implementation of the scheme and 
District Administration, exploits this opportunity especially if the Insurance do not 
have any indirect control on district administration (This happens when district 
administration is not under direct hierarchy or control of state nodal agency). Thus 
DA gets veto power especially in empanelment of hospitals, pressurizing insurance 
company to empanel his favored hospitals even if they do not qualify. These 
unqualified hospitals under immunity of district administration collude with other 
agencies making extensive fraudulent claims.  This incites counter opportunism by 
insurance company and opportunism and counter opportunism by other stakeholders 






As shown in Table 7.2, in some states the district administration has complete 
veto points (Uttar Pradesh); in other states it has limited veto points (Punjab), while in 
others it has no influence on the implementation of decision making (Himachal 
Pradesh). In the states where the district administration has high veto points, the 
district administration uses them to seek rents if the opportunity for seeking rent 
exists 
Table 7.2  Variation in Opportunism across states 
  
  Dependence on District Administration   







 Moderate to low  














7.2.2 Implementation Management Approach Used in the Scheme  
. 
When an agency behaves opportunistically, the aggrieved agency selects a 
prevention method, an initial approach, and a later approach. At each step in the 
process of opportunism management, the aggrieved agency uses either relational or 
transactional tools, depending on factors other than the characteristics of the 
opportunism. Agencies use different governance approaches, supplementing and 
complementing them, and mixing them with each other. 
Contrary to existing theoretical propositions that suggest basing the choice of 
governance approach on relationship strength, this study has found that the choice of 
governance approach depends on cost-effectiveness of the governance approach, and 
not only on relationships. Between two governance approaches, autonomy, control 





approach, whereas dependency on others, incentives to perform, and lack of clarity 
favor the use of the relational approach.  
In cases of dependency where private agencies cannot address opportunistic 
behaviors, they use relational governance activities with the partner agency, even 
when the partner agency has behaved opportunistically. Thus they (private-sector 
agencies) feign collaboration, externally using collaborative activities but internally 
monitoring partners‘ activities. To prevent opportunism, agencies mainly rely on the 
transactional approach, whose aspects include reducing flexibility and trust, 
increasing monitoring, and using official instructions. 
Although agencies (especially the private-sector agencies) prefer the 
relational approach because of their dependency on other agencies, they always use 
transactional tools to some minimum degree, like cross-checking or monitoring, even 
if a strong relational approach is used overall, as seen in the cases of Himachal 
Pradesh and Punjab. This is contrary to the observation of Van Slyke (2007).   
 Agencies also generally avoid extreme steps like imposing penalties because 
of the transaction costs of using these instruments (Girth 2011), and also because of 
the consequences of it on the relationship. In the case of RSBY, agencies understand 
that the pool of agencies with which they have to work in future is small (there are 
only 10–12 major insurance companies and 5–7 key TPAs and SCSPs), which deters 
the use of extreme tools. In addition, the contract design of RSBY provides limited 
transactional tools to punish, and these (or the threat of these) are therefore used more 
often than more extreme methods.  
Private-sector agencies choose a governance tool that does not disturb their 
liaisons with other agencies. They approach higher agencies only if they believe that 
higher authorities will be able to address the problem. If they foresee limited support 
from the higher authorities, they bow to the demands of public agencies, even if those 
demands are not in the contract. However, if they have close relationships with and 





in Punjab. In fact, if they have very close relationships with higher authorities, they 
even ignore the justified requests of other authorities, and thus behave 
opportunistically, as seen in Himachal Pradesh. 
At the network level, commonality of interest encourages collaborative 
behavior, and in cases of conflict of interest, collaboration between agencies is not 
expected to emerge (Lex and Sebenius, 1986, as cited in Wood and Gray, 1991, 
P161; Huxham, 2003). As expected highest level of collaboration was observed in the 
enrolment, but collaboration was also observed in claims management, contrary to 
expectation
160
, although the degree of collaboration was quite low. Agencies use 
collaborative activities even in cases of conflict of interest, feigning collaboration in 
order to prevent opportunism.  
At the state level, the governance approach used by public agencies becomes the 
dominant governance approach for the scheme, as private agencies simply respond to 
the approach used by public sector agencies. Among the public-sector agencies, either 
the governance approach used by the state nodal agency or that used by the district 
administration dominates.  
Governance dynamics at the dyadic level, contribute to governance at the 
network level, and this, along with variation in institutional factors, contributes to 
variation in governance dynamics at the state level.  
7.2.3 Influence of Compliance mechanism on Policy Implementation Performance 
 
At the dyadic level, a combination of both governance approaches controls 
partner opportunism much better than the use of single governance approach. 
Transactional governance serves as the base on which a relational governance 
approach is built. Transactional governance prevents blatant opportunism, whereas 
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 Wood and Gray 1991, P160; Lewicki, R. J., B. Gray, and M. Elliott 2003 suggested that in 
this case collaboration will not emerge and even if it emerges it will not be helpful (Huxham 






relational governance prevents invisible opportunism. Therefore, when both 
governance approaches are used, performance has been found to be better, as both 
types of opportunisms are prevented. The use of only one approach has been found to 
be ineffective in containing opportunism. For example, the use of the transactional 
approach alone has backfired in terms of counter-opportunism, whereas use of only 
the relational approach has failed to generate an effect. On the other hand, both 
governance approaches, when used in a synergistic manner, have prevented as well as 
contained opportunism. Agencies use different governance approaches, 
supplementing and complementing them, and mixing them with each other in an 
increasing cost form, leading to a calibrated strategy to manage opportunism. Yet it 
has been found that these governance tools do not supplement or complement each 
other perfectly, as each one has its own special effects.  
At the network level, the implementation of RSBY in a network requires a 
collaborative mode of governance, and therefore collaboration is expected to be a 
dominant mode of governance. The findings of the quantitative study support this as 
districts with higher collaboration were found to have higher levels of performance 
than others. Quantitative analysis suggested that a one unit increase in collaboration is 
associated with six units of increase in enrolment performance, and  16% increase in 
hospitalization ratio. In networks with conflicts of interest, when collaboration was 
complemented with hierarchical authority, the opportunism was controlled to some 
extent, and performance improved significantly (Punjab), compared with when this 
was not done (Uttar Pradesh). This suggests that the basic mode of governance 
appropriate for the RSBY scheme is the network mode, but also that other 
governance approaches need to be used to manage specific challenges in specific 
contexts.   
At the state level, alignment between the implementation context (the 
dependency relationship between agencies, hierarchical control by a state agency over 





and compliance mechanism (IORs at state level) determine the alignment between 
governance approaches in a given jurisdiction.   
Table 7.3 Variation in Governance Approach 
 
Governance Approach Opportunism 
High Moderate Low 




Collaboration + Incentive     
Collaboration + Incentive + 
Hierarchical  
 Punjab  
 
The dependency relationship between agencies and the hierarchical control 
over the implementation network by a state-implementation agency determine the 
veto power available to an agency involved in implementation, mainly the district-
level, public-sector, agency-district administration -responsible for facilitation of the 
scheme implementation. When there is no veto power, collaboration as a dominant 
approach to implementation has been found to be suitable. This was observed in the 
case of Himachal Pradesh, where district administration has no veto power.  
  Incentives to perform and incentives to seek rent determine how district 
administration uses this veto power. Where there is incentive to perform, the district 
administration uses the veto power and causes the compliance mechanism 
(collaboration and authority) to match the implementation structure, leading to high 
performance. This was observed in some districts in Punjab, where district 
administration actively managed the scheme using their veto power to facilitate 
implementation, and as a result higher performance was observed. 
On the other hand, in the presence of perverse incentives, the veto power is 
used to thwart the compliance mechanism, leading to poor performance. When veto 
power is abused by agencies, either incentives or hierarchical authority are needed in 





districts in Punjab and the majority of the districts in Uttar Pradesh, where district 
administration tried to abuse the veto power available to them.  
In Himachal Pradesh, implementation was structured such that no veto 
powers were available to agencies, and there were no perverse incentives for agencies 
either. Lower opportunities and lower incentive for opportunism resulted in lower 
level of opportunism between agencies.  The incentive to perform led agencies to use 
collaboration as a dominant method, and the use of hierarchical methods and/or 
incentives was not needed. Lower opportunism and high collaboration were 
responsible for higher performance in the case of Himachal Pradesh.  
In Punjab, the dependency relationship was found to be high. State agencies 
tried to control the veto power of district administration to some extent by 
restructuring the rules of implementation, but this was effective only to a certain 
extent because of the high perverse incentives available to the district administration. 
As a result, the district administration abused this veto power available to them. The 
state implementation agency tried to control this veto power through hierarchical 
control, which attenuated the opportunistic behavior of district administrators to some 
extent. Thus there was some opportunism, which led to a conflict of interest that 
lowered collaboration. As such, levels of performance in Punjab were found to be 
moderate to high.  
In the case of Uttar Pradesh, the implementation structure was redesigned, 
giving high veto power to the district administration. This high level of perverse 
incentives to perform, and the inability to use hierarchical control, led to agencies 
abusing their veto power. In Uttar Pradesh, the high empanelment of private-sector 
hospitals provided perverse incentives to the district administration to collude with 
these hospitals. Also, no hierarchical control could be exercised over the district 
administration, and therefore their veto power could not be controlled. Because of the 
high veto power, perverse incentives, and lack of control, the district administration 





opportunism by other agencies. This heightened the conflict of interest and lowered 
collaboration between agencies, reducing performance to a very low level. 
Table 7.4 Performance Variation at state level 
 
  
Complexity of  Implementation Context  
 


















Therefore, both qualitative and quantitative studies have found the existence 
of a consistent positive relationship between the use of the appropriate mode of IOR 
and the implementation performance at all three levels – micro (dyad), meson 
(network), and macro (state). When the compliance mechanism appropriately 
addresses the complexity of the implementation context, as shown in Table 7.4, both 
the quality and quantity of the performance improve. The more the compliance 
mechanism addresses the complexity of the context, the higher the performance is 
found to be.  
7.3 Thesis of congruency  
 
The following paragraphs summarize the interaction between the three pillars 
of the policy implementation process – structure, agents, and IORs. The interaction 
between these three pillars (which constitutes the fourth pillar of analysis) determines 
the performance. The interaction between structure, agents (the structure and agents 
together constitute the implementation context), and IORs (compliance mechanism) 
determine the performance, depending on the alignment between them.  
This thesis confirms the existence of a number of governance dynamics 
operating simultaneously, as the governance structures are never in a pure form, and 
therefore the required compliance mechanism is generally a combination of stylized 





suggested that implementation structure and compliance mechanism differ in terms of 
the combination of the required levels of incentive (market), accountability 
(hierarchy) and motivation ( network) for performance.  
The purpose of matching is to ensure that implementation structures and 
compliance mechanism together lead to an appropriate mix of incentive, 
accountability and motivation for performance. As implementation structures vary 
compliance mechanisms need to be combined in a manner that provides the required 
level of incentive, accountability and motivation for performance. The purpose of the 
structure and compliance mechanism is to facilitate some actions and prohibit others, 
and therefore incentive, accountability and motivation as three dimensions, that can 
be used to decide the congruence between compliance mechanism with the 
implementation structure.  
The congruence between the compliance mechanism and implementation 
structure influences agent‘s behavior, resulting in behavioral dynamics that allow 
agents to capitalize on opportunities during implementation and overcome threats, 
which in turn results in higher performance. Higher level of congruence is expected 
to lead to higher alignment and thus higher performance. Higher performance was 
observed in cases where there was a higher degree of alignment between the 
implementation structure and compliance mechanism. The findings suggested that 
higher collaboration was associated with higher performance. As collaboration 
increased performance is expected to increase but only up to a certain beyond that 
collaboration will cause incongruence and therefore will reduce the performance.  In 
the sample used in this study this was observed but a number of studies done in 
different context suggest a decreasing rate of return to collaboration and thus a 
curvilinear relationship between collaboration and performance (Villena et al 2011; 
Anderson and Jap 2005).  This further strengthens the argument of congruency as 
congruency is a continuous variable and therefore the congruency is expected to exist 





7.4 Theoretical Implications   
 
7.4.1 Implications for Theoretical Development in Policy Implementation   
 
Studies of the performance of policy have focused extensively on 
implementation design, and largely ignored the role of the compliance mechanism 
used to manage the policy implementation process. 
This thesis has demonstrated one of the approaches to disaggregate the policy 
implementation process into components and then trace the interaction between them. 
Most scholars (Howlett and Ramesh, 2013; Osborn, 2010; Peters, 2014) treat the 
implementation regime or mode of IOR  as a single structure, but this thesis separates 
the IOR  into components and studies the interaction between them. In the real world, 
there are no pure mode of IORs, but generally a combination of them (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2013; Osborn, 2010; Peters, 2014), and therefore separating the IORs into 
components allows us to understand the interaction between two implementation 
regimes much better. 
By disaggregating the IOR (implementation regime /service-delivery 
regime), this thesis has identified a number of variables related to implementation 
structure, agent, and compliance mechanism. The interactions between these 
variables could be further tested. The findings highlight that the compliance 
mechanism needs to match the structure, leading to congruent IOR. 
Disaggregating the IOR  into components also allows the tracing of the 
evolution of these components during the process of policy implementation, and of 
how each of the components varied across the different stages of implementation, 
thereby providing a nuanced understanding of the implementation process. 
Therefore, this thesis highlights the fact that policy implementation may be 
designed in congruence with the context and setting, but the compliance mechanism 





put the compliance mechanism into practice, stakeholders need to have incentives and 
motivation to do that, as otherwise they have been found to adopt the management 
approach that requires minimum effort and inconvenience. When the compliance 
mechanism that is adopted in practice matches the structure, the implementation 
performance is higher. Mere implementation design and capacity are insufficient to 
operationalize the required IOR. Thus this thesis has strongly illustrated that 
implementation performance depends on how the implementation is managed in 
practice, rather than how the implementation is designed. 
As policy implementation happens in a complex dynamic world, it is 
impossible to forecast the interaction between various factors and the ultimate 
incentives to agencies involved. The thesis clearly demonstrated that compliance 
mechanism can overcome the limitations of design to some extent.   
The thesis also highlighted the role of street level bureaucrats and the 
incentives they have. Public sector especially in developing countries relies on 
hierarchical control rather than incentive to manage performance. This study 
illustrated the limitations of hierarchical authority to motivate street level bureaucrats 
to perform. However good controls are there, street level bureaucrats can defeat them 
especially given their job guarantee. The best performance was only possible when 
there was some incentive to make things work. When there were incentives agencies 
even feigned collaboration to get things done.   So Implementation will not get 
operationalized the way it should be unless there are incentives to those who do that 
at the ground level that is street level bureaucrats.     
The findings also clearly establish the role of the IOR in determining policy 
implementation performance. During policy implementation, the IOR becomes the de 
facto mode of operational governance. Hill and Hupe (2014) do not consider the 
incongruence of the IOR a critical factor in implementation performance, but the 






7.4.2 Implications for the Field of Inter-Organizational Relations  
 
The research into IOR in implementation has been conducted mainly in silos, 
in various disciplines outside public policy, and public administration literature 
(Cropper et al., 2008). There has been very limited effort to aggregate, synthesize, 
and apply the findings in different theoretical paradigms to the field of 
implementation research. This study makes a contribution to this area by using 
different theoretical frameworks to analyze implementation performance. 
This thesis has therefore illustrated how IORs can be studied through a 
combined multiple-theoretical perspective. It has also illustrated how IORs can be 
studied at different levels, with one level of analysis building on another level of 
analysis. 
Apart from these methodological issues, this thesis has also emphasized the 
most important component in IOE – the relationship between agencies. Analysis at 
multiple levels – dyad, network, and state – has showed that structures, agent and 
compliance mechanism determine the nature relationship between agencies.  
Therefore, the next generation of research into the IOR should identify characteristics 
of structure, agent and compliance mechanism that contribute to these relationships 
between agencies, and how variations in these characteristics influence relationships 
and the different aspects of performance.  
The second key theoretical implication concerns the measuring of the 
compliance mechanism used by agencies. This thesis has found that the relationship 
between agencies has two components, an inner component (‗Relationship Strength‘) 
and an outer component (‗Governance Activities‘). The inner component is the core 
of relationship, and represents the true organizational identity, consisting of overall 
impressions of the partner agency (including trust and reliability), which are the result 
of the culmination of interactions with the partner agency over a period of time. The 





activities, which agencies use as part of their interaction. No correlation was found 
between governance activities used among agencies and the strength of relations 
between agencies. High use of governance activities was found even in cases of low 
relational strength, especially when there was high dependence on the other agency 
and low autonomy.  Therefore, a measurement of the compliance mechanism needs to 
include all three components – incentives, authority and motivation -which represent 
three different aspects of the relationship. Relationship strength indicates the inner 
core of the relationship (motivation); governance activities suggest nature of 
interaction between agencies (authority or incentive).  
Studies that do not take into account all three aspects of the IOR may end up 
calculating a partial dimension of the relationship, resulting in errors in the measuring 
and understanding of the relationship dynamics between agencies.   
Present measurement approaches, that either consider only governance 
activities (contract governance approach), or only relationship strength (trust-based 
studies), or only structure (network analysis), provide a partial explanation of the 
relationship and more research is needed to develop a better measurement scale.  
7.4.3 Implication for Theory of Collaborative Governance  
 
This thesis argues that the collaborative governance approach need not be the 
appropriate governance approach in all contexts, as some of the literature suggests. 
The findings suggest that even within the network structure, collaboration may not be 
the only appropriate approach, and needs to be combined with hierarchical and 
market-based governance approaches depending on the need of the implementation 
structure. Too much collaboration may become harmful as dark networks and 
collusive collaboration emerges, suggesting that collaboration should only be 
considered as one approach among others on the other hand very low collaboration 





 This thesis has validated the Thomson (2001) measurement model of 
collaboration. The five components of the measurement model fitted well with the 
data, suggesting the appropriateness of the conceptual model. Some of the 
measurement indicators had to be dropped, and this suggests that even though the 
conceptual model is valid, the measurement indicators need to be adjusted based on 
the context. 
Another finding that contributes to the collaboration literature concerns the 
role of collaboration in networks with conflicting interests. Huxham (2003) argues 
that collaboration will not emerge in these networks, but this study found 
collaboration even in the networks characterized by high conflict, as seen in the 
claims management network. This is probably because of feigned collaboration, as 
agencies, especially private agencies, used collaborative activities even when they did 
not have corresponding levels of trust. The issue of feigning collaboration therefore 
needs to be explored further. 
7.4.4 Implications for Contract Governance Theory   
 
The key findings congruence suggests that use of compliance mechanism 
cannot be studied in isolation from the implementation structure. Existing studies in 
contract governance assume the same structure and have focused mainly on 
compliance mechanism. The ignorance of relationship between structure and 
compliance mechanism probably explains the extensive contradictory findings 
observed in the literature.  
Compliance mechanisms /governance tools differ in their cost and 
effectiveness, and therefore the choice of governance tool depends on the cost-
effectiveness of one tool compared with others. This thesis suggests that in practice, 
managers move from one governance approach to another, using governance tools in 





complementing, and mixing them. The relationship between governance tools 
changes according to the context and the manner in which they are used. The mixing 
of these tools needs to generate a synergy to improve performance. In addition, 
governance tools neither supplement nor complement each other completely, as each 
has its own special effect; therefore there is a need to move beyond the debate about 
the relationship between governance approaches. 
The second key implication is that there are other important factors not 
previously identified that drive the use of governance mechanisms / tools. Previous 
studies have mainly identified transactional characteristics and transactional costs as 
the drivers of the use of governance strategies; however this study, in addition to 
those, also identifies a number of other characteristics based on relationship that also 
determine the use of the governance approach. Some of these findings could be 
further tested in other contexts. 
7.4.5 Implications  for Thesis of  Governance Design and Governance Failure 
  
This analysis suggests that the IOR is the mode of ‗operational governance‘. 
The appropriate mode of the IOR (matching with the task and context) needs to be 
operationalized, for higher performance. The appropriate compliance mechanism 
matching with the implementation structure leads to a governance dynamic that 
provides incentives to agencies to respond in a way that allows them to build on 
opportunities and manage the constraints imposed by the implementation structure. 
The extent to which the compliance mechanism matched with the implementation 
structure, the resulting governance dynamics incentivize appropriate behaviors among 
stakeholders, generating behavioral dynamics that improved performance.  
  In RSBY, the network is the mode of organization, and therefore the 





analysis clearly suggest that when the dominant mode of compliance is 
operationalized, the performance is higher.  
The qualitative study further strengthens this argument, as it provides more 
nuanced evidence suggesting that the mode of compliance or compliance mechanism 
needs to match implementation structure, which may vary even when the mode of 
organization is the same. In RSBY it was found that implementation may be designed 
in a particular mode of organization for all contexts (networks in the case of RSBY), 
suggesting an appropriate mode of compliance/governance matching the mode of 
organization (in the case of RSBY, collaboration matching the network mode of 
organization). However, variation in structural factors (dependency relationships, 
veto points available to the implementing agency, incentives to perform) will limit the 
appropriateness of the compliance mechanism, and therefore the appropriate 
compliance mechanism will vary in different contexts, even with the same mode of 
organization. In contexts and settings where the appropriate mix of compliance 
mechanism was not used, performance was found to be lower. This further stresses 
the importance of matching the compliance mechanism with the context and settings, 
further validating the thesis of ‗incongruent governance design‘.   
Given the complexity of the arrangements in general, a mix of all three 
compliance mechanisms is required in practice (although their proportions may vary), 
as one mode of governance cannot address all the opportunities and threat a context 
offers. The case of the RSBY scheme clearly illustrates that states which use 
governance tools from all three modes and combine them synergistically have much 
higher levels of performance. 
Howlett and Ramesh (2013) identify the constraints on capacity and 
competence of the governments, categorizing the lack of use of the appropriate 
compliance mechanism as a second-order governance failure, primary failure being 
the inability to match the governance approach with the policy problem. This thesis 





not used,  if the stakeholders do not have the incentive to do it, leading to a ‗third 
order governance failure‘. It was found that if stakeholders do not have enough 
incentives to perform; they prefer to use an compliance mechanism that requires the 
least cost or inconvenience to them, irrespective of its appropriateness to the 
structure. However, when the stakeholders had incentives to perform, they used the 
appropriate compliance mechanism.        
  
7.5 Policy Implications   
 
7.5.1 Policy Implications for Practitioners  
 
The findings of this thesis have numerous implications for practitioners. First, 
the findings suggest that it would be best to follow a structured approach to improve 
implementation performance. To improve the performance of inter-organizational 
arrangements, getting the context right is the first priority. Once the context is right, 
the incentives also need to be right, i.e. aligned through appropriate contract design. 
Once the incentives are right, the structure then needs to be right, i.e. the appropriate 
implementation structure must be found. Finally, the governance design needs to be 
congruent, with the appropriate compliance mechanism matched with implementation 
structure.   
Second, program designers need to recognize the importance of matching the 
compliance mechanism with the implementation structure. The findings clearly 
suggest that an compliance mechanism appropriate to context and setting leads to 
higher performance, but in many reform strategies a particular compliance 
mechanism is advocated as a better approach without consideration of the context and 
settings. When the compliance mechanism is completely inappropriate, it will lead to 
incongruent governance design, as seen in case of dark side of collaboration (O Toole 





Third, critical capacity and appropriate incentives for implementing the 
congruent compliance mechanism need to be included as part of the implementation 
design.   
Inter-Organizational Governance Design: Challenge of Capacity vs. 
Incentive  
Howlett and Ramesh (2013) identify the critical capacity required for 
different modes of governance; lack of this critical capacity leads to incongruent 
governance designs. A number of studies have also  found that bureaucracy in 
developing countries lacks even basic capacity  (Bhatt et. al., 2007; A Venkataraman, 
2009, Mills, 1998; Palmer, 2006; Siddiqui et. al., 2006; Zaidi et. al., 2011),   and 
therefore new public governance approaches like collaboration and networks will be 
counterproductive, serving as breeding grounds for corruption and favoritism 
(Manning, 2000). 
However, the choice of the compliance mechanism is implied by the 
implementation structure which depends on context and policy sector (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2014; Xun and Ramesh, 2013) and therefore the governments have limited 
choice of compliance mechanism. According to the implementation structure, which 
is determined by the context, policy sector, and policy problem, the appropriate 
compliance mechanism is required, and if the appropriate compliance mechanism is 
not used, it will lead to incongruent IOR /governance design. Therefore, governments 
need to build critical capacities to operationalize the required compliance mechanism.  
Analysis of such cases suggests that even when capacity is present, the 
appropriate compliance mechanism may not become operationalized if managers do 
not have incentives to put the required compliance mechanism into practice. 
Compliance mechanism differ in terms of the costs (time and energy) needed to 
operationalize them, and so some compliance mechanisms are easier to operationalize 
than others. Compliance mechanisms like collaboration require considerable amounts 





therefore if there are no incentives, managers may end up using the compliance 
mechanism instead, which requires limited effort on their part. On the other hand, the 
analysis presented here suggests that if there are incentives, managers will use the 
governance tool, to the extent of feigning a compliance mechanism. Public managers 
were found to collaborate only when they had incentives to do so; otherwise they 
preferred to govern with a hierarchical traditional approach. Thus, designing 
implementation delivery in an inter-organizational arrangement will not automatically 
lead to the appropriate IOR/ governance dynamics, even when capacity exists. 
Getting the appropriate governance dynamics requires incentives for 
managers to use the appropriate governance tools or compliance mechanism. The 
case of the RSBY scheme shows the limitations of the top-down approach to 
governance design. Public managers, especially at the district level, continued using 
their old style (hierarchical governance) even when new structures and processes for 
the required mode of governance were put in place. The public managers not only 
continued using the old style of governance, but also, if there were incentives, 
changed the intention or purpose for which these governance structures were first put 
in place. However, if the incentives were provided appropriately, a change in 
compliance mechanism was observed. 
Third, the implementation structure needs to be designed in a way that 
reduces the risk of opportunism. The mode of governance can only contain the 
deficits in the implementation structure to a certain extent. The risk of opportunism 
increases if an agency is completely dependent and lacks control – direct or indirect – 
over the other agency. Therefore, implementation design should include opportunities 
or venues to air grievances and allow agencies to have some direct or indirect control 
over others.  
Also, to manage opportunism, the contract should include a sufficient number 





option of using the relational approach, but it should always be backed up by a 
transactional approach as a last resort, in case the relational approach fails. 
 
7.5.2 Policy Implications for RSBY Scheme  
 
Collaboration has a limited role in the RSBY scheme, but still accounts for a 
significant portion of the variation in performance across districts. This suggests that 
the State Nodal Agency and insurance companies should consider fostering 
collaboration at the district level as an important step to improving performance. 
Insurance companies and Third Party Administrators need to capitalize on the 
relationships developed by the field-level staff. At the same time, the State Nodal 
Agency needs to be observant about the dependence of the private agencies at the 
district level, and monitor the situation actively for any abuse by the district public 
agencies. 
Shorter durations of contracts not only stunt the development of trust and 
relational norms, which are critical to improving performance, but also prevent 
agencies from investing in other strategies for improving scheme performance, like 
pricing of the premiums and investment in preventive healthcare. Thus efforts could 
be made to increase the duration of the contract, which will increase the investment 
cycle.  
One of the biggest exercises in the scheme implementation is the enrolment 
process, which is repeated every year. This repeated enrolment causes great 
inconvenience to both the beneficiaries and implementing agency, and disrupts the 
delivery of the services. Longer contract duration, with one enrolment process every 
two years, will reduce the investment of time and disruption in services. A longer 
contract period will also facilitate collaboration between agencies.   
With mass policies like RSBY, monitoring is done on a random basis, and 





sufficiently high to set an example and deter stakeholders from indulging further in 
any kind of fraudulent activity.  
There is a strong association between the share of private hospitals and the 
extent of opportunism in scheme implementation. Private players corrupt the process 
of empanelment that perpetuates fraudulent behavior in hospitalization and claims 
management. The participation of   public hospitals will not only improve 
performance in terms of lower levels of fraud, but also improve continuity of care and 
generate extra revenue for the starving public facilities, which the hospitals can use to 
improve infrastructure, as in the case of Punjab. 
To improve the share of public hospitals, it is important that role of the health 
ministry in the scheme be augmented. Compared with the Ministry of Labor, the 
Ministry of Health is in a better position to implement the scheme, given their 
expertise in the health sector, in managing health insurance programs, and in creating 
opportunities for synergy with various other health programs. Bringing in the health 
department will also improve control over public hospitals, which are one of the big 
stakeholders in the scheme, as in the case of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh.  
7.6 Contributions   
 
This thesis contributes to theorization in the field of policy implementation, 
an under-researched area in public policy. In spite of the critical role of policy 
implementation, theoretical development in the field has been limited (Herald, 2014), 
and enthusiasm for implementation research, which was observed during the period 
of Pressman and Wildavsky‘s research (1973), seems to have  died down, as if 
implementation studies have lost their fashionable character (Moynihan, 2008; pg. 
486). 
This thesis contributes to the theorization in policy implementation 





may break the jinx on policy implementation theorization. Scholars have argued that 
the reason for the weak conceptual development in policy implementation literature is 
that implementation studies have wrongly focused on policy outcomes or policy 
success, rather than explaining variation in the  policy/implementation outputs (May, 
1999; Winter, 2012; Hill and Hupe, 2014; Peters, 2014). Hupe (2014) suggests that it 
is the ―empirical variation in the performance (horizontally) that needs explanation, 
rather than goal achievement (vertically)‖ (pg. 173). Thus this thesis addresses one of 
the most pressing needs of the field. By analyzing variations in implementation 
performance, this thesis explains the role of contextual factors, implementation 
design, and inter-organizational relations, thereby enriching theoretical development 
of the field.  
This thesis strongly establishes, for the first time, the role of the relationship 
between implementing agencies in implementation performance, which has been an 
overlooked and neglected area of research in policy implementation literature. When 
implementation goes wrong, it is usually the implementing agencies that are blamed, 
but there has been no research on how relations between implementing agencies 
influence implementation performance. This is the first study that has not only 
identified and established the role of the IOR in policy implementation performance, 
but also measured the extent to which the IOR influences implementation 
performance, thereby guiding managers on the use of the appropriate IOR during 
program implementation.  
Policy implementation literature has often overlooked the importance of 
matching or aligning the compliance mechanism with the implementation structure. 
Peters (2014) writes, ―much of the initial spate of literature on implementation 
recognized the role of multiple public sector organizations in implementation but 
continued to assume a more top-down logic for implementation‖ (pg. 131). This 
study has firmly established, for the first time, the significance of appropriate inter-





Thus this is the first study which empirically tests the theory of incongruent 
mix (Hill and Hupe, 2014) between implementation structure and mode of 
compliance mechanism, teasing out the impact of a mode of IOR on performance, 
and thus disaggregating the role the IOR plays in governance design.  
Howlett and Ramesh (2013) have identified the improper matching of 
governance design with policy problem, and constraints on governments‘ ability and 
capacity to steer or shape governance relationships, as first- and second-order 
governance failures respectively. This thesis argues that even if there are no first- and 
second-order governance failures, an appropriate governance approach may not 
appear. This is because of the fact that, even if the governance design matches the 
problem and there is capacity in the bureaucracy to steer the governance relationship, 
the required compliance mechanism may not get operationalized because of a lack of 
incentives. This thesis found that managers used the appropriate compliance 
mechanism only when they had incentives to perform; otherwise they preferred to use 
the authority or command and control approach, even if the implementation structure 
was inappropriate. Thus this thesis has identified the ‗third-order failure of 
governance‘, namely the failure to operationalize the appropriate governance 
mechanism.  
This is one of the initial pieces of research that explore the use of governance 
approaches by public sector managers, in the context of opportunism, and in the case 
of public-private partnerships. Studies of governance dynamics have been conducted 
(e.g. Van Slyke, 2007), but they do no focus specifically on the context of partner 
opportunism. This study concentrates on the governance mechanisms that public-
sector managers use to deal with the opportunism of the private sector, and that 
private-sector managers use to deal with the opportunism of public-sector managers.  
This is the first-ever study to trace the interaction between different 
governance approaches at three different levels, and how the dynamics at one level 





This study also presents a methodological improvement, compared with 
previous studies linking collaboration with performance. This study uses a new 
approach as it measures the strength of the relationship (the explanatory variable), 
compared with previous studies, which measure relationship activities. This study 
uses objective performance indicators as the dependent variable, rather than the 
subjective performance indicators used by others. Compared with other studies in 
public contracting, this study uses a quantitative regression analysis, rather than the 
usual case-study approach taken by other studies, to link relationships between 
agencies with performance.  
This is the first-ever empirical test linking the IOR and performance in public 
contracting, where all sample units have the same contracted service characteristics, 
the same contract design, similar implementation arrangements, and similar 
institutional arrangements. This increased the strength of causality in this case, 
because of the unique program design that allowed for control of the structural 
determinants of the program performance (which other studies have found difficult to 
allow for), thereby increasing the causality and validity of the findings.  
Finally, this is one of the first studies of inter-organizational relations and 
their relationship with performance in a developing-country context. Most of the 
studies of IORs have been conducted in the Western context, and there has been very 
limited evidence of the testing of these approaches in a developing-country context, 
especially involving both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. There have 
been a number of studies of inter-organizational relations and performance, but they 
have been limited to private-sector contracting, especially supply-chain relations. 
There has been no known study of the context of public contracting in a developing-
country context. 
Following are some more contributions of this research summarized as 
follows. The study has made an effort to link disparate literature segments which 





measure IORs in network context and identified an approach that takes into 
consideration the important components of social relations.  
7.7 Limitations  
 
One of the main challenges encountered during this research was primary-
data collection, for both surveys and in-depth interviews. The data required for the 
analysis was sensitive as it included reporting on issues related to cooperation, trust, 
support, and opportunistic behavior with agencies‘ present partners. Due to extensive 
frauds and scams in the RSBY scheme, it was very difficult to get information on 
fraudulent behaviors; as such information was very sensitive. Everyone was keen to 
report the fraudulent behavior found in other states, but not in their own state or 
district, or within their own close relationships, especially in an internet-based survey, 
despite the promise of anonymity. A clear reporting bias was observed in the survey 
data, and as such the survey data was reconfirmed in telephonic interviews. The 
respondents were reassured of anonymity, and only opened up more easily after this 
verbal confirmation, providing sensitive information.  
Another big challenge of the data collection was that most of the respondents 
were still very young and inexperienced, with no prior experience with surveys 
designed to collect data on relationships between agencies; this could have affected 
their responses. The RSBY senior management team had already warned the 
researcher about the limited capability and interest of the district-level staff in 
answering this survey. This was the reason that, even after the survey was sent to 202 
districts, the initial response was very limited. A very strong and continuous follow-
up was done the telephonic interviews after the internet-based survey helped to 
explain the questions, which were then answered more accurately, thereby improving 





To emulate this study in another location, the issue of sensitivity of data and 
capability of the staff to understand and respond to the survey/interview would need 
to be considered. The staffs who are mainly involved in the day-to-day interaction 
with other agencies are generally field-level staff, with limited exposure to these 
kinds of surveys and interviews. The private-sector and public-sector agencies, at the 
state and district levels, are not keen to participate in this kind of research, fearing it 
could be a covert investigation by higher authorities. The familiarity of the researcher 
with the health sector in India, and access to the network of managers in the insurance 
company, public health departments, and Ministry, proved invaluable to this research, 
and hence would almost be necessities for other studies.  
Another big challenge was obtaining data on control variables. A number of 
factors that influence performance were controlled by the unique design of the 
program, but even so, some of the programmatic factors which directly influence the 
program‘s performance, like awareness, IEC efforts, and leadership of the district 
administration, were not controlled because of the lack of data on these factors.  
7.8 Further Research 
 
Scholars have always complained about the lack of theoretical development in 
implementation research, specifically of the IOR in implementation. There is a need 
for more research to understand IOR dynamics, especially in a developing-country 
context. The findings of this study could be verified further by other cases of service 
contracting in other social sectors like education, water etc. A number of findings 
related to the policy implementation process need to be further tested for validation of 
the findings in other contexts. 
This thesis is one of the first-known empirical tests of the thesis of the 
incongruence governance mix and its impact on implementation performance. Further 





The triad of Structure, Agent, and compliance mechanism used to explore the 
incongruence of IOR can be used further to explore the policy implementation 
process. The further use of this approach to disaggregate the policy implementation 
process will identify additional characteristics and interactions between these 
variables, generating a hypothesis about advancing theoretical conceptualization in 
the field that could be tested. 
Furthermore, the role of the IOR could be explored in other contexts. The 
examination of the process of evolution of the IOR in other implementation contexts 
may reveal variations in terms of sequence of compliance mechanism. The thesis of 
dual governance, the approach used to mix compliance mechanisms and the 
relationship between opportunisms and their management could be explored further. 
Feigning of collaboration needs to be explored in other similar settings of short 
duration exchanges.  
Further testing of the collaboration model of Thomson will validate the 
components of the model. In addition, measurement models of other implementation 
regimes of the IOR could be developed. 
One of the most important critical findings that need to be validated in other 
contexts is the thesis of incongruence between compliance mechanism and 
implementation structure and their impact on performance. Further studies focusing 
on measuring IORs, various modes of IORs, incongruence mix and operationalization 
of IOR can further advance the field of governance design and governance failure. 
The thesis of third-order failure of governance design needs to be tested in other 
contexts. 
This thesis has analyzed governance dynamics at three levels – state, 
network, and dyad – which match the levels of analysis suggested by Hill and Hupe 
(2014). In this study, ‗state-level analysis‘ refers to constitutional choice level; 





level of governance. Further research on the framework suggested by Hill and Hupe 
(2014) and Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) will provide new insights into the 
variations in governance dynamics at different levels, and the interrelations between 
them.    
This is one of the first contributions quantitatively linking IORs with 
implementation performance, in policy implementation literature. More quantitative 
studies in this area will strengthen the results found here, and may find possible 
variations. 
Partnerships in healthcare, especially health insurance, is a potential area in 
which the dynamics of IORs may be explored, as a number of agencies both from the 
public and private sectors get engaged to deliver services for a longer duration of 
time. There is considerable interest in identifying areas to improve performance and 
reduce opportunism in these kinds of partnerships. Research on the areas of synergy, 
conflict, and cooperation between various implementing agencies, and how they 
influence performance, is important for better design and implementation of health 
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Appendix 2.1  components of contract governance 
 
Transactional Governance Approach   
 
The Transactional governance approach or control approach to governance, uses 
following mechanisms to control opportunism.  
 
Administrative control/authority through use of contractual terms:  
Transaction cost theory argues for need for adequate controls for controlling 
opportunistic behaviours. Administrative control through the use of contractual 
agreements as suggested by Stinchcombe (1985) is considered as an important 
alternative to the hierarchical control as exercised in the hierarchy.  Contract states 
the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour of the parties in the contract and specifies 
specific duties of both parties along with penalties for the opportunistic behaviour and 
thus uses legal force to prevent opportunistic behaviour ( Liu et al 2009). Contract 
gives authority to the party who has legitimate rights to make decisions and then this 
party uses governance mechanisms such as rules and procedures, as listed in the 
contract to control the activities of the other party. ( Haugland and Reve 1994; Ness 
and Haugland 2005; Wang et al 2008) 
 
Most studies use some indicator measuring contractual explicitness as a 
component of transactional governance. The studies examining use of administrative 
control as a tool to control opportunism are Andaleeb (1995), Caniels and Gelderman 
(2010), Yang et al (2011), Liu et al (2009),Ferguson et al (2005).   
Transaction specific investments: transaction cost economics highlights 
importance of using relationship specific investments as an important safeguard 
against opportunism. (Williamson 1985; Jap and Anderson 2003). Relationship 
investments hold very little value outside of the relationship and therefore investment 
serves as a mutual hostages and sign of credible commitment. (Williamson 1983). In 
this way bilateral relationship specific investments increase interdependence of 
parties on each other provide economic incentives to both parties to continue their 
relationship (Jap and Anderson 2003). These transaction specific investments could 
be both tangible (eg a manufacturing facility, a specific tool or machine) as well as 
intangible (e.g, transfer of tacit knowledge, investments in inter-firm routines, process 
and procedures and capability including specific technology) (Jap and Anderson 
2003). A number of studies (Wang et al 2012; Liu et al 2009) have used transaction 





opportunism and found that relationship investment is associated with higher 
opportunism (Wang et al 2012) as well as lower opportunism (liu et al 2009).  The 
Transaction specific investments serve as complementary to contracts specially in 
emerging markets as they compensate for the relatively weaker contractual 
governance ( Luo 2002).  
Monitoring: Monitoring is advocated by scholars to control opportunism as ex-
ante efforts (selection and incentive design) are incomplete (Williamson 1993) and 
therefore monitoring is needed in all governance forms (Heide 1994) especially to 
control ex-post opportunism (Stump and Heide 1996). Monitoring basically reduces 
the opportunistic behaviour that results from information asymmetry ( Wathne Heide 
2000). Monitoring acts as a tool to prevent as well as control opportunistic behaviour. 
Monitoring prevents opportunism by increasing compliance of the party as it puts 
social pressure on the parties to comply with the requirements of the relationship 
(Murry and Heide 1998). Monitoring controls opportunism by increasing the ability 
to detect opportunistic behaviours and take necessary actions to curb opportunism. 
To be effective monitoring needs to be done at the acceptable level as very 
intensive monitoring can lead to distrust and promote opportunism ( Murray and 
Heide 1998). Explicit monitoring also acts as a screening device where by 
opportunistically inclined parties are discouraged to enter in to the relationship 
(Murray and Heide 1998). Usually parties in a relationship establish standards for 
quality and delivery, specify the metrics on how these will be measured and track the 
compliance over time. ( Stump and Heide 1992). The business lietarture in buyer and 
supplier relationships has identified two types of monitoring –process based and 
outcome based monitoring. The research in distribution channel relationship have 
found that process based monitoring
161
 increases opportunism whereas outcome based 
monitoring
162
 reduces opportunism ( Heide et al 2007). 
Relational Governance Approach:  
The Relational governance approach or control approach to governance, uses 
following mechanisms to control opportunism. Relational governance in inter-
organisational relationships includes relational norms and trust (Anderson and Narus 
1990, Heide and John 1990, Luo 2007). Out of the ten types of relational norms 
identified by MacNeil (1978, 1980, 1983), flexibility, solidarity and information 
                                                          
161
 Process monitoring includes monitoring of the partners actions like onsite inspection , 
quality control procedures and thus it imposes guidelines on which activities should be 
performed and how those activities should be performed 
162
 Outcome monitoring is monitoring of the visible consequences of the a partners actions 
like delivery time order accuracy and product quality ( Heide et al 2007) and thus partner 





exchange,  are the three most widely studied relational norms (Heide and John, 1992; 
Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Lusch and Brown, 1996; Simpson and Paul, 1994) and forms 
the key component of the relational contract (Poppo and Zenger 2002).   
Information exchange as a relational norm,: This relational norm implies a 
mutual expectation between parties to proactively share information that is useful for 
each other (Heide and John 1992 P 35),  in the benefit of the relationship rather than 
in their self interest ( Hawkins 2008). This norm based behaviour reduces risk of 
opportunistic behaviours caused by information asymmetry, promotes harmonization 
of conflict, reduces transaction cost, enhances bilateral trust (Luo 2007)  and acts as a 
socially binding force that reduces desire for opportunism  (Luo 2006).  
Flexibility: According to the Heide and John (1992 P 35) Flexibility is ― is a 
bilateral expectation of willingness to make adaptations as circumstances change‖   
Solidarity: According to Heide and John (1992 p 35) solidarity is a ―bilateral 
expectation that a high value is placed on the relationship. It prescribes behaviors 
directed specifically toward relationship maintenance‖. Solidarity encourages 
behaviors that fosters unity, based on common responsibility and interest,  rather than 
self interest (Rokkan et al 2003) 
 Compliance with these norms is reflected in the extent to which parties exchange 
information, share ideas or initiatives , use joint consultations and discussions to 
solve problems and make decisions in a joint participatory manner ( Heide and John 
1992; Jap and  Ganesan 2000) 
Trust:  Trust has been considered as the most important and most encompassing 
element of the relational governance (Claro et al 2003). It is considered as necessary 
for the development of relational governance ( McNeiel 1980; Ring Ven de Ven 
1994; Vandaele et al 2007 ) as well as it is considered as an outcome of the relational 
governance, suggesting a recursive relationship (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Johnston 
et al 2004).  
 
 Trust implies benevolence - belief that party is genuinely interested in welfare of 
the other party and joint gains,  and credibility or honesty (Cavusgil et al 2004 p 10; 
Doney and Cannon 1997 p 37; Geyskens et al 1998; Grayson et al 2008; Kumar et al 
1995). In the context of inter-firm relationship trust  on a partner implies a 
willingness to rely on the partner  (Gundlach and Cannon 2010), motives intentions 
and behaviour of the partner are trustworthy (Gundlach and Cannon 2010), there is a  
belief that partner will take actions that will result in positive outcomes and not 





is one of the most important dimension of trust especially in inter-organisational 
relationships ( Cavusgil et al 2004) .  
Trust is considered as one of the most potent mechanisms to control opportunism 
(Wathne and Heide 2000) . Trust raises cost of engaging in opportunistic behaviour, 
such as loss of the long term benefits and loss of opportunity for future exchange 
(Cavusgill 2004).  Trust reduces transaction cost of exchange, as it obviates the need 
for more elaborate safeguards, improves interactions, facilitates timely and 
comprehensive information exchange, creates higher receptivity to influence of others 
and reduces need for controls (Chiles and McMackin 1996). This decreases 
behavioural certainty among partners   (Chiles and McMackin 1996; Sako 1992) 
leading to replacement of more expensive formal monitoring process with monitoring 
by social norms and personal relationships (Haugland Reve, 1994). At the same time 
trusting parties make themselves vulnerable to an opportunistic partner, who can 
systematically cheat in absence of verification strategies (Gundlach and Cannon 
2010; Anderson and Jap 2005).  
Relational norms along with trust prevents opportunistic behaviours by serving as 
a moral control encouraging pro relationship behaviour and suppressing opportunistic 






































Measurement Indicators  
Decision 
Making  
This partner organization takes your organization‘s opinions seriously when decisions 
are made about collaborative implementation of the activities. 
Your organization brainstorms with this partner organization to develop solutions to 
problems during collaborative implementation of the activities.  
Administ
ration  
You, as a representative of your organization understand your organization‘s roles and 
responsibilities in the collaborative  implementation of the scheme while working with this 
partner 
Meetings with this partner organization accomplish what is necessary for collaborative 
implementation of the scheme?  
This partner organization agrees about the goals of the collaboration for 
implementation of the scheme? 
Your organization‘s tasks are well coordinated with those of this partner organization 
while working in collaboration for implementation of the scheme? 
Autonom
y  
Working in collaboration with this partner for implementation of the scheme hinders 
your organization from meeting its own organizational mission (profit)? 
Your organization‘s independence is reduced by having to work in collaboration with 
this partner organization? 
You, as a representative of your organization, feel pulled between trying to meet both 
your organization‘s and the collaboration‘s expectations? 
Resource 
Sharing  
Your organization and this partner organization have combined and used each other‘s 
resources so both parties benefit from collaborating? 
Your organization shares information with this partner organization that will 
strengthen their operations and programs? 
You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and 
respected by this partner organization? 
Your organization achieves its own goals better by working with this partner 
organization than working alone? 
Your organization and this partner organization work through differences to arrive at 
win-win solutions? 
Trust  People who represent this partner organization in the collaboration are trustworthy. 
My organization can count on this partner organization to meet its obligations to the 
collaboration. My organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with this partner 





















Tasks  Responsible 
Person  
Inputs required from   Level of 
Specification in 
the contract  
1 Preparation of 
Beneficiary list  
MOLE Requires beneficiary 




2 Preparation of 





regarding locations and 
flow depending upon 
the geography  
Process specified  
3 Block level 







Block level officer 
under direction of 
district administration , 
invites field key 
officers of the block 
and related government 
field workers  
Process listed  






provides the chits and 
list of beneficiary to 
each field key officers  
Process listed  
5 IEC campaign 
for enrollment  
Insurance 
company  
 Task listed 
6 Verification of 
beneficiary on 




 Task listed   




Verification of the 
beneficiary by FKO  
Quality of Inputs 
and Quality of 
outputs  specified 
in the contract  




 Quality of output 
specified in the 
contract 
9  Preparation of 
enrollment data  
Smart card 
company  
 Quality of output 

























Inputs required from Level of 
Specification in 
the contract 
1  Informing all 




IC Requires inputs from the 
district administration on 
which hospitals to be 







Place of hospital 
workshop and   
Process 
specified  





 Process listed  
4 Hospitals list  Field Key 
officers  
Requires inputs from the 
district administration on 
which hospitals are better 
quality and which are 
problematic as well 
geographic dispersion  
Process listed  
5 Installation of 
hardware and 




 Task listed 
6 Hospitals MCH 
cards issued  
District Key 
manager  
 Task listed   
7 Preparation of 
hospital data  
Insurance 












































Hospitals   
Assam  27 22 49 55.10204 
Bihar  767 37 804 95.39801 
Chhattisgarh 302 453 755 40 
Gujarat 1134 412 1546 73.35058 
Haryana  658 58 716 91.89944 
Himachal Pradesh 38 170 208 18.26923 
Jharkhand  239 262 501 47.70459 
Karnataka  425 317 742 57.27763 
Kerala 200 153 353 56.65722 
Maharashtra  1181 15 1196 98.74582 
Meghalaya  8 65 73 10.9589 
Mizoram  13 74 87 14.94253 
Nagaland  7 1 8 87.5 
Orissa  116 284 400 29 
Punjab 354 165 519 68.20809 
Uttar Pradesh  1392 676 2068 67.31141 
Uttara -khand 88 75 163 53.98773 
West Bengal 483 1 484 99.79339 
(Source: based on the RSBY website accessed on 10
th




































from   
Level of 
Specification in the 
contract  






    Responsibility 
specified  
2   Claims 





  Process specified  
3 Claims submissions  Hospital    Process listed  





 Process listed, 
Percentage of claims 
answered within 30 
days measured and 
monitored. 
5 Payment and 
rejection of claims  
Insurance 
company  
 Task listed 
6 Suspension of 
hospital in case of 
fraudulent activity  
Insurance 
Company 
 Process listed    
7 Disempanellement of 
Hospital   
Insurance 
company   




Process listed  















































Name of the Respondent Designation 
ID1 Mr Jagananath  Prakash  Manager in a TPA handling RSBY scheme  
ID2 Mr Vijendra Katre Officer of the State Nodal Agency of a high 
performing state   
ID3 Mr Somnath malankar  Officer,  Third Party Administration 
ID4 Mr Sun Xi  Officer from The Work Bank  
ID5 Mr Raghav Puri  Officer from The Work Bank  
ID6 Dr Karan  Academician   
ID7 Dr Selvaraj  Academician 
ID8 Dr (jagannaths refrenece ) Ex- CEO of State Nodal Agency 













































Name  Description  
P1 Mr Kakatkar  Officer of the State Nodal Agency of a poorly 
performing state   
P2 Mr Ali Zaidi  Manager in an Insurance Company  
P3 Mr Gaurav Tripathi  Manager in an Insurance Company handling 
RSBY scheme 
P4 Mr Jagannath Prakash  Manager in a TPA handling RSBY scheme  
P5 Dr Sanjay  Manager in a TPA handling RSBY scheme 
P6 Mr XYZ Manager, Insurance Brokers firm handling RSBY 
scheme   
P7 Mr Onkar Shukla Manager in an Insurance Company handling 
RSBY scheme 
P8 Mr Abhishek singh Manager in an Insurance Company handling 
RSBY scheme 
P9 Mr Vijendra Katre  Officer of the State Nodal Agency of a high 




































Appendix 4.4  Questionnaires of core groups Interviews 
Four Interviews 
 Interview with Director General Labor & Welfare  
 Interview with GIZ Representative-1  
 Interview with GIZ  Representative-2  
 Interview with GIZ Repreentative-3  
 
Interview with DGLW 
Explain the purpose of the research  
Research process – questions, methods, tools and outcome of the research  
Scheme background  
 Describe evolution of the scheme and role played by different agencies 
stakeholders in the process? 
 What are some of the key changes in the contract/ rules /process that has 
taken place in RSBY scheme from its inception till now.  
 What is your vision of the scheme and what are some of the reasons for gaps 
between vision and reality? 
 Why contract between various agencies don‘t have penalty clauses? 
 How you view approach to management of relationships between parties -
control based or relational approach? 
 What methods are available with MOLE to ensure accountability of SNA in 
the process  
 What are the factors that explain variation in the performance of the RSBY 
scheme? 
 How to you foresee different stakeholders managing the scheme ( based on 
the contract or based on  
 Integration with Ministry of health  
 Future of the scheme 
 Goal to universal coverage  
 What are the areas of concern according to you in the scheme  
 Flooring in case of premium 
 Premium package rates  
 Why and why not take insurance guarantee from IC 
 SCSP risk of losing money  
 Final decision maker in case of empanellement and disempanellement 
 Funds for hospital promotion and awareness  
 Lack of quality hospitals /supply issue  
 Managing frauds at various levels  
 Reason for limited human resources at MOLE devoted to the scheme 
 Requests:  
 Recommendation Letter for participation in the survey  
 Approval letter for research  
 Data access  
Questions for Representative of GIZ-2 
 Show the participant informant sheet  
 Show copy of proposal ( IIM A submission)  
 Explain the purpose of the interview  
 Explain and get feedback on  the purpose of your research , research design , 
survey and qualitative data (limited) ask from collaboration perspective 
 explain and get feedback especially on  





 sites with high collaboration , medium and low collaboration (Punjab which 
places are dong best ) Harayana  
 
 RSBY Scheme Management  
 Feedback on author and relationships between various players ( using a 
chart)- organizational structure of SNA and support by GIZ 
 Role of GIZ, and your  
 What methods are available with MOLE to ensure accountability of SNA in 
the process  
 What methods are available with SNA to ensure accountability of insurance 
company  
 What methods are available with SNA  to ensure accountability of district 
administration  
 What is reporting and communication method (control or relational)  what 
kind of relationships between parties they envision  
 Hospital empanelment -How you envision it should happen and but how it‘s 
happening? What issues and challenges are there in hospital empannellement 
and how they need to be addressed  
 How you ensure quality of hospitals in empanelment process  
 What issues arise in the hospital disempanellement process and how they are 
managed  
 How you envision function of grievance redressed committees  but how it‘s 
happening  
 
Questions for Representative of GIZ-1  
 Participant informant sheet  
 Explain the purpose of the interview  
 Scheme background  
 What are the factors that explain variation in the performance of the RSBY 
scheme? 
 What are some of the key changes in the contract/ rules /process that has 
taken place in RSBY scheme from its inception till now. Describe evolution 
of the scheme and role played by different agencies stakeholders in the 
process? 
 What methods are available with MOLE to ensure accountability of SNA in 
the process  
 What methods are available to ensure accountability of DA, DKM and DKO? 
 What methods are available with SNA to ensure accountability of insurance 
company?  
 What methods are available with SNA to ensure accountability of district 
administration? 
 Research  
 Show copy of proposal ( IIM A submission)  
 Explain and get feedback on  the purpose of your research , research design , 
survey and qualitative data (limited) ask from collaboration perspective 
 explain and get feedback especially on  
 Data indicators (caesarean section rate, % of claim payment done in 21 days. 
Hospitalisation ratio, enrollement ratio) 
 site of qualitative approach 
 Data access:  
 





 What are the factors that explain variation in the performance of the RSBY 
scheme? 
 What are some of the key changes in the contract/ rules /process that has 
taken place in RSBY scheme from its inception till now. 
 Role of GIZ in RSBY scheme  
 Relationship between GIZ and MOLE 
 Relationship between GIZ and other agencies ( SNA, Insurance Company, 
and state departments ) 
 Reporting and data flow structure  
 Access to data on performance measures ( Indicators used to measure 
performance of IC) 




























































Appendix-4.6  for Interview Schedule of various stakeholders  
 
Four Interview schedules  
1. Schedule for Representative of State Nodal Agency  
2. Schedule for Representative of Insurance Company  
3. Schedule for Representative of Third Party Administration  
4. Schedule for District Administration  
 
In-depth Interview Guidelines for State Nodal agency 
Background details  
Organisational structure  
Number of members  
Years of working  
Experience of working in the SNA  
Academic qualification  
Different job responsibilities of different individuals  
Reporting structure of SNA to MOLE and to state government  
 Implementation structure – formal and informal groups 
 Organisational structure – reporting structure  
 Coordination structure and coordination process  
 
Contract fine tuning before bidding (SNA) 
 
Are the guidelines clear and specific by MOLE in this regard? What do guidelines 
suggest? How it was done? 
What elements of the contract were fine tuned and why?  What process was followed 
to fine tune the contract?  
Who all participated (MOLE, other state level agencies) in the contract fine tuning?  
 Role of MOLE ( consultation , information sharing , technical assistance ) 
 Role of IC/previous IC ( consultation , information sharing , technical 
assistance ) 
 Role of other state departments ( consultation , information sharing , 
technical assistance ) 
Who makes the final decision in this area? 
Tendering/Bid evaluation process:  
Can you please explain me the whole process? Who all are involved?  
Tendering process; bid evaluation process  - what different approach is followed 
compared to other places. 
What discretion SNA has in bid selection process? 
What are some of the common issues or problems that can happen at this stage? 
How they are solved? (Control approach or relational approach) 
Planning for implementation: 
 What is your role in the process  
 Which organisations are expected to be involved in the planning process? 
How their relationship is defined in the contract?  
 Tell me how you planned for this process did. How many people (how many 





 Decision making process during planning (On what basis decisions were 
made, who had the right to make decisions? who made the decision? who has the 
final say in these matters) 
 What problems happen during the planning process? Explain giving an 
example  
 How do you manage them (control or relational approach)? What options you 
have? Whom you approach? Who makes the final decision? (incentives , authority 
investment or joint problem solving sharing trust solidarity) 
 What are the different ways that your partners in the process can game the 
system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? If yes 
how did you address that issue and why? ( incentives authority ,investment o joint 
problem solving , sharing trust , solidarity) 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed? 
 
For each function Enrollement process:/ Hospital network creation,/ Claims 
Management / Claims Monitoring / Hospital De-empanelment  
 What is your role in the process  
 Which other organisations are involved in the task of enrollement? 
 In practice how many organisations participate in these areas? What different 
roles they play? 
 How activities in this area are planned? How roles and responsibilities are 
defined? 
 What are the common problems and issues that happen in this process? what 
does the contract suggest to manage these problems ( incentives , authority , 
investment or joint problem solving , sharing , trust solidarity ) 
 Describe each problem and reasons for that? 
 How do you manage them (control or relational approach)? What options you 
have? Whom you approach? Who makes the final decision? (incentives , authority 
investment or joint problem solving sharing trust solidarity) 
 What are the different ways that your partners in the process can game the 
system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? If yes 
how did you address that issue and why? ( incentives authority ,investment o joint 
problem solving , sharing trust , solidarity) 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed? 
Collaboration with Insurance Company  
 How long you have been working with this insurance company? 
 How did you select this organisation to work with? 
 Was there any changes compared to what was envisioned in the contract? What 
were those changes? How these changes arrived at? how you manage those 
changes ( control- no change or change with formal negotiation , change in 
contract terms ; relational = joint discussion , common understanding , joint 
decision making) 
 Once a contract is awarded how state nodal agency facilitates working of 
insurance company? What kind of support is provided to the insurance 
company? 
 According to you what understands of different parties about their roles in the 
relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly?  What kind 
of decision making process you follow with insurance company? How the final 






 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and 
Insurance Company? What type of resource sharing happens between your 
organisations and this organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is 
at present? How can it improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the insurance company?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with Insurance Company? Once a 
contract is awarded how state nodal agency monitors activities of insurance 
company? What tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it 
decreases? what aspects you monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when Insurance company has not delivered/ or doesn‘t full fill a 
promise of delivering a service or delivers a poor quality of service? What are 
the different ways this issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  
Explain with an example describing various stages and what steps were taken at 
each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the Insurance Company can game the 
system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? If 
yes how did you address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 In case of high performance what methods and tools you use to incentivise and 
award high performance? 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organization. 
 
 Collaboration with District Administration  
What is the nature of relationship between state nodal agency and district 
administration? What is the reporting structure between these two entities?  
 Explain the relationship arrangement (formal agreement, formal letter /part of 
the plan) between SNA and district administration? What is the hierarchy, 
reporting structure and flow of information? 
 How state nodal agency facilitates working of district administration? What kind 
of support is provided to the district administration? 
 According to you what is the understanding of different parties about their roles 
in the relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly ? What kind 





final decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when 
there is no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and district 
administration? What type of resource sharing happens between your 
organisations and this organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is 
at present? How can it improve further? 
 What kind of decision making process you follow with insurance company? 
How the final decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you 
resolve when there is no consensus? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the district administration? 
 How you ensure accountability of the district administration?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with district administration? Once 
a activities are started in a district how state nodal agency monitors activities of 
district administration ? What tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring 
increases when it decreases? what aspects you monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when district administration has not delivered/ or does not 
coordinate or cooperate with insurance company? What are the different ways 
this issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  Explain with an example 
describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the district administration can game 
the system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? 
If yes how did you address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 In case of high performance what methods and tools you use to reward high 
performance of district administration  and what incentives are there /are being 
provided for DA to perform better  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
 
Collaboration with MOLE:  
 Explain the relationship arrangement (formal agreement, formal letter /part of 
the plan) between SNA and MOLE? What is the hierarchy, reporting structure 
and flow of information? 
 How MOLE facilitates working of SNA? What kind of support SNA gets from 
the MOLE? 
 According to you what is the understanding of different parties about their roles 
in the relationships? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 





 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and MOLE 
? What type of resource sharing happens between your organisations and this 
organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it 
improve further? 
 What are the different kind of activities which are done in participation with 
MOLE  
 What kind of decision making process you follow with MOLE? How the final 
decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when there is 
no consensus? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
MOLE? 
 How MOLE ensures accountability of SNA?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with MOLE? Once a activities are 
started in a state how MOLE monitors activities of SNA? What tools are used? 
Frequency? When monitoring increases when it decreases? what aspects you 
monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when there are issues between SNA and other partners in the 
district (like issues with IC) ? What are the different ways MOLE intervenes in 
this? How you respond to these interventions of MOLE?  Explain with an 
example describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 How autonomous you feel your organisation is with respect to its relation with 
MOLE?  
 What issues arise in your relationships with MOLE and state government ( are 
there conflicts between what MOLE wants and what state government wants) 
how do you resolve these issues  
 How is the relationship between MOLE and SNA has evolved over time ? 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
 
 
In-depth Interview Guidelines for Insurance Company 
 
Section 1: Background details (get documents on this) 
 Organizational profile  
 Years of working in the RSBY scheme  
 % of total business from RSBY scheme  
 Years of working in this district  
 Number of persons managing this scheme in this district  
 Their job profiles responsibilities and reporting  
 Implementation structure – formal and informal groups 
 Organisational structure – reporting structure  





Section 2: Tendering/Bid evaluation process:  
 How did you prepare the bid for this district? What factors helped you decide 
about the premium rate for this district? What factors according to you led to 
your selection for this district? 
Section 3: for each of the functions -Planning for implementation / Enrollment 
process/ Hospital Empanelment/ Claims Monitoring / Hospital De-empanelment   
 What is your role in the process  
 Which other organisations are involved in the task of enrollement? 
 In practice how many organisations participate in this area? What different 
roles they play? How they work together? ( decision making , administration ) 
 What are the common problems and issues that happen in this process? what 
does the contract suggest to manage these problems ( incentives , authority , 
investment or joint problem solving , sharing , trust solidarity ) 
 Describe each problem and reasons for that? 
 How do you manage them (control or relational approach)? What options you 
have? Whom you approach? Who makes the final decision? (incentives , 
authority investment or joint problem solving sharing trust solidarity) 
 What are the different ways that your partners in the process can game the 
system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? If 
yes how did you address that issue and why? ( incentives authority ,investment 
o joint problem solving , sharing trust , solidarity) 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed? 
Section 4. Relation with Third party administrator  
 Do you have a previous experience of working with this TPA? 
 How did you select this organisation to work with? 
 Was there any changes compared to initial contract ( or contract template 
provided by MOLE) ? What were those changes? How these changes arrived at? 
( control- no change or change with formal negotiation , change in contract terms 
; relational = joint discussion , common understanding , joint decision making) 
 Once a contract is awarded to TPA, how IC facilitates working of insurance 
company? What kind of support is provided to the TPA? 
 According to you what is the understanding of TPA about their role in the 
relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with insurance company? How the final 
decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when there is 
no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and TPA? 
What type of resource sharing happens between your organisations and this 
organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it 
improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 






 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the insurance company?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with Insurance Company? Once a 
contract is awarded how state nodal agency monitors activities of insurance 
company? What tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it 
decreases? what aspects you monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when TPA has not delivered/ or doesn‘t full fill a promise of 
delivering a service or delivers a poor quality of service? What are the different 
ways this issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  Explain with an 
example describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the third party administrator can 
game the system? Did that happen in this district? if not what you think 
prevented it ? If yes how did you address that issue and why? explain with an 
example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
Section 5. Relation with District administration  
 Explain the relationship arrangement (formal agreement, formal letter /part of 
the plan) between IC and district administration? What is the hierarchy, 
reporting structure and flow of information? 
 How district administration facilitates working of insurance company? What 
kind of support you receive from the district administration? 
 According to you what is the understanding of district administration about their 
role in the relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly ? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with district administration? How the 
final decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when 
there is no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and district 
administration? What type of resource sharing happens between your 
organisations and this organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is 
at present? How can it improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the district administration? 
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with district administration? Once 
a activities are started in a district how district administration monitors your 
activities What tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it 
decreases? what aspects you monitor and why? 
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 





upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when district administration has not delivered/ or does not 
coordinate or cooperate with insurance company? What are the different ways 
this issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  Explain with an example 
describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the district administration can game 
the system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? 
If yes how did you address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
Section 6. Relation with state nodal agency 
 Was there any changes compared to initial contract ( or contract template 
provided by MOLE) ? What were those changes? How these changes arrived at? 
( control- no change or change with formal negotiation , change in contract terms 
; relational = joint discussion , common understanding , joint decision making) 
 Once the contract is awarded to TPA,  how SNA  facilitated  your working in the 
district ? What kind of support you received from SNA  ? 
 According to you what is the understanding of SNA about their role in the 
relationships? According to guidelines what is their  role and according to your 
experience how they view their own role  
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with state nodal agency? How the final 
decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when there is 
no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and state 
nodal agency  ? What type of resource sharing happens between your 
organisations and this organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is 
at present? How can it improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved? 
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the state nodal agency?  What issues and problems have come in this area?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with state nodal agency? Once a 
contract is awarded how state nodal agency monitors your activities? What tools 
are used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it decreases? what 
aspects you monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when state nodal agency does not cooperate or coordinate with 
you ? What are the different ways this issue can be handled? What approach you 
choose?  Explain with an example describing various stages and what steps were 





 What are the common ways through which the SNA can game the system? Did 
that happen in this district? if not what you think prevented it ? If yes how did 
you address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
 
Interview field guide for Third Party administrator 
 
Section 1: Background details:  
 Organizational profile  
 Years of working in the RSBY scheme  
 % of total business from RSBY scheme  
 Years of working in this district  
 Number of persons managing this scheme in this district  
 Their job profiles responsibilities and reporting  
 Implementation structure – formal and informal groups 
 Organisational structure – reporting structure  
 Coordination structure and coordination process  
Section 3: for each of the function- Planning for implementation/ Enrolement/ 
Hospital Empanelment/ Claims Monitoring / Hospital De-empanelment   
 What is your role in the process  
 Which other organisations are involved in the task of enrollement? 
 In practice how many organisations participate in this area? What different roles 
they play? How they work together? ( decision making , administration ) 
 What are the common problems and issues that happen in this process? what 
does the contract suggest to manage these problems ( incentives , authority , 
investment or joint problem solving , sharing , trust solidarity ) 
 Describe each problem and reasons for that? 
 How do you manage them (control or relational approach)? What options you 
have? Whom you approach? Who makes the final decision? (incentives , 
authority investment or joint problem solving sharing trust solidarity) 
 What are the different ways that your partners in the process can game the 
system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? If 
yes how did you address that issue and why? ( incentives authority ,investment o 
joint problem solving , sharing trust , solidarity) 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed? 
Section 4. Relation with Insurance Company  
 Do you have a previous experience of working with this IC? 
 How did you select this organisation to work with? 
 Was there any changes compared to initial contract ( or contract template 
provided by MOLE) ? What were those changes? How these changes arrived at? 
( control- no change or change with formal negotiation , change in contract terms 
; relational = joint discussion , common understanding , joint decision making) 
 Once a contract is awarded , how IC facilitates working of TPA ? What kind of 
support is provided to the TPA? 






 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with insurance company? How the final 
decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when there is 
no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and IC? 
What type of resource sharing happens between your organisations and this 
organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it 
improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved ? 
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the insurance company?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with Insurance Company? Once a 
contract is awarded how IC monitors activities of TPA ? What tools are used? 
Frequency? When monitoring increases when it decreases? what aspects you 
monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when IC does not cooperate or coordinate ? What are the different 
ways this issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  Explain with an 
example describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 In situations where IC asks  you to do something which is not in your interest 
,how do you manage this situation ? 
 What are the common ways through which the IC can game the system? Did that 
happen in this district? if not what you think prevented it ? If yes how did you 
address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
  
Section 5. Relation with District administration  
 Explain the relationship arrangement (formal agreement, formal letter /part of 
the plan) between TPA and district administration? What is the hierarchy, 
reporting structure and flow of information? ( do you have to always go through 
IC) 
 How district administration facilitates working of TPA? What kind of support 
you receive from the district administration? 
 According to you what is the understanding of district administration about their 
role in the relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly ? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with district administration? How the 
final decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when 





 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and district 
administration? What type of resource sharing happens between your 
organisations and this organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is 
at present? How can it improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the district administration? 
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with district administration? Once 
a activities are started in a district how district administration monitors your 
activities What tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it 
decreases? what aspects you monitor and why? 
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when district administration has not delivered/ or does not 
coordinate or cooperate with your organisation ? What are the different ways this 
issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  Explain with an example 
describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the district administration can game 
the system? Did that happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? 
If yes how did you address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
Section 6. Relation with Smart Card Company  
 Do you have a previous experience of working with this SCSP? 
 How did you select this organisation to work with? 
 Was there any changes compared to initial contract ( or contract template 
provided by MOLE) ? What were those changes? How these changes arrived at? 
( control- no change or change with formal negotiation , change in contract terms 
; relational = joint discussion , common understanding , joint decision making) 
 Once a contract is awarded to SCSP , how you facilitated working of insurance 
company? What kind of support you provided to the TPA? 
 According to you what is the understanding of SCSP about their role in the 
relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with insurance company? How the final 
decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when there is 
no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 





 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and SCSP ? 
What type of resource sharing happens between your organisations and this 
organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it 
improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved ? 
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the insurance company?  
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with SCSP ? Once a contract is 
awarded how your organisation monitors activities of SCSP ? What tools are 
used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it decreases? what aspects 
you monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when SCSP has not delivered/ or doesn‘t full fill a promise of 
delivering a service or delivers a poor quality of service? What are the different 
ways this issue can be handled? What approach you choose?  Explain with an 
example describing various stages and what steps were taken at each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the SCSP can game the system? Did 
that happen in this district? if not what you think prevented it ? If yes how did 
you address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  
 
In-depth Interview Guidelines for District Administration / CMO  
Background details  
 Number of members involved in RSBY scheme at district administration ,  
 Their roles and responsibilities  
 Reporting structure from FKO to DM  
 Coordination process (number of meetings and their agenda and participants)  
 
For each of the functions -Planning for implementation/ Enrollment/ Hospitals 
Empanelment/ Claims Monitoring / Hospital De-empanelment  
 What‘s your role (district administration role ) in the enrollement process  
 What are the common problems and issues that happen in this process? what 
does the contract suggest to manage these problems ( incentives , authority , 
investment or joint problem solving , sharing , trust solidarity ) 
 Describe each problem and reasons for that? 
 How do you manage them (control or relational approach)? What options you 
have? Whom you approach? Who makes the final decision? (incentives , 
authority investment or joint problem solving sharing trust solidarity) 
 What are the different ways that your partners in the process can game the 





yes how did you address that issue and why? ( incentives authority ,investment o 
joint problem solving , sharing trust , solidarity) 
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed? 
Collaboration with Insurance Company  
 Explain the relationship arrangement (formal agreement, formal letter /part of 
the plan) between IC and district administration? What is the hierarchy, 
reporting structure and flow of information? 
 How district administration facilitates working of insurance company? What 
kind of support you provide to the IC ? 
 According to you what is the understanding of IC about their role in the 
relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly ? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with district administration? How the 
final decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when 
there is no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and IC? 
What type of resource sharing happens between your organisations and this 
organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it 
improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the IC? 
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with IC? Once a activities are 
started in a district how district administration monitors activities of IC ? What 
tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring increases when it decreases? what 
aspects you monitor and why? 
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when IC has not delivered/ or delivers poor quality and quantity 
of service? What are the different ways this issue can be handled? What 
approach you choose?  Explain with an example describing various stages and 
what steps were taken at each step?  
 What are the common ways through which the IC can game the system? Did that 
happen in this district? If not what you think prevented it? If yes how did you 
address that issue and why? explain with an example  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 
relation with this organisation  





 Explain the relationship arrangement (formal agreement, formal letter /part of 
the plan) between SNA and district administration? What is the hierarchy, 
reporting structure and flow of information? 
 How state nodal agency facilitates working of district administration? What kind 
of support district administration receives from the state nodal agency? 
 According to you what is the understanding of different parties about their roles 
in the relationships? 
 What are the different activities that you plan and implement jointly? What kind 
of decision making process you follow with district administration? How the 
final decision is made? Who makes the final decision? How you resolve when 
there is no consensus? 
 What are the common methods (meeting emails, phone calls informal gathering 
and social events) through which you coordinate with other partners in this 
process? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it improve further? 
 Can you describe about resource sharing between your organisation and SNA? 
What type of resource sharing happens between your organisations and this 
organisation? Frequency? How adequate or optimum it is at present? How can it 
improve further? 
 For regular management to what extent you depend upon the contract guidelines, 
formal rules and formal process laid down in the contract? ( control= based on 
contract , formal letters formal communication , relational approach= informal 
communication based on shared understanding , relationships ) 
 How do you think the relationship with this organisation started and how it 
evolved  
 Please explain status of trust and nature of trust between your organisation and 
the SNA ? 
 What is role of monitoring in the relationship with district administration? Once 
a activities are started in a district how state nodal agency monitors activities of 
district administration? What tools are used? Frequency? When monitoring 
increases when it decreases? what aspects you monitor and why  
 In case of conflict between your organisation and this organisation, how do you 
address the conflict.. ( depending upon the terms of the contract or depending 
upon the relationship between parties ) What role terms of contract play in this? 
Role of adjustment or adoption? .kindly describe by giving an example  
 What happens when SNA  does not coordinate or cooperate with District 
administration ? What are the different ways this issue can be handled? What 
approach you choose?  Explain with an example describing various stages and 
what steps were taken at each step?  
 Any other thing which you think is important which we have not discussed in 



























 Central Core Group 
C1 Officer from the GTZ 
C2 Officer from the GTZ 
C3 National Nodal Officer of an Insurance Company  
C4 Officer from the GTZ 
C5 Mr Anil Swarup DG MOLE 
 Himachal Pradesh 
HP1 Officer from the State Nodal Agency 
HP2 Officer from the State Nodal Agency 
HP3 Officer of the Insurance Company 
HP4 Officer of the Insurance Company 
HP5 Officer District Administration  
HP6 District Key Manager 
HP7 District Officer in a Third Party Administration 
HP8 Officer  Third Party Administration 
 Uttar Pradesh 
UP1 Officer from the State Nodal Agency  
UP2 State level Manager in a  Third Party Administration   
UP3 State level Manager in a  Third Party Administration 
UP4 District Officer in a  Third Party Administration 
UP5 District Key Manager  of the district  
UP6 Officer of the Insurance Company  
UP7 District Officer in a  Third Party Administration 
UP8 Officer from the State Nodal Agency 
UP9 Owner of a Private Hospital empanelled in the scheme   
UP10 Owner of the Private Hospital empanelled in the scheme  
 Punjab 
PJ1 Officer from the State Nodal Agency  
PJ2 State Level Officer of the Insurance Company 
PJ3 State Level Officer from the  Third Party Administration 
PJ4 Officer from the State Nodal Agency 
PJ5 District level officer of the  Third Party Administration 
PJ6 Medical Officer from the District Administration  
PJ7 Statistical Analyst District Administration  
PJ8 Deputy Medical Commissioner  
PJ9 Officer of the  Third Party Administration 





Appendix 4.8 Four critical events in the program implementation 
 
Critical Incident  Stakeholders 
Involved  




Insurance Company  
District Administration  
District Key Manger  
Role of stakeholders  
Planning process  
Coordination process  
Decision making process  
Common Problems at each step  
Process used to address 
problems  
Opportunities for opportunism  
Actions to prevent and control 
opportunism  
Enrollment Process  
Creating a Road Map 
Enrollment IEC  
Distribution of smart 
card  
Data update  




Smart Card service 
provider  
District Administration  




Role of stakeholders  
Planning process  
Coordination process  
Decision making process  
Common Problems at each step  
Process used to address 
problems  
Opportunities for opportunism  




Hospital workshop  
Short listing of hospitals  
Verification of Hospitals  
Installement of 
equipments  
Insurance company  
Third Party 
Administrator  
District Administration  
 
Role of stakeholders  
Planning process  
Coordination process  
Decision making process  
Common Problems at each step  





Hospital promotion  problems  
Opportunities for opportunism  
Actions to prevent and control 
opportunism  
Claims Management  
Claims payment  
Claims monitoring  
Fraud detection  
Hospital 
Disempanellement 
Insurance Company  
Third Party 
Administrator  
State Nodal Agency  
District Administration  
Role of stakeholders  
Planning process  
Coordination process  
Decision making process  
Common Problems at each step  
Process used to address 
problems  
Opportunities for opportunism  


































Appendix 4.10 General governance classification 
Control approach implies parties believe /behave in following manner 
 Parties perceive that the terms are clear and specific in the contract  
 There are clear incentives  
 Whatever is needed everything is there in the contract and is  explicitly stated  
 We follow standard procedures  
 There are rewards and sanction in the contract  
 There is a clear responsibility of the parties  
 There is clear process identified to manage the problems  
 Parties refer to contract to manage this stage /problem  
 There is not much participation and consultation  
 There is limited information sharing  
 There is no need for adaptation or being flexible 
 There is no need for negotiation  
 Sanctions are imposed without any discretion  
 There is limited contacts and coordination  
 We regularly /need to  monitor for the problems  
 We decide what needs to be done as we have given contract/ they decide and we have to follow  
Relational approach implies parties believe /behave in following manner 
 Parties perceive that the terms are either not clear and specific in the contract /or if they are 
they are not suitable and need to evolve /we do not follows seriously  
 Many things are not yet defined and we work together to define and share as the program 
evolves   
 We consult negotiate and come to a common understanding  
 There is no standard procedure but there is common understanding through which we work   
 There are decide about how risks and rewards will be shared? We both share whatever happens 
after it has happened? 
 We both are responsible whatever happens it‘s a joint problem and not one parties problem    
 Problems are tackled jointly as we  face them through discussion , negotiation adoption / 
everything cannot be contract we have some understanding and trust on each other  
 There is always  participation and consultation  
 We generally have meetings and social events where we discuss these informally. Everything 
need not go through a formal channel 
 There is regular and frequent information sharing  
 We adopt to each other‘s needs and need to manage things  flexible 
 Most of the decisions are taken through negotiation and discussion   
 If the problem demands imposing a sanction on the contractor we negotiate and discuss with 
them before doing it  
 There is regular and frequent contacts and coordination  
 We think that the other party is sincere, they are concerned about our performance and welfare 
and therefore they will not do something that is not in our interest. The other part will offer help 
and assistance even if the things are changed and therefore we can count on our suppliers  
 We trust that the party will not cheat even if they are not being observed and therefore there is 
no need to monitor /establish process or procedures ( standard operating procedure ) for 
specific  of problems 
 There is no need to specify everything  
 We do  favours to each other ( in this situation he has helped and so when he needs help we will 





 We together try to improve/preserve  this relationship and so sometimes we adjust or go against 
























































Appendix 4.11 list of District Insurance Company wise 
 





New India Assurance-20 
Oriental -27 
Reliance-16 
Star Health -11 
TATA AIG -6 
United India-25 























































Appendix 4.13 Thomson collaboration questionnaire 
 
Component  Measurement Indicators  
Decision Making  This partner organization takes your organization‘s opinions seriously when decisions are made about collaborative implementation of 
the activities. 
Your organization brainstorms with this partner organization to develop solutions to problems during collaborative implementation of the 
activities.  
Administration  You, as a representative of your organization understand your organization‘s roles and responsibilities in the collaborative  
implementation of the scheme while working with this partner 
Meetings with this partner organization accomplish what is necessary for collaborative implementation of the scheme?  
This partner organization agrees about the goals of the collaboration for implementation of the scheme? 
Your organization‘s tasks are well coordinated with those of this partner organization while working in collaboration for implementation 
of the scheme? 
Autonomy  Working in collaboration with this partner for implementation of the scheme hinders your organization from meeting its own 
organizational mission (profit)? 
Your organization‘s independence is reduced by having to work in collaboration with this partner organization? 




Your organization and this partner organization have combined and used each other‘s resources so both parties benefit from 
collaborating? 
Your organization shares information with this partner organization that will strengthen their operations and programs? 
You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and respected by this partner organization? 
Your organization achieves its own goals better by working with this partner organization than working alone? 
Your organization and this partner organization work through differences to arrive at win-win solutions? 
Trust  People who represent this partner organization in the collaboration are trustworthy. 
My organization can count on this partner organization to meet its obligations to the collaboration. 





Appendix 4.14 for comparison of questions between my survey and Thomson 
Component  Questions in Thomson (2001)  Questions used in this study  
Decision 
Making  
This partner organization takes your organization‘s opinions seriously when 
decisions are made about collaborative implementation of the activities. 
Please rate how seriously this organization takes your 
opinion/suggestions? 
Your organization brainstorms with this partner organization to develop solutions 
to problems during collaborative implementation of the activities. 




You, as a representative of your organization understand your organization‘s roles 
and responsibilities in the collaborative implementation of the scheme while 
working with this partner? 
To what extent this partner is clear about his role and responsibility in 
RSBY scheme? 
Meetings with this partner organization accomplish what is necessary for 
collaborative implementation of the scheme?  
To what extent meetings /discussions with this partner is effective? 
This partner organization agrees about the goals of the collaboration for 
implementation of the scheme? 
To what extent you and this partner agree on how the collaboration 
should be between your company and this partner? 
Your organization‘s tasks are well coordinated with those of this partner 
organization while working in collaboration for implementation of the scheme? 
How effective is your coordination with this partner? 
Autonomy  Working in collaboration with this partner for implementation of the scheme 
hinders your organization from meeting its own organizational mission (profit)? 
To what extent collaboration with this partner hinders your company's 
goals? 
Your organization‘s independence is reduced by having to work in collaboration 
with this partner organization? 
To what extent your independence is reduced when you collaborate with 
this partner? 
You, as a representative of your organization, feel pulled between trying to meet 
both your organization‘s and the collaboration‘s expectations? 
To what extent you feel pulled between meeting your company's 
Expectation and this partner's expectation? 
Resource 
Sharing  
Your organization and this partner organization have combined and used each 
other‘s resources so both parties benefit from collaborating? 
To what extent your company and this partner share resources with each 
other? 
Your organization shares information with this partner organization that will 
strengthen their operations and programs? 
To what extent your company and this partner share helpful information 
with each other? 
You feel what your organization brings to the collaboration is appreciated and 
respected by this partner organization? 
To what extent this partner respect and appreciates your company's work? 
Your organization achieves its own goals better by working with this partner 
organization than working alone? 
To what extent collaboration with partner is necessary to achieve your 
company's goal? 
Your organization and this partner organization work through differences to arrive 
at win-win solutions? 
To what extent you and this partner organization work through 
differences to arrive at win- win solutions? 
Trust  People who represent this partner organization in the collaboration are 
trustworthy. 
To what extent you can trust people from this organization? 
My organization can count on this partner organization to meet its obligations to 
the collaboration. 
To what extent this partner completes its responsibility or obligation? 
My organization feels it worthwhile to stay and work with this partner 
organization rather than leave the collaboration. 
To what extent your company feels that its if worthwhile to work with 
























































Appendix 4.16 : Constructs and their Sources 
 




How effective is collaboration with this partner in 
achieving the goals of RSBY? 
Please rate the quality of relationships, between your 
company and this partner? 
To what extent you have learned from this partner about 
better ways to implement the scheme. 
As your company worked with this partner, to what 
extent your company's interaction increased with this 
partner 
To what extent the power difference between your 
company and this partner organization has reduced 




To what extent these partners tell lies for his benefit? 
To what degree this partner fails to deliver his promise if 
it is in his interest? 
Sometimes this partner will not do even things that are 
commonly taken as granted if it is in his interest? 
To what degree this partner takes advantage of situations 
which are not discussed or decided earlier? 
To what extent this partner takes undue advantage of its 
position for its own interests? 
John (1984) , 
Rokkan et al 
(2003) 
Partner Performance  Please rate the overall quality of service given by this 
partner. 
Please rate how this partner answers your problem or 
queries. 





























Appendix 4.17 Sample email sent to the Insurance Companies 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
I am a PhD Candidate at National University of Singapore and doing my thesis research on RSBY 
scheme. This research tries to understand the impact of collaboration among organizations implementing 
Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY Scheme) on its performance. 
My  research has been approved by Director General Labour Welfare, Ministry of Labour and 
Employment as well as National University of Singapore, Institutional Review Board.  An email has been 
sent to all the Insurance companies regarding this. 
As part of my Research, I am conducting a survey of district level coordinators of Insurance 
Companies ( or TPA in case there are no district level officers in Insurance company) who are directly 
involved in implementation of RSBY Scheme at district level. The survey is expected to take around 35 
minutes to complete.  
The questions are related to relationship between your organization and other organizations 
implementing RSBY Scheme. The responses to the survey questions will be kept confidential. Only I will 
have identifiable information (e.g. name of the person, organization, district etc which can lead to 
identification of Individual or organization) of the survey respondents and this will not be released to any 
other person or organization. Identifiable information will never be used in a publication or presentation.  
I request you to kindly support this research which is expected to bring about collaborative practices 
that are driving performance of the scheme. Please find attached with this email, participant information 
sheet for more information about this research.  
The process of going through the survey will help district level officers in understanding the level of 
collaboration with other agencies in their district and thus will help them to understand how they can 
further leverage collaboration. 
  
This is an online survey and survey participants can withdraw from completing the survey at any time 
without giving any reasons. 
  
I request you to kindly forward this email to district officer of your company or TPA working 
at following districts and urge them to answer this survey. 
 
District  X; District Y;  District Z 
 
 
--------Mail to be forwarded to District Level Officers (TPA or IC)------  
Dear District Nodal Officer of Insurance Company/ TPA 
As explained above in the email, i request you to participate in this survey.  This is online survey and 
will take maximum 45 minutes to complete.  Your participation is very valuable to make this research 
successful. You can use this survey as a self assessment tool to assess collaboration between your 
organization and other organization in this district and will help you identify the areas of strength and 
areas that need further attention. 
Here is the link of the survey if you are in Insurance 
Company https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Y2NSYQR 
Here is the Link of Survey if you are working in Third Party 
Administrator https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/7TDZY7X 





Please find attached with this email, participant information sheet for more information about this 
research. 
Your participation is extremely valuable and i look forward for your support towards this research. 
Thank you very much 
Best  
Dayashankar Maurya  
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy  
National University of Singapore  
Phone:  +919717430422 (India) 
maurya@nus.edu.sg 
Attachment:  
Participant Information Sheet and Consent Form 













































Appendix 4.18 Information package gives to NANOs 
 
Information package consisted of  
Letter of Invitation to the Participant of the Survey  
Participant information Sheet and Consent form 
Copy of the Survey Tool  
 










































Appendix 4.19  Process of creating collaboration index  
This section assesses the fit and specification of the structural model of collaboration with the 
sample data from RSBY scheme. This involves a process of specification of the estimation model, 
estimation and evaluation, and then re-specification until a structural specification which provides an 
appropriate theoretical and contextual fit in line with the RSBY context is obtained.  Bollen‘s (2000) 
―piecewise jigsaw technique‖ which uses both confirmatory factor analysis and exploratory data analysis 
was used, where each component part of the theoretical model of collaboration is first examined, followed 
by examination of the integrated model.  
Examination of each component of theoretical model involves assessing the relationship between 
each dimension and its corresponding indicators. Those indictors which were not suitable to the context of 
the RSBY scheme and statistically insignificant were systematically removed from the structural 
equation. In the first step, evaluation of each component of theoretical model was done and one indicator 
from Mutuality model was dropped.  
In the second step, the five components of the model are integrated keeping the same 
measurement component.  Process similar to step one was followed in the second step, for evaluating the 
integrated measurement model and four indicators- one from Trust, and one from Autonomy and two 
from Mutuality component were dropped.  
 In the third step, we examine structural components of the collaboration by including 
collaboration as a higher order model. At this stage the integrated model is again evaluated using similar 
principles and the model was specified and re-specified until a model with construct validity that best fits 
with the data emerges.  
The sample variance -covariance matrix was analyzed using Liserel 9.10 and maximum 
likelihood minimization function.  For goodness of fit, recommendation of Brown (2006) was followed, 
which suggests using Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) for absolute fit, Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) for parsimony correction and  Comparative Fit Index (CFI) for 
comparative fit. As suggested by Brown (2006), all the three indices were used to assess the model fit as 
they provide different information about the model fit.  
  SRMR is used as a measure of absolute fit; whereas RMSEA is used for parsimony correction as 
in this index has a penalty function for poor model parsimony. Brown (2006) considers RMSEA as an 
―error of approximation index ...as it assesses the extent to which a model fits reasonably well in the 
population‖.  
Brown‘s (2006) suggestion regarding acceptable model fit indices was followed. These are, close 





model is found to be poorly fitting with the data, as commonly found in the confirmatory factor analysis 
(Donna 2008), analysis moved from domain of confirmatory factor analysis to exploratory factor analysis.   
For understanding reasons for poor fit both theory and data needs to be closely examined.  
Examination of data includes analysis of localized strain in the data that is Standard Residual Variances 
which are greater than two
163
 and Modification Indices which are greater than four are considered as 
suggestive of localized strain. 
The positive standardized residual value indicates that model is underestimating the observed 
relationships between a pair of indictors and therefore implies need of additional parameters in the model 
to account for the covariance between the indicators. Similarly a negative standard residual indicates that 
model is overestimating the observed relationship between a pair of indictors which is due to presence of 
unnecessary parameters. 
The modifications indices ―reflect an approximation of how much the overall model 2 will 
decrease if the fixed or constrained parameters were freely estimated‖ (Brown 2006 Page 119). Thus 
modification indices present a change in the 2   between two models- fixed model with constrained 
parameters and other where the parameters are estimated freely.   Thus modification indices which 
suggest a significant 2 change (critical value of 2 at p<0.5, 1 df) cannot be ignored. In practice, this 
critical value is taken as 4.00. Most of the software also produces a Par Change value in the modification 
indices table, which  provides an estimate of extent of change in the parameters and direction of change 
(positive or negative), if it were freely estimated in a subsequent analysis. 
The parameters estimate of a measurement indicator indicates the extent to which latent construct 
can be explained by the measurement indicator.  Thus parameters estimate represent validity of the 
measurement indicator in explaining a particular latent variable. The reliability of a measurement 
indicator is explained by R
2
 which measures amount of variation in the measurement indicator that can be 
explained by the latent variable.  An acceptable measurement indicator has both acceptable levels of 
validity and reliability.  For validity, anything that is more than 0.4 is considered as valid and similar is 
the case for reliability (Brown 2006).  
Decisions regarding modification of a measurement indicator are based on theory and data. Data 
suggests which indicators might require modification (Standardized residuals, Parameter estimate and R2) 
and what type of modification may be suitable (Modification indices). The modification process should 
not be data driven as one poorly reproduced relationship may produce data strain (high modification 
indices or high standardized residuals) in more than one place in the matrix which may not be captured by 
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 Standardized residual are influenced by sample size.  a larger sample size will have larger standardized residuals. 
Given this scholars consider a cut of residuals greater than 2 to 2.58 as cut off values (Brown 2006). In this study as 





software and therefore theory is important as several misfits in the data may be resolved by freeing a 
single parameter. Therefore, the refinement of the indicator is based mainly on theory and context rather 
than data (Donna 2008; Brown 2006). 
The modification process generally leads to one of the four steps taken for measurement 
indicators, (1) Keep it as it is, if there are no problems with the measurement indicator, (2) linking error 
variances when the two indicators are measuring similar things, (3) Moving an indicator from one latent 
variable to another or linking an indicator to another latent variable, and (4) dropping a measurement 
indicator. 
After refining the model,  the goodness of fit measures of the refined model are compared with 
that of the original model to assess whether refining of the model has a significant difference in the fit 
indices. If the goodness of fit indices of refined model suggests an unacceptable level of indices than the 
whole process of refinement is followed again until we reach a model which is both theoretically 
acceptable as well as has a reasonably acceptable model fit statistics and limited strain in the data. 
Thus the analysis process followed here is a step by a step process in which modification is based 
on theory or prior evidence and the model is assessed after every modification until we reach to an 
acceptable model. This is known as specification search moving us out of the domain of confirmatory 






























Appendix 4.20  Inter –Factor correlations for Thomson (model) 
 
 DM ADM Auto Mutuality Trust Collaboration 
DM 1      
ADM 0.771 1     
Auto -0.250 -0.313 1    
Mutuality 0.629 0.789 -0.256 1   
Trust 0.527 0.660 -0.214 0.539 1  
Collaboration 0.784 0.983 -0.319 0.802 0.672 1 
 
Table 5.8: Inter –Factor correlations for Modified model  
 
 DM ADM Auto Mutuality Trust Collaboration 
DM 1      
ADM 0.776 1     
Auto -0.253 -0.312 1    
Mutuality 0.795 0.981 -0.320 1   
Trust 0.518 0.639 -0.208 0.655 1  































Appendix 4.21 Sources of Secondary Data 
 
Data  Source  
Infant Mortality Rate  Infant and Child Mortality in India District Level 
estimates  
 
Literacy Rate  Census 2011 
GDP Per capita  Various economics surveys of States  
Insurance Companies percentage of business from 
health  
Websites and reports of Insurance Companies  
Percentage of houses with electricity  District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
% of Institutional delivery  District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Percentages of villages with health committees District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Road per thousand sqaure KM Various sources  
Density of Population  Calculated  
Percentage of pregnant women taking ANC care  District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Percentage of women taking ANC care from 
private sector  
District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Percentage of village with a doctor  District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Percentages of villages with a government health 
facility  
District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Percentage of children treated for diarrhoea  District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
Percentage of children receiving complete 
vaccination  
District level Household and Facility Survey -3 
(2007) 
























Appendix 4.22 Gray’s Framework 
 
Grays (2000) framework Consists of five components:  
 
Achieving goals as collaboration outcome: One of the expected outcomes of the collaboration 
is achievement of goals for which goal oriented organizations collaborate in the first place. A clear gain in 
the early stage of collaboration helps overcome substantial cost of collaboration, providing incentive to 
continue collaborating. 
 
Generating social capital as collaboration outcome:  According to Gray (2000) it refers to the 
mobilization of actual or potential resources through social relationships and in collaboration it can be 
seen in the emergence of trust and norms of reciprocity (Putnam 1993; Coleman 1990). Thus 
collaboration leads to development of shared norms between stakeholders such that stakeholders agree 
upon appropriate behaviors with respect to each other and/or the problem or task of mutual interest.  
 
Shared meaning as a collaboration outcome:  Shared meaning as a collaboration outcome is 
conceptualized from a social constructionist perspective. According to this perspective organization or 
stakeholders usually bring with them a different and often fragmented conception of problem domain.  
But as they collaborate their limited conception widens because of the divergent views, interest and 
Knowledge of the partners enriching shared understanding of the problem situation. As organizations 
learn from each other they develop a joint appreciation of the each other‘s perspective. Developing a 
sense of positively correlated fate is critical for organizations to agree on a collaborative task (Boje 1982 
cited in Gray 2000).  
Gray (2000) argues that enhanced diversity or broadening of views or multi-voicedness is a better 
measure of collaboration outcome compared to a single shared interpretation which may be too 
restrictive. 
Lack of shared meaning has been cited as a one of the reasons for failure of collaboration in a 
number of areas whether environmental disputes (Vaugen and Siefert, 1992; Gray 1992 cited in Gray 
2000), occupation health (Hilgarten 1985 cited in Gray 2000). 
Gray (2000) has suggested a number of ways through this particular collaboration outcome could 
be measured. For example :- she suggests of using cognitive mapping technique as used in some studies 
or repeated survey documenting change in the understanding and interpretation of a problem. Other 





Increased interaction as collaboration outcome: Increased interaction is a perceived measure 
of collaboration outcome from a structuralist perspective.  From this perspective more collaboration is 
expected to lead to higher interconnections between the stakeholders and thus a change in connection 
density is expected to indicate change in level of collaboration.  Increase in interactions among 
stakeholders lead to increase in density of inert organizational network, resulting into higher degree of 
institutionalization of the domain.  A number of studies has related higher network density to higher 
performance  like Provan and Milward (1995) , Guilati (1995) 
Gray (2000) suggests that relation between collaboration and density of interaction between 
stakeholders is not a linear one. At lower levels change in density of networks suggest higher level of 
collaboration  and thus better outcomes but at a higher level higher level of density within a network may 
be constraining and inhibit adaptation.  
 
Shifting in Power Distribution as collaboration outcome: In ideal setting collaboration is 
expected to empower low power community members shifting from a situation of unequal distribution of 
power ( as in case of elitist decision making ) to more participative ,where parties have equal share in 
access to the decision making arena.  Thus collaboration leads to sharing of power among the 
stakeholders in a domain and the outcome of collaboration is measured as the extent to which a more 
equal distribution of power emerges.  
According to Hardy and Phillips (1998 cited in Gray 2000) , domain can have three types of 
power mix –compliance , contention and contest depending the mix of available sources of formal 
authority and discursive legitimacy. When the one party has resources and formal authority whereas 
others have little or no other countervailing source of power the situation is characterized as compliance 
where other parties just comply with the party having source of power.  
Second situation is contention where formal authority is not clearly prescribed and stakeholders 
are vying for discursive legitimacy.  A power contestation happens when one party has formal authority 
but another party has discursive legitimacy and some resources from a constituency they represent the 
situation. 
 Gray (2000) argues that assessing power distribution is very challenging for assessing 
collaborative efforts because of the subtle manipulation of the parties may happen without them being 
aware or even if they are aware they may not be open to admit it.  
Based on Michealman (1989) she suggests measuring power dimension of collaboration based on 
three criteria‘s (a) whether parties reach a new understanding of the situation (b) whether parties reached 
this new understanding at the expense of their own self interest. Thirdly is the process free from 






Achieving goals:  In terms of specific measures of the goal achievement in collaborations, 
specific achievement of objectives, specific contract provisions or general satisfaction measures can be 
considered (Gray 2000).  
Generating social capital:  Thomson (2001) and Chan (2006) operationalised this variable as a 
quality of working relationship which is measured by a single question- rate the quality of working 
relationships with partner organizations as a result of this collaboration.  
Shared meaning as a collaboration outcome: Thomson (2001) and Chan (2006) measured this 
variable as perceived broadening of views measured by a single question- rate the broadening of views as 
a result of listening to partners views.  
Increased interaction: Thomson (2001) and Chan (2006) have operationalised this variable as 
perceived increase in network density measured as a survey question-rate the increase in interaction with 
partner organization as a result of collaboration.  
Shifting in Power Distribution:  
Thomson (2001) and Chan (2006) measure the power dimension of the collaboration as perceived 
increase in the power relationship measured as a single question- rate the extent to which collaboration 






























Appendix 4.23 Field Work Photographs   
 
 




































































Appendix 4.24 List of other sources of data 
Sr 
No  
List of other sources of Data  
1 Face book Postings  
2 News paper articles  
3 Research studies on RSBY   
4 Websites of agencies  Insurance Companies and TPA 
5 RSBY connect newsletter  
6 Websites of State Nodal Agencies 










































Appendix 5.1 : Governance Approach at different stages 
 




   







( there is no trust among 
agencies but use of relational 
activity is used) 
R-M 
T-H 
( Public sector uses 
relational approaches like 
claims reconciliation)  









Hospital empanelment is more 
contractual as Ic dominates  
amd even if the SNA suggest 
they stick their rights that  is 
they will decide on the hospitals  
T-H R-L  
Claims management  
transactional dominates as 




There is high use of 
relational activity 
between DMC and 
TPA but no trust 
R-M T-H 
  Very little trust and reliability 
among agencies  
T-H R-M  
don‘t trust each other and 


























Appendix 5.2 Governance Tools used in the RSBY scheme 
 
GOVERNANCE TOOLS USED IN RSBY SCHEME  
Transactional Tools:  
In the following paragraphs I describe each of these governance tools and their variation in use.   
Referring to Contract:  
This is generally used to remind the partner agency about the terms of contract, if the partner agency 
is deviating from it. As per contract, both public and private sector agencies are expected to refer to 
contract and contract has been revised continuously so that the terms of the contract are relevant to the 
context.  But there are still some situations, where terms of the contract are not applicable
164
  and public 
agencies become opportunistic and try to enforce them ( as observed in Uttar Pradesh) . Private sector 
given their lower status and dependence generally doesn‘t refer to contract explicitly but they do so if 
public agency is pressurizing to do something which is not specified in the contract (as observed in case 
of Punjab). In general contract guidelines are not referred routinely and are refereed only when there is 
some important confusion which is expected to get clarified by referring to the contract.  
Authority verbal complaints/ Verbal Scolding:   This transactional governance tool is used to 
emphasize   importance of an issue which is affecting the interest of the party. This is generally the first 
step after the relational approaches of informing; reminding and raising issue has failed to get response 
from the partner.  Thus this is one of the first transactional step used.  This governance tool is used 
extensively, because it takes very little for the aggrieved agency to use this tool. Given the limited options 
available this has become one of the most extensively used tool and is used extensively in Punjab and UP. 
It is used extensively in both public and private sector. Public sector uses it very frequently, as they really 
do   not value the relationship. Private sector also uses it extensively with their contractors and allies, if a 
particular contractor and allies is not working properly and delaying the delivery.  
Authority Threats:  Threat is also another most common transactional tools used extensively in the 
RSBY scheme. In the RSBY scheme there are very limited transactional tools allowed and these tools 
require considerable cost therefore agencies cannot use these tools frequently given the cost involved but 
they can threaten the aggrieving agency regarding its use. For this threatening to have an impact this 
threat should be credible.  State Nodal agency and Public Insurance Companies in both UP and Punjab 
use this tool extensively as it requires considerable cost for them to use transactional tools.  
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 This is observed in UP where none of the SCSPs have required number of enrollment equipment’s as 
specified in the contract and sometimes Public agencies in order to extract rent pressurize SCSP to comply 





Authority –Written Complaints: Written complaints are generally the second step in the grievance 
management after the failure of verbal complaints. Written complaint indicates need for a necessary and 
serious effort to address the issue. Parties take the issue seriously when it is in the written format. All 
public agencies use this tool after the failure of verbal tools.  This is most commonly used between 
public-private or public-public. In Private –private issues tend to get sorted out verbally and written 
complaints are mainly used to document the decisions rather than to manage the issue. 
Authority formal approvals /letters /instructions:   
This formal approval or authority letter is sought /issued when an agency refuses to follow verbal 
instructions and need a formal authority or approval. Thus this is used to avoid the pressure by another 
agency and its cost is fairly low to be used even before reaching the verbal complaints and therefore this 
is one of the first approaches used in the transactional management. This is  generally used by Insurance 
Company to thwart pressure by DA during empanelment.  
Formal Communication:  
Formal communication is used mainly as a preventive approach to avoid misinterpretation or as an 
evidence to be used later. Thus this is again one of the common and first approaches used to prevent 
opportunistic behavior of the party.  
Monitoring:  
Monitoring is one of the most common transactional tools advocated for management of the scheme. 
In RSBY scheme, monitoring is done for different reasons, but it is related to ensure compliance with the 
contract. In the context of RSBY scheme monitoring is done to fulfill contract requirement (UP), to 
address the need to monitor performance (Punjab) and to also fulfill personal interest or agenda (HP). 
In UP, SNA monitors each and everything reported by the IC as part of the contract requirement. 
SNA refers to the agreement and verifies each and everything told by the IC.  They ―do not disbelieve 
what Insurance Company says but they do verify‖165. 
Monitoring is also done based on need as seen in case of Punjab. In Punjab, monitoring approach vary 
as per the circumstance. For some activities monitoring is intensive like physical visits but in others 
simply a phone call is made to confirm corroborate information from various sources. Parties use both 
formal and informal, monitoring based on need and where formal monitoring is not needed it is replaced 
by informal and social monitoring 
Monitoring is also done based on the interest. This is observed in case of SNA Himachal Pradesh 
where SNA purposely monitors IC intensively to find fault with them and suggesting that they monitor if 
they are not satisfied with work of some agency.  
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Punitive action / Blacklisting: Punitive actions like black listing of the insurance companies is the 
ultimate transactional tools that an agency can use against the other.  This is an option in the formal 
contract but requires considerable ground work preparation.   State Nodal agencies have recommended it 
against Insurance Companies & TPA on few occasions but given the limited number of Insurance 
companies involved in the scheme implementation it was not used by Ministry for Insurance Company  
but one TPA was blacklisted.  As this tool has not worked in the past, the threat of punitive action is not 
very credible. IC also have realized this and therefore they do not take this seriously as this tool has not 
worked in the past and selection of bids is based on the premium quote and not on performance.   
Relational Governance Tools  
The principle contract includes a number of relational tools for scheme management.  These are 
predominately observed in the form of coordination clauses and in the management of grievances in the 
scheme.  
Non-Response/ ignoring the issue:   
This is one of the first relational approaches which private sector agencies were found to use when 
they are pressurized to do something which is  they don‘t want to do.  Ignoring is possible only in those 
areas which are not part of formal responsibility as specified in the contract as an agency cannot afford to 
ignore tasks which are their responsibility.  
Ignoring prevents issues getting escalated and helps to delay the conflict as observed in hospital 
empanelment in Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and enrollment in Himachal. Ignoring is low cost relational 
approach, where relational strength does not decrease to high level and therefore if it is possible to ignore 
without effect on the relationship, this is the first choice. 
  
Participatory Decision Making:  
Participatory decision making is used to reduce discrimination of an agency.  Agencies use 
participatory decision making as per the contract design but this process gets dominated by the public 
agency as private sector is dependent on public sector. In practice the decision process is collective but 
public agencies do have an upper hand in the decision making process.  
 
Follow UP /Reminding:  
This is again most common tool used specially by the private sector agencies to make the case 
stronger, to make the issue clearer, to remind, to push the agenda. The officers of private sector agencies 
keep visiting the public stakeholders again and again providing them similar information and making 
same requests in different ways.  This is used because of the lower power position of private sector 





in case of TPA), they would have used the transactional version that is formal communication or written 
instructions. For example :-, TPA staff in Punjab has to request and push DMC in order to get work done 
as one of the TPA staff said that ―My work is to run the scheme properly. I pressure them that please do 
sir..Please do sir‖. 
  
Discussions:  
Discussions are used to clarify the issue and make positions transparent. They can be documented 
where, in addition to clarifying discussions are used to improve accountability.   
Liaison:  
Liaison is a general term used to denote ―communication or cooperation which facilitates a close 
working relationship between people or organizations‖166. In the context of RSBY scheme this term was 
used to refer to processes that include commonly used relational norms like flexibility, solidarity, resource 
sharing, participatory decision making, massaging the ego of other agency and offering respect. In the 
RSBY context, this was primarily used when the agency is dependent on the other agency for their 
performance and lesser the ability to control other agency higher was the use of liaison with that agency.  
In the context of the RSBY scheme, this is primary practice of private sector to get the favorable 
attitude of public agency as they are dependent on public sector agencies to get their work done.  If 
private agencies can control public agencies, they do not liaison as seen in case of Himachal. If they can 
control to some extent, they liaison to some extent only, as seen in case of Punjab. If, they have minimum 
control, they liaison extensively, as seen in case of Uttar Pradesh.    In Uttar Pradesh, the District level 
officer of the TPA says that they ‗won‘t be able to work even one day without liaison‘167.  
Trust:  
Trust forms the core of relationship and relational activities like flexibility, solidarity and resource 
sharing is built on the foundation of trust.  In the context of RSBY scheme, the use of trust is found to be 
very limited except some professional level trust based on the credibility of the position like commitments 
given by IAS officers. Apart from that trust is found to be wanting even in the relationships which have 
higher degree of use of relational activity. Among the three states, lowest level of trust was found in the 
stakeholder network in UP. In Punjab, some agencies have been able to garner trust but in general at the 
district level there was high level of mistrust between agencies.  In Himachal, stakeholders were found to 
have some professional level of trust among them.  One of the reasons for lower level of trust 
development in the RSBY scheme is shorter duration of the contract because of which parties are forced 
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to keep short term goals which tends to be opportunistic in nature that prevents development of trust 
between them.    
 Loss of Autonomy:  
This is used when an agency is particularly dependent on the other agency and can‘t risk losing 
liaison with that agency.  In the context of RSBY scheme, it is particularly observed with the private 
agency, which is dependent on the public sector agencies and don‘t have any way to control or deter the 
unjustified demands of the public agency. Thus in places where there is limited control on the public 
sector stakeholders in those situations this issue is found to be more common. 
Thus this step is taken by a private sector agency especially, when it can‘t risk losing the relationship 
and this step is used as a last resort available to private sector in order to save relationship with the public 
sector. Private sector generally accepts some of the demands and adjusts to the needs of the public sector 
agency to some extent.  
Public sector understands the limitation of the private sector and therefore they continue behaving 
opportunistically even when the private sector agency responds them relationally.  The short term 
contract, lack of penalties in the contract and protection of civil services rules provide public sector 
agencies especially at the district level to behave opportunistically.  
Approaching higher authorities:  
One of the relational approaches used by agencies when they are unable to use transactional approach 
is asking higher authorities to intervene in the matter. This is seen in case of SNA with IC in Himachal 














































Appendix 5.4 Governance Dynamics and Performance: A comparative analysis 
 
This link between relationship strength and opportunism prevention and management is much 
stronger than overall performance. The link between relationship strength and program performance is 
strongly related to enrollment performance than claims and empanelment performance.  This is 
because enrollment performance is same goal and same interest, whereas in the empanelment 
performance and claims management we see diverging goals but still there is positive association 
between relational approach used and performance.  
In case of enrollment performance we found that in districts which had high relational strength 
including relational approach between District administration stakeholder and private sector 
representative their performance was higher.   This was clearly observed in case of Punjab. There was 
relationship between performance and use of relational approach. Even in situations of poor 





















































Pradesh  5 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 4 
Punjab  2 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 2 
Uttar 
Pradesh  1 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 
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Thus we see a strong relation between relationship strength and opportunism performance. The 
relationship between relationship strength and program performance is not as strong as opportunism 
performance because there are many contextual factors that are important determinant of the program 
performance.  
Overall these results are in line with many other studies which have found a positive relationship 
between relationship strength and opportunisms. Many of these studies are quantitative which measures 
relational approach used which doesn‘t provide a true picture as we have seen in this case. Relationship 
dyads having dual governance are expected to have high relational approach used but relationship 




The   above graph clearly indicates that Himachal Pradesh does much better than Punjab and Uttar 
Pradesh in enrollment.  Both Punjab and Uttar Pradesh are consistently improving in the conversion ratio. 
Another dimension of performance is opportunism prevention and control. In Himachal Pradesh, not 
a single incident of opportunistic behaviors in enrollment process was found in the data collection. In case 
of Punjab, very few incidents of opportunism whereas in Uttar Pradesh a number of incidents of 






We find that A number of factors influence enrollment performance   but according to my analysis, 
there are five factors that drive enrollment performance in RSBY scheme as shown in the fig XXX. 
 
High enrollment performance requires that there is a high quality BPL list. Because calculation of the   
enrollment performance depends upon the quality of the BPL list, a poor quality BPL list reduces the 
enrollment performance as people in the list are missing and therefore they can‘t be enrolled.  Secondly 
poor quality BPL list increase the cost of identifying the beneficiary and therefore reduces the enrollment 
performance.  Among the study states, we find that Himachal Pradesh
168
 has a high quality BPL list 
compared to Punjab and UP. The quality of the BPL list is very poor in UP.   
 Second factor, critical for the enrollment performance, is support of the District administration to the 
enrollment teams. The enrollment team is an outsider in the district and therefore they are not familiar 
with geography and facilities available. The team member requires support in number of areas and 
therefore the support by District administration to the enrollment team considerably influences the 
performance of the scheme.   In Himachal Pradesh state government is   highly supportive of the RSBY 
scheme
169
  whereas in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh it varies. In Punjab, in some districts there has been very 
good support of District Administration. In Uttar Pradesh involvement of district administration depends 
considerably upon the liaison of the TPA
170
 as the DA don‘t have any incentives171 to get involved  as  
neither SNA or state government   pressurises them to  get involved in the  process.   
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 In Himachal Pradesh the Field Key Officers have continuously revised the BPL list after every enrollment and 
thus they have been able to considerably improve the quality of BPL list, reducing errors and omissions. Because of 
the improved list, more than 100 village councils were able to enroll 100% of population of BPL list, considerably 
pushing the enrollment performance.    
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 Given the populist appeal of the scheme, the state government is very keen to make the scheme successful 
and therefore there is considerable pressure on district authorities to implement the scheme and reach targets.   The 
commitment of the state govt is evident from the attention given to the scheme by high level political officials. The 
Health Minister and secretary of health chair the monthly meetings of the scheme. Health Minister decides about the 
targets of the scheme.  Because of the pressure from the state authorities, district administration reviews the progress 
of the scheme and is willing to provide any kind of support to the implementing agencies. 
170
 .  In Uttar Pradesh TPA appoints a person for liaison with district administration who meets the district 





Third factor that is important is availability and accessibility of FKOs. In the enrollment process, 
FKO‘s play a critical role of verification of beneficiary and they need to be present at the enrollment 
station for cards to be got issued under new 64 KB cards. In  places where the FKOs are easily available 
and are from the same locality, they not only play an important role in the verification of beneficiary but 
they also play a greater role in creating awareness about the scheme
172
. The availability and accessibility 
of FKO varies considerably across states. In case of Himachal Pradesh, Panchayat Secretaries are 
appointed as FKOs and they are not only locally available all the time, but they are also very much 
familiar with the local population. On the other hand is case of Punjab, where FKOs are ASHA workers 
and in many situations ASHA workers, from one location are asked to go and work in the other locations. 
These ASHA workers are not familiar with the local population.  But more worse is situation of the UP 
where FKOs workers do not even come to the enrollment stations. In most places even the SNA 
acknowledges that FKOs work as a proxy in Uttar Pradesh
173
  and they are not available at the enrollment 
station most of the time.  
 Fourth factor that plays an important role in enrollment performance is strength of field level 
monitoring. The enrollment process being afield level activity requires strong monitoring of the 
implementation process so that there are limited opportunistic behaviors by parties engaged in the 
enrollment process, whether it is District administration, TPAs or FKOs or beneficiaries.  Any of the 
stakeholders can behave opportunistically and therefore the strength of monitoring is important for 
limited opportunistic behaviors by the parties.  Strong implementation process also reduces the risk of 
poor cooperation and coordination because of blame gaming that is due to poor monitoring of the 
implementation process.  
 In the implementation strength, in my analysis i found that monitoring strength is best in Punjab 
when compared to among three, followed by the Himachal Pradesh and then finally UP.  In Punjab 
because of the high strength of monitoring they are able to prevent opportunistic behavior of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
liaison is indispensable. Part of the strategy is to motivate the DM and other district level officers by massaging their 
egos.  Manager of the TPA says that  
―Absolutely we can‘t work without liaisoning. In just two days we have to wrap up.‖ 
171
 The officers in the district Insurance committee are not under direct authority of state nodal agency and they 
don‘t have any additional incentives to perform. For them RSBY is like many other programs they are responsible to 
manage.   
172
 If they are from the same locality they can easily inform the target population and thus make beneficiary 
aware about the scheme. Being from the same locality they can answer the queries of the beneficiary.   
173
 In general, because of the geography and cultural context, ASHA do not actually come and stays during the 
entire period of enrollment at the enrollment station, especially when it is far from their home.  In place of ASHA, 
their husbands do attend the enrollment process and do the verification of beneficiaries as proxy.  SNA is also aware 
of this but in the given circumstances, in absence of other alternatives; this is allowed to happen, even though it is 







. In Himachal Pradesh through state government strongly supports the scheme implementation 
and therefore there is considerably strong support of the District administration but in many districts 
because of the Insurance Company being public there is limited monitoring from the private side of the 
public sector. In UP the monitoring system has been improved considerably recently with hiring of APOs 
at the SNA level and Technical assistants at the district level. But still as,  DA is not under any direct 
control of the SNA, the enrollment teams are considerably dependent on their ability to liaison with these 
agencies and therefore the implementation system is very week and there is limited monitoring of the 
enrollment process resulting into a number of frauds committed in the enrollment process.   
 Lastly, one of the main important factors that play an important role in enrollment performance is 
relationship strength and collaboration between agencies in the enrollment network. The relationship 
strength reflects the governance approach used in the enrollment function. In the area of enrollment the 
contract designers envisage a high level of relationship strength as well as high level of transactional 
approach. The contract design in the enrollment area reflects high level of transactional approach as 
contracts are high specified
175
, but at the same time, contract document also includes considerable amount 
of coordination clauses between agencies to complete the task in enrollment
176
. The two important 
agencies in the enrollment process are TPA and District administration and therefore the relational 
approach taken by each of the parties defines the relationship shared by the two agencies.    
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 The structure of the scheme implementation is such that the SNA has a team at the district level under their direct 
control like DMC, Nodal officer, statistical analyst. SNA given the direct hierarchical control can support and 
monitor the scheme implementation at the district level. There are a number of processes that have been laid down 
that improve the efficiency of the scheme implementation. The state nodal agency has close knit information 
network through which they are able to monitor the field activities. 
175
 As the table XX shows the inputs for the enrollment process (kits, Hardware and software) and its quality 
(number of machines per 1000 population ), the process of enrollment (awareness generation, card preparation), role 
of various stakeholders (district administration, District key Manager, Field Key Officer and Insurance Company) in 
the process and quality parameters of output ( quality of card , on the spot card distribution, distribution of the 
hospital list along with the card) are stated in the contract. 
176
 This coordination clause requires parties to work with each other. Coordination is required for deciding the 
appropriate route map. Coordination is required in the awareness generation, in making FKOs available at the 
enrollment station as these tasks are critical for enrollment performance; the role of relational approach to 







In the three states which we studied the relational approach used to manage the enrollment process 
differs considerably.  Highest level of relational strength was observed in case of Himachal Pradesh 
followed by Punjab and lowest in Uttar Pradesh.    
 
 
States  Uttar Pradesh  Himachal Pradesh Punjab 
Program Monitoring Low (+) Moderate (+) High (+) 
Availability and 
accessibility of FKO  
Low (+) High (+) Moderate (+) 
Level of support by 
DA in enrolled 
Low (+) High (+) Varies (+) 
Quality of BPL list  Very Poor (+) High (+) Poor (+) 
Relationship 
strength   




Low  High  Moderate  
 
Thus we find that the three states vary in the enrollment performance because of the considerable 
variation in the factors.  Most of these factors are of a higher level in case of Himachal Pradesh whereas 
in case of UP most of these factors are lower. Punjab has some factors favorable but some factors need 






5.7.1.3 Empanelment Performance 
 
 
The three states differ in the area of the performance in hospital empanelment.  In case of Himachal 
Pradesh the hospital empanelment process is marred with least problems and disputes and there have been 
very little controversies and complaints.  Though there are limited share of private hospitals empanelled 
in the scheme but this fits with the health seeking behaviour of the population which prefers public 
hospitals over private hospitals. The high utilisation ratio and lower disputes in the empanelment and 
lower frauds in the claims suggest that In Himachal Pradesh, hospital empanelment performance is at a 
higher level.  
 After Himachal Pradesh, it is Punjab, where the hospitals performance is above average. Though 
there is considerable share of the private hospitals in empanelment, but the public hospitals have reversed 
the trend in the claims ratio as high percentage of claims goes to public hospitals. There have been 
disputes and issues regarding hospital empanelment in Punjab but the state has been able to manage it 
internally.  Limited frauds in claims, limited and manageable disputes in the empanelment process and a 
good claims ratio suggest that the hospital empanelment process has performed above average in case of 
Punjab.  
In Uttar Pradesh, hospital empanelment process is doing very poorly. There has been large number of 
issues and problems related to hospitals empanelment. Private hospitals dominate in the process and in 
many cases fraudulent hospitals which existed only on paper have been found to be empanelled. Some of 
the hospitals even approached MOLE in this regard. The claims process is marred with extensive frauds 
and in some districts fraudulent claims were so high that hospitalisation ratio increased number of times. 










Variation in empanelment context 
States  Autonomy 

























PJ Moderate High Moderate Moderate to 
low  
Moderate  Low  
UP Low Moderate High Low to Very 
Low  
Low  Very low  
 
Autonomy of IC in empanelling a Hospital: 
 
A number of factors explain the variation in empanelment performance as shown in the table above.  
According to my analysis the extent to which IC is able to maintain its autonomy in the hospital 
empanelment process is critical to performance in the hospital empanelment. The power to empanel a 
hospital is considered as a key source of power and it varies across states. In HP it is completely with the 
Insurance Company to the extent that Insurance Company even doesn‘t follow the recommendation of the 
SNA. This is the way it should be as per the contract. At the second level is Punjab, where though IC has 
power to empanel a hospital, it has to bend down under if there is a pressure from the State Nodal agency 
but not necessarily DMC.  At the lower level is UP where the power to empanel a hospital has been taken 
away officially from the Insurance Company and it is entrusted with the District Insurance Committee 
comprising members from district administration and Insurance Company and District Medical council. 





administration. The IC autonomy in hospital empanelment depends upon the extent which SNA supports 




 Support of SNA in hospital empanelment and de-empanelment  
 
Another factor that determines autonomy of the Insurance Company in hospital empanelment and de-
empanelment is   support of SNA in hospital empanelment or de-empanelment. Support of the SNA 
varies across states with the SNA Himachal Pradesh is fully supportive and non interfering in the 
decisions of the IC and on the other extreme is SNA Uttar Pradesh which may ask Insurance companies to 
reconsider. The SNA Punjab is indifferent to issue of private hospitals which are basically the main 
source of contention.  
 
Relationship strength in Hospital empanelment  
 
The contract document clearly specifies the role and responsibilities of various agencies and process 
including coordination among agencies. The relationship in empanelment process is designed as 
contractually high but relationally low. Parties are just expected to do their roles as per the contract and 
not get involved in relational issues.   
 
As discussed earlier, District administration in this relationship can play a role that is supportive- 
preventing and controlling opportunism of Insurance Company, to exploitative-extracting rent from 





observed in case of Himachal Pradesh even though relationship between IC and DA is completely 
transactional
177
 but the stakeholders have professional level trust among each other.  
After Himachal Pradesh, Punjab was found to have relationship strength lower than Himachal but 
higher than Uttar Pradesh. The relationship between IC and DA in general is transactional but IC is 
expected to sometimes use relational approach by accommodating interests of DA as well as SNA.  
Therefore in Punjab we observe moderate relationship strength in the empanelment process where 
stakeholders have limited trust on each other and they also use relational approach
178
. In Uttar Pradesh 
extensive relational approach is used by IC and they are expected to accommodate interest of various 
parties‘ right from District Administration to State Nodal agencies. No agency trusts on any other agency 
in the empanelment process as reflected by multiple empanelment audits done by various agencies.  
 Lastly comes the case of Uttar Pradesh, in which the empanelment function though expected to be 
managed in transactional approach but the IC uses extensive relational approaches
179
  and tries to protect 
the relationship in order to reduce future cost but the relationship strength
180
 in the empanelment process 
is minimum. 
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 In Himachal Pradesh, DA doesn‘t play any role in the hospital empanelment process and they are not even aware 
of the hospitals which are empanelled in the scheme.  The Insurance Company is completely autonomous in its 
decision to empanel and de-empanel a hospital and even they do not get pressurized by State Nodal Agency in this 
regard. Thus in the context of the hospital empanelment the relationship between IC and DA is completely 
Transactional with lower use of relational activity.  The District administration even doesn‘t suggest hospitals as 
expected as per the contract. 
178
 In Punjab, the relationship strength between IC and DA in the context of hospital empanelment and de-
empanelment can be considered as contractually high and relationally moderate not low.  Both DA and SNA behave 
opportunistically pressurizing IC to empanel certain hospitals.   As discussed earlier the relational strength between 
IC and DMC is low in this context, but the relationship strength between SNA and IC has moderate level of 
relationship strength.  SNA shows considerable solidarity with the IC. The trust between the SNA and IC is 
professional level trust and therefore they monitor the IC and their allies through a close knit monitoring system. 
SNA keeps the communications with IC transparent and open.  Thus we see that the in the function of hospital 
empanelment in case of Punjab the is governed mostly governed by the transactional approach but in some situations 
relational approach   comes into picture. The relational approach is used not to improve program performance but to 
manage the opportunistic behavior of the other parties. 
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 In Uttar Pradesh, in the context of hospital empanelment IC has lower power position and is dependent on 
both the agencies and therefore has to use extensive relational approach with them even though they use 
transactional approach. In Uttar Pradesh, DM has a very powerful position given his status as an officer from 
Administrative services and therefore in relationship between IC and DA, DA has the dominant position than IC and 
accepts all of the instructions of the DA.  In conflicting situations IC presents all the information regarding dispute 
and gives the argument but at the same time because of their dependence on DA and their lower power position they 
follow a middle path where they accept few of the demands of the DM.   similarly in the relationship between IC 
and SNA, The approach of the SNA towards IC is transactional but given the lower power position of IC,  IC has to 
follow SNA even if it increase cost to them . In the situations of conflict IC has to listen to SNA and work according 
to them even if it affects their work.   IC is completely dependent on the SNA for decisions though they do provide 
information, prod and push SNA but ultimately their interest is to get the work done.    
 
180
 The trust between SNA and IC is professional trust where SNA verifies before believing on IC. SNA also 
holds responsible the IC for the tasks not completed.  Though there is some reciprocation between agencies but if 
needed SNA refers to the contract between agencies. SNA tries to enforce things and expect IC to follow directions 





5.7.1.4 Performance in claims management and role of context and governance in claims network  
 









UP High (-)  High (-) Low (+) Very Low Low 
HP Low (-) Moderate(-)  Moderate(+)  High  Low to 
Moderate 
  





 Another main area in the program performance is claims payment. In absence of the data only 
limited comparative analysis can be done on the claims performance.  
Punjab stands  out clearly in the  claims performance function because of a limited number of claims 
delay , high levels of claims monitoring, limited  fraud in claims function even though there is a 
considerable percentage of the claims are from private sector.  
Second to Punjab, is claims performance of Himachal Pradesh. Himachal Pradesh has very low frauds 
in claims,   moderate levels of claims monitoring but extensive delay in claims payment and very high 
claims ratio pulling down, performance of the HP.  
 Lastly Uttar Pradesh performs poorly in claims function. There have been reports of extensive frauds 
in claims, extensive delay in claims payment, out of the system settlements between IC and Hospitals, 
extremely high claims ratio in some districts with very poor service utilization in others.  
 
Fig : Factors Influencing Claims Performance. 
 
 








As shown in the fig above  There are a number of factors that contribute to the claims performance, 
and one of them is % of claims from the private hospitals.  It is expected that, higher, the number of 
claims from private sector, greater potential for disputes in claims management as compared to public, 
private hospitals have very strong incentive to do fraud. UP has the highest % of claims from the private 
sector whereas HP has the lowest.  Therefore it is expected that in UP claims related disputes are expected 
to be highest.  
 
 Percentage of Claims from Private Sector  
Years  Uttar Pradesh  Punjab  Himachal Pradesh  
2009 98.66 85.7  
2010 103.353 77.5 5.9 
2011 98.43 60.1 6.6 
2012  44.8 5.5 
 
Second contextual factor that influences claims performance is efforts for claims management. Efforts 
taken for claims management directly contributes to claims performance as more the efforts taken for 
claims management higher will be performance. In Punjab, claims monitoring is done by both IC and 
TPA, but most importantly they have started a claims reconciliation meeting every couple of months 
especially for public hospitals to address all pending claims. This has considerably reduced dispute in 
claims management and improved claims performance.  
 
At the second level is UP where claims monitoring is done by not only IC and TPA but also SNA. 
SNA calls back the hospitals to cross check if they have received their claims payment.   The most poor 
claims monitoring is in Himachal Pradesh, where only TPA does some form of claims monitoring and 
claims monitoring by IC is very shallow.  
 
Third factor that contributes to the claims performance is claims volume. It is expected that high 
claims volume will lead to lower claims performance.  UP leads in the number of claims followed by 


































UP High (-) Moderate (+)  High (-) High (-)  Low  (+) Low 












Fourth factor that contributes to the claims performance is interference in hospital empanelment and 
de-empanelment. It is expected that higher the interference in hospital empanelment and de-empanelment 
lower will be the claims performance.  Uttar Pradesh is the state with highest interference followed by 
Punjab and the least interference was observed in the case of Himachal Pradesh.  
 
Relationship Strength  in Claims management network 
 
Fifth factor that contributes in the claims performance is relationship strength in  claims function. In 
the process of the claims management,   the contract envisions a transactional relationship.   
 
The contract design in the claims function leaves very little area of ambiguity, and therefore there is 
very limited requirement for coordination and decision making in the claims process. Therefore the 
expected governance approach in this function is transactional as the contracts are designed in that format 
leaving little room for relational approach to take place.  
 
The relationship strength in the claims process in three states differ. In Himachal Pradesh, the claims 
management process was governed through a completely transactional approach. The IC manages the 
claims process without any interference. The trust between SNA and IC is low in the claims management 
areas and delays in claims payment is main issue of contention between two agencies.  
Compared to the Himachal Pradesh, governance approach in Punjab  has more relational element.  
Claims payment, is also the area where SNA, is keen to participate and ensure that claims are being paid 





Company is hands off
181
 but there is also a relational element and therefore the relationship strength in the 
claims function area is moderate.   
 
  In case of Uttar Pradesh, the relational approach is used more than the Himachal and Punjab but 
here IC is expected to reduce its autonomy and adjusts to needs of the District Administration and State 
Nodal Agency beyond what is expected in the contract. In Uttar Pradesh, IC   collaborates with the SNA, 
even if it is at the expense of their own autonomy. There are direct and indirect pressures on the IC from 
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 SNA keeps the communications with IC transparent and open and both parties share a professional level trust 
with each other. SNA understand the challenges faced by the IC and TPA in implementing the scheme as well the 
games that IC, TPA and DMC can engage in implementing the scheme. The trust between the SNA and IC is 







Appendix 5.5 General governance dynamics in Himachal 
 
The scheme governance in HP has evolved from a mixed governance approach to a predominately 
transactional approach. During the first year of the scheme implementation the insurance company and 
SNA shared a good relationship. The IC was new and so they were quite dependent on the SNA and SNA 
used to support and coach them
182
.  But state government
183
 started micromanaging of the scheme that 
strengthened relational ties between IC and State government
184
 and over the time they started bypassing 
state nodal agency over many issues
185
.   
This has resulted into a situation where the IC doesn‘t consider the suggestion and advice of SNA, 
especially if that increases cost to insurance company or cause inconvenience to the staff of Insurance 
Company. The officer of Insurance Company says that, ―Basically if they (SNA) ask us to do something, 
we just listen, but we just do what we want.‖ 
It is only when, State Nodal Agency  instructs Insurance Company via Secretary Health or Minister 
Health , than IC takes it seriously. The SNA officer says that ―we keep on saying them again and again 
and if they don‘t listen ...then there is a Principal Secretary  ... Pathak  ... than we go to him  ... so we do 
meeting .......and bring that in our level meeting and our Health Minister also talks with them‖.  
In addition the State Nodal Agency is understaffed and lacks expertise which has reduced the 
dependence of the IC on state nodal agency .As the insurance company gained the experience, their 
dependence on the SNA reduced further and there rapport with the high level public officials grew more. 
 As IC, started ignoring the suggestions of the SNA.  As the SNA learnt about this they first reduced 
all the informal and relationship support to SNA.  With continued opportunistic behaviour of IC, SNA 
started using more formal approach (authority) for managing this relationship. This included publically 
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 The SNA officers says that , ―In the first year insurance company did not even knew what they have to do 
and what they have not to do.  When to do... what to do... they didn‘t know anything.  Their vendors also didn‘t 
know.. Now they have become experts..  they took lot of time in installing the devices. Now there is little 
improvement but shortcomings are still there.  So earlier we have to coach them all the time.. now we have to do 
sometimes.‖ 
183
 The  state Nodal agency is supposed to be an autonomous agency  under department of the health but the decision 
making authority of the SNA is limited because of the strong political will and micro managing of the scheme by 
higher public officials from department of health (Secretary and  Health Minister).  The monthly review meetings 
are chaired by the secretary health or Minister of health rather than CEO of the HPSBY. Health Minister even sets 
the targets for the scheme. 
184
 As same insurance company has been implementing the scheme since the start of the scheme they have 
developed a strong rapport with the minister of the health and secretary health 
185
 Given the interference of the higher public officials other stakeholders, specifically Insurance Company 
bypass state nodal agency officer on many issues and approach the health Minister or Secretary Health. The 
Insurance company officer commented, ―I have liaison with the TOP bosses (Health Secretary and Minister). We 






highlighting the shortcomings of IC in various forums. The SNA changed their approach towards the 
relationship with Insurance Company from a role of  facilitator to  monitor
186
.  
Thus we see that  control based approach dominates in the relationship between IC and SNA in HP. 
The high handed approach of the IC has resulted into an animosity between the SNA and IC and therefore 
the relationship between the parties has become constrained and can be characterised as more dominant 
control based approach as seen in the Graph  below.  
 
 
This position of SNA and their approach has also influenced relationship of other stakeholders in the 
network to some extent. Stakeholders in the scheme are mainly concerned about getting their work done 
rather than performance of network though they do share some basic relationship. Network members 
carry out their prescribed roles in the scheme and do not interfere in the role of other Stakeholders.  For 
example :- SNA or DA do not interfere in hospital empanelment, contrary to what is commonly observed 
in other states. After few years of coaching and mentoring of IC and TPA (Himachal Pradesh has same IC 
and TPA from the beginning of the scheme),  SNA  now perceive their role as a monitor rather than a 
problem solver or facilitator and expects  others to simply do their duty. SNA expects implementation to 
                                                          
186
 Thus in HP, state nodal agency has limited power over the Insurance Company and as a result the role of 
state nodal agency has become more of a monitor of the scheme implementation rather than an agency that uses 
carrot and sticks to facilitate the implementation of the schemes.   
 The chief executive officer says that ―no we can‘t say that we support.. We will say that we monitor them.... if 
someone is not doing the work (for) example say if the insurance company doesn‘t do. Then we make it transparent 






happen according to the contract and parties are expected to delivery according to contract expectations. 
Thus they approach the scheme from a dominant control based perspective.    
 The IC being a public insurance company approaches with expectation that implementation is 
completely responsibility of TPA as they have outsourced it .Therefore they delegated everything to TPA 
especially in enrollment and they neither support nor monitor the activities of TPA. The officer of 
Insurance Company said that ―No technical support is provided. Actually all work has to be done by TPA 
only‖.  They don‘t monitor but they don‘t either trust TPA and therefore they repeatedly warn TPA to 
behave according to the contract and not to get involved in opportunistic behaviours, otherwise they will 
have to suffer penalty. They don‘t completely trust on the TPA also.  
At the district level, there is co-dependence between district administration and IC as both are keen to 
get enrollment done
187
.  Therefore District administration supports and works with the TPA
188
 and both 
share cordial relationships
189
 even though the DA has upper hand in the decision making
190
.  DA uses 
dominant transactional approach where as TPA uses governance approach towards DA which is 
dominantly relational. Therefore we see dual governance in the case of relationship between TPA and 
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 State Government pressurizes DA to get the enrollment done and therefore both DA and TPA  both have same 
concern.  
188
 The District Officer of TPA given his lower position.. he goes to  this big officer ( DC of the district) and he is 
happy that Dc recognizes him and so whatever way the DC treats is fine with him 
189
 that DC recognizes him 
190
 The TPA guy reports to the DC of all the activities.  Especially during enrollment every day the Manager of the 
TPA  sends a report to the DC. The superiority of the DC in the relationship with the TPA is evident from the fact 
that the enrollment plan decision is made by DC. If there is an issue as it happens it seems that TPA follows 





Appendix 5.6 General Governance Dynamics in Punjab 
 
Overall the governance mode of the scheme implementation in Punjab is a judicious mix of relational 
and transactional approach.  The unique position of State Nodal Agency in scheme implementation 
framework influences the governance approach used in general. Being able to control both supply and 
demand side of the scheme implementation, SNA, is able to use authority to enforce decisions. On the 
supply side, public hospitals are under their direct authority control where as on the demand side that is 
IC and TPA have a direct relationship through contract. This places SNA in a higher position to solve and 
mediate issues increasing authority and power of the SNA over the other stakeholders.  In addition SNA 
has in depth monitoring network that provides them onsite real information to track stakeholders‘ and 
their activities important pre requisite for judicious use of transactional approach. Thus SNA is able to 
chastise and use aggressive and pressuring approach to manage things.  
 Following figure presents the governance approach used by stakeholders towards each other in the 
RSBY scheme program in Punjab.    
Similar to other states we also see here dual governance approach. The dual governance approach in 
Punjab is only observed in relationship between public and private sector.  The relationship between 
public sector agencies is predominantly transactional as seen in the following diagram. Similarly the 
relationship between private sector agencies is also predominately transactional.  Only in case of 
relationship between private and public sector we see a dual governance approach.   In case of Punjab we 
can see that Public sector agencies use transactional dominant approach towards the private sector 
agencies where there is limited scope for the relational management.  But private sector uses a mixed 
approach that there is a balance between control and relational approaches used by the Public sector 
agency. Private sector agencies in Punjab, up to an extent, follow relational approach, but beyond a point, 
they approach higher authority to get the matters sorted out. This is because in Punjab, higher authorities ( 
State Nodal Ahency) can control lower public sector authorities ( DMC and FKOs) and  are able to solve 
issues raised by insurance companies. The Private sector agencies in addition to maintaining a relational 
approach, keeps a formal communication process so that facts cannot be twisted later, by other agencies.  






Because of the central position of the State Nodal Agency, strong implementation mechanism under 
their direct control, SNA has been able to considerably influence the governance process in the scheme.  
The governance process in the scheme uses predominantly transactional approach to manage the contract 
with some dimensions of relational approach.   State Nodal agency prefers using exchange of information, 
problem solving through discussion and consultations but there is only limited flexibility, solidarity and 
trust between agencies. There is limited professional level trust that requires monitoring. With some 
Private Insurance companies SNA were able to trust them much more suggesting that the relationship is 























Appendix 5.7 General governance dynamics in Uttar Pradesh 
Following figure presents the governance approach used by stakeholders towards each other in the 
RSBY scheme program in Uttar Pradesh.   
Earlier literature has described relationship between agencies as one sided approach (ref).  This is 
expected as this research was done in the context of long term relationships.  But in case of RSBY, we 
can see the stakeholders are strangers at the point of the relationship formalisation and they need to get 
working together knowing the relationship will last only for shorter duration and this results in both 
agencies in relationship responding to their incentives in context of relationship leading to a dual 
approach where each agency adopts a governance approach towards other agency irrespective of the 
governance approach adopted by the other agency.  ( in game theory terms this is dominant strategy).  
 
This dual governance approach is visible especially in case of relationship between public and private 
sector in Uttar Pradesh. In the Uttar Pradesh, public sector plays a dominating role in scheme 
implementation and management at the state and district level. State Nodal agency is well resourced, has 
a high monitoring and problem solving capacity
191
 and strong legitimacy
192
 and support.  State Nodal 
Agency uses a mixed approach (more towards transactional) towards scheme implementation. The 
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 SNA has developed a strong monitoring system by having technical officer at the field level and Assistant 
project officer at the state level for monitoring the scheme which provides SNA required information for managing 
the scheme without depending on others. Hiring staff outside the public system have given the opportunity to have 
high capacity human resources to understand, analyze and solve problems.  
192





relational tools used by SNA are, coordination and communication support
193





 to certain extent in project implementation. The common transactional 
tools used by SNA are -regularly referring to contracts during the contract management, documenting 
most of the important communication either in the form of minutes of meetings or letters which later used 
as an evidence to incriminate any agency.  SNA understands their limitations in using transactional tools 
given the limited choices given in the contract and therefore additional transactional tools they use are 
letters, and threat of blacklisting.   SNA manages the scheme through weekly meetings with different 
stakeholders in which issues and problems are discussed. The review meetings are the main channel of 
implementing and monitoring the progress
196
.  
Similar to State Nodal Agency, at the District level, District Administration dominates in the scheme 
implementation because of the role given to district administration in scheme implementation
197
. District 
Administration in Uttar Pradesh consists of two group of actors District Magistrate and Chief Medical 
Officers or Deputy Chief Medical Officer. DM is an IAS officer and there is a status attached to his 
position. DM has high level of autonomy
198
  and credibility
199
. In general District Magistrate shares a 
transactional relationship with most stakeholders in the scheme management. District Magistrate requires 
things in written and communicates in a formal manner. For communicating with the DM a protocol is 
followed where only an IAS officer (generally CEO or Addl CEO of SNA) can ask or suggest DM on 
issues related to scheme implementation.   
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 SNA especially provides communication and coordination support in the coordination with District level public 
agencies.  
194
 SNA communicates informally with various agencies and doesn‘t always require formal communication to take 
action.  
195
 Flexibility is seen in relation to enrollment process specifically.  Rules regarding availability of Kits were 
relaxed. Similarly rules‘ regarding FKO availability is also relaxed to some extent. In some cases enrollment 
duration was also extended.   
196
 Through these review meetings SNA does technical analysis and reviews progress of work in particular 
districts and held the concerned agency responsible for shortcomings. These meetings are conducted under the 
chairmanship of the SNA head who is an IAS officer and he actively sorts the issues immediately using modern 
technology like video conferencing. The minutes of these meetings are used as implementation guidelines and 
circulated among all the stakeholders including district level officials like DM. Therefore these meetings are taken 
seriously by all the project partners.   
197
 In Uttar Pradesh, scheme implementation at District level is managed by District Insurance committee which is 
chaired by District Magistrate and Chief Medical Officer of the District (District Key Manager) is secretary of the 
committee. The District Insurance Committee is responsible for the governance of the scheme implementation 
including enrollment and hospital empanelment in the district.  Thus compared to other districts where District 
Administration plays a supportive and judiciary role, in case of Uttar Pradesh district administration is directly 
involved in decision making.     
198
 The DM as a district level head is not under direct authority line of the state Nodal agency and therefore, 
State Noda l agency also finds it difficult to control district administration. Given the status of the DM, SNA also 
can‘t question the work of DM. DM only listens to the principle secretary of the state government.   
199





Chief Medical Officer or Deputy CMOs are also gazetted officers and therefore they also have a 
status in bureaucracy but their autonomy and credibility are limited. CMO generally have a dominant 
transactional approach with other stakeholders in the scheme.  Some relational element consists of 
informal communication with other agencies, support and flexibility provided to other agencies and 
working on informal communication.  
Public sector (specifically district administration) not only dictates private sector but also takes credit 
for the work done by private sector, if the performance is good; but when the performance is poor public 
agencies don‘t take responsibility, instead they blame private sector for their own shortcomings. 
 
On the other hand Private Sector in Uttar Pradesh plays a subordinate position. Private sector values 
their relationship with public sector much more than public sector, valuing their relation with private 
sector agencies. This is expected given that private sector keeps on changing and for them the particular 
state or district is completely new raising their dependence on the public sector. 
The decision making process is captured by the public sector
200
 and therefore insurance company and 
TPA have little autonomy. Wherever possible TPA and insurance company provide the information and 
also fight against any unfair approach taken by SNA or DA. Depending upon the situation they either 
succeed or fail.  The IC and TPA understand that they have to work with these agencies and therefore in 
order to avoid everyday trouble they also bow down to some of the demands of SNA and DA even if that 
is unfair and against the guidelines. 
 
Private sector does not openly criticise or argues with Public agencies as they don‘t want to spoil their 
relationship with the public sector. Because of their lower status, they are generally at the receiving end of 
the stick.  Private sector believes that work can‘t happen without liaison in Uttar Pradesh. They have to 
massage the ego of public sector officers (especially district administration), if they have to get work done 
from public agencies but there is no relationship as there is hardly any trust and credibility in the 
relationship. Therefore main basic approach used is transactional but on top of the transactional approach 
there is a layer of relational approach in the form of liaison and relationship building.   
The existing system, on the paper, gives voice to stakeholders as they can raise voice against any 
stakeholder
201
 and approach designated grievance committee to get their grievances addressed.  But in 
practice, this does not happen, as officers in SNA cannot even discuss /instruct District Magistrates as 
they are IAS officer and therefore, they can only be approached by an IAS officer holding similar or 
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 Compared to other states IC and TPA have limited autonomy is area of enrollment and hospital empanelment.  
201
 For example :- if CMO is not paying attention than stakeholders can contact DM. If DM, is not paying attention, 






higher rank (CEO of SNA or Principle Secretary). Even for instructing CMO, IC and TPA has to 
approach SNA. In Uttar Pradesh, MOLE also has limited influence on SNA because of closeness of the 
CEO of SNA with the ruling government (Times of India Dec 15
th
 2013) and thus has considerable 
autonomy visa vie MOLE.  Complaining about a Public officer can worsen the situation as officer may 
become more vengeful as they hold a permanent job.   
 
Even public sector agencies, who do not value their relationship with private sector, can‘t use tools of 
transactional approach like penalty with the private sector agencies,  because contract design and scheme 
management framework advocates using relational approach (discussions) to solve disputes by 
participatory discussion. Therefore they are forced to use transactional approaches which are not strong 
enough.  Because of the poor performance of grievance system and extensive collusion, only few cases of 
dispute are resolved through the formal channel as suggested by the contract document.  In the absence of 
effective dispute resolution mechanism parties in scheme respond to opportunism of partner by counter 
opportunism
202
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 This is seen in many relationships in case of RSBY specifically in Uttar Pradesh. Hospitals specially those 
who had political connection did rampant level of frauds and colluded at various levels. Hospitals colluded with 
district administration with TPA and IC staff, with auditors and thus collusion levels at multiple levels lead to 
massive number of frauds in the scheme.  Private Insurance companies responded to these frauds by using various 
tactics, both ethical and unethical that can reduce claims in short term (in the same policy period).  But Hospitals 





Appendix 6.1 : Associates of Insurance Companies 
 
 Name of Agency   Type  No of Districts in Sample  No of District Years  
1 Dedicated  TPA 4 30 
2 Medsave  TPA 16 169 
3 Family Health  TPA 3 13 
4 MD India  TPA 1 76 
5 E-Meditek TPA 1 101 
6 Smart Chip  SCSP 5 51 
7 FINO SCSP 9 253 

























Appendix 6.2 steps in creation of collaboration index  
 
Checking for Normality of distribution, data Outliers, Linearity, Multi co-linearity were done as 
preparatory steps for confirmatory factor analysis.    
Normality Score of Measurement Indicator of Thomson (2001) Model  
variable | Mean Median  Skewness Kurtosis SD 
DM1 4.22 5 -.91 2.87 1.783
036          
DM 2 4.95 5 -1.7 5.35 1.454
279          
ADM1 4.49 5 -.99 3.34 1.532
393   
ADM2 4.64 5 -1.11 3.73 1.456
875   
ADM3 4.7 5 -1.13 3.49 1.514
845  
ADM4 4.75 5 -1.56 4.62 1.659
088  
AUTO .90 0 1.56 4.83 1.396
196  
AUTO 2.31 2 .33 1.85 1.970
699  
AUTO 1.84 1 .64 2.38 1.718
168  
RES1 3.06 3 -.14 1.54 2.265
856  
RES2 4.7 5 -1.16 3.45 1.550
839  
RES3 4.64 5 -1.42 4.26 1.685
149  
RES4 5.09 6 -1.27 4.38 1.182
217  
RES5 4.99 5 -1.41 5.00 1.248
372  
TRUST1 4.24 5 -.64 2.76 1.335
483  
TRUST2 4.25 4.5 -.64 3.05 1.352
197  










The above table presents the test statistics for each of the 17 indictors for the normality check 
Data appears to be normally distributed as per the Klines (2005) suggestion as none of the variables have 
skew index absolute values greater than three and Kurtosis index absolute values greater than 10.  
The sample size of 130 is considered as a medium simple size and, adequate for the analysis. 
However, it should be noted that some tests may still exhibit low power, and result in a Type 1 or Type 2 
error Donna (2008).  









above table presents the Cronbach's alpha score of the five dimensions of the collaboration and 
the collaboration scale as a whole. Cronbach‘s alphas for three dimensions (except Autonomy), 






Latent Variable  No of Indicators  Cronbachs Alpha  
Decision Making  2 0.6025 
Administration  4 0.8376 
Autonomy  3 0.4671 
Mutuality  5 0.6332 
Trust  3 0.7714 
Collaboration consisting of all five 






Table : Descriptive statistics for all 17 indicators  
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Relationship with Third Party Administration (TPA) 
Decision Making TPA  30 5.35 0.72 3.00 6.00 
Administration TPA 31 4.94 1.20 0.00 6.00 
Autonomy TPA 31 1.18 1.15 0.00 4.33 
Mutuality TPA 30 4.61 0.79 3.00 6.00 
Trust TPA 31 4.82 0.84 3.00 6.00 
Collaboration TPA  31 18.21 3.95 4.00 23.55 
Relationship with District  Administration (DA) 
Decision Making DA  42 4.21 1.66 0.00 6.00 
Administration DA 42 4.36 1.39 1.25 6.00 
Autonomy DA 42 1.98 1.11 0.00 4.00 
Mutuality DA 42 4.47 1.05 2.20 6.00 
Trust DA 42 4.36 1.06 2.00 6.00 
Collaboration DA  42 15.42 4.40 7.72 22.25 
Relationship with District Key Manager (DKM) 
Decision Making DKM  43 4.31 1.42 0.50 6.00 
Administration DKM 43 4.48 1.43 0.75 6.00 
Autonomy DKM 43 2.04 1.11 0.00 4.33 
Mutuality DKM 43 4.39 1.24 0.00 5.80 
Trust DKM 43 4.39 1.17 1.33 6.00 
Collaboration DKM 43 15.53 4.77 1.58 22.68 
Relationship with Smart Card Service Provider  (SCSP) 
Decision Making Smart 
card  
33 4.44 1.56 0.00 6.00 
Administration Smart Card  32 4.86 1.03 2.00 6.00 
Autonomy Smart Card 31 1.24 1.26 0.00 5.33 
Mutuality Smart card 31 4.57 0.82 2.00 6.00 
Trust Smart Card 31 4.38 1.04 2.00 6.00 
Collaboration Smart Card 32 16.90 4.14 6.00 23.55 
 
Above table presents data of the collaboration score measured for each relationship before 
confirmatory factor analysis. The score was highest with Third Party Administrators, followed by Smart 
Card Service Providers, District Key Manager and least was with District Administration.  This follows 





closely with the TPA. In case of dispute, parties can exit the relationship.  Insurance companies 
experience more autonomy with their subsidiaries like Third Party Administrators and Smart Card 
providers compared to public sector organizations like District Administration and District Key Manager 
8.1.1 First Stage: CFA of Each Dimension of Collaboration  
 
In the first stage, each of the five dimensions of Thomson‘s (2001) model was checked for fitness 
of each model in the context of RSBY scheme and sample data. After testing for each component of 
collaboration separately, we test the integrated measurement model in the next step. Table 5.2 presents the 
fit indices of each of five component areas.  
Table : Fit statistics of each of the content areas of the Thomson‘s model 
Model  2 
 




Cannot be computed because of lesser number of indicators  
Administration  1.513 0.757 0.000 0.0431 1.00 No 
Autonomy 0.00  0.00   No 
Mutuality  27.402 5.480 0.176 0.620 0.810 Yes both 
MI and  
Residual 
covariance‘s  
Trust 0  0   No 
 
Decision Making  
As seen from table, the Model of decision making could not be tested because this model has less 
than required indicators to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis. DM model consisted of following 
Indicators  
1. Please rate,  how seriously this organisation takes your opinion/suggestions (DM1) 







Administration model consisted of following four indicators.  
1. To what extent, this partner is clear about his role and responsibility in RSBY scheme? (ADM1) 
2. To what extent meetings /discussions with this partner is effective? (ADM2) 
3. To what extent you and this partner agree on how the collaboration should be between your comp
any and this partner? (ADM3) 
4. How effective is your coordination with this partner? (ADM4) 
The parameter estimates of indicators of administration dimension are presented  below 
Table: Parameter estimate of administration dimension of collaboration  
.  Indicator  Parameter estimate Squared Multiple Correlations  Residual covariance’s   
Adm-1 0.654 0.427 Nothing   
Adm-2 0.981 0.534   
Adm-3 0.731 0.963   
Adm-4 0.654 0.390   
 
Administration model has acceptable fit indices without any issue. There was no indication of localized 
strain in the administration model. The latent variable administration also explains considerable variation 
in each indicator as indicated by the squared multiple correlations.    
Autonomy  
The autonomy measurement model of autonomy consisted of following indicators.  
1. To what extent collaboration with this partner hinders your company‘s goals? ( AUTO1) 
2. To what extent your independence is reduced when you collaborate with this partner? (AUTO2) 
3. To what extent you feel pulled between meeting your company‘s expectation and this partner‘s 
expectation? ( AUTO3)  






Table:  Parameter estimate of autonomy dimension of collaboration 
 






Auto-1 0.155 0.024  
Auto -2 0.475 0.226  
Auto -3 0.962 0.924  
 
  The measurement model of the autonomy is unacceptable because it is presenting out of range 
values
203
 probably because AUTO-1 is a redundant indicator as it has low coefficient estimate (0.155) and 
the latent dimension autonomy explains very little variation in the indictor (0.024). Auto-1 is about 
―collaboration hindering organization in achieving its own mission‖ which in the RSBY context is not 
applicable as it is the responsibility of the Insurance Company to achieve the performance objectives and 
therefore Insurance company will do all sort of activities (including collaboration) that leads to better 
performance especially in case of enrolment where its incentives are tied . This is specifically applicable 
in relationship with District Administration and District Key Manager, which do not directly benefit from 
better performance of the scheme, as they have limited incentives to perform. Therefore for Insurance 
Company, more collaboration is always better especially with public sector stakeholders as it is expected 
to provide more support for implementation activities of the Insurance Company. This probably explains 
such a low validity and reliability of the measure.  As the Autonomy model cannot be reduced further as 
that will make the model un-testable, therefore this will be done in the integrated measurement model.  
Mutuality  
The measurement model of the mutuality dimension has following five indicators.  
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 These out of the range values are known as offending estimates or Heywood cases. The Negative error 
variance is one of the commonest types of Heywood case.   Brown (2006) suggests a number of reasons 
that cause Negative error variance. These are (a) multi-collinearity (b) liner dependencies, (c) problems 






1. To what extent your company and this partner share resources with each other?  (RES1) 
2. To what extent your company and this partner share helpful information with each other? (RES2) 
3. To what extent this partner respect and appreciates your company's work?  (RES3) 
4. To what extent collaboration with partner is necessary to achieve your company‘s goal? (RES4) 
5. To what extent you and this partner organisation work through differences to arrive at 
win -win solution? (RES5) 
Table : Parameter estimate of Mutuality dimension of collaboration 






Res-1 0.292 0.085 With R2 and R3 
Res-2 0.560 0.313  
Res-3 0.459 0.211  
Res-4 0.769 0.592  
Res-5 0.592 0.350  
 
Above table presents the parameter estimates of the measurement model of mutuality dimension. 
The model is not fitting well with the data as suggested by the fit indices presented in the table. As the 
model is not fitting well with the data, the interpretation of the parameter estimates is dubious. The 
estimates suggest a poor reliability and validity of the Res-1 indicator. The analysis of residuals also 
suggests localized strain between Res-1 and other two variables Res-2 and Res-5. The poor fitting of the 
model suggests moving from confirmatory factor analysis to exploratory factor analysis.  
Res-1 measures the extent to which the parties have combined and used each other‘s resource. In 
the context of the RSBY, parties are governed by the written contract between parties according to which 
there is no physical resource sharing between parties.  Though resource sharing is not limited to only 
physical resources but in the context of the RSBY scheme, the survey respondents are more likely to 
interpret resource sharing as physical or financial resources. In the Indian context, according to civil 





and DKM) and private sector (Insurance company/TPA and Smart Card service providers). Therefore, in 
the Indian context, this indicator is redundant and needs to be removed from the analysis. 
Given the lower reliability and validity of Res-1, and lower suitability of the indicator in the 
context, this indicator was dropped and that improved the model fit and the change in the model fit is 
statistically significant. There is no localized strain in data as suggested by the analysis of residuals table, 
the test the model again without Res-1.  Comparison of the parameter estimates suggest that there is no 
drastic change in the parameter estimates though variance explained by the model has increased for all 
indicators. 
Trust  
The measurement model of trust has following three indictors.  
1. To what extent, you can trust people from this organization? (Trust1) 
2. To what extent, this partner completes its responsibility or obligation? (Trust 2)  
3. To what extent, your company feels that it is worthwhile to work with this partner? (Trust3) 
As the fit indices in Table : fit Statistics suggest, the measurement model of trust is a Heywood 
case. Trust -1 has out of the range value of 1.032 and this is not acceptable. As the measurement model of 
trust is not acceptable, its parameter estimates are also not interpretable. As all three indicators of trust 
measure, three different dimension of concept of trust therefore multi-co linearity cannot be a cause.  This 
is further confirmed from the correlation matrix.  The issue of small sample size, missing data has already 
been dealt earlier. The issues of redundant indicators could be a possibility but further reduction in 
indicators will lead to an un-testable model and therefore it is difficult to test this in the measurement 
model of Trust, but this can be tested in the integrated measurement model. 
Except administration and decision making, all the other measurement models did not fit well 
with the data. The measurement model of Mutuality was refined further making the model fit well with 





variances probably due to redundant indicators but they could not be refined further given fewer numbers 
of indicators that are used to measure this model. Further reduction in this model would make this model 
un-testable model and therefore it is difficult to test this measurement model, but this can be tested in the 
integrated model in the next step.  
Stage Two: CFA of Integrated Model of Collaboration  
 
Here, I test the integrated model of five components of collaboration, suggested by Thomson 
(2009) using survey data from the RSBY scheme. Table 5.3 compares the model fit of the 5 factor and 17 
indicator model of Collaboration in Thomson (2001) study with RSBY data. 
The first row in the table presents the model fit indices in Thomson (2001).The second row 
presents the results got from applying the same model in case of RSBY data. As shown in the table, the 
collaboration model does not fit well with the RSBY data
204
. Standardized residuals, also suggest 
localized strain in the data  suggesting a need to move from a confirmatory factor analysis to exploratory 
factor analysis (Brown 2006).  Modification indices suggests- adding a covariance between errors of 
indicators Adm-4 and Res-3 and Involvement of Res-1 in several modification indices. Adm-4 is extent of 
effectiveness of coordination of tasks between organizations and Res-3 is amount of respect and 
appreciation by partners. High respect and appreciation in collaboration is expected to be associated with 
better coordination and therefore the error variance of both these indicators could be linked. This linkage 
seems plausible but Donna (2008) warns to be cautious while justifying linking two error terms, because 
it is always possible that one can stretch the logic too far, making changes based on data rather than 
theory.  
Secondly involvement of Res1 in several Modification Indices suggests unsuitability of this 
indicator in the RSBY context. The analysis of the measurement model of Mutuality, done in previous 
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 According to the Brown (2006) RMSEA, CFI and RMSA are the important model fit statistics. For a close model 







step also suggests the same. Dropping Res-1 from the measurement model moved it from a not fitting 






Table  Model fit indices of series of confirmatory factor analysis models on the RSBY data 




RMSEA RMSA CFI Df Differen
ce in χ2  
Difference 
in df  
Significance of the 
model change  
Thomson (2001) Model  195.10 1.79 0.044       
Model before CFA using RSBY 
Data  




(Removing Res-1)  
236.63 2.804 0.102 0.188 0.917 94 43.08 15 *** 
Model after 2
nd
  Modification 
(Removing Res5 )  




(adding error variance between 
Res-4 and Adm-3. 
146.885 1.859 0.0767 0.161 0.957 79 22 1 *** 
Model after fourth   Modification 
(removal of Trust 3) 
114.93 1.741 0.071 0.152 0.965 66 31.955 13 *** 
Model after fifth Modification 
(Removal of res-4) 





Based on the above analysis, Res-1 was removed from the integrated 
measurement model and third row in the table 5.3 presents the Model fit indices of 
model after dropping Res-1. The modified model has better model fit compared to 
original model and change has resulted in a significant improvement (p < 0.05) in the 
model fit.  But the modified model remains short of the recommended criteria for an 
acceptable fit suggested by Brown (2006). 
There are still localized areas of strain in the model as many standard residual 
error variances remain at Z>2, and the Modification indices are greater than 4.  
The analysis of the Modification Indices suggest Res-5 is the indictor which 
is  involved in several modification indices and in standardized residuals suggesting 
that there is lot of localized strain in the data which is related to Res-5.  Res-5 
indicator measures the extent to which organizations in collaboration work through 
differences to arrive at win-win solutions. In the context of the RSBY scheme, the 
responsibility of each party is defined in the contract. Most of the common issues and 
problems which arise in the implementation of the scheme are identified and a 
process outlined to address that issues. In this way there are limited opportunities to 
craft a solution that is a win-win in true sense and therefore this indicator is not very 
relevant to the context of RSBY scheme.  The Parameter estimates of the indicator 
Res-5 are 0.49 and only 24.2% of the variance in the indicator is explained by the 
latent variable.  Given the theoretical rationale, suggestion from localized strain in the 
data, and parameter estimates, Res-5 can be removed from the collaboration 
framework.  
Based on the above analysis, Res-5 is removed from the integrated 
measurement model and tests it again for further CFA. Fourth row in the above table 
presents the third model after removing Res-5. Third model after removing Res-5 has 
better model fit compared to the previous two models and this has resulted in a 
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significant improvement (p < 0.05) in the model fit but the model fit is still below 
acceptable fit statistics.  
Analysis of the modification indices and standard residuals suggest two 
things. First, there is reduction in modification indices and reduction in the standard 
residuals compared to previous model suggesting that the removal of indicator Res-5 
has improved the model fit. 
Secondly, Modification indices suggest that adding a covariance between 
error terms of Res-3 and Adm-4 will cause a 20.5 change in the 2.  The modification 
indices suggesting linking up error variance of Res-3 and Adm-4 has persisted even 
after making two modifications in the model. This suggests that this localized strain 
in the data is not representing some other data strain or problem due to cross loading. 
As discussed earlier the indicators Res-3 and Adm-4 can be linked as they present the 
coordination and appreciation link of the data. Therefore, this modification seems 
reasonable to make at this stage. 
After adding covariance between error terms of Res-3 and Adm-4, model was 
tested again for model fit statistics. Fifth row in the above table presents, model fit 
statistics of Model after third modification that is linking error variances between 
Res-3 and Adm-4. Comparison of the model fit indices of the model suggests that, the 
model after linking error covariance of Adm3 and Res4 has resulted in a significant 
improvement (p < 0.05) in the model fit.  The model after this modification has a 
much better fit and it is close to a moderately fit model as model has CFI of 0.957, 
RMSEA as 0.076 and RMSA of 0.161.  
The model fit can be improved further as there are localized areas of strain in 
the model as suggested by standard residual error variances and modification indices.  
The analysis of modification indices and standard residuals suggest that many 
modification indices involve Trust 3 (3 out of 8 modification indices involve Trust 3). 
Secondly standard residuals also suggest that Trust 3 is involved in 2 out of 6 
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localized strains in the data as suggested by standardized residual table. Thomson 
(2001) in her analysis has also found low validity and significance of trust 3.  Trust 3 
measures the extent to which organization feels it worthwhile to work in 
collaboration rather than working alone.  This indicator is also not suitable for the 
RSBY context as insurance company has to work in collaboration to deliver as it 
cannot do it alone.   Secondly the contract between parties is only one year which is 
to be renewed every year. After a contract it takes at least few months to discover 
problems with other party.  Thus by the time the problem is discovered there are only 
few months left for the contract and given the cost of exiting the relationship parties 
prefer the finish the contract and exit the relationship.  Based on theory and data, it 
seems reasonable to drop this indicator from the model.  
A model fit test was run again after dropping Trust-3 indicator from the 
model. Sixth row in the above table  presents, model fit statistics of model after 4
th
 
modification that is after dropping Trust-3,  Comparison of the model fit indices of 
the models suggests that, removing Trust3 has resulted in a significant improvement 
(p < 0.05) in the model fit.  Removal of Trust3 has moved model more closely 
towards a moderately fit model with CFI of 0.965, RMSEA equal to 0.071 and 
RMSA equal to 0.152. The parameters estimates of the model did not have any 
significant change after the 4
th
 modification suggesting that this change didn‘t disrupt 
other factor loadings. 
Examination of standard residual errors and Modification indices respectively 
suggest that there is still localized area of strain in the data and model fit can be 
improved further. The modification indices suggested linking error variance between 
ADM-4 and Adm-3 and Res-4 and DM1.  Another suggestion which involves Res-4 
is linking Res-4 with DM-1. Res-4 measures the extent to which there is agreement 
on goals about the collaboration and Dm-1 measures the extent to which partner takes 
organizations views and opinions seriously.  
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In the RSBY context, contract between Insurance Company and state nodal 
agency is designed by a central team in the Ministry of Labor and GIZ. This contract 
document has gone under considerable revision over the number of years. The 
contract document is very explicit and lays down clearly the goals of the contract as 
well as their roles and responsibility. Thus as the goals of the parties as well as goal 
of the whole network is explicitly written, there is considerable agreement between 
parties on goals of collaboration.  Thus indicator Res-4 which measures agreement on 
goals of collaboration is not suitable in the context of RSBY scheme.  Res-4 is 
involved in both modification indices and is involved in data strain as the table of 
standard residuals show.  Based on theory and data Res-4 doesn‘t seem to be valid in 
the context of RSBY scheme and therefore it can be removed from the model.  
Based on the above analysis, I removed Res-4 from the integrated 
measurement model and run model fit statistics again. Sixth row in the above table 
presents model fit statistics of model after fifth modification that is after removing 
Res-4. Comparison of the model fit indices of the models suggests that, the removal 
of Res4 has  resulted in a significant improvement (p < 0.05) in the model fit and 
model now has acceptable level of goodness of fit statistics with CFI of 0.974, 
RMSEA equal to 0.063 and RMSA equal to 0.145. The modification indices and 
standard residual  suggest a minor strain in the data. 















DM1 0.67 0.44 *** 0.297 *** 
DM2 0.67 0.45 *** 0.198 *** 
ADM1 0.70 0.49 *** 0.156 *** 
ADM2 0.80 0.64 *** 0.111 *** 
ADM3 0.89 0.79 *** 0.0973 *** 
ADM4 0.62 0.38 *** 0.213 *** 
AUTO1 0.17 0.03 ** 0.223 *** 
AUTO2 0.52 0.26 *** 0.461 *** 
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AUTO3 0.88 0.78 *** 0.709 Not sig 
RES2 0.65 0.42 *** 0.307 *** 
RES3 0.35 0.11 *** 0.303 *** 
TRUST1 0.76 O.58 *** 0.127 *** 
TRUST 2 0.98 0.95 Not 
significant 
0.155 Not sig 
 
 
Above table presents the parameter estimates of the collaboration model that 
has acceptable level of model fit statistics. Parameters do not have out of range 
values, parameter estimates are statistically viable (no negative variances – variance 
cannot be negative! What is this supposed to refer to?) and statistically significant at 
conventional standards (p <0.05). The direction of the parameters estimates are also 
in accord with the prediction. There is considerable precision in the estimate of the 
parameters as they have smaller standard errors. 
The magnitude of the parameters Res-3 (0.35), auto-3 (0.88) and Trust 2 
(0.98) are in accord with the prediction. 
Except Auto-1 (0.03) Auto-2 (0.25) and Res-3 (0.11) measures have a high 
reliability as suggested by the communality. The low reliability of these indicators 
raises questions on meaningfulness of its relation with the latent factor. To some 
extent this could be explained by the context of the scheme. The questions related to 
autonomy are sensitive and surveyed were generally hesitant to answer this question 
during in-depth interviews, even after they were assured of confidentiality of their 
identity. Therefore it is expected that the quality of the data for these two questions 
does not reflect the real situation and low reliability of these indicators is due to the 




















Measurement Model ( after stage 2) 
.   
 
Stage Three: Testing High Order Structural Model of Collaboration 
 
This is the final step of the confirmatory factor analysis presented here. The 
purpose of this step is to examine structural relationship among five unobserved 
dimensions which are expected to be correlated with each other. Second purpose is to 
understand the effect of structural model on the measurement model and relationship 





 Table : High order model of collaboration – structural and measurement 
model 
  





RMSEA CFI GFI Df 
Higher order 
model (original 













The goodness of fit of higher order structural model suggests that the model 
is fitting well with the data.  The RMSEA of 0.068 and CFI of 0.968 suggest that 
model is within acceptable model fit statistics. The parameter estimates and R
2
 
statistics suggest that measurement indicators did not change much in the structural 
model. The Modification indices and standard residuals suggest minor strain in the 
data.  
Following table presents the parameter estimate and R
2
 of the five latent 
variables of both original model (Thomson, 2001) model and modified model. The 
modification of the model has led to the more appropriate parameter estimate of the 











Table  Component Fit Indices of the Structural Relationships Specified in 
Final Model 




Squared Multiple correlations for 










0.793 0.615 0.629 
Administration  0.983 
 
0.979 0.966 0.958 
Autonomy  -0.319 
 
-0.319 0.102 0.102 
Mutuality  0.802 
 
1.002 0.644 1.005 
Trust  0.672 0.653 0.452 0.427 
 
 
The main purpose of a high order structural model is examining relationship 
between latent variables in the model. Factor correlations of latent variables in the 
original Thomson (2001) model and modified model are provided below  
Table:  Inter –Factor correlations for Thomson (model) 
 DM ADM Auto Mutuality Trust Collaboration 
DM 1      
ADM 0.771 1     
Auto -0.250 -0.313 1    
Mutuality 0.629 0.789 -0.256 1   
Trust 0.527 0.660 -0.214 0.539 1  
Collaboration 0.784 0.983 -0.319 0.802 0.672 1 
 
Table Inter –Factor correlations for Modified model  
 
 DM ADM Auto Mutuality Trust Collaboration 
DM 1      
ADM 0.776 1     
Auto -0.253 -0.312 1    
Mutuality 0.795 0.981 -0.320 1   
Trust 0.518 0.639 -0.208 0.655 1  
Collaboration 0.793 0.979 -0.319 1.002 0.653 1 
 
 Comparisons of factor correlations suggest appropriate relationship as per 
expected in the modified model. The negative relationship between autonomy 
 438 
 
indicators and other indicators is expected as per the theory.  The only significant 
finding is covariance between Administration (ADM) and Mutuality is very high 0.98 
suggesting poor discriminant validity. Brown (2006) suggest a correlation score of 
0.85 or greater as sign of poor discriminant validity and that it may be appropriate to 
combine these factors into one.  This higher correlation could have resulted because 
of linking the covariance errors of mutuality indicator and administration indicator as 
factor correlation without linking of the error variance was 0.78  
The validity (parameters estimates) and reliability (R
2
 index) estimates of the 
high order model of collaboration when compared to integrated measurement model, 
does not show any significant variation as seen below  
Table: Parameter estimates of the High order model of collaboration 
 
Indicators  Parameters estimate  Proportion of Variance Explained  
 Original 
Model 
New Model  Original Model  New Model  
DM1 0.67 0.68 0.453 0.47 
DM2 0.67 0.65 0.444 0.43 
ADM1 0.70 0.70 0.489 0.48 
ADM2 0.80 0.80 0.637 0.64 
ADM3 0.89 0.89 0.789 0.79 
ADM4 0.64 0.63 0.407 0.39 
AUTO1 0.19 0.18 0.0345 0.03 
AUTO2 0.53 0.54 0.284 0.289 
AUTO3 0.55 0.84 0.722 0.711 
RES2 0.70 0.64 0.493 0.415 
RES3 0.47 0.36 0.225 0.126 
RES4 0.65  0.426  
RES5 0.47  0.225  
TRUST1 0.77 0.76 0.588 0.57 
TRUST 2 0.97 0.98 0.939 0.96 
Trust 3  0.46  0.214  
 
   The refined model consists of the same five components measuring 
collaboration as in the case of Thomson model (2001) but confirmatory factor 
analysis lead to change in the measurement model.  The refined model is fitting well 
with the data and has strong and significant relationships between dimensions of 
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collaboration. The measurement indicators have acceptable index of validity and 
reliability.  
 
High order Structural Model 
 
 
Appendix 6.3 :  Descriptive Statistics of Collaboration Score of Each 







Collaboration TPA 30 18.80 3.15 11.25 23.75 
Collaboration DA  42 15.51 4.47 6.92 22.25 
Collaboration DKM 43 15.61 4.84 2.42 22.58 














































Appendix 6.5 Collaboration Dimensions between Private and Public 
Sector 
 




Fig  2 Comparison of autonomy between private sector and public sector 
 
 
Fig  3:  Comparison of Administration component of collaboration between 





Fig  4:  Comparison of Mutuality component of collaboration between private 
sector and public sector 
 
Fig  5:  Comparison of Trust component of collaboration between private sector 





















































Collaboration Index of Enrollment 
Network  






Collaboration Index of 
Hospitalization Network  



















































































Appendix 6.8 : Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Enrollment Rate  38 47.50 13.78 14.796 72.55 
Collaboration Index of Enrollment 
Network  
38 4.20 0.91 1.875 5.84 
Infant Mortality  38 52.48 16.93 21.6 83 
Age of Enfoldment Network in months  38 14.76 10.02 4 40 
No of District Rounds of Insurance 
Company  
38 69.61 61.07 3 177 
No of District Rounds of TPA 38 140.61 86.98 13 253 
Premium Rate  38 448.37 103.85 310 721 
Enrollement Round  38 2.87 0.70 1 4 
Hospitalization Rate of Previous Round  36 1.82 1.59 0.4 7.95 
Literacy Rate  38 71.56 10.64 39 88.6 
GDP per Capita  37 27654.95 24319.25 5522 85735 
No of Agencies in enrollement Network  33 5.91 1.53 1 8 
Percentage of Institutional Deliveries  38 39.79 21.46 7.1 87.4 
Percentage of Villages with health 
Committees  
38 22.96 22.01 0 89.47 
Population Density  37 728.95 470.61 46 1882 
Percentage of Births Registered 38 37.89 35.39 5.8 89 
Percentage of women taking ANC care 
from private sector  
37 41.94 19.29 4.3 74.6 
Percentage of Villages with availability of 
a doctor  
37 18.88 13.70 2.2 55.3 
Percentage of households with a BPL 
(Below Poverty Line) card  
37 27.76 11.09 9 50.8 
 
Note: Data is taken from various sources. 
